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Résumé 
Lorsque les aléas naturels se déroulent en catastrophes, les réponses des religieux, de l’Etat, et 
d’autres acteurs puissants dans une société révèlent à la fois les relations complexes entre ces 
parties et leur pouvoir dans la production des espaces auxquelles les survivants accèdent. La 
réponse en cas de catastrophe comprend la création d’espaces post-catastrophes, tels que des 
centres d’évacuation, des logements de transition et des sites de réinstallation permanente, qui 
ciblent spécifiquement un sous-ensemble particulier de survivants, et visent à les aider à survivre, 
à faire face, et à se remettre de la catastrophe. Les acteurs puissants dans une société dirigent les 
processus de secours, de récupération et de reconstruction sont des acteurs puissants qui 
cherchent à problématiser et à rendre un problème technique dans des termes qu’ils sont 
idéalement placés pour aborder à travers une variété d'interventions. 
Ce projet de recherche vise à répondre à la question: où les survivants d'une catastrophe 
reconstruisent-ils leurs vies et leurs moyens de subsistance? Il enquête sur un cas spécifique de la 
migration environnementale dans laquelle des dizaines de milliers d'habitants ont été déplacés de 
façon permanente et temporaire de leurs résidences habituelles après le typhon Sendong à 
Cagayan de Oro, Philippines en 2011. La recherche est basée sur des entretiens avec les acteurs 
puissants et les survivants, des vidéos participatives réalisées par des survivants pauvres urbains, 
et des activités de cartographie. L’étude se fonde sur la théorie féministe, les études de migration, 
les études dans la gouvernementalité, la recherche sur les changements de l’environnement 
planétaire, et les études régionales afin de situer les diverses expériences de la migration dans un 
contexte géographique et historique. 
Cette thèse propose une topographie critique dans laquelle les processus et les pratiques de 
production d’espaces post-catastrophe sont exposés. Parce que l’espace est nécessairement 
malléable, fluide, et relationnelle en raison de l'évolution constante des activités, des conflits, et 
des expériences qui se déroulent dans le paysage, une analyse de l'espace doit être formulée en 
termes de relations sociales qui se produisent dans et au-delà de ses frontières poreuses. En 
conséquence, cette étude explore comment les relations sociales entre les survivants et les acteurs 
puissants sont liées à l’exclusion, la gouvernementalité, la mobilité, et la production des espaces, 
des lieux et des territoires. Il constate que, si les trajectoires de migration de la plupart des 
survivants ont été confinés à l'intérieur des limites de la ville, les expériences de ces survivants et 
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leur utilisation des espaces urbains sont très différentes. Ces différences peuvent être expliquées 
par des structures politiques, économiques, et sociales, et par les différences religieuses, 
économiques, et de genre. En outre, il fait valoir que les espaces post-catastrophe doivent être 
considérés comme des «espaces d’exclusion» où les fiduciaires exercent une rationalité 
gouvernementale. C’est-à-dire, les espaces post-catastrophe prétendument inclusives servent à 
marginaliser davantage les populations vulnérables. Ces espaces offrent aussi des occasions pour 
les acteurs puissants dans la société philippine d'effectuer des interventions gouvernementales 
dans lesquelles certaines personnes et les paysages sont simplifiées, rendues lisibles, et améliorés. 
 
Mots-clés : Migration environnementale, gouvernementalité, exclusion, Philippines, 
catastrophes, aléas naturels, genre, espace, territoire et lieu 
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Abstract 
When natural hazards unfold into disasters, the responses of religious, state, and other trustees 
reveal both the complex relationships among these parties and their power in producing the 
spaces accessed by the survivors. The disaster response includes the creation of post-disaster 
spaces, such as evacuation centres, transitional housing, and permanent resettlement sites, that 
specifically target or appeal to a particular subset of survivors, and aim to help them to survive, to 
cope with, and to recover from the disaster. The trustees directing the processes of disaster relief, 
recovery, and rebuilding are powerful actors who seek to problematise and render technical an 
issue in terms that they are ideally placed to address through a variety of interventions. 
This research project sets out to answer the question: where do the survivors of a disaster rebuild 
their lives and livelihoods? It investigates a specific case of environmental migration in which tens 
of thousands of residents were permanently and temporarily displaced from their usual places of 
residence after Typhoon Sendong in Cagayan de Oro, Philippines in 2011. The research is based 
on interviews with trustees and survivors, participatory videos made by urban poor survivors, and 
mapping activities. The study draws on feminist theory, migration studies, studies in 
governmentality, global environmental change literature, and regional studies to situate diverse 
experiences of migration within a geographical and historical context.  
This dissertation offers a critical topography in which the processes and practices of producing 
post-disaster spaces are exposed. Because space is necessarily malleable, fluid, and relational due 
to the ever-changing activities, conflict, and experiences unfolding in the landscape, any analysis 
of space must be formulated in terms of the social relations occurring within and beyond its 
porous boundaries. Accordingly, this study explores how the social relations among survivors and 
trustees are linked to exclusion, governmentality, mobility, and space- and place-making. It finds 
that although the migration trajectories of most survivors were confined within the city limits, the 
experiences of these survivors and their use of urban spaces were vastly different. These 
differences can be explained by political, economic, and social structures, and by religious, 
economic, and gender differences. Furthermore, it argues that post-disaster spaces are best 
understood as “spaces of exclusion” where trustees exercise a governmental rationality. That is, 
purportedly inclusive post-disaster spaces serve to further marginalise vulnerable populations. 
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These spaces also open opportunities for trustees to carry out governmental interventions in 
which certain people and landscapes are simplified, rendered legible, and improved. 
 
Keywords: Environmental migration, governmentality, exclusion, Philippines, disaster, natural 
hazards, gender, space and place  
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Chapter 1. A case of environmental migration 
Introduction  
On the evening of Friday December 16th 2011, many Cagayaños were celebrating the holiday 
season at Christmas parties all over town. Unaccustomed to severe tropical storms, most Cagayan 
de Oro (CDO) residents had failed to notice or had dismissed the tropical storm weather 
warnings issued earlier that day by the Philippine national weather bureau, PAGASA, as fear-
mongering hyperbole. They reveled, returned home, and fell asleep. Hours later, they awoke to 
the sounds of rushing water and the terrified screams of neighbours. Only then did they realise 
that the great Cagayan River had breached its banks, and was rapidly sweeping people, houses, 
and debris into its torrential waters and carrying them downstream out to sea.  
This was Tropical Storm Washi, locally known as Typhoon Sendong. Never before had the city 
experienced such devastation: 41 of 80 barangays1 were directly affected; 388 people died; 386 
people went missing; 38,071 families were displaced; $19.5 million worth of road, water, and 
power utilities infrastructure were destroyed; and economic losses to the agriculture, fisheries, 
forestry, service, commerce and trade, and industry sectors were $4.9 million (Local government 
unit of Cagayan de Oro (LGU of CDO) 2012).2 On 20 December 2011 Philippine President 
Benigno Aquino III declared a State of National Calamity for the cities of CDO and Iligan 
(Government of the Philippines (GoP) 2011a). The disaster revealed myriad weaknesses – from 
impotent local political leadership and uneven distribution of disaster relief aid to unsafe and 
unenforced zoning laws and precarious livelihoods of many CDO residents. The activities that 
unfolded in the ensuing days, weeks, and months showed the intricate negotiation between the 
survivors of the disaster and the trustees who controlled the access to resources, especially those 
linked to disaster relief and recovery. (The concept of trustee is developed in chapter 2.) The 
disaster and the response to it exposed a city topography in which gender, religious, and class 
dynamics continually produce spaces and places that are experienced very differently by 
individual residents. 
                                                          
1 In the Philippines, a barangay is the smallest administrative unit. It loosely translates to “village.” 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all figures are converted from Philippine pesos into American dollars using 
the average exchange rate from 2012, which according to the Philippine Statistics Authority – National 
Statistical Coordination Board was ₱1 = $0.024 US (PSA-NSCB 2015). 
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Of particular significance to this study is the displacement or migration of the survivors. When 
environmental factors influence the mobility of people away from their habitual residences, either 
temporarily or permanently, such movement is termed “environmental migration” (U.K. 
Government Office for Science (GOS) 2011). Typhoon Sendong is one such example: over 
38,000 households in Cagayan de Oro were temporarily forced from their houses because of 
rising flood waters. Only a portion of these people were granted housing in the official 
permanent off-site relocation sites. Other affected people returned to the sites of their old 
houses, or left permanently for other locations.  
Official aid conduits included government agencies, religious groups, civil society organisations, 
and international humanitarian agencies. These experts or trustees created official spaces of 
disaster relief and recovery. They contributed financial, material, and human resources to alleviate 
the suffering of survivors, to rebuild the local infrastructure and economy, and to support 
survivors in rebuilding their lives and livelihoods. Directly or indirectly, they urged a subset of 
survivors to follow very particular trajectories, along what I call “institutionalised sleeping 
pathways.” The typical pattern is: flooded house site to evacuation camp, to transitional housing 
site, to permanent relocation housing site. Although hundreds of households did follow 
institutionalised pathways, such trajectories were exceptional. Far more survivors forged much 
more complex routes; they supplemented official relief aid with personal assets, personal 
networks, and individual or household initiatives.   
The experiences of survivors in the aftermath of Sendong were highly gendered. In some 
instances, the existing gendered division of labour was amplified, for example when women 
stretched a very limited household budget in the temporary housing sites. In other cases, 
prevailing gender roles were temporarily reshaped, for example as mothers assumed the 
responsibility for securing a resettlement house. The official spaces of disaster relief and recovery 
were profoundly gendered, too. The responses of state and religious trustees to gender-based 
violence in evacuation camps and temporary housing sites, and the isolation of relocation sites in 
CDO’s periphery disproportionately penalised women survivors. Even purportedly inclusive 
official aid spaces reinforced the exclusion of the city’s Muslim population, in particular by 
designing official sleeping spaces inaccessible to veiled Muslim women and by allowing religious 
prejudices to affect relief distribution.   
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The environmental migration after Typhoon Sendong in CDO is an interesting and instructive 
case. It is neither representative of, nor unique among, disasters around the world, or even in the 
Philippine archipelago. Yet, understanding what happened is potentially very useful. The 
perceived inexperience of the city with natural hazards hints at what climate change might bring 
to other areas previously unaccustomed to them. The interventions of religious and state trustees 
in disaster relief and recovery suggest they pursued what James Scott (1998) calls acts of 
simplification with the goal of increasing the legibility of survivors and of the spaces they inhabit 
for the purpose of manipulation. Moreover, the CDO case reveals the importance of pre-existing 
religious prejudices in the failure of official post-disaster spaces. The purported improvement of 
so-called worthy survivors in relocation sites raises practical and ethical questions for politicians 
and practitioners, and, for scholars, theoretical questions about vulnerability, space, place, 
exclusion, and mobility.  
Before describing the academic landscape in which this research is situated, a brief terminological 
note is warranted. In this dissertation, the term “Typhoon Sendong” does not refer strictly to the 
geophysical phenomena associated with this particular tropical storm and the flooding that 
ensued. According to the Saffir-Simpson hurricane wind scale categories, Sendong was not a 
typhoon, it was only as strong as a tropical storm (Manila Observatory 2011). The criteria 
separating tropical storm from typhoon, while useful to meteorologists, are meaningless to the 
people affected by Sendong. For example, a shopkeeper whose micro-business and house were 
swept away in the flood waters wasn’t particularly bothered by technicalities such as the exact 
wind speed that differentiates a tropical storm from a typhoon.3 What mattered was the outcome. 
As such, in this dissertation, the geophysical components of Typhoon Sendong are deemed 
inseparable from its catastrophic impacts on people, and on the social, political, economic, and 
physical environments in which they live their lives. Such an understanding of Typhoon Sendong 
is echoed by Filipinos, and especially Cagayaños, for whom the natural phenomenon of the storm 
and the human devastation are indivisible. When referring exclusively to the geophysical 
components, the official designation for this tropical storm is used: Tropical Storm Sendong. The 
discrepancy between the understanding and prescription of so-called experts or trustees, and that 
                                                          
3 According to the Manila Observatory (2011), the one-minute maximum sustained wind speeds for a 
tropical storm are 63 to 118 kph, and 119 to 153 kph for the lowest intensity typhoon. 
 
 
 4   
 
of the laypeople (i.e. the intended beneficiaries of the former’s knowledge and programs) surfaces 
many times in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. For the remainder of this chapter I situate this 
study as an example of environmental migration best studied through a feminist lens, and then 
provide an outline of the dissertation. 
Environmental migration 
That people move, in part, for environmentally-driven reasons is not a new phenomenon. In fact, 
it has existed for about as long as humans have inhabited the planet as a means for adapting to 
environmental and economic “perturbations,” and for reducing vulnerability (Suhrke 1993, Hugo 
1996, Barnett and Webber 2010, McLeman and Hunter 2010, McLeman 2013).4 What is new, and 
what is likely to be seen in the coming years, is an increase in population mobility that is 
influenced by environmental change and perturbations, and especially by climate change, most of 
which will occur in developing countries (Perch-Nielsen, Bättig and Imboden 2008, McLeman 
and Hunter 2010, GOS 2011, McLeman 2013). Climate-related exposures, for example, will 
affect ecosystem goods and services, water supply, food production, and spread of infectious 
diseases, and may reduce the effectiveness of traditional coping mechanisms or even render them 
maladaptive (Barnett and Webber 2010). The poorest people and poorest countries will be 
disproportionately affected (Barnett and Webber 2010, GOS 2011).  
Migration is but one of a suite of adaptation measures people may pursue in anticipation of or in 
response to environmental “triggers” such as typhoons, famine and industrial pollution. The term 
“adaptation” is conceived differently by migration scholars and by environmental change 
scholars. Migration scholars use the term to discuss the ability of migrants to integrate into 
destination communities, whereas environmental change scholars use it to describe the capacity 
of a system, population or location to adapt to a given exposure (McLeman 2013). Throughout 
this thesis, “adaptation” refers to the latter sense. Environmental “triggers,” however, may have 
                                                          
4 The environmental migration literature typically uses terminology like “perturbations,” “drivers,” 
“targets,” “pressures,” “triggers,” and “factors.” Feminist scholars contend the uncritical use of these 
terms serves patriarchal, capitalist and neoliberal agendas. Such use of language abstracts or naturalises the 
objects being described, thereby suggesting they can be studied outside of the social and that they are not 
human constructs produced through unequal social relations. The use of these terms is minimised, but 
when their inclusion is necessary I have written them inside quotation marks so as to draw attention to 
this limitation in the environmental literature.  
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little or no direct connection with other factors, such as access to social networks and financial 
resources, cultural heritage, and the freedom to migrate legally, that influence the duration and 
destination(s) of migration (McLeman 2013, xii). Migration can be considered an adaptation to 
environmental change in that it can be used to adapt to negative impacts or to take advantage of 
resulting opportunities (McLeman and Smit 2006, Tacoli 2009, Barnett and Webber 2010, 
McLeman and Hunter 2010, Warner 2010, GOS 2011). 
One example of a migration-focused adaptation is the planned relocation of groups of people or 
even entire communities to a predefined location. Since the mid-1990s, planned resettlement has 
occurred in Papua New Guinea, Montserrat, Ethiopia, China and the Maldives, where 
households and entire communities were moved away from areas dealing with sea level rise, 
erosion, volcanic activity, drought, and land degradation (GOS 2011, 175-179, 185). The U.K. 
Government Office for Science’s (2011) report on the future of environment migration argues 
that these experiences reveal the following factors that undergird successful relocation and those 
that hasten failure. Well-resourced, carefully planned relocation is better than haphazard, 
uncoordinated, internal relocation. Relocation funding should be secured before there is an 
immediate need for it, as in the aftermath of a typhoon. Moving agricultural communities from 
one rural area into another is very risky and has a low probability of success. Securing adequate 
and appropriate livelihoods for migrants is very difficult. Relocation organised by the state or by 
another organisation is very costly. People should always have the option to refuse relocation. 
The most resilient policies are the ones that favour individual control over mobility; the least 
resilient ones privilege state control over individual mobility.  
A brief history of environmental migration scholarship 
In the 1980s there was an enormous surge in the volume and breadth of research on the causes 
and impacts of anthropogenic climate change, so it is not surprising that the idea of 
environmental refugees first surfaced in the United Nations Environment Programme in 1985 
(Bates 2002). The concept of environmental migration was based on hypothetical projections and 
worst case scenarios, and not on empirical evidence. Environmental refugee-type research 
succeeded in connecting migration to changes in exposure to environmental phenomena, but 
overlooked the significant effects of adaptation processes, especially those occurring at the 
individual and household levels where most migration decisions are made (McLeman 2013).  
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Stephen Castles (2002), (2010) and the U.K. Government Office for Science (2011) provide 
succinct overviews of the evolution of the environmental migration discourse, the wide 
discrepancies in estimates of the number of affected people, and the debate over how to 
categorise them. Since the mid-1980s, scholars from a range of disciplines have contributed 
diverse empirical studies, allowing for a much more nuanced, but still inadequate, characterisation 
that reflects actual cases. Emerging research came from fields such as natural hazards, global 
change, biology, ecology, climate science, political science and law (McLeman 2013). Migration 
scholars were conspicuously absent. Writing specifically about climate change and migration, 
geographer Robert McLeman (2013, 8) points out that this dearth means “that much of what 
scholars know about the relationship between climate and migration has been developed in 
relative isolation from the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological practices of the broader 
scholarly field of migration research.” A parallel situation exists in the broader environmental 
migration literature. 
In a recent review of empirical work from around the world, Bremner and Hunter (2014) 
highlight four salient features of environmental migration. One, environmental change can be a 
dramatic push factor for migration, but more often, there is a continuum of environmental 
“pressures” (i.e. natural hazards and the disasters they precipitate are the extreme). Two, most 
environmental migrants move voluntarily over short distances, often returning after the 
“pressure” subsides. Three, environmental change may constrain some migrants, and so a focus 
on immobility and trapped populations is urgently needed. Four, environmental change almost 
always interacts with other drivers of migration. In other words, environmental migration is not a 
simple case of stimulus-response. Instead, like every other type of migration, environmental 
migration will be shaped by the interactions of environmental processes with cultural, political 
and social ones (McLeman 2013). Bremner and Hunter (2014) also emphasise that the early 
alarmist projections of massive waves of environmental refugees flooding across international 
borders, threatening the security and sovereignty of states (cf. Homer-Dixon 1994, UNHCR, 
IOM et al. 2009), have been discredited as hyperbolic fantasy (cf. McLeman 2011, GOS 2011). 
Today, researchers of environmental migration issues are urged to study the linkages among 
climate change, migration and food security issues; the trapped and immobile populations in the 
context of environmental change and; the classed, racialised, and gendered aspects of climate 
change and migration (GOS 2011, McLeman 2013). It is the latter call that this study addresses. 
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To critically investigate the classed, racialised, and gendered aspects of a case of environmental 
migration, this research project draws upon feminist approaches to migration. 
Migration through a feminist lens 
Gender and migration scholars underline the inadequacy of mainstream migration theories, 
whose ideas inform environmental migration discourses. One of the earliest critiques targeted the 
persistent invisibility of women. Over decades of engaging in migration debates, feminist scholars 
shifted academic debates away from the omnipresent male standard. Prior to the 1970s, most 
migration research assumed women were passive companions (Pessar and Mahler 2003), who 
“followed merely as appendages to the career aspirations of the male partner” (Raghuram and 
Kofman 2004, 96), and were thus denied the possibility of agency (Gaetano and Yeoh 2010). At 
the time most research was focused on economic and labour-based explanations for migration. 
By assuming men and women equally valued higher wages, and by restrictively defining work as 
paid productive work in the public sphere, this research effectively silenced women’s migratory 
experiences, and left uninvestigated the role of household dynamics, reproductive activities and 
gender relations in migratory processes (Lawson 1998), even though women made up nearly half 
of all international migrants (Hunter and Davis 2009). In the 1970s and 80s, feminist scholars 
tried correcting these omissions with an add-and-stir approach of inserting women’s experiences 
into dominant narratives (Pessar and Mahler 2003). The focus on women became so pronounced 
that the male migrant almost disappeared from migration studies. The response to this swing was 
the emergence of a gender and migration approach, which prevailed from the late 1980s until the 
early 90s. It sought to reveal how gender differentiated men’s and women’s experiences in 
migration and how gender relations shifted in the process of migration. The current approach of 
feminist migration scholars is to situate gender as a constitutive element of migration, where 
gender is understood to operate in a myriad of institutional, political and economic structures, to 
intersect with other forms of inequality, and to permeate practices, identities, expectations and 
institutions at a variety of scales (Parreñas 2009, Gaetano and Yeoh 2010, Roulleau-Berger 2010).  
To be a useful analytical tool, gender is best conceived as a situated social difference and 
inequality that is located between and within groups of women and men with material 
consequences, and that operates as both a contested social process and structure. Gender is 
manifested materially in everyday practices, ideas and representations, which reflect power 
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relations between men and women, and within groups of women and of men (Wickramasinghe 
2005). Hence, gender encompasses both social difference and social inequality; Parreñas (2009) 
fiercely defends that the latter should be the principal framing to avoid inadvertently accepting 
difference or inequality as natural or inevitable. The tangible outcomes of gender are best 
understood when gender is conceived as both a social process and a structure. Theorising gender 
as a process implies that social differences are necessarily created, revised and repeated to 
reproduce or dispute hierarchies of power and privilege (Pessar and Mahler 2003). Treating 
gender as a process is conducive to a praxis-oriented approach of debunking the myth of the 
naturalness and inevitability of gender differences by interrogating fluid gender identities, 
relations and ideologies (Pessar and Mahler 2003). Such a process, however, does not occur 
within a vacuum. As such, gender should be simultaneously imagined as a structure, or a 
scaffolding, of social relationships that allocates and organises power beyond the reach of an 
individual. 
Mainstream migration discourses and practices do not incorporate such an understanding of 
gender. Instead, they tend to indiscriminately equate “gender” with a biologically-based definition 
of “sex,” which can overlook the voices of marginalised men, limit gender relations to male-
female relations, and ignore major underlying structural issues (Cornwall 2003).  
Dominant approaches are similarly impoverished by their simplistic definition of migration. 
Migration is typically conceived as a discrete event in which one or more person(s) move(s) over 
a certain distance for a certain period of time (Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson 1998). Such a 
portrayal is problematic because it overemphasises economic and geopolitical forces precipitating 
the migration event, thereby implicitly inscribing masculinist assumptions about the nature and 
significance of migration (Kofman 2004, Silvey 2005). It neglects the practical role of migration 
as a pressing social justice issue insofar as migration policies dictate who is controlled, and how 
(Crosby 2006), and as a livelihood strategy, in particular for livelihood diversification and 
household security (Caces, Arnold et al. 1985, Hunter and Davis 2009) in the context of global 
environmental change (GOS 2011, Bremner and Hunter 2014).  
Mainstream approaches cannot adequately address the complex stratification and interaction of 
gender, class and race (Kofman 2004). The example of Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. underscores 
the potential for these inequalities to impart devastating impacts when a natural hazard occurs in 
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a locale with an uneven distribution of risk and vulnerability. The variation in the social inequality 
landscape of New Orleans far surpassed that observed in the physical landscape. Entitlements to 
health care, clean food and water, safe and livable neighbourhoods, social networks, 
transportation, capital and political representation were highly differentiated (Cutter 2006). The 
city’s topographical gradients mirrored its class, race, ethnic, age and gender gradients: the 
wealthy had access to cars, credit cards and insurance plans; African-American and other ethnic 
enclaves were located in some of the most hazard-prone areas; insurance cheques were delayed 
for female-headed households who did not fit their insurer’s narrow definition of family (Smith 
2006, Hunter and Davis 2009). The social systems that had produced such unequal exposure to 
risk increased the likelihood that a disaster would affect certain people more than others, and 
these disparities reflected the city’s power hierarchies (Bankoff 2006). As the relief and 
reconstruction efforts after Hurricane Katrina tragically demonstrated, disasters do not obliterate 
social differences but instead further entrench pre-existing social oppression and exploitation 
(Smith 2006).  
Finally, feminist scholars reject the binary theoretical perspectives characteristic of dominant 
migration research. Mainstream approaches reinforce gendered dichotomies of public/private, 
male/female, skilled/unskilled, agentive/reactive, permanent/temporary, global/local and 
production/reproduction in explaining complex migratory flows (Kofman 2004, Gaetano and 
Yeoh 2010, Roulleau-Berger 2010).  Even a heroes/victims discourse is problematic insofar as it 
eliminates a wider spectrum of migrant identities (Gaetano and Yeoh 2010). The static categories 
of “men” and “women” used in these approaches obscure the causes of diverse mobility patterns 
and the consequences of migration on migrants and their networks (Lawson 1998), while strict 
classification schemes (and immigration rules) that limit migratory moves to a single category (e.g. 
labour, family reunification, asylum) oversimplify actual migratory decisions combining work, 
career and marriage aspirations (Kofman 2004). The binaries are damaging; whether a person is 
categorised as “legal” or “illegal,” or as an “immigrant” or a “refugee” has (un)intended, and in 
some cases, dangerous and marginalising consequences when used as a means of control or 
restricting access to resources and services (Crosby 2006). 
The rejection of mainstream paradigms does not infer a refusal of all insights, methodologies and 
theorisations associated with them, only that there is a need for alternative approaches to better 
 
 
 10   
 
account for different experiences. Feminist scholars offer several options. A useful starting point 
is to reframe migration as a social process embedded in other social processes simultaneously 
reflecting and reinforcing the existing social order, political processes, cultural norms and power 
differentials (Silvey 2004, 2005, Piper 2006, Roulleau-Berger 2010). Roulleau-Berger (2010, 10, 
my translation)5 proposes a revision of migration categories to better explain the myriad of 
migratory situations in which women’s life journeys are “multipolar, transnational and 
oscillating.” Unlike mainstream theoretical frameworks in which classification is aimed at 
simplifying migration into departure-arrival, settlement-return, temporary-permanent or other 
binaries, her classification scheme insists upon maintaining the complexity inherent in migration.  
A troubling of scale is important, too. Scale can refer to either spatial or temporal boundaries and 
is often defined for “a particular issue and for particular purposes” (Cash and Moser 2000, 110). 
By extensively exploring scale, its construction and operation, feminist migration scholarship 
destabilises the gender-neutral approach of conventional migration research and its uncontested 
assumption of the primacy of certain scales (e.g. region, nation). Scale is socially constructed 
through sociospatial hierarchies and political, gendered and racial processes, privileging specific 
identities while excluding others (Silvey 2004, Hays-Mitchell 2008). Migration highlights different 
temporal, spatial and analytical scales, such as the body, household, region, nation-state, 
supranational organisation, among others. When people migrate, they bring with them social and 
cultural norms, they develop new social ties, and they send remittances home in the form of 
money, knowledge and skills (Bailey 2010). Gender constraints in the sending area are often 
replaced by a new set in the receiving area; for example, gender constraints operating at the 
national level in the sending area may be absent at the national level in the receiving area but 
present at the household level (Parreñas 2009, Roulleau-Berger 2010). Gender is part of each 
exchange, and so gendered social norms and constructs are circulated in the migration process at 
various spatial and temporal scales (Pratt 2004, Hunter and Davis 2009, Bailey 2010).  
A scalar approach to investigating migration is akin to looking through a kaleidoscope, gently 
shifting between coarse and fine scales, trying to perceive how each picture is related to another. 
Investigating multiples scales and the interactions between them can reveal relational linkages 
                                                          
5 The original text reads “multipolaires, transnationales, pendulaires aussi à certains moments” (Roulleau-
Berger 2010, 10). 
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hidden from single scale studies; for example, turning the kaleidoscope around the national scale 
can illustrate connections among bodies, households and the transnational sphere (Silvey 2004, 
Wright 2014). Interrogating scales reveals how the female migrant is constructed in departure, 
transit and arrival spaces, all of which produce differentiated inequalities. Roulleau-Berger (2010, 
152, my translation6) explains, 
At each stage of migration, women place themselves or are placed in a social space or 
order, differentially constructed depending on societal contexts. At each stage, men and 
women in migration change places in societies uniquely stratified as a result of the 
political, social and economic histories of countries. But, depending on the economic, 
cultural or political gaps among the different societal contexts, inequalities can be 
amplified or reduced along the migratory journey.  
Hence, scales do not exist in isolation. With increased mobility of people, goods, ideas and 
institutions comes increased connectedness of scales from the body to the transnational space, 
and even the ability to bypass or jump scales (Bailey 2010), for example when global trade 
policies have material impacts on the households and even the bodies of Mexican maquiladora 
workers (Wright 2014). Investigating multiples scales and the interactions between them can thus 
reveal relational linkages hidden from single scale analyses (Pratt and Yeoh 2003, Silvey 2004). 
Two additional alternatives to the dominant migration discourses merit a brief mention here. 
Pessar and Mahler’s (2003, 818) update of their gendered geographies of power framework is 
designed to analyse people’s social agency “given their own initiative as well as their positioning 
within multiple hierarchies of power operative within and across many terrains” in transnational 
spaces. It highlights the organisation of gender in migration as a process that (re)produces social 
differences. According to the model, a person’s ability to act (e.g. the types and degrees of their 
agency) depends on scales such as the state, body and family and on their social location within 
fluid hierarchies of race, class, sexuality, ethnicity and gender. Gaetano and Yeoh (2010, 2-3) 
                                                          
6 The original text reads:  
À chaque étape migratoire, les femmes se placent ou sont placées dans un espace social ou dans 
un ordre de reconnaissance construit différemment selon les contextes sociétaux. Les hommes et 
les femmes en migration changent de place à chaque étape dans les sociétés stratifiées 
différemment en fonction des histoires politiques, sociales et économiques des pays. Mais selon 
les écarts économiques, culturels ou politiques entre les différents contextes sociétaux, les 
inégalités multisituées peuvent s’amplifier ou se réduire au cours des étapes migratoires (Roulleau-
Berger 2010, 154). 
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articulate an inclusive theoretical framework that best applies to the analysis of gendered 
mobilities in the Philippines: 
[It] carefully analyses how gender intersects with the global and regional political 
economy; transnational institutions, legal frameworks, and social movements; state policy 
and citizenship practices; labour markets, labour processes, and the migration industry; 
households and family structure and relations; cultural and social norms in sending and 
receiving societies; and individual women’s desires, goals, strategies and activisms. [It] 
considers how gender intersects with other axes of identification such as nationality, 
ethnicity or race rural or urban, class, kinship, and sexuality to shape migrants’ 
experiences and relations with sending and host societies. Moreover, [it] explores the 
complex ways that migrant women actively accommodate, reinforce, resist and otherwise 
engage with these gendered institutions, processes and ideas, as individuals and 
collectives.  
Hence, scholars should embrace complexity in deconstructing gendered binaries and in exposing 
the institutions that construct them and strip away women’s agency. 
What is lacking in much of the gender and migration literature is the integration of environmental 
considerations. Environmental and global change factors are essential in any theoretical analysis 
of gender and migration because livelihood strategies, including migration, are shaped by 
environmental factors that interact with gendered labour processes and the household division of 
labour (Hunter and Davis 2009, Willis 2010). For example, climate change and shifts in the 
availability and quality of proximate natural resources and agricultural potential may differentially 
shape both the causes and consequences of migration by gender. A decline in natural resource-
based livelihood options can shape patterns of outmigration, especially in developing countries 
where environmental change has immediate and direct impacts on livelihood options and on the 
health and well-being of millions of people.  
The neglect of environmental factors in the gender and migration literature is problematic, but 
unsurprising. It is unsurprising because migration scholarship and environmental migration 
scholarship evolved as distinct non-overlapping fields, and has been developed by researchers in 
different disciplines (McLeman 2013). It is problematic because environmental factors are also 
gendered. This is especially true for natural hazards and the disasters they catalyse. Women, for 
instance, are three times more likely to die in disasters than men, although mortality rates by sex 
differ according to type of disaster and risk-taking behaviour (Hunter and David 2009, 18). 
Deadlier experiences for women are not due to biology (e.g. strength, size, physical capabilities) 
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but to socially produced gender relations. Gender-based cultural factors also shape immobility, 
and sometimes are a hurdle separating the intention to evacuate and the capacity to evacuate. In 
flood situations, for example, women took risks more seriously and evacuated earlier than men 
but were less able to evacuate than men once the floods were well underway because their 
caregiver role made it impossible for them to escape with their children (Hunter and David 
2009). Such situations create trapped populations, which are disproportionately female. In the 
immediate aftermath of disaster, women often experience extra economic, domestic, social and 
personal burdens, and face increased domestic violence and sexual demands (Delica 1998). At the 
same time, they may also find that new gendered opportunities have opened up for them, which 
may have long-lasting impacts on gender relations (Delica 1998, Enarson 2000). Integrating 
environmental factors into a feminist study of environmental migration is thus imperative. 
Research questions 
The central research question guiding this dissertation is seemingly simple: where do survivors 
rebuild their lives and livelihoods after a disaster? An exhaustive list of locations accompanied by 
their geographic coordinates, however, is not what I’m after. The “where” component is much 
more nuanced. In asking, “where do survivors go?” I seek to analyse post-disaster spaces – their 
characteristics and meanings, the connections they have with other spaces, the way they are 
shaped. Post-disaster spaces are spaces that specifically target or appeal to a particular subset of 
survivors, and aim – in some way – to help them to survive, to cope with, and to recover from 
the disaster. This question segues into the equally important question of “where do survivors not 
go?” which begs for an explanation of forced exclusion or voluntary immobility. Embedded in 
the “rebuilding their lives” part of the research question is the assumption that lives were in some 
way “broken” or severely disrupted by Typhoon Sendong, and that these lives are indeed 
“rebuilt.” This component requires an unpacking of both the explicit and implicit objectives of all 
implicated actors, as well as the actual processes and outcomes (both intended and unintended) 
of the rebuilding. In this way, a simple “where” research question is also layered with questions 
of what, why, how, and for whom. 
Three research objectives further tease apart the overarching research question. They are: (1) to 
characterise vulnerable survivors, (2) to map their post-disaster routes in the short and medium 
term, (3) to evaluate the roles of trustees and vulnerable survivors in shaping post-disaster spaces. 
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A brief note on terminology is required here. As feminist migration scholars have argued, 
definitional issues have very real implications on the lives of migrants. This dissertation refers to 
the people directly affected by Typhoon Sendong as “survivors” and “victims.” Unless otherwise 
indicated, a survivor is someone who was physically present in a location affected by the tropical 
storm on 16-17 December 2011, and who was obliged to leave that location temporarily or 
permanently. A victim is someone who died or went missing during or as a result of the tropical 
storm. These terms accurately describe the people affected by Sendong, and their situations, 
while still leaving open the possibility of analysing alternative discourses advanced by trustees.  
Other possible terms, including “environmental refugee,” “environmental migrant,” “internally 
displaced person,” and “bakwit,” were rejected for a variety of reasons. Using “environmental” as 
a descriptor is misleading because no single factor, event or process inevitably produces 
migration. Indeed, while environmental change may be a proximate catalyst of migration, the 
impetus to migrate or not is often deeply embedded in underlying and interacting social, 
economic, political, cultural and personal factors (Lonergan 1998, McLeman and Smit 2006, 
Boano, Zetter and Morris 2008, McAdam 2009, Barnett and Webber 2010, McAdam 2011a).  
Many communities in Mindanao, the large Philippine island in which Cagayan de Oro is located, 
use the term bakwit to describe displaced people; its literal translation is “to evacuate” (Canuday 
2009, 1). The bakwit are usually portrayed as helpless, evoking an image of “a throng of people 
burdened by heavy loads, trudging away from some strife-torn countryside” (Canuday 2009, 1). 
Although bakwit has Mindanao roots and offers the possibility of looking beyond pejorative 
stereotypes to see the power of the displaced (cf. Canuday 2009), it is inappropriate for this 
research project. Bakwit is associated with the war in Mindanao and the people directly impacted 
by the conflict, and not with the people living outside the war zone affected by natural hazards.  
The challenge of labelling is further complicated by political, colloquial and organisational 
meanings. The term “refugee” has a very specific and narrow definition enshrined in international 
law; the definition does not include environmental factors as a form of persecution (Kniveton, 
Schmidt-Verkerk et al. 2008, Wahlström 2011, McAdam 2011b, 2011c). Colloquially, “refugee” 
connotes an image of limited choices, forced mobility, minimal agency, but conferring of legal 
protection through the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Prior to the adoption 
of the Refugee Convention, the term “refugee” was widely used as a generic term for forced 
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migration, even in government documents (McLeman 2013). The term “migrant” has no 
internationally agreed upon legal definition. It is usually associated with agency, choice, and 
voluntary, planned mobility; for instance, people following job opportunities or loved ones are 
classified as “economic migrants” or “family reunification migrants,” respectively. On the other 
hand, displacement insinuates forced or unplanned mobility with limited choice; for example, 
people forced from their homes due to violence, war, famine, natural hazards who do not cross 
international borders are called “internally displaced persons” (IDPs). Like refugees, IDPs may be 
afforded certain protections, but only if the IDPs’ home country has agreed to implement the 
voluntary United Nations guiding principles on internal displacement (OCHA 2004). Furthermore, there 
are currently no internationally agreed upon legal definitions for “environmental migrant,” 
“environmental refugee” or “environmentally displaced person” (Black 2001, Betts 2011). Given 
the disparate political, colloquial and organisational meanings of refugee, migrant and IDP labels, 
and their mismatch with the CDO case, the best descriptors of the Sendong-affected people are 
thus “survivors” and “victims.” 
Outline of the dissertation 
The dissertation is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 2 presents theoretical concepts that 
help in critically interrogating migration. Briefly, these concepts construct migration as (1) a 
process that alters space, place and exclusion, (2) an avenue for exercising governmentality, and 
(3) mobility which can compress space-time or the distance separating an individual from desired 
resources. These concepts form the basis of the conceptual framework guiding this thesis. The 
chapter also introduces the trustees who shape migration. 
Chapter 3 delves into political, historical, geographical, social, cultural elements that help explain 
the settlement and growth of Cagayan de Oro (CDO), and the trustees who play salient roles in 
post-disaster efforts. It is a selective history of CDO up to, and including, Tropical Storm 
Sendong. The chapter is based on official reports, newspaper articles, eye witness accounts and 
scholarly research. Chapter 3 and subsequent analytical chapters find that the aftermath of 
Typhoon Sendong was neither anomalous nor unpredictable, but was instead an example of the 
continuity of the power of the Catholic Church and the state in the Philippines.  
The methodology chapter articulates the research process – from conception to final analysis – as 
a process of becoming. Chapter 4 is inspired by the calls of feminist geographers to question how 
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the researcher’s positionality, power and the constructed boundaries of the field all affect the 
research process. The writing style of this chapter reinforces the chapter content (i.e. the 
underlying messy, disruptive, rewarding, and emotional aspects of developing and writing up a 
research project, and of conducting fieldwork with a family). Foregrounding the intersection of 
research and family life in the research process is not a thinly veiled mommy blog. Rather, it 
justifies using particular methods over others, and illustrates how methodology-related decisions 
were rooted in family-related factors. The chapter deals with the specifics of accompanied 
fieldwork, data construction methods, data interpretation methods, and study limitations.  
The following three chapters present the research results. Chapter 5 analyses vulnerability in 
CDO, in the particular context of the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. It argues that vulnerability 
is not natural, but is instead a function of constructed economic, political, social and cultural 
elements that form societal structures, which necessarily interact with environmental factors. It 
shows that in selecting the beneficiaries for their disaster relief, recovery and rebuilding efforts, 
trustees typically single out particular demographics or identify people with particular indicators 
of vulnerability. These approaches do not encapsulate all the different types of people who lie 
along the vulnerability continuum. The chapter ends with an analysis of the vulnerability 
discourses that inform and shape post-disaster efforts.  
Chapter 6 offers a critical topography of post-Sendong CDO. It maps the trajectories of 
survivors and the specific places where they rebuild their lives and livelihoods. The chapter draws 
heavily on Hall, Hirsch and Li’s (2011) Powers of exclusion to articulate the exclusionary character of 
post-disaster spaces. The analysis of post-disaster spaces emphasises the extent to which the 
vulnerability approaches and vulnerability discourses laid out in Chapter 5 rely upon the powers 
of exclusion. Together, the approaches, narratives and powers of exclusion combine to produce 
profoundly gendered post-disaster spaces where power hierarchies are reinscribed, gender roles 
are remade and pre-existing prejudices are perpetuated.  
Chapter 7 posits CDO’s post-disaster spaces are spaces for reconstruction where time-space is 
stretched out for the majority of residents. The intended long-term products of the 
reconstruction processes are permanent resettlement sites and purportedly “improved” people; 
these spaces and the people who live there reflect what each actor envisions as an improved 
society. Simplified and legible resettlement sites receptive to governmental interventions are 
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contrasted with the impenetrable, illegible slum communities to which many survivors belonged 
pre-Sendong. Put another way, this case of environmental migration is also a case of 
governmentality; the trustees shaping official post-disaster spaces aimed to conduct the conduct 
of others. The chapter engages with James Scott’s (1998) Seeing like a state and Tania Murray Li’s 
(2007a) The will to improve.  
The final chapter synthesises the preceding chapters, highlights the study’s main contributions 
and limitations, and suggests notable areas for future research. In doing so, it reframes 
environmental migration as a (re)making of spaces, places and people at the sites of people’s old 
homes, their new homes, and everywhere in-between.  
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Chapter 2. Theorising post-disaster spaces and places 
Introduction 
Which spaces do survivors access and avoid, and which spaces are they excluded from in the 
process of rebuilding their lives and livelihoods after a disaster? Who else is there or not there? 
What explains their presence or absence? Why is each space uniquely experienced as distinct 
places by different people or even by the same person over time? This chapter provides a 
theoretical basis for applying these questions to the post-disaster trajectories of Sendong 
survivors. 
To answer these questions, this chapter reaches beyond the environmental migration literature. A 
growing body of empirical environmental migration studies informs the research design of this 
project and especially the methodology; for example in selecting appropriate questions, and in 
identifying and locating potential interviewees. This literature also usefully characterises 
environmental migration as typically short distance, voluntary, return-oriented, linked to pre-
existing or structural vulnerabilities, a response to a continuum of “environmental pressures,” 
and almost always interacting with other “drivers of migration” (GOS 2011, McLeman 2013, 
Bremner and Hunter 2014). This chapter delves into other theoretical concepts that help in 
critically interrogating migration. Briefly, these concepts construct migration as (1) a process that 
alters space and place, (2) an avenue for exercising governmentality, and (3) mobility which can 
compress space-time or the distance separating an individual from desired resources. 
Chapter 2 is organised into three parts. Part I contends that space and place are inextricably 
linked to social relations, which are differentially experienced by individuals and groups at 
particular moments in time. These social relations are necessarily influenced by political, social, 
historical, economic, environmental, and other factors that result in an unequal distribution of 
power and, of particular relevance to this study, control over mobility. Although people with 
varying access to mobility may temporally or spatially share given locales, each individual’s 
experience and interpretation of these places will necessarily be unique. Moreover, the inequality 
in social relations unfolding in these locales yields a simultaneous multiplicity of spaces, which are 
produced through myriad social processes occurring and structures existing above the scale of the 
individual within and beyond the boundaries of a given space. In other words, no two people had 
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identical conceptions of post-disaster spaces in Cagayan de Oro (CDO); each person had their 
own unique experiences of post-disaster places. 
Part II examines government in the Foucauldian sense of “the conduct of conduct.” It includes a 
discussion of power, informed by critical studies, and especially by feminist studies. The section 
studies the experts or trustees who “problematise” and “render technical” particular issues (Li 
2007a), so that they can “manipulate” (Scott 1998), or exert a “will to improve” (Li 2005, 2007a, 
2007b). It also identifies the objects of governance; although diverse people and landscapes are 
subject to manipulation or improvement, the discussion here focuses on vulnerable people 
because the relevance to the CDO case. 
Finally, because this research project is a case of environmental migration in which trustees 
attempt to govern vulnerable people, particular attention will be paid to mobility and time-space 
compression in part III. Individuals and groups who can initiate and control their mobility 
benefit from a compression of time-space because their hypermobility reduces the temporal and 
spatial distance between them and desired resources (Massey 1994). In some cases, these 
hypermobile elites can diminish the mobility of others, and effectively stretch out the latter’s 
experience of time-space, making it harder for them to access resources.  
Space, place and exclusion 
The concepts of space and place are intrinsic to a geographical study investigating where 
survivors go in the aftermath of a disaster. Understanding the constructed, dynamic character of 
space and place helps to situate the objectives of and actions occurring within official post-
disaster spaces such as evacuation camps, transitional housing sites and permanent relocation 
sites, and to explain the various roles played by different groups of people at these sites. 
While space and place are sometimes used interchangeably, geographers distinguish between the 
two concepts. In conventional geography, place is a unique bounded entity within which a person 
can undergo a subjective, meaningful and emotional experience; space is usually couched in 
abstract, geometrical, locational and objective terms such as distance, latitude and longitude 
(Bondi and Davidson 2005). Space is portrayed as general and impersonal, whereas place is 
portrayed as particular, authentic, localised and intertwined with everyday relations (Taylor and 
Flint 2000). Such conceptualisations are built on the erroneous assumption that space and place 
are static (Massey 1994).  
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Echoing Massey, many feminist geographers reject the assertion that spaces and places are fixed, 
neutral, separate from social and spatial processes, and impervious to social categories such as 
sexuality, race and gender (Staeheli and Martin 2000, Silvey 2004, Bondi and Davidson 2005). 
They reject any suggestion of disembodied objectivity, and offer alternative characterisations. 
They emphasise the malleability of space and place over time due to ever-changing activities, 
conflict and experiences unfolding in the landscape (Staeheli and Martin 2000). Massey (1994) 
argues that concepts of space and place must be formulated in terms of social relations, which are 
themselves constantly shifting, and so space and place are necessarily dynamic. Space occurs 
above the scale of the individual; it encompasses “the broader network of relations and processes 
that connect places with each other” (Staeheli and Martin 2000, 141). These networks connect 
“all spatial scales from the most local level to the most global” (Massey 1994, 264). Massey (1994, 
264) insists that space and time are inseparable and that “space is not static, nor time spaceless 
[… because] neither can be conceptualized as the absence of the other.”  
Places, contend Staeheli and Martin (2000, 140), are uniquely experienced by each individual, and 
are “contested, multiple, layered, subject to shifting and porous boundaries, and constructed in 
relation to systems of power, including economic relations, racialization, ethnicity, and gender.” 
The unique experiences of each individual, stemming from their different experiences and 
interpretations of social relations, produce multiple identities of a place and a “simultaneous 
multiplicity of spaces” (Massey 1994, 3). The particularity of a place derives “not from some long 
internalized history but [from] the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of 
relations, articulated together at a particular locus” (Massey 1993, 66 in Li 2007a, 28). In other 
words, the identity of a place is constructed through its openness to “movement, communication 
and social relations which always stretched beyond it” (Massey 1994, 170). Massey (1994) notes 
that most places are hubs of social relations and interconnections from within and that stretch 
beyond the boundary of a locality. In other words, place is necessarily extra-local and border-
crossing.  
In her critique of American urban planning in The death and life of great American cities, Jane Jacobs 
(1961) offers an understanding of borders that will prove salient to the discussion of post-disaster 
spaces in subsequent chapters. To Jacobs (1961, 257), a border is any “perimeter of a single 
massive or stretched-out use of territory.” Borders exist at many scales, including within cities or 
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even within the neighbourhoods that people encounter in their everyday lives. Jacobs dismisses 
the characterisation of the border as passive object, arguing instead that it actively exerts 
influence through its mere existence. Borders are inevitably destructive; the blandness and 
emptiness of a border around a single primary use area kills diversity, discourages people from 
visiting the area and makes streets unsafe, which, in turn, reduces areas to “fragmented, self-
isolated neighborhoods or backwaters” (Jacobs 1961, 259). As we’ll see in Chapters 6 and 7, the 
single “stretched-out use of territory” for resettlement housing is already turning relocation sites 
into “fragmented, self-isolated neighborhoods or backwaters.” Yet, at the same time, relocation 
sites are not fenced in, their borders deliberately left ambiguous. 
In the broader context of migration, feminist research positions borders – usually national 
borders – as the subject of inquiry. Operating between social subjects and places, “the border is a 
‘meeting place’ of a tangled network of uneven social and economic relations, environmental 
circumstances, and ecosystemic limitations, all of which are constructed on a far larger scale than 
the place itself” (Di Chiro 2005, 511). They are complex, contradictory and transient (Staeheli and 
Martin 2000), and political, deliberate and imposed (Crosby 2006). They exclude certain people 
yet are porous to capital (Kofman 2004, Silvey 2004, Pellerin 2004a, 2004b, 2005, Mountz 2011). 
They are produced through gendered relationships of power (Staeheli and Martin 2000). Hence, 
borders must be conceptualised as simultaneously form and function (Pellerin 2004b). Managing 
borders is fundamental to current debates on citizenship, human rights, democracy, economic 
development and transborder cooperation (Pellerin 2004b). Indeed, Crosby (2006) points out 
that the term “migration policy” is a euphemism for containment policy or population control 
policy. Therefore, asking questions about the social and political making and remaking of borders 
challenges dominant discourse and uncovers underlying assumptions and power relations that 
sustain their taken-for-grantedness (Silvey 2005). Borders, of course, also connote exclusion.  
Powers of Exclusion 
In their book Powers of exclusion: land dilemmas in Southeast Asia, Derek Hall, Philip Hirsch and Tania 
Murray Li (2011) examine the processes and actors implicated in land exclusion in rural Southeast 
Asia, arguing that the interaction of regulation, force, the market and legitimation can largely 
explain exclusion. The authors define exclusion as “the ways in which people are prevented from 
benefiting from things (more specifically, land)” (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 7, emphasis in original). 
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The opposite of exclusion is thus “access” and not “inclusion.” There are three main processes 
of exclusion: (1) the ways in which already-existing access to land is maintained by the exclusion 
of other potential users; (2) the ways in which people who have access lose it; and (3) the ways in 
which people who lack access are prevented from getting it (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 7-8). Hall, 
Hirsch and Li’s (2011) approach recognises that exclusion is inherent in all land use. Despite its 
conventional framing as a negative condition or process imposed on the weak, “all political 
perspectives on land relations – from the most conservative to the most radical – take some types 
of exclusion to be positive” (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 4). For example, a rice farmer may prevent 
construction workers from building houses on her land, thereby ensuring she has a paddy to 
cultivate. Exclusion is thus normal, inevitable, and desirable. Yet, exclusion is not a random 
process, nor does it occur on a level playing field. It is structured by uneven power relations and 
creates both security and insecurity.  
Four so-called “powers of exclusion” – namely, regulation, force, the market and legitimation – 
interact to facilitate and hinder access to land (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011). These societal 
constructs often remain anonymous and faceless, are not the sole purview of the state, and are 
not strictly defined as a “who.” The first exclusionary power, regulation, refers to the state and 
legal instruments that set rules about access to land and the conditions of use. Regulation consists 
of prohibitions and requirements, as well as positive incentives to promote or reduce certain 
behaviours, all of which may prove effective. As a result, “ ‘fuzzy’ zones of compromise, 
accommodation and bribery are the rule rather than the exception” (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 
16). Force is at the heart of regulation. Sanctions ultimately come down to force. Even the threat 
of force by state or non-state actors can be very effective; “[t]he possession of means of violence, 
then, can create a climate in which force acts quite effectively without ever being used” (Hall, 
Hirsch and Li 2011, 17). The market limits access by price and creation of incentives to lay more 
individualised claims to land. The market is underpinned by regulation, force and legitimation. 
Legitimation provides the moral basis for exclusion claims, and entrenching the market, 
regulation and force as politically and socially acceptable bases for exclusion. It is powerful and 
never opposed. As Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011, 196) explain,  
Legitimation, finally, is vital to exclusion. It has a power in itself, in that at times people 
will relinquish or allow claims to land on the basis of the compelling power of discourses 
of right and wrong. But it also provides the indispensable normative underpinnings to 
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rules, right to buy and sell, and violence that makes them seem legitimate, or in some 
cases, makes them so much more a natural order of things that they are not up for debate 
or analysis.  
Legitimation emerges from discourses of development, modernity, civilisation and ambient 
environmentalism. In addition to the four powers of exclusion on which they concentrate their 
analyses, Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011, 197) identify four other powers, namely “environmental 
change, growth in and control over knowledge and technologies that influence both the 
incentives for new forms of exclusion and capacities for monitoring and enforcement, political 
relationships and alliances, and inertia.” 
While the book largely focuses on conflict over land in rural Southeast Asia, the eight powers of 
exclusion provide helpful heuristics for analysing post-Sendong spaces. Hall, Hirsch and Li’s 
(2011) framework helps in dissecting the processes of creating and controlling post-disaster 
spaces in an urban environment, and in understanding the people and the organisations who 
employ powers of exclusion to intervene in post-disaster spaces, and facilitate and constrain 
access to them. 
The will to govern 
Access to post-disaster spaces is important for many reasons. For instance, post-disaster spaces 
offer shelter and basic goods needed by people whose houses, their contents, and even loved 
ones were swept out to sea. Of greater interest to this study, however, are the strategic 
opportunities to govern in post-disaster spaces. The will to govern is variously motivated by 
desires to maintain, change or improve upon the status quo, and to manipulate or improve 
people, landscapes and societal structures. Actually shapinging the behaviour of others necessarily 
entails unequal power relations among those who control post-disaster spaces, those intended to 
be controlled in them, and those who are excluded from them. The “who” can be individuals, 
groups, and institutions, or it can be the more intangible forces that Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011) 
call “the powers of exclusion.” 
Governmentality 
French philosopher Michel Foucault is credited with shaping how we understand government 
and what it mean to govern. Timothy Mitchell (2006, 179) explains that for Foucault,  
the word [government] refers not to the institutions of the state, but to the new tactics of 
management and methods of security that take population as their object. […] 
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Government refers to power in terms of its methods rather than its institutional forms. 
[…] Conceived in terms of its methods and its object, rather than its institutional forms, 
government is a broader process than the relatively unified and functionalist entity 
suggested by the notion of the state. 
Foucault’s conception of government is succinctly summarised as the “conduct of conduct,” in 
which government is “the attempt to shape human conduct by calculated means” (Li 2007b, 
275). It is not limited to “political structures or […] the management of states” and “the 
legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection” (Foucault 2003a, 138). 
Instead, government refers to the deliberate structuring of all the possible actions of individuals 
or groups. Government requires that the people being governed are active, free and willing 
subjects, and not passive or coerced ones (Burchell 1991, Gordon 1991). The challenge of 
government is thus spurring individuals “to act and to align their particular wills with ends 
imposed on them through constraining and facilitating models of possible action” (Burchell 1991, 
119), without “attempting to dictate actions or coerce the population” (Li 2005, 387). The lofty 
aims of government, such as increases in the wealth, longevity, health and education of the 
citizenry, cannot be achieved through coercion at this scale. So, the “government operates by 
educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs. It sets conditions, ‘artificially so 
arranging things so that people, following only their own self-interest, will do as they ought’ ” (Scott 
1995, 202 in Li 2007a, 4, emphasis in original). Consent is a non-issue because control is exerted 
remotely and people are likely unaware of how or why their behaviour is being shaped, and 
consequently do not raise the issue of consent (Li 2007a). 
In his essay on “Governmentality,” Foucault (2003b) argues that government is more concerned 
with improving the welfare of the population than the actual act of governing. The breadth of 
issues subject to governmental improvement is extraordinary (Li 2007a).  
The[se] things […] [include] men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with 
those things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with all its 
specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, and so on; men in their relation with those 
other things that are customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, and so on; and finally, 
men in their relation to still other things that might be accidents and misfortunes such as 
famine, epidemics, death, and so on (Foucault 2003b, 235).  
Today, government is applied to “public health, welfare, agricultural extension, conservation, 
good governance and, increasingly, conflict management, elements of the hydra-headed endeavor 
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we have come to know as development” (Li 2007b, 276). Improving the welfare of the 
population requires specific governmental interventions. These schemes are usually aimed at a 
particular part of the population, and on defined issues or purported deficiencies (Li 2007a, 
2007b). They are important because they effect change, albeit rarely the change anticipated in the 
original plan (Li 2007b). The plans themselves are typically assemblages that cobble together the 
intentions of diverse parties striving to shape human conduct (Li 2007b). 
Foucault calls the art of government the “rationality of government” or “governmentality.” He 
offers a three-part definition of the term,  
1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflection, the 
calculation and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of 
power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political 
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. 
2. The tendency that, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led toward 
the preeminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, and so on) of this type of 
power – which may be termed ‘government’ – resulting, on the one hand, in the 
formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in 
the development of a whole complex of knowledges [saviors]. 
3. The process or, rather, the result of the process through which the state of justice of the 
Middle Ages transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries and gradually becomes ‘governmentalized’ (Foucault 2003b, 244). 
Governmentality is about how to govern. As Gordon (1991, 3) explains, “it is a way or system of 
thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; 
what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable 
both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced.” 
A governmentality analytic is especially useful for the present study of post-disaster spaces. It 
directs researchers to inquire about the design of government interventions, the practices 
employed to achieve them, and the actual outcomes and unintended effects (Li 2005, 388). It is 
applicable to cases where non-state actors attempt to set the conditions under which lives are 
lived; according to Gupta and Sharma (2006, 277), “governmentality offers a way of approaching 
how rule is consolidated and power is exercised in society through social relations, institutions, 
and bodies that do not automatically fit under the rubric of ‘the state’.” Furthermore, 
governmentality “draws our attention to the ways in which subjects are differently formed and 
differently positioned in relation to governmental programs (as experts, as targets), with particular 
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capacities for action and critique,” instead of being limited by a binary of “power here, resistance 
there” (Li 2007b, 276, emphasis in original). These theoretical insights are applied to various cases in 
Seeing like a state by James Scott (1998), where he examines the objectives, methods and outcomes 
of state actors implementing an extreme form of governmental rationality. 
Seeing like a state 
In his highly influential book Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have 
failed, James Scott (1998) analyses state mega-projects. He contends that states aiming to remake 
society and ecology in accordance with a rational, high modern plan will inevitably fail. According 
to Scott (1998), the three primary objectives of any state are simplification, legibility and 
manipulation. Achieving these objectives facilitates the expansion of state spaces and the 
neutralisation of non-state spaces. Although he never uses the term “governmentality” per se, the 
processes he analyses clearly demonstrate the willful attempts of state actors to apply a 
governmental rationality in improving the welfare of populations (Li 2005).  
Simplification, legibility and manipulation 
Legibility and simplification are prerequisites for manipulation. Because most societies predate 
the very states who profess to administer them, there is often a mismatch between state plans and 
actual social relations, settlement patterns, production methods, etc. (Scott 1998). The resulting 
diversity of social forms spanning state territory remains opaque to the central administrators. 
Therefore, to appropriate wealth and exert control, the state demands a simplification that 
“reduce[s] the chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality” into a highly selective, easily 
replicable, synoptic view that does not require local knowledge (Scott 1998, 81). High 
modernism, “a particularly sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific 
progress might be applied - usually through the state - in every field of human activity,” advanced 
this objective (Scott 1998, 90). High modernist schemes took the simplification of individuals to 
the extreme. The standardised citizens they envisaged 
were uniform in their needs and even interchangeable. […] [They had] no gender, no 
tastes, no history, no values, no opinions or original ideas, no traditions, and no 
distinctive personalities to contribute to the enterprise. They have none of the particular, 
situated, and contextual attributes that one would expect of any population and that we, 
as a matter of course, always attribute to elites. […] [T]he lack of context and particularity 
is not an oversight; it is the necessary first premise of any large-scale planning exercise 
(Scott 1998, 346). 
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Still, simplification is only one of the necessary conditions for state manipulation. For states to 
successfully enact any major intervention in society – from population-wide vaccination 
campaigns to collecting income taxes – there must be visible units (e.g. citizens, villages) that can 
be readily “identified, observed, recorded, counted, aggregated and monitored” (Scott 1998, 183). 
In other words, society must be rendered legible. Legibility enables “counting and locating 
people, gauging wealth, mapping land, resources and settlements” (Scott 1998, 77). To render 
society legible, states carry out a “civilizing process,” which Scott (1998, 184) describes as “an 
attempt at domestication, a kind of social gardening devised to make the countryside, its 
products, and its inhabitants more identifiable and accessible to the center.”  
Scott’s use of a gardening metaphor is apt. The gardener designs and plans the spatial and 
temporal layout of the garden; the gardener selects which flowers, shrubs, trees and edibles are 
permitted to flourish, and even determines their role in the garden; the gardener categorises and 
attributes value to plants, such that what is deemed a beautiful addition one season may be 
weeded out as an invasive in the next. There is a high degree of control exerted by a central 
authority acting to achieve specific objectives. Yet, there are always subversive and unpredictable 
elements in the garden; the dormant seeds of undesirable weeds threaten to sprout in 
inopportune places, while a heavy downpour, late spring frost, or heavy windstorm can wreak 
havoc on and disrupt the meticulous work of the gardener. It is these elements beyond the direct 
control of authority that ultimately undo and recreate the garden when there is a lapse in the 
gardener’s attention. The garden metaphor can also be applied to the processes of expanding 
state spaces and neutralising non-state spaces; for example, the gardener seeks to extend the area 
under careful cultivation and also tries to eliminate the threats to the garden posed by wild plants 
and grazing herbivores outside the garden. 
Expanding state spaces and neutralising non-state spaces 
Historically, the processes of expanding state spaces and neutralising non-state spaces are 
intertwined with the expansion of agricultural land. Scott (1998) affirms that state authorities felt 
threatened by impenetrable (i.e. wild, remote, inhospitable lands) and illegible non-state spaces; 
authorities sought either to fully transform them into controllable state spaces, or to defuse the 
presumed subversive elements of non-state spaces. Previously disparate pieces of marginal lands 
were assembled by the state and colonised by peasants, and both the people and nature in these 
margins were “ ‘domesticated’ and brought into the national mainstream” (De Koninck and Déry 
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1997, 2). These processes form the basis of a geopolitical strategy, where geopolitics is not only a 
“contest over space between nations” but also “within the borders of a given country” that 
serves the intention of a state “to define itself territorially and [… to] send a message to its 
neighbors and to the world at large, about its capacity to manage its domain, including its 
borderlands” (De Koninck 2006, 33). De Koninck (1996, 231-232) explains:  
By ‘planting’ or ‘sowing’ peasants, and then ‘protecting’ them, many States have secured 
their territory. By establishing its control, whether or not as a result of a planned process, 
over agriculturalists located on the frontiers of a coveted domain, as well as in the heart 
of the country, a State consolidates its very base. […] The peasants were thus providing 
their past, present, or future rulers, who were generally following closely in their 
footsteps, with a territory to rule, administer, and defend, often by using the same 
peasants as soldiers. Following this unequal exchange, the state builders were able to gain 
territorial legitimacy. 
These planted peasants under state control serve as the landmarks that demarcate state spaces; 
they “reaffirm [a state’s] territoriality” and demonstrate its ability to “establish tighter control 
over people’s activities as well as movement” (De Koninck 2006, 34). 
State concerns include increasing legibility and quelling agrarian unrest through land titling, 
formalisation, and land reform and land settlement programs. These concerns can be understood 
as a progression of what Scott (1998) contends are the main objectives of a state: simplification 
and legibility of land and society, which enable manipulation by outsiders. These concerns also 
demonstrate systematic attempts to transform non-state spaces into state spaces. Hall, Hirsch and 
Li (2011, 34) explain:  
Formalization projects are motivated in substantial part by official  desires for better 
information about who is using what land for what purposes and for the revenue that 
comes from taxing newly ‘visible’ resources, while resettlement programs promise 
expanded state control over sparsely populated ‘frontier’ areas. 
These formalisation projects adopt a discourse of inclusion. They reposition so-called “squatters” 
as newly legal “landowners” enmeshed in an integrated market economy. Proponents of titling 
such as the World Bank herald this transformation as the successful inclusion of the poor into 
the national economy, national politics and national legal system. Titling also accrues benefits to 
outsiders by delocalising the land market and “transform[ing] land into a commodity easily 
bought and sold outside place-based networks” (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 39, emphasis in original). 
Titling, language that repositions people, and settlement programs were all part of the post-
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Sendong interventions in Cagayan de Oro. These interventions served to expand state space into 
the designated official post-disaster spaces and to neutralise the perceived threats of the city’s 
non-state spaces – the informal settlements that were impenetrable and illegible to outsiders.  
A critical engagement with Scott’s arguments  
Tania Murray Li (2005, 383) critically engages with Scott’s work, reading it “as a starting point 
and a provocation.” She agrees with Scott’s overarching argument, which she articulates in the 
following way: “states construct simplified models of the world that they would like to control 
and improve, yet improvement schemes fail in proportion to their effectiveness at preventing 
people from applying the everyday knowledge essential to human well-being” (Li 2005, 383). But, 
as she convincingly points out, what is missing from his argument and his examples significantly 
changes the discussion, resulting in messier, albeit more realistic and nuanced, accounts of 
governmental interventions.  
Her main arguments are summarised below because of their relevance to analysing the schemes 
enacted in post-disaster spaces, who initiates and who is affected by them, and how. Most current 
day governmental intervention schemes are not high modern mega-projects, but are instead 
designed as improvements (rather than manipulations) that incorporate the wants, needs and 
practices of the intended beneficiaries. Such schemes are not master plans reflecting a singular 
state vision but are instead “the emergence of a discursive formation […] formed within relations 
of power” that is continually contested and reformulated, and that is not always aligned with 
elites’ interests (Li 2005, 386). As such, the state does not have sole jurisdiction over 
improvement projects; there are many proponents, including a wide range of activists, planners, 
corporations (and their corporate social responsibility branches), missionaries, local and 
international NGOs, United Nations agencies, conservation groups, humanitarian organisations, 
and other trustees or experts (Li 2005, 2007a, 2007b, Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011). Their methods 
rarely include coercion but instead set the parametres so that beneficiaries will freely choose to 
behave in the way intended for them to behave. Often, the methods even reflect the right way of 
doing planning, as prescribed by Scott (Li 2005). In spite of their good intentions and supposedly 
correct planning methods, the proponents of many current-day improvement schemes replicate 
the problems characteristic of Scott’s high modernist planners. 
They [the non-high modernist planners] position themselves as experts who know how 
others should live, they collect and arrange data according to simplified grids, they 
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diagnose deficiencies, and they devise elaborate interventions to bring about 
improvement. […] [It] is still an exercise in power. Not only do experts direct peoples’ 
conduct without a democratic mandate, they define what counts as development and how 
it can be achieved (Li 2005, 384).  
Scott’s narrow focus on how certain schemes designed to improve the human condition have 
failed is too restrictive. More valuable insights can be gleaned from empirical studies investigating 
Ferguson’s (1994, in Li 2005, 384) questions: “What do these schemes do? What are their messy, 
contradictory, multilayered, and conjunctural effects?” The answers will likely reveal that power 
and resistance are intertwined, and that “improvement schemes are simultaneously destructive 
and productive of new forms of local knowledge and practice” (Li 2005, 391). Li’s insights help 
inform the critical engagement with Scott’s work in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.  
Power 
Governing, attempting to govern, and resisting government are all an exercise of power. Power is 
variously conceived as “something to be held, exerted, deployed, mobilised, sought after, or 
refused, or as something structural and inevitable, despotic and concentrated, or dispersed and 
everywhere” (Moss 2005, 42). It is used as an umbrella term to describe the people, institutions 
and structures that wield control. Power operates in post-disaster spaces through structures and 
institutions that facilitate and constrain mobility, that enhance or deny access to resources and 
opportunities, and that influence vulnerability.  
Power acts upon the actions of others, it designates relationships between partners. In his essay 
“The subject and power,” Foucault (2003a, 137) contends the defining characteristic of “a 
relationship of power is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on 
others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on possible or actual future 
or present actions.” It thus requires that both parties act freely, albeit unequally. According to 
Foucault (2003a), if one party is not free to respond in several ways when faced with a field of 
possibilities, then it is a relationship of violence and not a relationship of power. Power can only 
exist if both parties retain the capacity to act, including refusal or revolt (Foucault 2003a, Li 
2007b). Like the act of governing, the exercise of power conducts or leads an individual or a 
group to behave in a certain way.  
It incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, 
makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is 
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always a way of acting upon one or more subjects by virtue of their acting or being 
capable of action (Foucault 2003a, 138). 
Power involves ideas and practices (Li 2007b), and “is omnipresent is human relations, but […] 
never a fixed and closed regime” (Gordon 1991, 5). It is typically characterised as an exterior 
constraint. Mitchell (2006, 177-178) explains that “its source is a sovereign authority above and 
outside society, and it operates by setting external limits to behavior, establishing negative 
prohibitions, and laying down channels of proper conduct.” In contrast, discipline works from 
within, “entering social processes, breaking them down into separate functions, rearranging the 
parts, increasing their efficiency and precision, and assembling them into more productive and 
powerful combinations” (Mitchell 2006, 178).  
Diverse forms of power and discipline permeated post-disaster efforts and post-disaster spaces in 
CDO. The two models of power that best characterise the intentions of trustees, their 
governmental interventions, and social relations in official post-disaster spaces, however, are the 
empowerment and pastoral power models. 
Empowerment 
Power is typically constructed negatively as the control over people and things, often of men over 
women (Lennie, Hatcher and Morgan 2003). Because existing social structures equate power with 
domination, if women gain more of this type of mainstream power, they just imitate men and 
reaffirm dominant oppressive systems (e.g. over poor, working class or minority women) instead 
of changing them (hooks 1984). Consequently, the redefinition and redistribution of power has 
been an important feminist project, and one that has also been embraced by a variety of trustees 
seeking to govern, including some of the ones directing post-disaster efforts in CDO. 
One alternative model pursued by scholars and activists is that of “empowerment,” a process 
whereby people develop a personal sense of power that fits within their own specific context 
(Lennie, Hatcher and Morgan 2003). It was heralded as “the key to challenging gendered and 
other forms of oppression and thus overcoming the obstacles to meaningful education and 
development” (Gupta and Sharma 2006, 283). Formerly perceived as a laudable objective to 
address unjust power imbalances, empowerment has degenerated into a ubiquitous and almost 
meaningless buzzword that continues to be employed uncritically by scholars, organisations, 
businesses, government agencies and others. The institutions funding empowerment initiatives 
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are usually the very same ones who imposed the structural adjustment policies that 
disempowered marginalised people in the first place (Gupta and Sharma 2006). The emphasis on 
empowerment derives not from a sense of guilt or a desire to reverse harms, but from the cosy fit 
of empowerment with a neoliberal governmentality. Gupta and Sharma (2006, 284-285) explain:  
[E]mpowerment fits in the neoliberal agenda of small government, participatory 
governance, and market-based competitiveness. It enables developmentalist states to shift 
away from directly providing for the basic needs of their marginalized citizens to helping 
these citizens to govern themselves and take care of their own development needs. 
[Furthermore] [...] as compared with welfare-based programs […], which distribute 
material resources to particular groups, empowerment programs are relatively low-cost 
because they do not deliver any goods or services. 
The failure of the empowerment discourse was inevitable. There is an inherent hypocrisy in the 
empowerment promise of contemporary development interventions: the people and institutions 
who direct such interventions forget that their own positioning relies on uneven power relations 
(Li 2007a). That is, “the will to empower others hinges upon positioning oneself as an expert 
with the power to diagnose and correct a deficient power in someone else. […] Empowerment is 
still, in short, a relationship of power” (Li 2007a, 276).  
Pastoral power 
Foucault (2003a) develops the concept of pastoral power, which is especially relevant to the type 
of power employed in CDO’s post-disaster governmental interventions. Pastoral power is a 
technique that originated in Christian institutions and, since the 18th century, has been adopted by 
modern states exercising governmentality. Originally, pastoral power was very much rooted in 
Christian doctrine and institutional practices. Foucault (2003a, 132) explains that  
1. It is a form of power whose ultimate aim is to assure individual salvation in the next 
world;  
2. It is not merely a form of power that commands; it must also be prepared to sacrifice 
itself for the life and salvation of the flock. Therefore, it is different from royal power, 
which demands from its subjects to save the throne;  
3. It is a form of power that looks after not just the whole community but each individual in 
particular, during his [sic] life; and  
4. It cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s minds, without exploring 
their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of 
the conscience and an ability to direct it. 
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When the wielding of pastoral power spread beyond ecclesiastical institutions, and the intended 
partners included not only parishioners but the whole social body, the old pastoral power 
changed in three ways. 
1. [There was] a change in its objective. It was a question no longer of leading people to 
their salvation in the next world but, rather, ensuring it in this world. And in this context, 
the word “salvation” takes on different meanings: health, well-being (that is, sufficient 
wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accidents. 
2. Concurrently, the officials of pastoral power increased. Sometimes this form of power 
was exerted by state apparatuses or, in any case, by a public institution such as the police. 
[…] Sometimes the power was exercised by private ventures, welfare societies, 
benefactors, and generally by philanthropists. But ancient institutions, for example the 
family, were also mobilized at this time to take on pastoral functions. 
3. Finally, the multiplication of the aims and agents of pastoral power focused the 
development of knowledge of man around two roles: one, globalizing and quantitative, 
concerning the population; the other, analytical, concerning the individual (Foucault 
2003a, 132-133).  
The emphasis on ensuring, sustaining and improving the concrete lives and conduct of 
individuals, characteristic of pastoral power, is observed in CDO’s official post-disaster spaces. 
Moreover, the attention paid to saving souls in the old pastoral power is found in the 
governmental interventions carried out by Christian trustees in these spaces. 
Who governs? Who is governed? 
Who or what are the powers that govern post-disaster spaces? The state certainly does not have 
exclusive jurisdiction over the governmental interventions that transpire in them. There is a range 
of parties seeking to influence the behvaiour of others, including “not only diverse state agencies 
with competing visions, mandates and techniques, but missionaries, scientists, activists and the 
so-called NGOs, both national and transnational” (Li 2007b, 276, 2005). Moreover, there is a 
fuzzy line separating state from so-called non-state actors (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011). For 
example, how best to categorise state representatives using official authority for private gain, or 
the collaboration of NGOs, government offices and local businesses? The following paragraphs 
consider who shapes populations, including both the parties seeking to govern, and the people 
intended to be governed. 
Tania Li Murray’s (2007a) analysis of trustees offers a useful lens through which to study those 
who seek to govern in the Foucauldian sense. In The will to improve, she examines the rationale of 
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programs, the practices of experts in drawing boundaries around a knowable, manageable and 
technical domain, and the limits of government in colonial and post-independence Indonesia. She 
defines trustees as having a “position defined by the claim to know how others should live, to 
know what is best for them, to know what they need” (Li 2007a, 4). There are a range of trustees; 
in Indonesia in the last 200 years, trustees included “colonial officials and missionaries, politicians 
and bureaucrats, international aid donors, specialists in agriculture, hygiene, credit and 
conservation, and so-called NGOs of various kinds” (Li 2007a, 5). The Philippines, with its 
extensive colonial history and wide range of ongoing development, disaster relief and 
conservation projects, offers a comparable list (Chapter 3). Guided by the – often genuine – 
desire to improve the welfare of populations, these trustees manage processes and relations. 
However benevolent the objective of trusteeship may appear, the underlying power imbalance 
between trustee and intended beneficiary is highly problematic. Li (2007a, 4-5) cautions that 
[t]he objective of trusteeship is not to dominate others – it is to enhance their capacity for 
action, and to direct it. […] Their [trustees] intentions are benevolent, even utopian. They 
desire to make the world better than it is. Their methods are subtle. […] They make 
certain courses of action easier or more difficult. […] Whatever the response, the claim to 
expertise in optimizing the lives of others is a claim to power, one that merits careful 
scrutiny.  
As previously stated, the goal of empowering or enhancing the capacities of certain people itself 
depends on a hierarchical power relationship (Li 2007a). On a practical level, many trustees 
blindly assume the ruling regime – their critical development partner – will necessarily act on 
behalf of public interest (Li 2007a). Indeed, Philippine political studies scholar Patricio N. 
Abinales (2010, 155) laments that “development agencies maintain this myopic vision that is 
based on the assumption that the Philippine state is ‘good’ and ‘efficient,’ and hence a capable 
partner in development.” Trusteeship interventions will ultimately fail because the solutions 
proposed and implemented never fix the structural sources of inequality, and usually rely upon a 
utopian narrative of “an incarcerated ‘local’ in which properly guided villagers are expected to 
improve their own condition by their own efforts” (Li 2007a, 275-276). 
To translate the will to improve into specific programs, trustees deploy two practices: 
problematisation and rendering technical. In the first practice, experts “identif[y] deficiencies that 
need to be rectified” (Li 2007a, 7). In the second, experts frame the problem in technical terms 
that only they can solve. In fact, “the claim of experts to expertise depends on their capacity to 
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diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds of solutions that fall within their repertoire” (Li 
2007a, 7). Through processes of problematisation and rendering technical, trustees “limit 
opportunities to engage targets of improvement and schemes as political actors, fully capable of 
contestation and debate […] by inscribing a boundary [dividing] those who claim to know how 
others should live from those whose conduct is to be conducted” (Li 2007a, 281-282). Trustees, 
in other words, are the people and institutions who identify and frame a problem that they are 
suited to rectify, and then implement what they perceive as appropriate governmental 
interventions. Two of the most influential types in the Philippine context are those loosely 
classified as state and Catholic trustees. 
State trustees 
The state is perhaps the most readily identifiable trustee shaping populations, mobility, and access 
to land. Indeed, in most of the world the state has been the most powerful institution in society 
since the 17th century (Scott 1998). But what is, or who is, the state? That is, beyond Scott’s 
(1998, 7) assertion that it is “the vexed institution that is the ground of both our freedoms and 
our unfreedoms.”  
For most of history, the majority of the population perceived the state as an abstract and distant 
institution demanding (but not necessarily successfully obtaining) tribute from the people and 
localities over which it claimed dominion (Taylor and Flint 2000). In Southeast Asia, the 
separation between the state and the lives of people living outside the capital region eroded 
during the colonial era as larger, centrally administered bureaucratic states emerged (Scott 1976). 
These new states unified “fragmented local customs and procedures into a more homogeneous 
whole” through its central administration who “worked increasingly through formulas, 
regulations, and laws that would be applied across the board by its agents” (Scott 1976, 94). It 
also had a disciplined army and modern weapons at its disposal, ensuring that it had the power to 
effectively extract taxes, often through coercion. The new bureaucratic state is perhaps best 
represented by paperwork such as cadastral surveys, settlement reports for land revenue, 
censuses, land titles and licenses, identity cards and tax receipts (Scott 1976, 1998). Together, 
these tools enable the state, like large corporate firms, to be “examples of power institutions with 
particular forms of knowledge and power” (Scott 1998, 11). 
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As part of her critical engagement with Scott’s (1998) Seeing like a state, Li (2005) posits that 
Scott’s definition is limited and out-of-date. The “ ‘up there,’ all-seeing state operating as a 
preformed repository of power spread progressively and unproblematically across national 
terrain, colonizing nonstate spaces and their unruly inhabitants” that Scott describes is a myth 
because there is “no spatial beyond the state, and […] no subjects outside power” (Li 2005, 384). 
Scott’s assertion that only states possess sufficient resources to move people and build 
settlements, or want to simplify and render populations and landscapes legible in order to 
manipulate them is similarly wrong. Many other non-governmental groups such as resource 
extraction corporations, conservation NGOs, missionaries and family planning groups also share 
the state objectives of simplification, legibility and improvement (Li 2005). Furthermore, the state 
that Scott envisions does not reflect the paradoxical, conflictual and composite nature of the 
modern state. 
Today, scholars portray the state as paradoxical in that it “exist[s] simultaneously as material force 
and as ideological construct [and that] it seems both real and illusory” (Mitchell 2006, 169). 
Mitchell (2006, 185) maintains that the state should be addressed  
as an effect of mundane processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, 
functional specification, supervision and surveillance, and representation that create the 
appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society or state and economy. 
The essence of modern politics is […] the producing and reproducing of these lines of 
difference. […] These processes create the effect of the state not only as an entity set 
apart from economy or society, but as a distinct dimension of structure, framework, 
codification, expertise, information, planning and intentionality. The state appears as an 
abstraction in relation to the concreteness of the social, a sphere of representation in 
relation to the reality of the economic, and a subjective ideality in relation to the 
objectness of the material world. 
In addition to paperwork, the modern state is represented by government departments, 
politicians and bureaucrats who make decisions and implement policies. In its networks and 
practices, the state is incoherent, but the public imagination of the state is coherent (Mitchell 
2006). There are often multiple and contradictory motivations of and actions carried out by 
government agencies (Li 2007b, Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011). That the state routinely pursues 
discordant and incoherent objectives belies any claims to a singular, unified, integrated state. 
Rather, the state is “a multilayered and conflictual ensemble” (Gupta and Sharma 2006, 291). The 
importance of this “composite reality” and “mythicized abstraction,” Foucault (2003b, 244) 
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argues, “is not so much the statization [étatisation] of society, as the ‘governmentalization’ of the 
state.” As such, studying power and the governmentalisation of the state necessarily requires 
looking beyond the state (Mitchell 2006). 
Catholic trustees 
Religious trustees also seek to govern, and are thus another potential shaper of post-disaster 
spaces, especially in the Philippines – “the country [that] rivals the Vatican as the most Catholic 
place on earth” (Calderisi 2013, 122). In his book Earthy mission: the Catholic Church and world 
development former World Bank economist and longtime Catholic Robert Calderisi (2013) argues 
that organised religion aspires to shape society through emotional and intellectual appeals to 
believers. He asserts that in many developing countries Christianity’s historical influence resulted 
more from educating and spreading particular religion-inspired values, than through direct 
intervention in economic and social affairs. This claim of non-interference, however, does not 
apply to the Philippines. For more than three hundred years, Catholic priests and friars directly 
intervened in all aspects of governance in the Philippine archipelago under Spanish colonial rule 
(Hedman 2006, Tan 2009, Francia 2010). Later, under American rule and Philippine 
independence, the Catholic Church maintained its hegemonic position in governing Philippine 
society, albeit in new ways (Hedman 2006, Tan 2009, Francia 2010). 
Still, Calderisi’s (2013) discussion of how the Catholic Church has and continues to serve the 
world’s poor is useful in contextualising the post-disaster interventions of CDO’s religious 
trustees. He affirms that by the end of the 19th century, church leaders began looking beyond the 
interests of the institution and began engaging with larger social issues. The idea of a Christian 
social mission overseas was sparked by 19th century missionaries encountering hardships and 
inequalities, which they interpreted as opportunities to intervene with modern technology – such 
as medicine – that would improve the lives of the poor. The three thrusts of church action were 
education, basic development services, and advocacy. The overseas social mission was based less 
on specific scriptures than on Catholic traditions, especially the emphases on collective well-being 
and on material progress. Calderisi (2013) explains that these emphases meant that Catholic 
services must serve everyone and not only Christians, and that building hospitals and introducing 
improved agricultural practices were as important as providing spiritual nourishment. In 
presenting the advocacy work of Catholic missionaries, Calderisi (2013, 242) goes as far as to 
assert that church action “has gone further than any other religion in questioning the structures 
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of capitalism and socialism alike.” Variations of this Christian social mission were resurrected in 
diverse post-Sendong interventions of Catholic trustees in CDO. 
The governed 
The final actors to consider as shapers of post-disaster spaces are the people directly affected by 
the disaster – the survivors themselves. Ignoring the potential for them to play even a small role 
in their post-disaster trajectory is to deny them agency, defined as “people’s abilities to influence 
lines of conduct in their lives and call attention to factors that both constrain and enable people 
to act” (Bolin, Jackson and Crist 1998, 28). The acts of migrating and of staying put are two ways 
of exercising agency. The role of human agency in migration is paramount (GOS 2011, McLeman 
2013). More importantly, eliminating the possibility that survivors influence their post-disaster 
trajectory eliminates the opportunity for government. Recall that government demands that those 
being governed are free to act, albeit within the constrained conditions set out by trustees.  
Mobility and time-space compression 
Mobility is not merely the ability to move or the act of moving from one physical or social 
location to another, but also an embodied experience with distinct everyday, materially and 
socially differentiated dimensions (Silvey 2005, Willis 2010). Mobility acts reciprocally within 
existing hierarchies and spatialities of power, thus the way mobility is organised and imbued with 
meaning must mirror its embeddedness in a fluid economic, political and cultural landscape 
(Pessar and Mahler 2003, Silvey 2005, Piper 2006, Hunter and Davis 2009). It can be seen 
positively as an indicator of existing empowerment and transformational opportunities, or 
negatively as a mechanism for reinforcing social exclusion and poverty through displacement or 
forced containment (Silvey 2005, Willis 2010). Mobility depends on many factors, including 
socioeconomic status, childcare responsibilities, geographic location, violence, age, race, gender, 
sexuality, religion, class, caste, and institutional and state migration practices and policies (Lawson 
1998, Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000, Silvey 2004, Crosby 2006). Increasingly, the mobility 
of people is deliberately constrained, while the mobility of goods and ideas is facilitated by 
nation-states as regional economic integration issues collide and clash with security and border 
control issues (Pellerin 2004a, 2004b, Crosby 2006). In today’s globalised world, only the 
“innovators, transmitters and managers of information, science and technology who propel the 
global economy” are bestowed the privilege of unrestrained hypermobility (Kofman 2004, 653). 
Unsurprisingly, workers representing the reproductive sectors whose skills and competences are 
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people-focused are excluded from this elite group (Kofman 2004). Taken together, these 
observations underscore the gendered nature of mobility. 
Doreen Massey (1994, 149) calls for framing mobility within a power geometry, in which 
“different social groups, and different individuals, are placed in very distinct ways in relation to 
these flows [of technology, capital, communication, etc.] and interconnections.” Different 
individuals and social groups have unequal access to and control over mobility and movement, 
with some initiating flows, others merely following flows, and yet others imprisoned by them. 
Such differential power over mobility (or lack thereof) is not inevitable, but is instead the product 
of time-space compression, which Massey defines as “movement and communications across 
spaces, […] the geographical stretching-out of social relations, and […] our experience of all of 
this” (Massey 1994, 147). One’s place in this time-space compression depends on actions related 
to capital, race and gender that may not be within one’s control. Time-space compression has real 
repercussions for people’s lives, especially when those in power actively constrain the mobility of 
the less powerful. Massey (1994, 150) explains: 
mobility, and control over mobility, both reflects and reinforces power. It is not simply a 
question of unequal distribution, that some people move more than others, and that 
some have more control than others. It is that the mobility and control of some groups 
can actively weaken other people. Differential mobility can weaken the leverage of the 
already weak. The time-space compression of some groups can undermine the power of 
others.  
In this way, Massey underlines critical links among mobility, power, and space.  
People with very little or no access to or control over mobility through space are immobile. 
Immobility is an urgent yet underappreciated component of environmental migration (GOS 
2011, Bremner and Hunter 2014). This was one of the main findings of the Foresight: migration and 
global environmental change final project report, a highly regarded analysis on migration and non-
migration influenced by environmental change. Commissioned by the U.K. Government Office 
for Science, the Foresight report was informed by more than 70 papers and other reviews, and 
involved more than 350 experts and scholars from 30 countries. 
Environmental change is expected to shape migration, “specifically through its influence on a 
range of economic, social and political drivers which themselves affect migration” (GOS 2011, 9). 
For example, more frequent or intense natural hazards are expected to increase migration and 
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displacement. Conversely, the deterioration of the environment is expected to reduce the wealth 
and capital of people with land and natural resource-dependent livelihoods. Diminished 
livelihood returns may prevent them from amassing sufficient capital to migrate, which will 
reduce migration. This problem will be especially acute among people who wish to migrate but 
are unable to do so.  
It is important to distinguish between populations who stay because they are unable to leave (i.e. 
trapped) and those who stay because they chose to stay (i.e. immobile), although, admittedly, the 
line separating these categories is blurry. Migration can help diversify livelihood options; the 
remittances from migrants can present households or even entire communities with the choice to 
remain in a sending area (including in hazard-prone locations). In other cases, populations can be 
trapped, either through direct force (e.g. from the state, paramilitary or other actors) or through 
implied constraint (e.g. asset levels are insufficient to enable migration). These reduced options 
for migration do not necessarily reduce migration in the long-term. Instead, they increase the 
likelihood of large-scale, illegal, unsafe, unplanned and unmanaged displacement when extreme 
environmental events occur. When vulnerable people do migrate, they typically go to areas of 
high environmental risk, such as low-lying areas in mega-deltas or slums in growing, water-
insecure cities (GOS 2011).  
Trapped populations in the context of environmental change face a double dilemma. People with 
little wealth or capital do not possess the means to move away from environmentally risky or 
hazardous areas, yet the same lack of capital diminishes their capacity to cope and adapt to 
environmental shocks and change, effectively trapping them in areas susceptible to 
environmental change. Based on an analysis of the 1930s Dust Bowl Migration in the American 
Midwest, McLeman (2013, 176) offers a useful and intuitive characterisation for distinguishing 
among mobile, trapped and immobile migrants and non-migrants based on their capital. People 
with portable capital, including cultural capital (e.g. young healthy families with good farming 
skills), economic capital (landless or tenant farmers who are not destitute) and social capital (e.g. 
social networks connecting them to locations outside the Plains), were more likely to migrate. 
People less likely to migrate were those with place-specific capital, including landowners or 
people with strong local social networks, and people with little or no capital, including the 
destitute, elderly, broken families and people without any social connections. 
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Conclusion 
The concepts introduced in this chapter are essential to analysing post-disaster spaces and the 
migration that directs people to these spaces. Sendong survivors access many spaces, including 
slums, covered courts, evacuation sites, barangay halls, city hall, transitional sites, places of 
worship, permanent relocation sites, and shopping malls. The character of each space can be read 
as a state or non-state space, as conducive or not to the compression of time-space, as a site for 
governance or improvement, or as selectively exclusionary.  
Each individual accessing a given space has a unique understanding of it as a particular place. 
This understanding evolves over time as social relations within the space change and spur new 
relations in other spaces. Hence each space consists of multiple places. Each individual has the 
potential to exert agency in the space they inhabit, although their agency is necessarily 
constrained by multiple hierarchies of power. The social relations unfolding within and stretching 
beyond each space are fluid and influenced by various forces. The forces can be easily recognised 
as trustees such as religious officials, bureaucrats, NGO workers, politicians, business tycoons, or 
can be understood as broader structures or phenomena such as legitimation, force, the market, 
regulation, political alliances and relationships, inertia, human agency, and environmental change 
and hazards such as Tropical Storm Sendong. These forces originate and manifest themselves at 
various scales, from the international down to the household and individual levels. That there are 
many human forces acting upon post-disaster spaces underscores the unnaturalness of disaster 
outcomes.  
Individuals and groups may or may not have access to mobility that enables them to enter other 
spaces. Sometimes actors have the mobility to exit some spaces and approach others, but they are 
unable to penetrate them. The boundaries around spaces are selectively porous. Some actors, 
ideas, capital, goods and services easily pass through, while others are effectively trapped within 
or prohibited from entering. In other cases, certain actors may be absent from a particular space 
because they are ignorant of its existence or its relevance to post-disaster processes. Mobility and 
access to space are spatially and temporally specific.  
The next chapter delves into political, historical, geographical, social, cultural elements that help 
explain the settlement and growth of Cagayan de Oro, and the trustees who play salient roles in 
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post-disaster efforts. It is a history of the city and the forces acting upon it up to, and including 
Tropical Storm Sendong. 
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Chapter 3. Migration, settlement, and Tropical Storm 
Sendong 
Introduction 
Sometimes a simple question can spark a whole new set of questions or a new way of looking at a 
problem. In my case, the question (two, actually) came from Dr. Emma Porio, a lively sociology 
professor at Ateneo de Manila University. At the recommendation of some friends of friends I 
had met some years earlier during a Tagalog language training program at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, I interviewed her before plunging into my fieldwork in Cagayan de Oro 
(CDO). Drawing on her own research on vulnerability in Manila slums, she suggested I start my 
research by answering two short questions: ‘who settles where?’ and ‘what do they build?’ Then 
she answered her own questions, offering that settlement patterns are based on social networks 
(e.g. family, friends, and recruitment through other social connections), and that housing 
construction is based on affordability. This chapter expands upon Porio’s succinct answers.  
Migration of all sorts has influenced Mindanao and the city of Cagayan de Oro. These migration 
patterns are linked to the overarching geopolitical strategies of colonial and post-colonial 
governments, and to diverse projects such as settling the frontier, propelling economic 
development, assimilating minority populations, quelling political unrest, and consolidating 
central state control. The geographical and historical processes that have shaped migration and 
settlement in the Philippines, and especially in Mindanao and in Cagayan de Oro, have made 
CDO what it is today. These processes help situate the context in which the city’s post-disaster 
spaces are first needed, and later created, governed and transformed.  
The chapter begins with an overview of migration to Mindanao, and its role as a governmental 
intervention intended to influence behaviour. Next, the chapter characterises the trustees 
involved in migration and settlement. It presents where different people settle in CDO, and why. 
This discussion is useful in deciphering which CDO residents are vulnerable to disaster. The 
chapter ends with a synopsis of the factors leading up and including Typhoon Sendong. 
A brief history of the Philippine archipelago 
A short synopsis of Philippine pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history helps situate 
migration and settlement in Mindanao. From 250,000 years before present to the early 16th 
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century, the islands were sparsely inhabited and organised into small kinship and village-based 
groups dispersed throughout the islands (Church 2003, Tan 2009, Francia 2010). Unlike other 
pre-colonial territories in the region, the Philippine archipelago did not have large cities, agrarian 
kingdoms or indigenous states supported by bureaucracies, aristocrats, or religious organisations 
(Church 2003, De Koninck 2012). Connecting the islands in the Philippine archipelago to what 
would later become the nations of Southeast, South and East Asia, was a well-established 
maritime trade network (Church 2003, Francia 2010). In the 13th century, Malay merchants 
involved in this network introduced the archipelago to Islam, which subsequently spread 
throughout Sulu, Maguindanao, Palawan and Manila, and hastened the creation of sultanate-
based settlements that were united by and organised around religion (Tan 2009, Francia 2010, 
Donoso 2013). In fact, had the Spaniards arrived much later and not halted the spread of Islam 
(Francia 2010), the Philippines may have evolved to reflect Islamic social norms, power relations 
and spatial forms. 
But Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese-born captain working for Spain, arrived in the archipelago 
in 1521, his successor Lopez de Legaspi established a Spanish settlement in Cebu by 1565, and 
the Spaniards took Manila by 1570, setting in motion over three centuries of Spanish colonial rule 
(Church 2003, De Koninck 2012, Francia 2010). The Spanish colonial era (1521-1898) was 
characterised by the repatriation of Philippine resources to Spain (Church 2003, Batalla 2010), the 
colonial state-supported efforts to Catholicise the islands (Tan 2009, Francia 2010), and the 
undermining of traditional economic and political structures, settlement patterns, and social 
hierarchies (Tan 2009). Yet, the Spanish failed to alter spatial patterns of human settlement in the 
entire archipelago; Mindanao, and remote, often mountainous, parts of Luzon and the Visayas 
remained largely beyond direct colonial influence (Tan 2009).  
After the Americans replaced the Spaniards as colonial rulers in 1898, the isolation of these 
territories from the central administration and colonial authorities eroded. As discussed in the 
following section, variations on a Mindanao-as-frontier narrative and waves of both state-
sponsored and spontaneous migration played major roles in a wider geopolitical strategy under 
American rule (1898-1941, 1945-1946), and later under Philippine independence (1946-present). 
After the end of the violent Philippine-American War (1899-1902), U.S. colonial rule was 
characterised by a hearts and minds approach. A strategic realignment of the values and cultural 
 
 
 45   
 
ideologies of Filipinos with U.S. interests positioned the Americans as both friend and benign 
ruler, which meant they could behave as they wished without fear of serious rebellion from the 
nationals (Tan 2009). Like their Spanish predecessors, the Americans were not concerned about 
developing the archipelago for the benefit of Filipinos, and more concerned about establishing an 
American presence in Asia. A strategic position in the Philippines facilitated U.S. military and 
economic penetration in the region (De Koninck 2012). 
The strategy to win over the hearts and minds of Filipinos paid off handsomely in World War II. 
Many Filipinos overtly or covertly resisted Japanese occupation (1941-1945), retaining the hope 
that the Americans would return to free them (Francia 2010). Filipinos suffered immensely; 
urban and economic development was put on hold as financial, human, natural, and material 
resources were redirected to meet the demands of war (Tan 2009, Francia 2010). After the war, 
the Americans returned to reclaim the colony for a brief period. As a colonial ruler, the U.S. 
would have been responsible to pay for and carry out reconstruction throughout the archipelago. 
The U.S., however, successfully shirked any official responsibility by expediting the long-standing 
promise of granting independence to the Philippines on 4 July 1946 (Francia 2010). As an 
independent nation, the first in Southeast Asia, the Philippines had to sequester resources for 
reconstruction and development on its own (Tan 2009). The war had depleted much of the 
country’s resources, effectively forcing Philippine government officials to accept inadequate 
compensation for its losses and to sign exploitative trade and military agreements with the U.S. 
(Francia 2010). The newly independent state of the Philippines was thus open to neocolonialism, 
and the U.S. stepped in to reinforce its control over national and local political, economic, 
military, and sociocultural affairs (Tan 2009). The U.S. government has maintained a hegemonic 
position in the Philippines and persists today as one third of the “dominant bloc […] whose 
identity and interests have been deeply imprinted on […] institutions and practices” in the 
country (Hedman 2006, 21). The U.S. government, along with the other members of the 
dominant bloc – the Catholic Church and the capitalist class – have also played roles in migration 
to and settlement in Mindanao.  
Migration to and settlement in Mindanao 
As argued by Rodolphe De Koninck and Steve Déry (1997, 2), the “migrations of people, 
whether planned or not, whether controlled fully or only partially – at least at their outset – by 
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the State or by State builders, represent a key feature of the history of Southeast Asia, including 
its contemporary one.” The state is necessarily involved, to some degree, in all migration. For 
example, in recent decades, the state in its myriad forms has supported emigration away from the 
Philippines (Bello, Docena et al. 2004, Pratt 2005, Dungo 2009, Kelly 2009, Francia 2010, 
Gibson, Cahill et al. 2010, De Koninck 2012). In the 20th century, state-supported internal 
migration to Mindanao was part of a wider geopolitical strategy. An administrative map of the 
Philippines is depicted in Figure 3.1. Mindanao, the large region covering the southern third of 
the archipelago, is less volcanic, less population-dense and has fewer typhoons than its Visayan 
and Luzon counterparts to the north (De Koninck and Caouette 2012). Consequently, 
Mindanao-bound migration fit a geopolitical strategy designed to attain diverse goals. It promised 
to solve agrarian problems, and decongest and redistribute the populations of Luzon and the 
Visayas (Pelzer 1948, De Koninck 1996, De Koninck and Déry 1997). It promised to consolidate 
central state control over peripheral and border areas, and to politically and culturally integrate 
the population and assimilate minority populations (De Koninck 1996, De Koninck and Déry 
1997, Abinales 2000). It promised to develop Mindanao’s vast resources to propel the country’s 
economic growth and to meet the increasing demand for agricultural exports (De Koninck and 
Déry 1997, De Koninck and Caouette 2012). Yet, there was never a clear and coherent 
southward-bound internal migration strategy. Instead, state and other trustees alternately 
supported and stalled migration to Mindanao.  
The perception of Mindanao has been carefully crafted by politicians and other state and non-
governmental trustees so as to advance their particular agendas and ideas about state-building. 
Under American rule, for example, all of the Philippine islands were governed by a central 
civilian American and Filipino government based in Manila except for the highlands of northern 
Luzon and southern Mindanao (Abinales 2010). The newly established province of Misamis, of 
which Cagayan de Oro was the capital, was granted civilian jurisdiction and was not subject to 
military rule (Edgerton 2008). The American Army had been granted the right to govern the 
Moro province, an autonomous regional structure covering almost two-thirds of Mindanao on 
the premise that it was an “ungovernable territory” inhabited by a “wild, backward, and 
unpacified” population (Abinales 2010, 97, 100).  
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Fig. 3.1. Administrative map of the Philippines. Source: Nations Online (2015), adapted by Marc 
Girard. 
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In governing southern Mindanao in the early 20th century, the U.S. Army favoured military rule 
with de facto autonomy from Manila. The U.S. military deliberately avoided any interference with 
Islam, a propitious decision that won the Muslim population onto their side (Abinales 2010). 
Because it was so invested in the idea that Southern Mindanao was different from the rest of the 
archipelago and because of the pervasive American mistrust of Filipinos, the Army fabricated 
fantastical images of the inhabitants, advocated for the separation of Mindanao, and embellished 
the narrative of a “Moro problem.”7 Abinales (2000, 21) explains, “[w]hen Manila did poke its 
nose into provincial affairs, the army conjured up the image of Mindanao as a vast frontier, 
peopled by savages who were once the scourge of the northern communities, to limit Manila’s 
interference.” U.S. Army administrators heralded the “successful pacification of non-Christians” 
but always tempered their achievements with a warning about the potential instability resulting 
from “the Moro problem” (Abinales 2000, 21). Historically, non-Muslim Filipinos were 
suspicious of Muslims because they had been the targets of Moro slave raids (Abinales 2010), 
                                                          
7 There are several terms used to refer to people living in the Philippines who practice Islam; each 
connotes a particular meaning. At the 1935 Philippine Constitutional Convention, Aluya Alonto, a newly 
elected official from Lanao, spoke to the prejudice embedded in the term “Moro” and implored his 
colleagues to use an alternative term. Abinales (2000) cites an excerpt from that speech,  
We do not like to be called “Moros” because when we are called “Moros” we feel we are not 
considered as part of the Filipino people. […] So I would like to request the members of this 
Convention that we prefer to be called “Mohammedan Filipinos” and not “Moros,” because if we 
are called Moros we will be considered as enemies, for the name “Moro” was given to us by the 
Spaniards because they failed to penetrate into the Island of Mindanao (Philippine Constitutional 
Convention 1935 in Abinales 2000, 61). 
Alonto conveyed the willingness of “Mohammedan Filipinos” (later “Muslim Filipinos”) to participate in 
the Filipinisation process as long as both “Muslim” and “Filipino” identities were permitted to coexist. 
The term “Muslim-Filipino” was “articulated consciously by those datus who had come to accept as their 
political arena the agencies, institutions, and offices opened to them by the Filipino authorities” (Abinales 
2000, 68, my emphasis). Alonto and his Muslim colleagues were the sons of datus and were the first 
generation to attend school in Manila (Abinales 2010). They wanted to distinguish themselves from their 
elders who purportedly did not share their youthful cosmopolitanism. Today, by using the term “Muslim 
Filipinos,” the national government’s National Commission on Muslim Filipinos declares its preference 
for a particular type of Muslim who is sympathetic to national unity and the broader goals of the state. 
In contrast, the term “Moro” emphasises opposition, distinctiveness and sovereignty. It is the term chosen 
by secessionist political organisations, notably the MNLF and the MILF. It is also the term used in the 
ongoing Bangsamoro peace talks between the national government and militants. (Bangsa means ‘nation,’ 
thus Bangsamoro is the ‘nation of the Moro people’ (Abinales 2010, 119). The emergence of the term 
coincided with the escalation of violence in Mindanao under Marcos and the subsequent proliferation of 
writings asserting a “Moro” national identity (Canuday 2009). 
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suggesting a fear of the identity represented by the Moro, and not of Islamic religious beliefs per 
se, is at the root of anti-Muslim prejudices. This fear of Muslim Filipinos persists into the 21st 
century. 
The U.S. Army’s propaganda campaign ultimately failed with the Philippine Commission’s 
passing of Act 2408 on 20 December 1913, which integrated Southern Mindanao into the larger 
body politic of the country (Abinales 2000, 29). The U.S. military ceded power to civilians and 
Filipinos in 1914 (Abinales 2010). The Act created the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, aimed 
at bringing non-Christians under democratically organised government as fast as possible. 
Migration was a critical policy tool in the bureaucrats and politicians’ governmentality toolbox. It 
was expected to expedite the integration of non-Christian groups (De Koninck and Déry 1997, 
De Koninck and Caouette 2012), and to transform Filipinos into “quintessential owner-
cultivators who would combine the desire for self-improvement with service to the general 
welfare of the community” (Abinales 2000, 97). The design of seven agricultural colonies 
established in Mindanao between 1913 and 1917 reflect this government objective of 
assimilation; the government deliberately mixed Christian and Muslim settlers “in an attempt to 
show that the two could work together and live peaceably […] even when there was no need for 
them [Muslims] to seek land” (Pelzer 1948, 129-132).  
Under the auspices of American colonial rule, state-led migration programs yielded mixed results. 
The social aim of creating peaceful, mixed communities of Christians and Muslims was met, but 
the economic goal of establishing many productive, economically independent homesteads was 
not (Abinales 2000). In late 1928 settlers owed the government ₱372,000 (equivalent to $2.6 
million US dollars in 2015), and were unlikely to ever repay the sum (Pelzer 1948, 132).8 This 
failure was attributed to: a lack of funds, ill-chosen sites, unwisely chosen settlers (most migrants 
had no farming experience and hailed from waterfront sites of Cebu City and Manila), the 
absence of a system of uniform administration and supervision in the colonies, minimal 
assistance in resolving transportation and marketing problems, and chronic irrigation and 
                                                          
8 Under American colonial rule, a Philippine peso was valued at half a U.S. dollar (Kemmerer 2005, 375); 
this valuation lasted until the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas was established in 1949 (Justiniano pers. comm., 
23 September 2015). According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation 
calculator, ₱372,000 or $187,000 in 1928 is equivalent to $2,606,145.73 in 2015 (BLS 2015). 
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drainage problems resulting in frequent crop failure (Pelzer 1948). Instead of becoming the 
“quintessential owner-cultivators” that Manila desired, many of the government-sponsored 
migrants “became homesteaders, squatters, tenants, or agricultural laborers” (Pelzer 1948, 134). 
Despite their limited agricultural achievements, these land pioneers necessarily played a critical 
role in the formation of the Philippine state and in securing its legitimacy (De Koninck 1996, De 
Koninck and Déry 1997). 
The dual task of fabricating national unity and attaining social integration was later led by the first 
Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon (1935-1944), a Filipino who favoured civilian rule 
with Muslim datus9-cum-politicians apprenticing to Manila-based Filipino politicians (Abinales 
2000). By preserving communal differences within the nation-building process, employing 
“ethnic juggling” to thwart separatist sentiments nurtured by American army administrators, 
copying the American approach of not touching Islam, and giving “ ‘friendly’ Muslim leaders 
access to the state,” Quezon successfully convinced Muslim leaders that their local interests were 
best preserved under Filipinisation (Abinales 2010, 31). According to then vice-governor of the 
Philippines Joseph Ralston Hayden (1942 in Abinales 2010, 76), Filipinisation worked towards 
“the establishment of the Moros in the Philippine Commonwealth under conditions that will 
make them willing, patriotic, and useful members of the body politic.” In other words, the datu-
cum-Moro representative was supposed to align his interests with those of the nation-state, and 
subsequently convince his constituency to do likewise.10 Despite these efforts, the Filipinsation of 
Mindanao’s population remained an unfinished project. 
The dismal failure of the perennial state project of developing Mindanao and subsuming it within 
state interests is similarly illustrated by the history of the now defunct Mindanao Development 
Authority (MDA). Formally created in 1951, the MDA was a government agency with the 
flexibility of a corporation to oversee the economic, infrastructure, education, health, and social 
development of Mindanao within the framework of a national plan (Abinales 2000). It never 
achieved its objectives; it was not activated until the 1960s, its allocated budget was never fully 
disbursed, and it had a very weak structure and personnel (Abinales 2000, 118). As a result, the 
                                                          
9 A datu is a traditional chief. 
10 In all of the material I have read, Muslim politicians were all men at this time. 
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development of Mindanao and the MDA itself fell into the hands of local politicians. The 
preeminence of local politicians in shaping cities, towns and villages in Mindanao persists today, 
including in CDO. These politicians, together with their national counterparts and colonial 
officials, have drawn up various framings of Mindanao as frontier, which, in turn, have affected 
migration and settlement to and within Mindanao. 
Mindanao as frontier  
De Koninck (2006, 35) aptly points out that “a fundamental planning tool of any state [or other 
trustee] lies in its discourse about the people over which it rules as well as the land under its 
control.” The discourses about Mindanao as a frontier illustrate this point well. The state 
imagination of Mindanao as frontier has been evoked repeatedly to advance diverse policy 
objectives that have shaped spaces in Mindanao. Mindanao was frequently used by leaders of the 
nation-state as a laboratory for implementing reformist agendas, for bringing the lumads11 and 
Muslims into modernity through “education, the law, the market and the political process” 
(Abinales 2010, 155), and promoting the political integration of the archipelago via the cultural 
dilution of Mindanao’s Muslim population (De Koninck and Déry 1997, De Koninck and 
Caouette 2012). But it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to transform Southeast Asian frontiers. 
[A]s has been the case of many frontier zones, development means only the further 
entrenchment of national interest in these peripheries, and if a petit bourgeois does grow 
out of the latter, its tendency is to depart the frontier in favor of the national 
metropolitan centers, leaving Mindanao, Aceh, Sulawesi, Sabah, and Kalimatan backward 
or underdeveloped. This condition preserves the idea of frontiers as a zone of darkness, 
savagery, and instability, which, in turn, continues to nurture the fantasies of nation-states 
subduing and binding these dark places to them. The cycle continues, and the only way to 
stop it and fundamentally recast relationships and flows to favor the frontier is to break 
up or fragment the nation-state (Abinales 2010, 185). 
Since the Spanish colonial era, Mindanao has been characterised by “its dense ecology and the 
presence of small communities of fiercely independent Muslims and semi-isolated ‘wild’ lumad 
living off each other, mak[ing] many parts of it impenetrable. For the leaders and planners of the 
nation-state, a frontier like Mindanao stands for mystery, volatility and darkness” (Abinales 2010, 
154). The meaning of “darkness” evolved alongside major changes to the landscape and the 
                                                          
11 Lumad is a collective term for the non-Muslim minority in the Philippines (Abinales 2010, 128). In 
CDO, the term is used synonymously with ‘Indigenous Peoples’ or ‘IP.’ 
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island’s population. Up to World War II, 95% of Mindanao was covered in rainforest, and most 
of the population lived in lowlands along the sea or river shorelines (Abinales 2010, 194), leaving 
much of the island inaccessible except on foot or by boat. Darkness was thus equated with 
impenetrability. From the mid-1950s, extensive road-building, logging, and settlement of 
Filipinos from the Visayas and Luzon rendered lands accessible; Mindanao’s darkness had 
become synonymous with “savagery in referring to the Muslims and even the lumad” (Abinales 
2010, 170).   
The perception of Mindanao as frontier persists well into the 21st century in spite of the fact that 
the once vast forests are gone, the gulf between the area’s population density and the national 
average has shrunk significantly (e.g. in 2007, population densities in Mindanao’s regions ranged 
from 107 to 204 persons/km2 versus 260 persons/km2 nationally (PSA-NCSB 2008)), and 
Mindanao’s political landscape is the same as in Luzon and the Visayas in terms of the control of 
local politics by political clans, the ubiquitous class and social differentiation, and the “insidious 
presence” of the military and the communist insurgency (Abinales 2010, 184). The Muslim areas 
with an active presence of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, however, remain noticeably 
different from Luzon and the Visayas. 
Drawing on the frontier narrative, the government and other state actors have long played roles 
in alternately hindering and promoting migration to and settlement in Mindanao. The Americans 
alternated between a frontier-as-danger narrative to justify military rule and autonomy from 
Manila, and a frontier-as-empty-space-and-enormous-wealth narrative to attract American 
homesteaders to settle in the Moro province (Pelzer 1948, Abinales 2000, 2010). The Philippine 
Commonwealth pursued a frontier-as-“land of promise and unlimited opportunity” narrative to 
encourage resettlement of Filipino peasants from congested Visayan islands to Mindanao (Pelzer 
1948, 127). Subsequent governments promoted this same image to solve agrarian problems 
linked to insufficient or unfair land distribution in Luzon and the Visayas (De Koninck 1996, De 
Koninck and Déry 1997, De Koninck and Caouette 2012). The Philippine Commonwealth 
(1935-1946) used resettlement as a nation-building exercise: 
In the Philippines colonization was a national adventure. It was one of the first large-scale 
enterprises undertaken by the Philippine Commonwealth. […] All the participants had a 
national as well as a personal, stake in the success of the National Land Settlement 
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Administration. Everyone shared in the glory as well as the responsibility. […] All 
participants shared also in the discomforts and risks (Pelzer 1948, 232). 
After World War II, the Philippine Republic repeated the Commonwealth’s evocation of 
unbridled possibility, hoping that the lure of so-called empty space would attract enough 
disgruntled farmers from overcrowded areas to dissipate political instability (Abinales 2010). In 
response, and to dissuade Filipino immigrants from settling in their territory, local leadership in 
Muslim Mindanao encouraged a counter-narrative of frontier-of-dangerous-savages (Abinales 
2010). Variations on these narratives endure in the 21st century, are selectively employed to attract 
or deter investment, tourists and settlers, and are used to justify violence in the territory. 
Postwar migration and conflict in Mindanao 
In his book Making Mindanao Patricio Abinales (2000) contends that the movement of 1.2 million 
people from Luzon and the Visayas to Mindanao and within Mindanao between 1946 and 1960 
was the most important social change in the Philippines during the postwar era. Postwar 
difficulties and diminishing availability of land in northern provinces convinced enough peasants 
to reconsider resettlement and overcome their fear of Mindanao, propelling the most massive 
movement of Filipinos in history (Abinales 2000). 
Migration was the ultimate panacea for state leaders. It offered the perception of state 
capabilities, reduced resource demands in overcrowded areas, and enabled political leaders to 
address the ever-present land problem without undertaking radical reforms such as breaking up 
and redistributing landed estates (Abinales 2000, 99). In short, it was an excellent geopolitical 
strategy to solve agrarian problems (De Koninck and Déry 1997, De Koninck and Caouette 
2012). Moreover, the demographic shift aimed to undermine the communist movement by 
providing irate peasants with an alternative to rebellion, namely the possibility of becoming 
owner-cultivators (De Koninck 1996, Abinales 2000). Mindanao was the ultimate receiving area 
for both people and economic development because it was relatively unscathed by the 
devastation wrought by American liberation,12 90% of its land was public, and its population was 
                                                          
12 CDO was one of the few sites in Mindanao directly hit by World War II. Before 1942 there were many 
Japanese shops in CDO, and many of the Japanese merchants became military men during the war. The 
city, however, was accepting of American colonial rule. On 2 September 1944, U.S. planes bombed the 
city, purportedly to destroy Japanese installations (Edgerton 2008).  All the buildings in the old part of the 
city were destroyed. Xavier University, which had been temporarily repurposed as a garrison, was also hit. 
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sparse (Pelzer 1948, Abinales 2000). State leaders set impossibly high expectations – “migration 
to Mindanao was at once expected to accomplish peasant aspirations, dissipate the predilection to 
rebel, and ease population pressure in other parts of the Philippines” (Abinales 2000, 96, De 
Koninck and Déry 1997). Between 1946 and 1972, there were five major government 
colonisation programs targeting Mindanao as a receiving area (Abinales 2000, 119). All tried to 
provide land to small settlers; all had no or negligible success owing to “administrative ineptitude, 
pervasive corruption, and lackluster support from central state authorities” (Abinales 2000, 120). 
Despite the failure of government migration programs, there was massive spontaneous and 
unorganised migration to Mindanao as people joined their relatives and settled by newly or soon-
to-be-constructed roads (Abinales 2000). 
An important non-outcome of such migration was conflict. Contrary to what some scholars have 
suggested, Mindanao was not on a rapid downward spiral; in fact, there was minimal social 
conflict from 1946 to the mid-1970s (Abinales 2000). Due to the rush for land and the changes in 
the demographic environment, tensions rose between Muslims and Christians, but they never 
escalated to the point of undermining the pre-existing political and social conditions. The relative 
peacefulness of the period is notable given the proliferation of American and Japanese firearms 
that fell into the hands of bandit groups and local strong men after the war, and the ill-equipped 
and understaffed character of the Philippine Constabulary and Philippine National Army 
(Abinales 2000, 124). The addition of Christian settlers, overlaid with a popular belief among 
Muslims in Southern Mindanao that “a Catholic Filipino state was determined to destroy Muslim 
culture and religion,” created a sense of identity, not a symbol of defiance against the state 
(Abinales 2000, 109). In fact, the Philippine state, despite its weak structure and capacity, “was an 
important source of legitimate political symbols and practices” for aspiring Mindanao leaders, and that 
the goal of a stable frontier was advanced by extending the right to vote to Mindinao residents 
(Abinales 2000, 129, emphasis in original).  
The violence that has become synonymous with Mindanao over the past four and half decades 
originated during the Marcos dictatorship, which lasted from 1972 to 1981. The former president 
                                                          
The old water tower next to the archbishopric was the only building that survived the air assault; it has 
since been converted into the City Museum (Roa 2012).  
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chose Mindanao to grandstand his economic, land, and political reforms, and to solidify his 
influence. Mindanao was rich with vast timber and agricultural lands, minerals, and fishing 
grounds, all of which were undeveloped, and it had an increasing and diverse population 
(Abinales 2000). Marcos activated the MDA, staffed it with his cronies, and then used it to 
selectively distribute economic and industrial support to sympathetic communities. According to 
Abinales (2010), it was Marcos who broke the delicate balance between state and strongmen in 
Mindanao. He undermined the power of local Muslim politicians who opposed his regime by 
destabilising their political networks (Abinales 2010). Not surprisingly, Muslim-Christian tensions 
escalated in the 1960s. Marcos’s government exacerbated the violence by supporting Christian 
settlers, including the extremist militia anti-Moro group Ilaga (Bisayan for “rat”) in the 1970s, and 
dispatching the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) into Muslim areas (Abinales 2000, 2010). 
Several Moro separation movements and militia groups formed, including the Muslim 
Independent Movement in 1968, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1969, the 
Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (later renamed the Bangsa Muslimin Islamic Liberation 
Organization or BMLO) in 1970, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984 
(Abinales 2000, Canuday 2009). These groups thus emerged as a response to a threat under 
exceptional and violent conditions during a period of intense and extremely disruptive 
interference by the national government. This history supports Abinales’ (2010, 119) thesis that 
the MNLF and the MILF “are better understood as modern mobilizations against the intrusive 
reach of the nation-state than as the latest edition of an epic Moro struggle against various 
colonialisms.” As such, the violence, unrest and mistrust that mar Mindanao are less the product 
of religious tensions (which many scholars argue were rather exceptional, historically) and more 
the deliberate fabrication of actors affiliated with the state, carefully designed to achieve specific 
goals. 
Migration to and settlement in Cagayan de Oro 
Geographical considerations 
The siting of Philippine secondary cities (the primate city being Metro Manila) was determined by 
proximity to resources, water access and strategic location, as defined by habitable relief and 
protection from natural hazards (Francia 2010, Huff and Angeles 2011, De Koninck 2012). The 
city of Cagayan de Oro reflects this tendency, with water and topography featuring prominently 
in its geography and settlement patterns. The city’s location on the coast of Northern Mindanao, 
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at the mouth of the great Cagayan River, is indicative of the importance of water in CDO’s story 
and its connections with other parts of Mindanao and other Philippine islands, and beyond to 
other parts of Southeast Asia. 
CDO is located in Mindanao, the second largest island in the Philippine archipelago (Fig. 3.1). 
The city is nestled between the central coastline of Macajalar Bay to the north and the lush 
plateaus and mountains of Lanao del Sur and Bukidnon that bound the city from east to west to 
the south (Fig. 3.2). These upland areas are part of the vast river basins of seven rivers and six big 
creeks that traverse the city and empty into Macajalar Bay (LGU of CDO 2012). The Cagayan 
River basin is one of the largest in Northern Mindanao, covering an aggregate area of 136,046 
hectares (Scientific research and risk assessment committee for TS Sendong 2012). It is bowl-
shaped, fed by eight major tributaries, and prone to flooding (Scientific research and risk 
assessment committee for TS Sendong 2012). Previously, the watershed supported a rich and 
abundant biodiversity and offered a generally stable climate; these two factors are credited with 
attracting and retaining settlers (Montalvan 2002). Today, its lands have been logged, mined or 
used for short-term crop production (Corrales, Mascarinas et al. 2011, LGU of CDO 2012, 
NEDA 2012). In the Bukidnon headwater regions, for example, destructive and widespread 
logging operations and lax enforcement of forest protection laws have resulted in the siltation of 
the Cagayan, Iponan and Tagoloan Rivers and the flooding of surrounding areas (Edgerton 
2008).  
The city’s topography constrains development. Within the city limits, steep inclined escarpments 
separate the lowlands along the bay and CDO’s rivers from the highlands. In 2010, 35.8% of city 
land was classified as agricultural, with the remaining 64.2% of non-agricultural lands classified as 
residential, commercial, industrial, special class, other properties, exempt properties, and open 
spaces (LGU of CDO 2012, 7). Only 28% of CDO’s total land area (13,587 ha out of a total 
56,967 ha) has a slope of eight percent or less (LGU of CDO 2012), meaning that most of the 
city’s landmass is ill-suited for infrastructure, residential, agricultural, commercial and industrial 
development. The only level or gently sloping areas are concentrated on the narrow coastal plain, 
the flood plain areas of the Cagayan and Iponan Rivers and in the upland terraces (LGU of CDO 
2012).  
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Fig. 3.2. Topographical map of Northern Mindanao. © Marc Girard, 2015. 
Such topographical challenges influenced the spatial pattern of urban development, concentrating 
people and infrastructure into the limited relatively flat areas. The city’s first buildings – the 
cathedral, convent, jail and courthouse – were erected at a high point near both the Cagayan 
River and Macajalar Bay under the watchful eyes of the Portuguese-born Recollect Fray Agustin 
de San Pedro who was charged with the Christianisation and pacification of Cagayan during the 
Spanish colonial period (Demetrio 1995, Roa 2012). When these buildings were first constructed 
circa 1624 (Demetrio 1995), the site was estimated to be less than 100 m from the bay. Now, this 
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same site is five kilometres away due to extensive siltation of the Cagayan River, and the land 
between the bay and the old city centre is densely built-up.  
An exhibit at Xavier University’s Museo de Oro in CDO shows that residential, commercial and 
industrial development first spread northward and eastward along what is now Burgos Street, 
which parallels the river, and out toward the port (Burton 2013). Once the land parallel to the 
river was built up, development radiated outward from around this centre. Although permanent 
structures were concentrated in flat lowland areas 10 m or less above sea level, the areas first 
developed were rarely flooded. In contrast, the lands adjacent to the river in barangays Macasandig 
and Carmen were used as rice farms in the 1920s, which benefitted from the periodic flooding 
that replenishes soil nutrients. The rice fields in these barangays are now a mixture of commercial 
buildings, informal and formal settlements, and flattened settlements devastated by Typhoon 
Sendong.  
The rapid and mostly unplanned construction of formal middle class housing developments and 
informal housing settlements in the flood plains began in the 1990s when there was no other land 
near the city’s economic and cultural centre available to the influx of migrants. For example, the 
large sandbar in the Cagayan River known as Isla de Oro mushroomed into a bustling informal 
settlement. Isla de Oro was one of the many locations covered under a settlement ban that was 
issued, but not implemented, by the local government. Tragically, it was also one of the areas 
devastated by Typhoon Sendong. 
Natural hazards in Cagayan de Oro 
As a whole, the Philippine archipelago is subject to frequent and intense natural hazards, 
including typhoons, landslides and flash floods (Francia 2010, De Koninck 2012), which often 
unfold into disasters and affect people, infrastructure and development. The proximity of CDO 
to mountain ranges and to coastal areas, for example, increases its exposure to landslide, flooding 
and storm surge hazards (Fig. 3.3; LGU of CDO 2012).  
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Fig. 3.3. The susceptibility of Cagayan de Oro to floods and landslides. The map indicates areas with high susceptibility to flooding 
(purple) and low to moderate susceptibility to flooding (pale pink); and areas with high (red), moderate (green) or low (yellow) 
susceptibility to landslides. Main roads are depicted with a continuous black line, rivers with a blue line, municipal boundaries with a 
thick dashed line and trails with a think dashed line. Source: Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Mines and 
Geosciences Bureau (DENR-MGB)(2011), adapted by Marc Girard.
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Yet, CDO has been largely considered safe from natural hazards, albeit erroneously. In seven 
months of fieldwork, nearly every single person with whom I spoke – both within and outside of 
the city – made a point of informing me that typhoons and floods “don’t visit CDO” or “are not 
in people’s consciousness,” and that “Sendong was just a freak incident.” The myth that 
“typhoons don’t come to CDO” (or to Mindanao more generally) recurs in local historical 
accounts (cf. Demetrio 1995), and persists among local residents, although the occurrence of 
severe tropical storms in 2011 and 2012 seems to have shaken this belief.  
How did the narrative of a disaster-free CDO originate and persist? Like most myths, it contains 
a kernel of truth. CDO lies south of the nation’s typhoon belt (Pelzer 1948), but within the 
Intertropical Convergence Zone (De Koninck 2012). As depicted in the United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Regional Office for Asia Pacific’s hazard map, 
CDO does not fall within any of the tropical storm intensity zones, meaning that it has less than a 
ten percent probability of being hit by a category 1 to 5 tropical storm in the next decade (Fig. 
3.4). CDO does not experience natural hazards at the intensity or frequency of many other parts 
of the country, but the city still is subject to the occasional violent storm (LGU of CDO 2012). 
According to the Manila Observatory, typhoons strike CDO once every 80 to 100 years (PPDO 
no date). Thus, CDO and Mindanao more generally are rightfully perceived as being relatively 
safe as compared to the Eastern Visayas and the eastern coast of Luzon (Fig. 3.4).  
Under the American colonial government, the myth was perpetuated through official propaganda 
and mass media designed to attract homesteaders to Mindanao agricultural settlements. Pelzer 
(1948) recounts an exchange he observed in the early 1940s between the chief of the National 
Land Settlement Administration and two representatives of a tenant organization in Tarlac 
province, Luzon. The farmers expressed their preference for settlement in a Mindanao 
agricultural colony instead of a Northern Luzon alternative “because they had read in the press 
that Koronadal [in Mindanao] was free from typhoons” (Pelzer 1948, 234). Despite the 
pervasiveness of the myth, geographical features and historical events that transpired before 
Tropical Storm Sendong (2011) and Super-typhoon Pablo (2012) belie it (Montalvan 2002, 2014).  
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Fig. 3.4. Natural hazard risks in the Philippines. Source: OCHA (2011), adapted by Marc Girard. 
 
 
 62   
 
The city and its environs have previous experiences with flooding. The CDO Disaster Risk 
Assessment Report cites nine separate typhoon-rain induced flooding incidents between 1916 and 
2011 (LGU of CDO 2012, 12). Anecdotal evidence indicates additional incidents of minor and 
major flooding of the Cagayan River during this period (cf. Demetrio 1981, Montalvan 2002, 
2011). Two of these floods deserve some explanation here because of their link to Typhoon 
Sendong. A 1916 storm followed a trajectory similar to Sendong and inflicted similar damage. 
Heavy rains fell from 21-24 January 1916 causing major flooding and killing people and animals, 
but it was the post-flood cholera and smallpox that actually exacted the greatest toll (Montalvan 
2002, Roa 2012). As a result of the 1916 flood, an entire barangay was abandoned. Yet, few 
current residents are aware of the flood (Montalvan 2002, 2011). A single panel in the City 
Museum of Cagayan de Oro commemorates the event: a photograph of houses piled up against 
each other taken by the Hon. Antonio Tadeo Cosin and a short explanatory paragraph (Roa 
2012). In more recent memory is the January 2009 floods, in which the Cagayan River breached 
its banks on 3, 11 and 13 January, flooding homes, streets and businesses near the river (Fig. 3.5), 
and affecting approximately 15,000 families. The lack of human casualties is attributed to the fact 
that the 2009 flooding occurred relatively slowly and during daylight hours. After the flood, 
Catholic churches and other non-governmental groups distributed construction materials 
enabling families whose homes had been destroyed to rebuild in-situ. As recounted by several key 
informants, these same organisations were accused three years later of enabling the devastation in 
locations affected by both the 2009 and 2011 floods because they had implicitly encouraged 
residents to rebuild in hazardous locations. 
Knowing a particular part of the city was hazard-prone is unlikely to have deterred prospective 
residents intent on living there. Hazard risks are rarely the most significant consideration in 
deciding where to live. In fact, the economic opportunities that attract migrants can be, in some 
cases, so compelling that people stay knowing full well that their homes and businesses are 
located in natural hazard-prone locations (Gaillard 2008). There is little evidence (apart from the 
aforementioned exchange overhead by Pelzer (1948)) that the presence or presumed absence of 
natural hazards were significant push or pull factors for in-migration to CDO during the 
American and early postwar years. Rather, political, economic and social considerations were 
more salient in propelling out-migration from other parts of the Philippines, and in influencing 
where they settled in the city. 
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Fig. 3.5. The areas along the Cagayan River flooded in January 2009. Source: Xavier University 
Engineering Resource Center (2009). 
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Economic, social and political considerations for migration 
Historically, the Cagayan territory had been connected to other parts of the archipelago and 
Southeast Asia through maritime trade and migration. For example, the Cagayaños and Spaniards 
had known about each other for more than six decades before the Spanish Recollects first arrived 
at the Himologan settlement,13 which lay along the Cagayan River, several kilometres inland from 
Macajalar Bay (Demetrio 1995). When the Spanish navigator Miguel López de Legaspi captured a 
Muslim junk off Camiguin Island in March 1565, “he was surprised to find its pilot to be a skilled 
navigator familiar with not only Philippine but with Chinese, Indonesian, and Indian waters, and 
plying a four-cornered trade between Manila, Mindanao, China, Borneo” (Demetrio 1995, 4). 
Artifacts displayed in Capitol University’s Museum of Three Cultures and in Xavier University’s 
Museo de Oro provide additional evidence of Cagayan’s role in the Southeast Asian maritime 
trade (De La Peña 2012, Burton 2013). Cagayan was thus directly involved in a well-established 
maritime trade network connecting what would later become the nations of Southeast, South and 
East Asia (Church 2003, Francia 2010).  
Not all visitors to Cagayan left. Demetrio (1995, 2) points out that “in legend and probably in 
fact too” the indigenous Bukidnon people were driven out of the coastal and lowland areas into 
the mountains by Visayan migrants prior to the Spanish colonial era. Although the Spaniards 
largely failed to penetrate and pacify most parts of Mindanao, there was continued migration 
from crowded parts of the Visayas to coastal areas in Northern Mindanao during the Spanish era 
(Pelzer 1948). The colonial government did not provide official support to said migration. 
This migration continued under the auspices of American and independent Philippine rule as 
migrants flowed into traditional areas of in-migration. As a destination, Misamis Oriental was a 
perennial favourite for migrants from the Central Visayas, especially from Cebu and Bohol 
(Edgerton 2008). Once established, the migrants encouraged their relatives and friends to join 
them. Between 1939 and 1948, Misamis Oriental has the greatest population growth rate of any 
Philippine province (Edgerton 2008). The growth cannot be attributed solely to a particular 
                                                          
13 Before the coming of the Spaniards, the site that was to become Cagayan was originally called 
Kalambagohan, on account of the many lambago trees that grew along the riverbanks (Demetrio 1995). In 
several languages spoken in the Philippines the suffix –han indicates a place. Hence Kalambagohan is the 
place of the lambago trees. 
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government intervention because CDO was not a site of any official state-sponsored migration 
program or policy (Pelzer 1948).  
Instead, the unplanned and spontaneous inter-regional migration reflects the ramping up of 
historical movement and the intensification of demographic and agrarian problems in the 
Visayas. During the American era, overcrowding,14 continued cultivation of annual crops of the 
steep slopes of Cebu Island, and the precipitous drop in agricultural productivity resulting from 
such practices forced Cebuanos to migrate to neighbouring islands, especially to Mindanao 
(Pelzer 1948). Thus agrarian problems related to inequitable land distribution, overcrowding and 
difficulty in meeting subsistence needs in Cebu, Bohol, and other parts of the Visayas were 
important push factors spurring out-migration. Strong social networks connecting Visayans to 
CDO and Misamis Oriental were an important pull factor directing the destination of this 
movement to the closest large and thriving city to the south.  
In recent decades, urbanisation and the promise of better economic opportunities in CDO has 
lured migrants from adjacent provinces and towns (LGU of CDO 2012). Indeed, labour-
motivated migration among regions continues to be a major source of internal migration in the 
Philippines (Kelly 2009, Francia 2010), including rural to rural flows, and flows into, out of and 
between cities (Fuwa 2011). Faced with overpopulation in rural areas (De Koninck 2012), 
migration appeared to be the only way of securing an adequate livelihood in the face of 
decentralisation policies that devolved development and welfare responsibilities from the national 
to the provincial or even municipal governments (Gibson, Cahill et al. 2010). The industrial 
sector and cities, however, cannot absorb the excess labour (De Koninck 2012), leading to a 
seemingly paradoxical relationship of accelerated rural-urban migration in the context of rising 
un- and underemployment in cities (Calero Cuervo and Kim Hin 1998). Despite boasting the 
highest 10-year average growth in Gross Regional Domestic Product in Mindanao (Rubillo 2014), 
the unemployment and underemployment rates in Region-X in April 2014 were 5.3% and 20.7%, 
                                                          
14 The population density statistics provided by Pelzer (1948, 84) underscore the huge variation among 
Philippine islands, and point to the attractiveness of Mindanao. Circa 1939, the population density was 
53.8 persons/km2 nationally, with vast discrepancies between sparsely and densely populated areas. Cebu, 
for example, has a density of 214.8 persons/km2 whereas Mindanao had a density of only 19.3 
persons/km2. Crowding was even worse in the small peasant farms on crowded plains and valleys; the 
population density in Cebu’s agricultural areas was 767.5 persons/km2. 
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respectively (PSA 2014). In comparison, the national unemployment and underemployment rates 
were 7.0% and 18.2% (PSA 2014).  
Evidence from interviews and local media sources indicates that unemployment and 
underemployment in sending areas were, and continue to be, salient issues for CDO residents 
who came to the city since the 1970s. A lack of viable economic opportunities drove them out of 
their old communities and into a city they presumed had them. The lack of economic options in 
many parts of the Philippines outside large cities is linked to larger problems such as the takeover 
of large swathes of agricultural land by large corporations or landowners, deforestation, resource 
extraction, land conversion, and the government policies and programs that explicitly or tacitly 
support them; they all displace people and impede their access to viable livelihoods (cf. Bello, 
Docena et al. 2004). 
The war in Mindanao 
Despite the limited geography of the war in Mindanao (Abinales 2010), the whole island carries a 
tarnished reputation of violence, unrest and mistrust, which, in turn, has deterred potential 
migrants from outside the region. Yet, CDO maintains a reputation as a peaceful city largely 
exempt from violence. Informants described the city as “the rest and recreation centre for the 
military forces and the revolutionary forces” and “the playground of opposing factions where 
Philippine Armed Forces, Moro and Communist rebel fighters lay down their arms and go 
malling” alongside each other at the city’s four major shopping malls.15 A CDO-based 
businessman and philanthropist I interviewed went as far as distinguishing between the petty 
crimes committed in CDO and the major crimes committed in other Mindanao cities such as 
Davao, Zamboanga and Cotabatu. He explained that the major criminals come to CDO to 
pickpocket, and then return to Davao and Zamboanga where they assassinate people and bomb 
                                                          
15 A legacy of the American colonial era, “malling” is a favourite pastime of many Filipinos in which they 
enjoy air-conditioned stores, eat at fast food or fancy restaurants, listen to concerts, receive vaccinations, 
attend church services and occasionally purchase items. Philippine malls are indicators of the relative 
stability, safety and economic potential of a city. For example, Guisano malls are found everywhere in 
Mindanao; they sell inexpensive goods, house crowded chaotic stores, attract customers from all economic 
classes, and have very lax mall security. In contrast Ayala malls are known to exist only in cities considered 
to be very safe; they house luxury brand stores, are very clean and calm, attract upper and upper middle-
class shoppers, and have very tight mall security. There are only two of Ayala malls in all of Mindanao, 
including the new Centrio Mall that opened in CDO in 2012. 
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buildings. As a result of its peaceful reputation, CDO has drawn Mindanao-bound migrants from 
the Visayas and Luzon, as well as migrants from other parts of Mindanao seeking to escape 
violence and unrest, among other reasons. The conflict in Mindanao, however, still affects 
economic activities, social dynamics and politics in the city. For example, commercial banks in 
CDO receive money earned from illicit activities in the underground economy of Muslim 
Mindanao (Abinales 2010), and the business community is continually faced with investment, 
supply and distribution problems linked to the conflict. 
The only time the CDO-as-a-peaceful-space narrative is seriously challenged occurs during the 
electoral period. Two anecdotes illustrate this dynamic. The first occurred during an interview at 
a research institute in CDO. My informant advised me against going to Iligan City to conduct 
interviews because she feared that my family and I would be kidnapped. She explained that it was 
approaching the electoral campaign period and that the ransom from a presumed affluent white 
foreign family would to bolster campaign funds. The second incident occurred several months 
later when a prominent lawyer from one of the affluent established families in CDO offered me a 
ride back into town after a meeting we had both attended. He was concerned I would fall victim 
to a “drive-by snatching” from a “thief on a motor bike.” He explained that during the election 
gun ban “thieves” are especially brazen because they are not afraid of retaliation. For 90 days 
before and 60 days after elections, everyone except uniformed officers is banned from carrying 
firearms.16 Consequently street crime in CDO rises during the election gun ban, and home 
robberies decrease because the “thieves” know people keep their guns at home. The election gun 
ban was instituted because of the risk of electoral violence, especially between political family 
                                                          
16 Guns are everywhere in the Philippines. Armed guards patrol the entrance of many restaurants 
(including McDonald’s!), banks, schools and shopping malls. Young attractive saleswomen sell guns, 
bullets and related accessories in shopping malls. My husband, quite knowledgeable about firearms from 
over two decades of playing violent video games, was amazed and horrified by the plethora of guns, 
including military grade weapons, he saw on the streets, in markets, and in private businesses. On one 
occasion we left Cogon market abruptly when he noticed a very young child carelessly waving a gun 
around like a toy – only it was not a toy. Despite the abundance of firearms, there were no reports of gun 
violence in CDO during my fieldwork. 
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dynasties.17 These two examples also illustrate the race- and class-based assumptions of my 
informants. 
The peaceful space narrative at the city level does not scale down to the barangay, sitio18 or street 
level. According to the police, the incidence of criminal activity is roughly even across barangays. 
Yet, research participants frequently reported that the barangay they personally inhabited was safer 
and more peaceful than other barangays. This disjuncture between city and barangay scale peace 
and safety discourses had real repercussions in the aftermath of Sendong, particularly in the 
evacuation and relocation sites. The incongruence, like the two anecdotes described above, also 
underlines the salience of profoundly racialised, gendered, and classed dynamics in shaping 
narratives. The lawyer, for example, performed what he perceived as his duty in protecting a 
foreign woman from the purportedly violent streets in the city’s working class sitios. Similar to the 
lawyer, the comments made by many research participants revealed racialised, gendered, and 
classed discourses about who settled where in the city. 
Who settles where? 
Today, the city of Cagayan de Oro is the provincial capital of Misamis Oriental, the regional 
capital of Northern Mindanao (Region X), and the primary gateway to the rest of Mindanao. It 
houses the provincial Capitol, provincial government agencies, and regional offices for many of 
the national government agencies. In addition to being the administrative centre of Region X, 
CDO is the education and business centre and a major transport and transshipment hub in 
Mindanao (LGU of CDO 2012). CDO is a chartered city, meaning that it has an administration 
separate from that of Misamis Oriental.  
CDO is the third most populous city in Mindanao, after Davao and Zamboanga Cities. 
According to the latest published census data from 2010, the city counted 602,088 residents (PSA 
                                                          
17  A recent example of horrific electoral violence was the Maguindanao massacre on 23 November 2009. 
Buluan vice-mayor Esmael Mangudadatu had arranged for members of his family, journalists and lawyers 
to accompany him when he filed a certificate of candidacy to challenge Andal Ampatuan, Jr. for the 
mayorship of datu Unsay. The Ampatuans are a leading Muslim politican clan, and had threatened 
Mangudadatu if he filed his candidacy. The Ampatuans followed through with their threat: 100 armed 
men stopped Mangudadatu’s convoy on its way to the Commission of Elections office, then brutally 
murdered and raped 57 members of the convey and bystanders (Abinales 2010). 
18 A sito is hamlet or sub-village. It is smaller than a barangay. 
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2013), making it the tenth most populous city in the Philippines and the most densely populated 
city in Northern Mindanao, with an average of 11 persons per hectare (LGU of CDO 2012, 44). 
The city is divided into 80 barangays (23 rural and 57 urbanised) (LGU of CDO 2014). The most 
densely populated barangays are situated around the city centre and along the coast of the 
Macajalar Bay (Fig. 3.6), with the highest density (450 persons per hectare) in Macabalan, a 
barangay situated on reclaimed land and bounded by Macajalar Bay to the north and the Cagayan 
River to the west (LGU of CDO 2012, 44). The most populous barangays are Carmen (67,583), 
Lapasan (41,903), Kauswagan (34,541), Balulang (32,531) and Bulua (31,345) (PSA 2013).  
Where people settle within the city depends upon several factors, especially economic 
considerations and social connections. The cost of land and housing affects where people live, 
the type of housing they inhabit, and whether they are renters, sharers or homeowners. Social 
networks also strongly influence settlement decisions. Like the Visayan migrants who persuaded 
their kin to settle in CDO (cf. Edgerton 2008), late 20th and early 21st century CDO residents 
convinced their family, friends and acquaintances to settle in their neighbourhoods. As a result, 
for example, there are sitios such as Villa Angeles in barangay Balulang where many of the Muslim 
residents came from Marawi City in Lanao del Sur in the 1990s based on positive word-of-mouth 
accounts. Residents inhabiting the city’s informal settlements also display a shared geographical 
origin or ethnicity.  
As previously mentioned, natural hazard risks were not a significant factor in recent settlement 
decisions for migrants of any economic class. In CDO, both formal middle-class subdivisions 
such as Emily Homes in barangay Macanhan and informal settlements such as Isla de Oro and Isla 
Bugnaw in barangay Consolacion are located in hazard-prone areas, and were all heavily affected 
by Typhoon Sendong. These middle-class residences were recently built; developers had 
advertised stunning riverside views. (After Sendong, developers began advertising “flood-free” 
homes.) For low income households whose transportation budgets are very limited, the attraction 
of riverside living was less about gorgeous views than proximity to jobs, services, markets and 
people in their social networks. Typically these low income settlements are a mere $0.16 motorela 
ride lasting five to ten minutes to the city centre. 
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Fig. 3.6. Population density of Cagayan de Oro by barangay. © Marc Girard, 2015. 
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Few city spaces are the sole purview of a single group, although different groups of people have 
very different levels of access to and control over these spaces and the way life unfolds there. For 
example, all city barangays include households of varying income levels, although certain 
neighbourhoods may be exclusively inhabited by rich or by poor people. Like in many parts of 
the Philippines, makeshift houses built from locally-sourced materials sit adjacent to the tidy high 
exterior walls enclosing affluent gated communities (cf. Alcazaren, Ferrer and Icamina 2011). Yet, 
many poor, informal residents freely pass through the gates to work in the most intimate spaces 
of private homes, raising children, touching personal belongings, and hearing private 
conversations of the rich. Such divergent access to and control over city space had real impacts in 
the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. 
What do people build? 
There are different ways to answer the question, ‘what do they build?’ People build houses. They 
also build communities. This section focuses on the physical characteristics of formal and 
informal housing settlements. The social, economic, cultural, ecological and political aspects of 
community is beyond the scope of this section, but is explored extensively in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The type and quality of housing is frequently a question of availability and affordability. CDO has 
a housing shortage. According to the local government unit of CDO and the Region X offices of 
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and the National Economic and Development 
Authority, the ideal household to housing ratio is 1:1, but in 2010 the ratio was 116,224: 113,321 
(1.03:1), indicating there was a doubling up of housing and a shortage of 2903 housing units 
(LGU of CDO 2012, 49). The devastation of Typhoon Sendong, however, drastically changed 
the scenario, with 4362 houses totally washed out, 6283 partially damaged, and countless others 
now sited in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Mines and Geology 
Bureau (DENR-MGB)-designated danger zones (LGU of CDO 2012, 49).19 The local 
government has suggested that the backlog can be met temporarily with “unacceptable housing 
units – those made of light materials like cogon, nipa, anahaw, etc. which will not last for five years 
and makeshift houses” (LGU of CDO 2012, 49). This statement reflects the preference of most 
                                                          
19 After Typhoon Sendong, the President declared several heavily flooded areas in the city as “no build 
zones” where the construction of permanent residential and commercial structures is prohibited. 
Previously, many of these areas were densely populated with informal housing settlements. 
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Filipinos for concrete houses, which are perceived as more durable and comfortable than houses 
built with other materials.  
In the Philippines, urban housing settlements are characterised as either planned or formal 
settlements, or as unplanned or informal settlements. The former description is typically applied 
to middle or upper class developments, and the latter to working class ones. Informal settlements 
are usually called “squatter cities” or “slums,” except by the residents themselves who call them 
by the neighbourhood’s proper name (e.g. Isla de Oro, Isla Bugnaw). A stunning coffee table 
book, Lungsod iskwater: the evolution of informality as a dominant pattern in Philippine cities, identifies five 
types of informal settlements in Philippine cities: tabing-ilog (by the river), tabing-dagat (by the sea), 
barangay basura (by the dump), along the riles (by the train tracks), and gillage (around exclusive 
village) (Alcazaren, Ferrer and Icamina 2011, 12). CDO has four of the five types – despite 
promises from the national government and a completed feasibility study, there is no railway 
system (and hence no train tracks) running through the city (cf. Diaz 2013). CDO also has its 
share of so-called planned settlements. 
In distinguishing between the two types of settlements, regional government agencies reveal their 
interest in governmentality and their frustration with non-state spaces. According to the Office of 
Civil Defense (OCD) (2012, 13), informal settlements are “unplanned, usually overcrowded, have 
poor sanitation and other basic facilities, and are not in compliance with current planning 
regulation and building standards” and “have been constructed on land that the occupants have 
no legal claim to.” In contrast, formal housing “is constructed following the building codes and 
planning standards enforced by local government and national housing agencies and has security 
of tenure as it follows formal procedures of legal ownership” (OCD 2012, 14). Informal 
settlements are unreadable by outside observers, and thus hinder state interventions aimed at 
improving “sanitation and other basic facilities” and enforcing “planning regulation and building 
standards” (OCD 2012, 13).  The definition of formal settlements is equally telling, problematic 
and ironic. It values adherence to building codes, planning standards and formal legal procedures 
– all forms of regulation and legitimation that states can employ to exclude (Hall, Hirsch and Li 
2011), or to increase legibility and to facilitate manipulation (Scott 1998). The phrase “enforced 
by local government and national housing agencies” in the definition is ironic, and blurs the lines 
between formal and informal housing in CDO (OCD 2012, 14). The municipality had ordinances 
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prohibiting the construction of residences on hazard-prone land. It just did not enforce them 
(Corrales 2011). If building codes and planning standards were not enforced, or the siting not 
compliant with the no-build danger zones of DENR-MGB hazard maps, then shouldn’t these 
affluent middle-class developments be labelled informal settlements, too? 
Moreover, the definition of informal settlements is decidedly pejorative, reflecting a broadly-held 
misunderstanding about the reality of actual residents. For residents, the siting of the settlement 
was planned insofar as it is located on free or inexpensive land close to social networks, 
livelihoods, and critical amenities and services. The houses themselves may be planned but built 
with affordable, locally-sourced light materials, or built and then iteratively renovated as resources 
became available. Instead of describing their neighbourhood as “crowded,” residents focus on 
the benefits of being surrounded by a large customer base that supports their livelihood activities. 
As will be unpacked in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the sometimes unsubstantiated assumptions about 
people’s needs and wants has material consequences. Many of the trustees who directed post-
disaster efforts in CDO were the same ones who have previously shaped migration to and 
settlement within the city. 
Trustees shaping migration and settlement 
Recall that trustees assert a “position defined by the claim to know how others should live, to 
know what is best for them, to know what they need” (Li 2007a, 4). Since the beginning of the 
Spanish colonial era in the 16th century and into the present day, a range of trustees have 
governed the Philippine archipelago, and have shaped migration and settlement patterns. The 
positioning of each of the trustees as “state” or “civil,” or as “religious” or “secular” actors has 
shifted under Spanish and American, Japanese occupation, and Philippine independence (cf. Tan 
2009, Francia 2010). Most trustees, in fact, have simultaneously spanned multiple categories. For 
example, it is impossible to identify a purely religious actor or institution who has never been 
involved in state or civil matters, or a politician who was not taught at a religious (usually 
Catholic) school, volunteers in their church and has no ties to influential members of the 
business community or voluntary sector. Much like how the state is simultaneously a “composite 
reality” and “mythicized abstraction” (Foucault 2003b, 244) in pursuit of discordant and 
incoherent objectives, the trustees occupying each category also form “a multilayered and 
conflictual ensemble” (Gupta and Sharma 2006, 291). Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity and 
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brevity, it is helpful to discuss the trustees who have influenced CDO-bound migration and 
settlement patterns as state, Christian, Muslim, or elite family trustees.  
State trustees  
Earlier parts of the chapter discussed migration to and settlement in both Mindanao and CDO. 
The movement of people into Mindanao was alternately helped and hindered by which variation 
of the Mindanao-as-frontier narrative was promulgated. Different governments, government 
departments, politicians, and other representatives of the colonial, and later independent, state 
employed diverse, and often conflicting, discourses, policies and programs that changed over 
time. In CDO, government incentives to develop different parts of the local economy helped 
convince job-seekers to settle nearby; for example, investment in the maritime transportation and 
shipping industry attracted people to barangays near the port. The situation in which various levels 
of government, and even different government agencies within a single level of government, 
pursue discordant objectives and vie to govern particular spaces continues today. The following 
paragraphs elaborate on one particular municipal program to illustrate how state trustees 
currently influence where Cagayaños live in the city, and to underscore the incoherence of state 
trustees. 
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Cagayaños associate their mayor20 with many things: a very deep voice, incessant smoking, the 
colour purple,21 an aversion to attending Mass,22 peace-brokering,23 membership in political 
parties in opposition to the President, controversy, land-banking, pro-poor sympathies,24 and the 
piso-piso program. The last four elements are components of a municipal program that has 
influenced where many poor residents have settled in the city. Under the previous administration, 
the city’s Office of the Marginal Settler had helped to organise informal settlers into associations 
or cooperatives so that they could purchase land. The city government contributed ten percent. 
Still, many families had difficulty in consistently paying the monthly mortgage payments 
                                                          
20 Mayor Vicente Emano was ousted from office in the May 2013 elections, so technically he is the 
“former mayor.” However, because this research project focuses on the pre-Sendong period up to April 
2013 during his mayoral reign, I refer to him as the “mayor” and not the “former mayor” throughout this 
dissertation. 
21 The most obvious and widespread (and garish) mark of the mayor on the urban landscape is the use of 
the colour purple. It’s a colour he has liked since childhood. He chose it as the official colour of his 
political party, and uses it in abundance. In nearly all city barangays, the infrastructure, including flyovers 
(overpasses), barangay covered courts, bridges, and the main city market, is painted purple. The mayor’s 
office has two Ikea-style purple couches, light violet walls, curtains patterned with giant purple flowers, 
and purple paneling around each ceiling light. Moreover, as he explained to me, purple provokes the ire of 
his political opponents. 
22 His refusal to attend church services – in spite of his claim to believe in God – distinguishes him from 
his predecessors. Moreover, religious icons or symbols of any sort are conspicuously absent at city call. 
Instead of the usual crucifix or Santo Niño statue that adorn other government offices in the city, the lobby 
display at city hall consists of four six feet high rectangular columns presenting his peace-brokering 
achievements. 
23 The mayor stands apart as one of few Philippine leaders who is trusted by all sides of the Mindanao 
conflict (except by the Muslim separatist group Abu Sayyaf, which he states are “only terrorists with no 
ideology”). During his career, he successfully negotiated the release of 13 of 14 kidnapped persons, and 
personally exchanged the ransom money for the hostages. He boasts that he can even bring his beautiful 
secretaries and other women with him when he travels into hostile territory, announce that there are 
women there if the men want to have sex with them, knowing that the women will not be touched. He 
explains that his reputation among the leaders of diverse groups in Mindanao as a respected peace-broker 
derives from his decades-long campaign for the autonomy of Mindanao and his insistence that in 
Mindanao there are no Muslims, Christians, Indigenous Peoples, communists, etc., - only “Mindanaoan.” 
24 The mayor’s voter base, selective enforcement of municipal bylaws, preferred means of communication 
and political priorities and initiatives all reinforce his “pro-poor” reputation.  
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demanded by the landowner for 15 to 25 years. In his first year in office, the mayor replaced the 
Office of the Marginal Settler with the Estate Management Division (EMD), a municipal office 
responsible for relocation, and he introduced the piso-piso program. Through piso-piso, for a one-
time fee of one peso ($0.02) poor families could purchase a 70 m2 lot on which they could build a 
house. Beneficiaries own the land and any building they erect on the lot, thereby gaining security 
of tenure. The head of EMD describes the program as a way to resolve “the situation [in which] 
there are a lot of people residing within areas where [it is] not really a dignified place or a suitable 
place for these families who came in the city.”  
As of February 2013, the city had sold more than 2000 lots to piso-piso beneficiaries. The lots 
come from the mayor’s “land-banking” initiative in which the city used a “proactive approach” to 
purchase “vacant” lands that could be used for future relocation. Before selling one peso lots to 
beneficiaries, the city scouted potential properties, negotiated a purchase agreement with the 
landowner, acquired the land, arranged the zoning, and prepared the land for roads and services. 
As of January 2013, the city had 36 sites for piso-piso relocation, including 30 in-situ sites. This 
availability of land was a critical factor in expediting the construction of relocation housing for 
Sendong survivors.  
The mayor matter-a-factly admits that his piso-piso program has gotten him into trouble. He was 
accused of plunder, and was critiqued that some resettlement lots were located in geohazard-
designated areas, including areas devastated by Typhoon Sendong. In early January 2013, for 
example, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) accused the mayor of gross 
negligence and dereliction of duty in relation to Typhoon Sendong, and attempted to deliver 
suspension papers. The DILG charged that the mayor’s piso-piso program had encouraged city 
residents to inhabit unsafe areas. The national government representatives failed because they 
could not reach the door to city hall. Hundreds of supporters from informal settlements and 
relocation sites had responded to a request to surround city hall in a week-long sit-in to protect 
the mayor. Despite the controversy, the mayor insists that the piso-piso program has benefited the 
city’s urban poor. He noted that the national government’s Ombudsman’s Office publically 
defended him against the DILG charges with its statement: “if only all local government units in 
the country would follow the programs of the city mayor of Cagayan de Oro then there would be 
lesser poor in this country.”  
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Catholic and other Christian trustees 
The Philippines is the “bastion of Christianity in Asia” (de Guzman 2011). From the 16th century 
until very recently, Christianity had made little headway in Asia (Moreno 2006), unlike in Africa 
and Latin America. This difference is attributed to (1) the perceived youth and lack of 
sophistication of Christianity as compared to the older religions already present in the region, (2) 
“Asian institutions and intellectual traditions [that] were sturdier than their African and Latin 
American counterparts,” and (3) the incompatibility of “Western individualism and the stress on 
religious truth” with “Eastern life, which emphasized the rules and requirements of community” 
(Calderisi 2013, 119). In contrast to many of its Asian neighbours, the Philippines has embraced 
Christianity, in large part due to the wide-reaching governmental interventions of Catholic 
Church officials during more than three centuries of Spanish colonial rule. The 2000 census 
national survey found that almost 93% of the population is Christian (USCIRF 2013). According 
to the census, the religious affiliations of Filipinos are: Catholic (82.81%, including Roman 
Catholic (81.04%) and Aglipayan25 (1.77%)), Muslim (5.06%), mainline Protestant (3.10%), 
Evangelical (2.82%), Iglesia ni Cristo (2.31%), and other (3.90%) (NSO 2003, 200 in Moreno 2006, 
33).  
Clearly, Catholicism is not the only Christian religion practiced in the Philippines, nor are its 
officials the only Christian trustees wielding financial, political and social clout (Hedman 2006, 
Moreno 2006). Still, the Philippines remains the third largest national Catholic Church, surpassed 
only by Brazil and Mexico (Moreno 2006), and now “rivals the Vatican as the most Catholic place 
on Earth” (Calderisi 2013, 122). Over its long and storied history in the Philippine islands, the 
Catholic Church hierarchy has established itself as one of three components of the dominant 
bloc of forces in civil society in the Philippines (alongside the U.S. government and the capitalist 
class) (Hedman 2006). It has repeatedly used its hegemonic position to organise and govern the 
physical and social landscape, working alongside and sometimes in opposition to other trustees. 
The following discussion thus focuses on Catholic trustees. 
During the Spanish colonial era, the Catholic Church hierarchy occupied a privileged position as 
a de facto state actor. Spanish rule was officially devoted to the evangelisation of the archipelago, 
                                                          
25 Aglipayan is also called Iglesia Filipina Independente or the Philippine Independent Church. 
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with the church formally awarded considerable autonomy and power within the colonial state 
(Hedman 2006). Colonial administrators and their allies instituted political, social and economic 
structures to achieve the objectives of the motherland, namely “God, glory and gold” (Tan 2009, 
50). The administrators quickly learned that by cooperating with the Catholic priests and friars, 
and by supporting efforts to Catholicise the islands, they could attain their objectives (Tan 2009, 
Francia 2010). For example, in 1622, eight Augustinian Recollect priests arrived and launched a 
religious movement that eventually resulted in the Christianisation of the entire northeastern 
coast of Mindanao; they are credited with pacifying a part of the archipelago deemed 
impenetrable by colonial officials (Demetrio 1995). 
It was extremely difficult for administrators and clerics to rule, extract taxes from, and convert a 
highly dispersed and transient population. The solution they devised was to compel people to 
settle permanently in compact villages; this forced relocation was done under the auspices of 
reduccion (resettlement) policies (Hedman 2006). Spaniards encouraged the pre-existing tendency 
to settle in groups instead of isolated farmsteads (Pelzer 1948), which facilitated Christianisation 
and state supervision. New settlements were patterned according to an abajo de las campanas (under 
the bells) logic, whereby each resident was within earshot of the church and could quickly come 
to Mass or respond to a call for arms (Francia 2010, 69). Ecclesiastical, administrative, and 
business establishments were clustered into a “municipal plaza complex, […] signal[ing] the 
fusion of religious, state, and economic power” (Hedman 2006, 26). Such reorganisation of the 
Philippine territory mostly took place in lowland parts of Luzon, the Visayas and Northern 
Mindanao.  
Through its wide-ranging activities operating at a variety of scales, the influence of the Catholic 
Church hierarchy spanned both private and public spheres. In the Spanish colonial era, each 
village had its own church, run by a Spanish friar who was granted the liberty to rule (and enrich 
himself) as he desired so long as he assisted with tax collection and colonial administrative duties 
(Tan 2009). He administered the private lives of villagers by sanctifying births, deaths and 
marriages in Catholic rituals (Hedman 2006). Throughout the archipelago, the Church 
monopolised education, and censored literature, media and other forms of cultural production 
(Hedman 2006). The local friar was the conduit of state power through his official duties of 
overseeing “the ratification of elections among the principalia (local notables) to positions of 
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municipal and village-level authority (gobernadorcillos and cabezas de barangay)” (Hedman 2006, 26, 
emphasis in original).  
In the countryside, commercial and export-oriented agriculture slowly replaced traditional 
subsistence agriculture, providing the colonial government with a source of sorely needed 
revenues, and a newly emerging elite (e.g. native principalia, Chinese mestizos, Church orders, 
Spanish citizens and government officials) with political and economic structures conducive to 
establishing monopolies and accumulating private landholdings (Tan 2009, Batalla 2010). These 
monopolies disrupted and destroyed the open and dynamic nature of Philippine external trade 
and commerce that existed pre-1521, and later provided the basis for rent-seeking activities of 
elite families (Tan 2009).  
The church and friars were among the great landowners at the beginning of the 20th century in 
the Philippines; for more than 300 years, the Roman Catholic Church and Orders had amassed 
large areas of the best agricultural land, especially around Manila (Pelzer 1948). These vast estates 
or “friar lands” were a source of conflict and repeated revolts. Some of the land titles date back 
to the 17th and 18th centuries, but most of the friar land titles were issued in 1880 and 1894 under 
a weakening Spanish colonial government (Pelzer 1948). Hedman (2006, 26, emphasis added) 
summarises the reach of this de facto state actor: “In short, the Catholic Church did not simply 
‘inflect’ the nature of colonial rule in the Philippines with religious coloration, as has been argued 
for the (Protestant) British Raj in India; it was located at the very core of Spanish state power in the 
archipelago.” Put another way, the Catholic hierarchy practiced an extremely wide-reaching 
governmentality. 
Why were the Catholic Church and its emissaries so successful in governing many parts of 
Luzon, the Visayas and Northern Mindanao? Calderisi (2013) suggests that Catholic missionaries 
began implementing methods that enhanced the receptiveness of locals – especially the ruling 
class – to foreigners and their ideas. Moreover, they prioritised local concerns unrelated to 
evangelisation over their religious duties. The activities of Catholic priests during the Spanish 
colonial era in what is now CDO illustrates the successful application of these tactics. The 
following account is based on a compilation of oral and written histories of Northern Mindanao 
written by the Jesuit priest Francisco R. Demetrio, S.J. (1995), and on articles by and 
conversations with CDO historian Antonio J. Montalvan II (cf. 2002, 2009). 
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In the 16th century, the lumad tribes living in the Cagayan area were at the northern periphery of 
the great Maguindanao sultanate. They were concentrated in the hilltop Himologan settlement 
several kilometres upstream from present-day CDO. Datu Salangsang, the then-chief of the 
Cagayan people, initially rebuffed the request of two Spanish friars to enter Himologan because 
he feared reprisal from the Maguindanao sultanate. Later, he relented and even granted them 
permission to say Mass. When the legendary Sultan of Maguindanao Muhammad Kudarat learned 
that Himologan was harbouring Catholic priests, he ordered Salangsang to kill them. Betting on 
eventual Spanish conquest, and being positively inclined towards Christianity, Salangsang 
appealed for Spanish support. Instead of receiving a battalion of Spanish soldiers, Himologan got 
a single new priest: 23 year old Fray Agustin de San Pedro, trained in architecture, gunnery and 
military tactics. Immediately, Fray Agustin suggested two major changes to Himologan’s defence: 
(1) dispatch spies to track Maguindanao movements, and (2) relocate the fortified settlement. 
Salangsang consented. The new citadel was built circa 1624 at the present-day site of San Agustin 
Cathedral and city hall. Four years later, once Salangsang was convinced of Cagayan’s victory 
over the Maguindano, he and his wife pledged allegiance to Spain and were baptised. By 1634, 
most of Salangsang’s people had also converted. In this way, a young Portuguese priest inspired 
by strategic military considerations – and not Catholic doctrine – had accomplished three major 
feats. He won the trust of Cagayaños by leading successful defensive and offensive military 
operations against the Maguindanao and Maranao fighters. He also initiated the first recorded 
large-scale relocation in the Cagayan territory and the founding of Cagayan de Oro as a 
predominantly Catholic settlement.  
The replacement of Spanish colonial rule by American colonial rule loosened the entanglement of 
church and state in state governance. The Catholic Church shifted into the “emerging public 
sphere of civil society” as its privileges were whittled away by the new American colonial 
government (Hedman 2006, 26). In 1905, the Bureau of Lands bought 23 friar estates totaling 
165,000 hectares of land, then transferred them to the tenants (Pelzer 1948, 91). (The Church was 
generously compensated for its losses, and later, repossessed confiscated property (Hedman 
2006).) The Church’s authority in politics, education, mass media and cultural expression was 
similarly eroded. Control over local elections and municipal politics was no longer the purview of 
parish priests (Hedman 2006). Instead of backing the Catholic Church, the new colonial 
government endorsed “secular education, civil liberties, and freedom of religion” (Hedman 2006, 
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26). Hedman (2006, 26) surmises this disentanglement yielded a “Catholicism [that] now serv[es] 
as a ‘civil’ rather than a state religion.”  
The identity of the Church changed under the auspices of American rule. The Church was 
demoted from a position of equality with colonial authorities to a subordinate position. In 1902, 
the Church splintered when archbishop Gregorio Aglipay and other dissident priests formed the 
Iglesia Filipina Independente (Philippine Independent Church), taking one quarter of Philippine 
Catholics with them (Moreno 2006, 33). American bishops replaced Spanish bishops (Hedman 
2006). The Church adapted to its reconfiguration as a civil and fractured institution, and quickly 
regained its influence on power through new means. Today, the Catholic Church continues to 
sway political decision-making and remains a fundamental collective cultural symbol in much of 
Filipino society (Quimpo 2011), especially through its governmental interventions in education, 
voluntary associational activities, and reproductive health. 
The Church’s educational institutions proved a formidable obstacle to the American colonial 
administration’s efforts to diminish the Church’s power. Catholic schools were preeminent in the 
formation and socialisation of the Filipino elites who assumed leadership roles in government 
and in civil society (Hedman 2006). Religious orders had established colegios catering to the sons 
of the elites in the Spanish colonial era (Calderisi 2013). These Catholic colleges aimed “to give 
the sons of the native ruling families an education which would not only make Christians of 
them, but fit them for the local magistracy; for as town governors and village headmen, they 
could exercise a profound and salutary influence on their own people” (de la Costa 1961 in 
Hedman 2006, 28). Many prominent and influential politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders 
were educated in these institutions, even if they were not Catholic themselves. According to 
Calderisi (2013), it was not so much the number of schools, but the quality, reputation and 
prestige of a Catholic education that gave Catholic schools an advantage over their secular 
counterparts. The prestige of Catholic colleges, including Ateneo de Manila, University of Santo 
Tomas, and De La Salle University in the national capital region and their counterparts in major 
provincial cities, persists into the 21st century.  
By sponsoring voluntary associational activity, the Catholic Church further entrenched its 
hegemonic position. Lay Catholic organisations such as the Catholic Action of the Philippines, 
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the Knights of Columbus and the Catholic Women’s League were formed under American rule. 
Participation in Christian lay associations was a stepping stone for professional success and career 
advancement even if associational duties were entirely unrelated because of the invaluable 
“cultural, social, and symbolic capital” accrued through membership (Hedman 2006, 31). The 
Philippines also hosts many Catholic labour and peasant federations, radio and television stations 
and magazines, which are preoccupied with “imparting a Christian outlook on all aspects of 
modern life, from intellectual to economic life, from family life to civic life” (Poggi 1967 in 
Hedman 2006, 31). Many Christian churches and their lay organisations have allied themselves 
with other segments of civil society, including business associations, to promote free and fair 
elections though various campaigns in the 1950s, 60s, 80s and early 20th century (Hedman 2006). 
In sponsoring diverse voluntary associational activity, the Church has influenced the social, 
political and economic landscape in the Philippines.  
The nation’s bedrooms are yet another space shaped by a civil Catholic faith. For decades, 
national governments have timidly proposed then backed away from reproductive health laws 
despite clear calls for them within and outside the country. Many non-Catholic Christian 
organisations, including those represented by the National Council of Churches in the 
Philippines, are strong advocates of reproductive health laws (Calderisi 2013), and have lobbied 
extensively to provide all Filipinos with safe and affordable access to family planning and safer 
sex services. In contrast, since the 1970s Catholic Church officials in the Philippines have stymied 
numerous attempts to reform reproductive health laws. For example, the Church blocked 
government legislation that would increase access to condoms; the money that was destined for 
contraception was instead given to the Catholic organisation Couples for Christ to teach natural 
family planning (Calderisi 2013, 190). In CDO, the interest of Catholic officials in natural family 
planning surfaces as an important component of the archdiocese’s post-Sendong relief efforts, 
and the educational programs of Couples for Christ are used extensively to shape the bevaiour of 
Sendong survivors living in relocation sites.  
Even if one manages, somehow, to evade the influence of the Catholic Church on education, 
public policy, career advancement, voluntary organisations, and sex in the Philippines, it is 
impossible to miss the plethora of Catholic symbols etched upon urban and rural landscapes. The 
in-your-faceness of the Catholic faith in Manila is unmistakable.  
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Every school bus in Manila seems to belong to a Catholic school. To attract credulous 
customers, private clinics carry religious monikers (St Stephen, Sacred Heart, The Lord’s 
Grace), advertisers play tricks with Holy Writ (Almighty Aluminum, Immaculate 
Complexion), and bus companies name themselves after saints, like St Martin of Tours. 
[…] Reacting to a fall-off in attendance and the inroads of Protestant Evangelical sects, 
pastors now schedule Sunday masses at shopping malls (Calderisi 2013, 122-123).  
The names of most Philippine cities, towns and villages outside Muslim Mindanao can easily 
replace “Manila” in Calderisi’s description. The visual and social imprint of Christianity is also 
striking in CDO. 
Catholicism in Cagayan de Oro 
The Catholic Church hierarchy, its lay organisations, and Catholic educational institutions in 
CDO have acted as both de facto state actors under Spanish rule and as entities whose power to 
shape public and private spaces has rivalled (and sometimes exceeded) that of the state under 
American and later Philippine rule. But, as in other parts of the archipelago, the Catholic Church 
in CDO has another side that deserves elaboration – its social mission.  
The city of Cagayan de Oro lies within the archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro – 3,799 km2 of 
predominantly Catholic territory comprising of two provinces (Misamis Oriental and Camiguin), 
a town in Bukidnon and CDO (Catholic Hierarchy 2014). A beautiful hand-drawn map of all the 
barangays in the archdiocese is displayed in the archbishop’s sala. The map, prepared by Lino G. 
Gelsano, was probably the most complete map of the area that I saw during my fieldwork.26 
From 1958 to 2013, the percentage of people who self-identified as Catholic in the archdiocese 
fluctuated from 80 to 90% (Catholic Hierarchy 2014). 
The Catholic Church is a recognised and trusted authority in the city. Its data are widely regarded 
as valid, reliable, and sometimes superior to government data. The archbishop is frequently 
consulted on matters, religious or otherwise. He is a highly educated, charismatic and outspoken 
individual known for his progressive political views and for his commitment to peace and 
                                                          
26 Unfortunately, a replica of the map was not for sale. The salesclerk at the bookstore where I purchased 
my city map (produced by government agencies) apologetically warned me not to heed the map too 
closely because it was incomplete and erroneous. There is only one university geography department in 
the entire Philippine archipelago, which may explain the dismal enthusiasm for producing official maps. 
The department is housed at the University of the Philippines-Diliman, located in Quezon City. 
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community outreach initiatives. Journalists, academics, visiting researchers and local community 
leaders actively seek out and respect his opinion. Under his leadership, the Catholic Church in 
CDO became notable for its social mission. According to Calderisi (2013), the three pillars of a 
Christian social mission are education, provision of basic services such as health services, clean 
water, primary education and credit schemes, and advocacy on behalf of the poor and 
disenfranchised. The first two elements are very much reflective of the objective of the new 
pastoral power characteristic of welfare-type governmental schemes (Foucault 2003a). The 
current activities of the archdiocese in CDO indicate its focus on implementing a Christian social 
mission and its retreat from state governance and administration. 
The promotion of a Christian social mission in CDO is perhaps best exemplified by the Social 
Action Center (SAC), one of the two ministries established by the archbishop when he arrived in 
the city in May 2006.27  The SAC is an “ad-extra-ministry,” which its director describes as  
programs to take care of the body because we [are] both body and soul. So this is the 
ministry that takes care of the body. It’s outward-looking, and the programs [and the] 
apostolate services of the ad-extra-ministries [are] not limited only to Catholics but [are 
open] to all people regardless of religion, belief, culture.  
The SAC is illustrative of the conscious effort of churches in developing countries to immerse 
themselves in local economic and social issues. At a global scale, such efforts were spurred by 
Pope Paul VI’s 1967 papal encyclical (Populorum Progressio), which extended the Church’s social 
teachings to the problems of the world at large (Calderisi 2013). The SAC operates 25 different 
programs in all 63 parishes in the archdiocese. The programs cover a wide range of concerns, and 
include ministries for sustainable agriculture, women, prisons, migrants, children, mentally 
challenged persons, Indigenous Peoples, natural family planning, good governance, enterprise 
and ecology. The SAC’s commitment to changing the unfair conditions that cause the need for 
charity seems to embody the words of Pope Pius XIII, when he addressed his fellow bishops in a 
1951 letter: “Charity can remedy many unjust social conditions. But that is not enough. For in the 
                                                          
27 The other ministries established by the archbishop are “ad-intra-ministries,” which focus on faith and 
evangelisation (e.g. liturgy, clergy, catechism, etc.), and on caring for the souls of Catholics. The ad-intra-
ministries’ emphasis on preparing the individual for salvation in the next world indicates these ministries 
exercise the old pastoral power (Foucault 2003a). 
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first place there must be justice” (Evangelii Praecones 1951 in Calderisi 2013, 6). The basic services 
and advocacy aims of the SAC are reinforced by ecclesiastic teachings directed at Catholics. 
Sunday homilies announce the advocacy component of the Church’s modern-day social mission. 
Unlike many of the homilies I have heard in Catholic Churches in North America, which tend to 
be general and global, the homilies I heard in CDO churches focused predominantly on locally 
relevant priorities. In a tiny rural barangay church, for example, the local priest and a visiting nun 
jointly delivered a homily about the impacts of climate change on local watersheds and the 
concrete actions the parishioners should take. The accompanying PowerPoint presentation 
included local topography, water catchment basin and hazard maps obtained at a recent disaster 
risk reduction and climate change workshop for religious women and men in Northern 
Mindanao. For several Sundays around the one-year anniversary of Sendong, the homilies 
focused on natural hazards, disasters, and human activities that destroy the environment such as 
logging and mining. The archbishop explained the rationale for addressing such concerns from 
the pulpit: 
Here, it’s because of the immediate effects of calamities like Typhoon Sendong and also 
news from other parts of the country about disasters. I think the consciousness on 
protecting the environment has been – you might say – raised by that. The term climate 
change may be something that’s still vague for many, but the idea of protecting the 
environment is certainly there. And connected with that here are local issues like concern 
about mining and logging activities. There is a concern here about mining activities in 
upland areas of Iponan River and also here in the city – Lumbia area and beyond. [There 
is] flash mining [in the] Iponan River. Hydraulic flash mining has certainly affected the 
topsoil and caused the severe siltation of the riverbed. And in a way, has caused the 
flooding during typhoons like Typhoon Sendong. [The church is addressing the situation 
through] advocacy [by] making people aware of the dangers of environmental 
destruction. Saying ‘no’ to irresponsible mining and illegal logging. Actually now the 
president has declared a moratorium on logging, commercialised logging. So there should 
be no more logging except maybe just for on a small scale for local needs.   
The archbishop and local priests demonstrate a clear willingness to immerse themselves in 
advocacy efforts, including adopting stances that strongly oppose the positions and activities of 
powerful state and business actors. In a sense, they use Catholic social teachings as “a convenient 
entrée into debates that might otherwise have seemed outside the scope of church 
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responsibility,” much like their fellow “priests, nuns, brothers, and even laypeople, previously shy 
about expressing ‘political’ opinions” in other parts of the world (Calderisi 2013, 67).  
The archbishop, priests and other religious figures who are the faces of Christian institutions are 
not the only Christian trustees in CDO. Many lay organisations, such as Couples for Christ and 
Gawad Kalinga, and civil society organisations with Catholic roots, such as Habitat for Humanity, 
are active in the city. There are many Catholic educational facilities, such as Capitol University 
and the prestigious Xavier elementary, secondary and university campuses. The leaders of these 
Catholic lay associations and schools act as Catholic trustees governing city spaces; their 
objectives and methods are often but not always in line with those of their religious counterparts. 
The visual imprint of Catholicism and Christianity on the cityscape is unmistakable. In 
November 2012, the first billboard greeting visitors entering the city from the Lumbia airport 
proclaims “God is great.” Churches, cathedrals, basilicas, seminaries, and parish and archdiocese 
offices are scattered throughout the city, including in prime city centre locations. Even the 
grounds of secular public schools have murals with the words to popular prayers and small 
shrines devoted to the Virgin Mary or the patron saint of the barangay (Fig. 3.7). Many of the 
city’s public transportation vehicles sport Christian names and are decorated with Christian 
posters, crucifixes, and religious statues (Fig. 3.7). The dominance of Christianity, and especially 
Catholicism, on the city landscape is not just indicative of the wealth of the Church, but, as 
Calderisi (2013, 35) would argue, also “a mark of its reach, experience, potential, and 
commitment to serving others.” Similar to other parts of the archipelago, it also demonstrates the 
extent to which Christianity has permeated local popular culture (Hedman 2006, Moreno 2006). 
Christianity imbues cultural life in CDO, as illustrated by the following two examples. First, as in 
other parts of the Philippines, the city and each of its barangays host an annual fiesta or local feast 
honouring the barangay’s patron saint. San Agustin was declared the patron saint of Cagayan by 
the Recollects on 28 August 1780 (Montalvan 2009). For one week each August, city residents 
and tourists – Christians and non-Christians alike – participate in parades, feasts, dance 
competitions, water processions, and religious services celebrating him. 
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Fig. 3.7. Christian symbols abound in CDO. Clockwise from top left: the secular Macasandig 
National High School has a shrine devoted to Mary and the Santo Niño in the schoolyard (4 April 
2013); a jeepney announces that “God is good all the time” (18 December 2012); crucifixes and 
religious statues greet visitors at the DSWD-X office (15 March 2013) and the municipal tax 
collection office (19 February 2013). 
Second, business-as-usual grinds to a halt in government offices and formal businesses on the 
days or weeks around Christian holidays, especially Holy Week and Christmas, as people travel 
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and prepare for celebrations with family and friends.28  The processions for the Stations of the 
Cross, for instance, are very popular in CDO during Holy Week. Thousands of people partake – 
to reaffirm their faith and commitments, to petition for favours, or just for the adventure. The 
city boasts several options to contemplate Christ’s journey: a three kilometre walk up the steep 
Malasag Hill in barangay Cugman; a 14 church pilgrimage; a multi-kilometre walk past small farms, 
a posh gated partially-built residential development and wooded areas in barangay Agusan. I opted 
to join my friend A. on the popular four kilometre river trek from barangay Tablon to the shrine 
of Our Lady of Guadalupe at Igbalalay Hills in barangay Balubal (Fig. 3.8). The following excerpt 
from my field notes illustrates the solemnity, excitement and perseverance that characterised the 
event. 
We – A., her 7 year old son E., Frank, Ada and I – were in the van by 5 am. It’s best to 
hike before the sun gets too strong. The trek starts at the end of a concreted road in 
Tablon. Cars pile into a field converted into a parking lot. It’s filling up and a young man 
is directing drivers into specific parking spots (for a tip, of course). By 5:20 am vendors 
are already selling bottled water, snacks, Stations of the Cross prayer books and the 
colourful pencil-thin candles typically found in Catholic Churches. We brought water and 
buy only candles.  
The trek entails crossing the Umalag River nine times. At low water levels crossing is 
easy; there’s negligible current. But it rained this year. The current is strong(ish) in places, 
requiring a human chain. I take Ada out of the carrier and hold her above my head to 
keep her dry for some of the crossings where the water rises above my hips. Yet, despite 
the conditions, I count dozens of elderly men and women and young children among the 
‘pilgrims’ (or thrill-seekers). None appear as worried as I feel. The Army arrives by the 
time we head back down; they wear bright orange life vests and secure ropes across the 
river to help people cross. 
The stations are unevenly spaced, located in sheltered areas along the riverbank or in 
wooded areas. Each is marked with a numbered six or seven-foot tall bamboo cross and a 
pile of blackened rocks. Small groups of people stop and pray silently or in hushed tones, 
reading specific prayers at each station. They wedge lit candles in the rock pile. The calm 
                                                          
28 Some entrepreneurial people plying their trade in the informal sector augment business activities around 
religious holidays, capitalising on short-term demand for certain goods and services. For example, outside 
churches on Palm Sunday, women were selling the most intricate and beautifully-designed palms I have 
ever seen. Lechon-makers, typically men, see a spike in business around Christmas as people spend their 
13th month salary (an expected bonus in the Philippines) on special holiday food such as roasted pig.  
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and solemnity at each station contrasts sharply with the light banter adults exchange and 
the pitter-patter of children’s footfalls as they scamper between stations. 
There’s a lineup at the small mountaintop shrine. Only a few people can enter at one 
time. They touch the Our Lady of Guadalupe figure, and pray silently on the kneelers 
flanking the altar. Some pose for a selfie or group shot before leaving, probably to post 
on Facebook. 
It’s a party-like atmosphere in the clearing just below the shrine between stations 13 and 
14. Loud music is playing (more pop than church hymns), vendors are selling hot food 
prepared on-site (presumably brought up via an alternative route), families are picnicking, 
and kiosks are bursting with religious paraphernalia and toys. A similarly boisterous and 
bustling party unfolds around the parking lot entrance. By the time we arrive at the 
bottom, a local radio station has set up a mobile unit, and dozens of vendors and 
specialty food makers are busy making sales. It’s more like a noisy market than the 
entrance of a solemn religious journey. 
The return trip from the shrine to the parking lot is what attracts the adventure-seeking 
crowd. For several years now, some entrepreneurial river raft guides offer to take people 
down the river in inflatable tubes. ₱200 gets you a tube, a guide and an exhilarating ride 
down the river (but no safety briefing, helmet or life vest).  
Two groups of people who are usually present at major public events in CDO were 
noticeably absent. I did not see or hear of any local politicians doing the trek – although 
they may have arrived after we left. There were no women or men whose dress identified 
them as Muslim. I expect that Muslims would refrain from partaking in Catholic religious 
traditions. Perhaps any Muslim vendors present might have tried to ‘blend in.’  
The river trek Stations of the Cross shows the comingling of Christianity, informal commerce, 
pleasure-seeking, loud mass media, social media, and the presence of force (i.e. army) present in 
everyday life in CDO. To many Cagayaños, Catholicism is not a religion demanding quiet, piety 
or separation from the joys of life and the necessity of making money. Rather, like in many other 
parts of the country, it is omnipresent and infused in diverse elements of popular culture, 
business and social relations (Hedman 2006, Moreno 2006). 
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Fig. 3.8. The Stations of the Cross river trek in CDO (28 March 2013). The barangay council of 
Talon welcomes pilgrims at the entrance – note the absence of the mayor’s name even though 
the Tablon barangay councilors and the mayor are part of the same political party (top). Crossing 
the Umalag River (bottom). 
 
 
 91   
 
Muslim trustees 
Islam arrived in the archipelago in the 13th century, and subsequently spread throughout much of 
what is now known as Mindanao (e.g. Sulu, Maguindanao) and to Palawan and Manila, hastening 
the creation of sultanate-based settlements that were united by and organised around religion 
(Tan 2009, Francia 2010, Donoso 2013). Inhabitants of the Cagayan territory once paid tribute to 
the powerful Sultanate of Maguindanao, although historians have found no convincing evidence 
that Cagayaños actually practiced an Islamic faith during this period (cf. Montalvan 2009). Today, 
about ten percent of city residents are Muslim, but the political, religious, cultural, social, 
economic and visual imprint of Islam on the city is much less visible than that of Christianity. 
More salient, perhaps, is the dearth of Muslim trustees powerful enough to exercise 
governmentality, to shape city space, and to influence mobility to the same extent as state, 
Catholic, or other so-called “non-state,” “non-religious” trustees. The subordinate position of 
CDO’s Muslim trustees means that the treatment of the city’s Muslim population is heavily 
influenced by historical relations and contemporary prejudices and interactions between Muslims 
and non-Muslims. 
Politically, CDO’s Muslim population wields little clout. Even in barangay Balulang, which has the 
largest Muslim population in the city, there is no Muslim barangay councilor. Similarly, there are 
few or no Muslims elected to City Council, or working in city, provincial and regional 
government offices (except for the regional office of the National Commission on Muslim 
Filipinos). Muslim residents can voice their concerns, but they are not guaranteed of an 
empathetic or receptive audience. For example, an official from a barangay with a large Muslim 
population told me that there were no Muslims there. We were a five minute walk away from a 
mosque. 
The regional office of the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF) is similarly 
marginalised. Created by Republic Act No. 9997, the NCMF is the sole government office with 
an explicit claim of defying the principle of separation of church (mosque) and state (GoP 
2010a). A poster in the NCMF-X office sets out the aspirations of the commission. Its mandate 
is “to preserve and develop the culture, traditions, institutions and well-being of Muslim-
Filipinos, in conformity with the country’s laws and in consonance with national unity and 
development;” its vision is “progressive, caring and peaceful Muslim Filipino communities living 
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harmoniously with all stakeholders;” its mission is “to promote the well-being of Muslim 
Filipinos and strengthen Islamic institutions towards national unity;” and its organisational vision 
is to be “the premier Muslim national government agency committed and competent to provide 
quality and efficient services to Muslim Filipino communities.” Despite the inclusive aspirational 
language, the regional NCMF office in CDO is marginalised by and isolated from other regional 
government offices. The office is situated, somewhat ironically, in barangay Nazareth, near the 
Nazareth mosque. Its isolation is due less to the physical distance separating it from other 
government offices, which are dispersed throughout the city, than to the minimal communication 
and coordination it has with other government offices except with other NCMF offices. This 
divide was unmasked in the relief and reconstruction efforts after Sendong. The appearance of 
the NCMF-X office also contrasted sharply with all the other municipal, provincial and regional 
government offices I visited. It was very plain, and had minimal furniture, few computers and no 
air conditioning units.  
The spatial distribution of the city’s Muslim population and Islamic institutions is much more 
confined than their non-Muslim counterparts. Muslims are concentrated in barangay Balulang, 
with some families living in Bulua, Consolacion, Iponan, Macanhan, Macasandig and Vamenta 
(near Igpit) (Fig. 3.6). Fewer than ten mosques serve the Muslim population. Unlike many of the 
Christian churches, none of the mosques is situated in the city centre; instead they are tucked 
away in a maze of buildings or in peripheral barangays. Named after the first Muslim missionary to 
arrive in North Mindanao from Malaysia in 1475, the Sharief Alawi Islamic Centre boasts the 
largest mosque in Northern Mindanao and CDO’s only madrasah (Arabic school) (Sharief Alawi 
Islamic Sharief Alawi Islamic Centre no date). Yet, it is not served by regular jeepney, multicab or 
motorela routes. One needs to hire a sikad or walk from the nearest motorela stop to the mosque. 
The mosque and madrasah lie on the west bank of the Cagayan River in Lower Balulang, opposite 
barangay Macasandig. Even though both buildings were flooded during Sendong, the mosque 
served as a refuge for Sendong survivors and a distribution point for relief goods.  
Officially, CDO welcomes everyone, and even calls itself the inclusive “City of Golden 
Friendship” (Department of Tourism (DOT) no date). Public spaces, such as markets, shopping 
malls, schools, restaurants, and businesses are open to, and operated and frequented by people of 
all faiths. Yet, signs of Islam in public spaces are much less conspicuous than signs of 
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Christianity. Few businesses in CDO advertise clever wordplays and symbols inspired by Islam. A 
handful of jeepneys and motorelas are notable exceptions (Fig. 3.9). Several small shops at the main 
public market, Cogon market,29 and at the Limketkai shopping mall cater specifically to a Muslim 
clientele, for example by selling Muslim women’s clothing. Other shops are owned and operated 
by Muslim families selling goods with broad appeal, such as mobile phones and prepaid credit, 
jewelry, pirated CDs and DVDs, fake brand name apparel and accessories, and beautiful malongs30 
imported from Thailand, Malaysia or southern Mindanao. Many of these shops are located in a 
strip of stalls running along the outer northeastern wall of Cogon market. Apart from the malongs, 
the only clues to the religious affiliation of the shopkeepers are banter in the Maranao language 
and the hijabs and chadors worn by some of the women owners and clerks.  
The official discourse of religious inclusivity is not by matched by private opinions. In private 
conversations some non-Muslim residents express their personal ignorance and misgivings about 
Muslims – always a generic Muslim. Consequently, while not officially barred from any city space, 
Muslim residents typically do not match their non-Muslim counterparts in the depth and breadth 
of their use of and control over urban space. These personal prejudices and the underlying 
Christian hegemony embedded in many government offices, policies and programs limit the 
access of Muslim residents to certain spaces. These religious prejudices and biases restricted 
mobility and access to resources in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong.  
                                                          
29 The market was named Cogon on account of the area being previously covered with cogon grass. 
Cogon grass (Imperata cylindrical) grows readily in areas cultivated with swidden agriculture methods (Pelzer 
1948). 
30 A malong is a traditional woven tube skirt used by Muslim Filipino men and women in southern 
Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. Today, it is widely used by Filipinos of all faiths throughout the 
archipelago as a skirt, a blanket in frigid Air Con buses, a hammock strung up in houses and jeepneys for 
sleeping children, a bed sheet, a prayer mat, and for many other uses. The malongs sold at Cogon market 
are batik-style, which means they are constructed from machine-made printed cotton and much cheaper 
than traditional handwoven ones. 
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Fig. 3.9. One of the few motorelas in CDO with an Islamic name (19 February 2013). 
Elite families or “non-state,” “non-religious” trustees 
In many parts of the Philippines elite family dynasties are a dominant social force. Through their 
actions and relationships, patrons, bosses, and caciques have significantly influenced the 
economy, politics and development at the national, regional, and especially the local scale (cf. 
McCoy 1994, Sidel 1999, Hedman 2006). These Filipino elites have repeatedly used the resources 
at their disposal for achieving and preserving personal and family power. McCoy’s (1994) An 
anarchy of families, for example, is dedicated to investigating the role of elite families in entrenching 
the seeming paradox of a resource-rich nation in a perpetual condition of state dysfunction and 
underdevelopment. The economic base of elite families has been largely independent of state 
apparatuses, even though the state has played a central role in the process of accumulating riches 
(Caouette 2010). This is made possible through a convergence of private and public interests 
favouring the elite (Caouette 2010), the imposition of landholding elite families’ views on the 
bureaucratic apparatus and even elections (Sidel 1994, 1997, 1999, Bello, Docena et al. 2004, 
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Caouette 2010), and the absence of efficient institutions (Batalla 2010). As such, the power in the 
Philippines lies outside the centre of the bureaucracy and is loyal to different factions of the 
landholding oligarchy, who paralyse the efforts of politicians and government agencies to 
implement real reforms. Elite families, in other words, wield power characteristic of a state and 
exercise government rationality even if they do not hold public office. 
Unlike many parts of the archipelago, CDO does not have elite family dynasties acting as a 
dominant social force. This point was insisted upon in several key informant interviews, including 
with local historians. According to one such historian, there are families with multiple generations 
of politicians and affluent families whose control over businesses and land is significant, but no 
dynasties, per se, who wield enough power to significantly shape city space singlehandedly. Some 
of these families are major landowners, but the area and importance of land under their control is 
much smaller than the elite dynasties in other parts of the archipelago. Not surprisingly then, the 
city’s elite families and prominent businesspeople did not operate as influential trustees directing 
the post-Sendong efforts. For example, they could not convince the municipal administration to 
endorse their funded plan of repurposing riverside areas devastated by the flood and designated 
as a no-build zone.  
There are, of course, other non-state, non-religious, non-elite family trustees relevant to CDO’s 
post-disaster spaces. Those interested in influencing behaviour include scientists, activists, 
humanitarian agencies, NGOs, corporations, among others (Li 2005, 2007a, Hall, Hirsch and Li 
2011). In CDO, for example, these other trustees include engineers and other technical experts 
from foreign development agencies, United Nations agencies, and foreign humanitarian 
organisations. These particular trustees, however, were not especially influential in shaping 
migration to and settlement within the city prior to December 2011. Their interest in and ability 
to control the city’s physical landscape and to govern the social relations therein mostly began 
after Tropical Storm Sendong hit CDO. 
Tropical Storm Sendong 
Tropical Storm Sendong was the most lethal storm of 2011 (Guha-Sapir, Vos et al. 2012). It 
swept across Northern Mindanao, Philippines, with the eye of the storm passing through CDO 
around midnight on 16 December 2011 (Fig. 3.10; PPDO no date). Never before had the city 
experienced such devastation: 41 of 80 barangays were directly affected by extreme flooding; 388 
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people died; 386 people went missing; 38,071 families were displaced; $19.5 million worth of 
road, water and power utilities infrastructure were destroyed; and economic losses to the 
agriculture, fisheries, forestry, service, commerce and trade, and industry sectors were $4.9 
million (Fig. 3.11; LGU of CDO 2012). On 20 December 2011 Philippine President Benigno 
Aquino III declared the cities of CDO and Iligan under a State of National Calamity (GoP 
2011a). 
Meteorologically, Tropical Storm Sendong (TS Sendong) was not particularly notable. With a 
maximum sustained wind speed of 75 kph and gustiness of 90 kph (OCD 2012), TS Sendong 
only qualified as a weak storm according to Saffir-Simpson Tropical Cyclone categories. The 
amount of rainfall in the city and its catchment basin, however, was extreme – more than 1.5 
times the December monthly average of 117 mm (PPDO no date). The city’s weather station in 
barangay Lumbia measured a record 180.9 mm of rain over a 24 hour period, most of which fell 
between 5 pm and midnight (PPDO no date).The Manila Observatory has suggested that the 
amount of rainfall was enhanced by an orographic mountain effect (PPDO no date). It was the 
excessive rainfall, and not the wind, that precipitated the disastrous flooding. 
All the waterways feeding into the city’s major rivers – the Cagayan River and the Iponan River – 
worked in overdrive, carrying water down from the mountains and plateaus out to sea. The 
waters swelled and spilled over the banks, flooding riverside and low-lying areas. The Cagayan 
River rose to 9.86 m with an estimated water discharge of 2,500,000 L/s during Sendong, more 
than 62 times its usual discharge rate of 40,000 L/s at 2 m (LGU of CDO 2012). It inundated 
nearby (mainly urban poor) settlements, drowning hundreds of people (Corrales, Mascarinas et al. 
2011). Many residents were caught by surprise because the flooding occurred late Friday night 
and early Saturday morning, a time when most people were asleep after an evening of Christmas 
partying. They had dismissed weather warnings from the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical 
and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA).  
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Fig. 3.10. Trajectory of Tropical Storm Sendong 15 to 17 December 2011. Source: NASA (2011), 
adapted by Marc Girard. 
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Fig. 3.11. Flood footprint of Tropical Storm Sendong in Cagayan de Oro. Source: Manila Observatory (2012).
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Survivor accounts and a scientific study carried out by engineers at Xavier University indicate that 
the particularities of the flooding were different along different parts of the rivers. The “snake-
like form” of the Cagayan River was especially treacherous for communities located inside the 
“S” curve with water on three sides and for those established on semi-permanent sandbars. For 
example, in the informal community of Isla de Oro, a sandbar in the river, an estimated 10,000 
people were affected (Corrales, Mascarinas et al. 2011). In the barangays upstream of the cathedral 
where the river is wide and the riverbanks not especially high (e.g. Macasandig, Balulang), the 
flooding occurred relatively slowly. The narrowing of the Cagayan at the Ysalina bridge that 
connects Carmen to downtown CDO near the cathedral became a bottleneck. As a result of the 
high pressure and volume of water and accumulated debris forced through the small area, the 
flooding was very fast and powerful in barangays downstream of the cathedral (e.g. Puntod and 
Consolacion). One child survivor explained that “the water is angry” (De La Peña and De Torres 
2012). An adult survivor living in a formal middle class development in a downstream barangay 
recalled the speed of the flood: “When the flash flood happened, it was so fast. At 1 am it was 
knee-deep. In five minutes or less, the water level had doubled. We have a second floor, which 
was lucky because you couldn’t open the door to get outside because the water pressure was so 
high.”  
What caused the disaster? 
The causes of the devastation wrought by Sendong have been variously attributed. At the top of 
the list is Tropical Storm Sendong itself as an extreme weather event (PPDO no date). Scientific 
and speculative explanations for the underlying factors that enabled the storm to catalyse a 
disaster range from government incompetence and general unpreparedness to irresponsible 
resource exploitation and deep-rooted development failures. 
The natural capacity of the landscape to cope with environmental stress was eroded by 
irresponsible resource exploitation. In the Bukidnon headwater regions, for example, destructive 
and widespread logging operations and lax enforcement of forest protection laws have resulted in 
the siltation of the Cagayan, Iponan and Tagoloan Rivers and the flooding of surrounding areas 
(Edgerton 2008). As mentioned earlier, the headwater areas in CDO’s watershed include 
mountains and plateaus that have been logged, mined and cultivated with short-term crops 
(Corrales, Mascarinas et al. 2011, LGU of CDO 2012, NEDA 2012). Deforestation from both 
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commercial and illegal logging has permanently changed the watershed; according to a woman 
from San Fernando, Bukidnon “the rivers [have] change[d] shape, [and] turn[ed] muddier, less 
deep, yet more violent during big rains” since the arrival of the big logging trucks (Edgerton 
2008, 276). Hydraulic mining of gold along one of the Cagayan River’s tributaries has also caused 
major changes in the landscape. Before Sendong, researchers noted that such mining has caused 
severe soil erosion, and warned it could result in massive mudflows and landslides (Gorra 2011). 
The debris from these activities that is carried down the rivers interferes with normal river flow 
and hampers drainage (LGU of CDO 2012). While some resource extraction and agricultural 
activities are carried out on a small scale by so-called illegal loggers and miners and smallholder 
farmers, the massive damage inflicted upon the land has been mainly carried out by corporations, 
especially foreign companies working with Filipino subsidiaries. As a result of the major changes 
to the landscape, the infiltration capacity of relatively barren soil in the mountainous areas of 
Bukidnon was overrun during Sendong, sending excess water down tributaries feeding the rivers 
that wind through the cities of Cagayan de Oro and Iligan as surface run-off (NEDA 2012).  
Almost all key informants, excluding those employed by the city government, identified local 
government failure as a critical factor. There was an overall lack of disaster preparedness at the 
city level, in particular in implementing the elements required by each municipality as per the 
Philippine Disaster Act of 2010 (Montalvan 2012). Flood warning systems were absent even in 
frequently flooded communities (LGU of CDO 2012). There were no flood mitigating structures 
to combat rising water levels on the Cagayan River, however, according to key informants at 
several regional government agencies, there are plans and funds committed for a river control 
project.  
In addition to neglecting disaster preparedness, the city was faulted with permitting, even 
promoting, construction and settlement in hazard-prone areas. The city issues building permits 
and is not supposed to allow construction in areas with known hazard risks. Yet, since the 1990s 
there has been rapid expansion of permanent structures built along the riverbanks and growth of 
an increasingly dense population in flood-prone areas such as floodplains, former mangrove 
areas, old waterways (e.g. dry riverbeds) and geologically unstable areas (e.g. sandbars) (LGU of 
CDO 2012, PPDO no date). Geohazard maps were produced by the Region-X DENR-MGB 
office after the January 2009 flooding, so the local government was aware of which parts of the 
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city were at risk of flooding and other natural hazards (Corrales 2011, Montalvan 2012), and even 
advised people against moving to these areas prior to December 2011. While people do not 
necessarily obtain permission before building, particularly in informal settlements, the city is still 
at fault. It did not implement its own ordinance banning settlement in hazardous areas, and, 
under the piso-piso program, even distributed land in areas that were known hazard-risks (Corrales 
2011). Such inadequate urban planning is widespread in the Philippines (Corrales, Mascarinas et 
al. 2011, La Viña, Dactor-Bercilla et al. 2012). 
It is not only CDO officials who shirk making responsible decisions about land planning and 
settlement. The lead researcher of the Disaster Risk and Exposure Assessment for Mitigation 
(DREAM) project noted that he routinely receives requests from politicians and city planners 
about the siting of relocation and housing projects. Supported by the Department of Science and 
Technology, the DREAM project is producing a comprehensive and integrated early flood 
warning system for the entire country based on 3D hazard maps. When I interviewed him in 
October 2012 much of the country had already by mapped, at least coarsely, and these maps 
made available for free online. That morning he had received an email listing dozens of proposed 
relocation sites and a request for him to ascertain whether or not the sites were safe. The list 
included areas clearly marked as flood-prone on the DREAM maps, and even included barangays 
that were flooded only two months prior in the Habagat rains that affected Metro Manila and 
Regions III and IV-A. He attributed this request (and the others he receives from all over the 
Philippines) to  
a culture of passing on [responsibility by people who] don’t want to decide for 
themselves. [It’s as if the government] already knows the answer but doesn’t want to do it 
themselves. They want academics and scientists to give the official approval so that the 
government can say, ‘the experts advise that …’ or ‘the experts approve or not of …’ 
These people don’t like being responsible, especially because they didn’t make the maps 
themselves. 
The Manila Observatory pointed to a lack of information and knowledge as a contributing factor 
of the disaster (PPDO no date). Yet, it is less about the absence of information and more about 
the refusal of CDO residents and their leaders to seek out and heed available information. 
PAGASA had accurately predicted the actual movement of Sendong, and issued an advisory on 
14 December 2011. It followed up with 15 severe weather bulletins disseminated through text 
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messages, Twitter, Facebook, reports from the Office of Civil Defense-National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Council, press conferences, and radio and TV notices (PPDO no 
date). Despite repeated warnings, most locals took no precautions. One informant explained that 
in CDO “we don’t take serious what the weather bureau is telling us.” The blasé attitude of 
residents towards disaster preparedness, and widespread complacency is due to a false sense of 
security that major flooding will not occur in the region (LGU of CDO 2012). The myth of CDO 
as a natural hazard-free safe haven reinforces this attitude.  
The other causal factors are development and environmental failures. The poverty that plagues 
many growing Philippine cities is a critical factor (Corrales, Mascarinas et al. 2011, La Viña, 
Dactor-Bercilla et al. 2012). Several NGOs, and even the chairman of the National Disaster 
Council, claimed the disaster was influenced by climate change (Kalikasan 2012); however, 
several key informants trained as scientists and engineers cautioned against asserting such a 
conclusion without further study. Like many other disasters, the causes of Sendong were complex 
and multiple. And, like in many disasters, the impacts, and not the causes, were of primary 
concern for the majority of people affected by Sendong. 
What are the impacts of the disaster? 
For city residents, it was the impacts of the disaster that mattered most. This section presents an 
overview of the impacts, as articulated in official government reports. Other perspectives on the 
impacts are analysed in Chapter 5, 6 and 7.  
The CDO disaster reduction assessment report focuses on the toll exacted by Sendong on the city’s 
economy and infrastructure (LGU of CDO 2012); unless otherwise indicated, all figures cited 
below come from this report. Total losses to agriculture, fisheries and forestry were $861,000 
(17.48% of total reported damages to the economic sector). A total of 2,417 farmers were 
affected, 1,203 ha under cultivation were flooded, 666 head of swine, cattle, goat, horse, carabao 
and poultry were lost. Fishing boats (both motorised and non-motorised), nets and fishponds 
were also reported as lost or damaged. Losses to the service sector, including hotels, restaurants, 
schools and real estate, were $492,000 (10% of total reported damages). White water rafting tours 
and cancelled Christmas parties in city restaurants and hotels were singled out as notable 
examples of lost revenue (NEDA 2012). Commerce and trade estimated $1.07 million in 
damages (21.71% of total reported damages). Industry, and manufacturing in particular, had $2.5 
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million worth of damages (50.81% of total reported damages). Road, water and power 
infrastructure were also affected. In CDO, 35% of roads (totaling 218 km) were damaged, 
requiring $14.5 million to repair. Damage to the water system was estimated at $3.3 million. More 
importantly, water supply to 80% of the coverage area was disrupted for at least 48 hours; it was 
one month before service was fully restored. The damage to power utilities was estimated at 
$1.968 million. Despite these damages and losses, Sendong did not significantly affect the prices 
of commodities, government revenues, or the regional economy overall (OCD 2012).  
Sendong was equally superfluous to formal employment numbers in Region-X because no major 
employers were severely affected (OCD 2012). In fact, the employment rate fell by less than one 
percentage point after Sendong (95.7% in Q1 of 2012 versus 96.1% in Q4 of 2011; OCD 2012, 
56). Breadwinners reported returning to work even before their houses were repaired and cleaned 
because their income was the primary means of recovery (OCD 2012). These optimistic findings 
obscure the impacts on the livelihoods of poorer families in the informal sector, especially those 
with home-based small businesses. A survey published by the Department of Labor and 
Employment (DOLE) Region X office in February 2012 found that people working in the 
informal sector were disproportionately affected. In barangays Balulang, Consolation, Carmen, 
Iponan and Macasandig, of the 7,100 people whose livelihoods were affected by Sendong, 6,862 
worked in the informal sector (NEDA 2012, 29). Responding to the needs it identified, DOLE’s 
initial release of $52,000 was targeted at 366 “greatly affected workers in the informal sector” (in 
all of Region X, not only CDO) (NEDA 2012, 30). DOLE distributed starter kits for carpenters, 
electricians, beauticians and dressmakers, and capital assistance for projects such as food 
processing, fruit and vegetable vending, backyard hog raising and electronics shops. 
According to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council’s final report 
published on 10 February 2012, there were a total of 38,071 affected families and 228,576 
affected individuals in CDO (OCD 2012, 8). Most survivors remained outside the 42 evacuation 
centres in the city; inside the evacuation centres there was a cumulative total of 13,321 families 
(65,046 individuals) whereas outside the evacuation centres there were 24,750 families (163,530 
individuals) (OCD 2012, 8). The city’s Disaster risk assessment report suggests that 17,527 students 
were affected when their schools were either damaged or transformed into evacuation centres, 
resulting in the suspension of classes (LGU of CDO 2012, 48).  
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The Post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA), published by the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) Region-
X, highlights housing as a critical issue. In CDO, 5,801 houses were totally damaged, and 12,635 
houses were partially damaged (OCD 2012, 11). The assessment and categorisation of damage to 
housing structures quickly emerged as a critical issue in post-disaster compensation and advocacy. 
A totally damaged house is a structure that was completely destroyed and became uninhabitable 
after the disaster. A partially damaged house had one or more components that had been 
damaged but could be repaired. The PDNA insists that these definitions do not imply that 
houses should be repaired or rebuilt in-situ because many are located in no-build zones.31 
Damaged houses were sorted into four categories based on the type of construction materials: 
wood or locally sourced light materials (57%), mixed wood-concrete (29%), concrete (13%), and 
individual house with shop (1%) (OCD 2012, 12). Using the National Housing Authority’s 
(NHA) standards of the value for typical household contents, the estimated damages per house 
type were: wood or locally sourced light materials ($428), mixed wood-concrete ($1,500), 
concrete ($2,140), individual house with shop ($2,140) (OCD 2012, 13). The large number of 
affected households, especially among ones with very limited capacities to immediately cope and 
to later rebuild without assistance – 85% of totally and partially damaged houses were informal 
houses (OCD 2012, 14), had a major impact of disaster efforts. It spurred trustees to create 
official post-disaster sleeping spaces: evacuation camps, transitional housing sites and permanent 
relocation sites. 
Various policy recommendations are included in the government reports. Both the PDNA and 
the Strategic action plan for the rehabilitation and recovery of the areas affected by Tropical Storm Sendong 
(Washi) (SAP) prepared by the regional office of the National Economic and Development 
Authority (NEDA) recommend a build-back-better principle (NEDA 2012, OCD 2012). The 
SAP includes policy recommendations that span reforming land use, improving infrastructure, 
providing adequate housing, monitoring prices of basic commodities and services, delivering 
financial assistance to and ensuring safety nets for micro, small and medium enterprises and 
severely affected individuals, and supporting good governance (NEDA 2012, 77-79). It calls for 
enforcement of environmental laws, particularly on prohibiting settlements in identified “danger 
                                                          
31 In a no-build zone, houses are prohibited within 40 m of the shoreline. No-build zones are declared by 
the national government, and are expected to be enforced by the municipality. In CDO, approximately 
2,700 households were located within the no-build zone (Reach 2012, 4). 
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zones,” or what the DENR-MGB have listed as no-build zones. The PDNA concentrates its 
recommendations on implementing coordinated, systematic long-term planning and zoning, and 
on providing “permanent housing for the internally displaced population that is safe, accessible, 
and sustainable and one that will provide security of tenure for the inhabitants” (OCD 2012, 15). 
The objectives and their relevance to CDO’s relocation sites is discussed extensively in Chapter 7. 
Conclusion 
Typhoon Sendong was much more than an extreme weather event, one that precipitated 
previously unprecedented levels of death and destruction in Cagayan de Oro City. Floodwaters 
swept away physical entities – houses, roads, people, houses, television sets, motorelas, sari-sari 
stores, trees, livestock – and deposited a thick layer of mud and debris on what they didn’t take. 
For many survivors, returning to their “normal” pre-Sendong life was impossible because of the 
trauma, the family and friends they lost, the siting of their old houses and workplaces in newly 
declared and enforced no-build zones, and the losses of personal belongings and livelihood 
capital. The displacement and loss of survivors, coupled with the outpouring of local, national 
and foreign resources for rebuilding, created a situation where it was both possible and in the 
interests of CDO trustees to relocate a targeted segment of the city’s population. The legacy of 
Typhoon Sendong is thus the reconstruction or improvement of society through the creation, 
expansion and contraction of post-disaster spaces.  
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Chapter 4. Methodology 
THE FOURTH “M”  
This blog chronicles the journey (and tangents) of my PhD. It begins in Montreal, where I am a student in the 
Université de Montréal’s geography department. Almost immediately it jumps to a tiny street in Quezon City 
called Mayumi. Mayumi was my home base for a three month exploratory field season in the Philippines in 2010. 
Then, it returns to Montreal for coursework and comprehensive assessments. The third “M” refers to an intensive 
two-month Tagalog language course in Madison, Wisconsin. 
Thus we arrive at the fourth “M” – motherhood. 
On many occasions, I have been told that there is never a “good time” to have kids. This is particularly true for 
academics – not as an undergraduate or graduate student (time and financial constraints), not as a post-doc 
(similar constraints as students), not as a young prof trying to balance a research programme, teaching requirements 
and administrative duties. The gap in publications that often accompanies parental leave isn’t always looked upon 
favourably in tenure applications. 
And so, for someone (hopefully) headed on a professorial track, the question is not when to have a family but 
rather how to make it work. 
*             *             *             * 
Four months ago my husband and I became parents. Thus far, it has been an exhilarating experience. 
Motherhood is also changing various dimensions of my PhD, in particular the dynamics of my field research. In 
this field season, for example, I’m joined by my husband and daughter. While they won’t accompany me to every 
meeting, interview and event, they will be integral parts of the research process. I anticipate that I will be treated 
differently, and perhaps privy to different kinds of insights, when people see me as a mother, in addition to being a 
western woman researcher. Caring for an infant also means that the pace of research is slowed. Plus, it’s more 
challenging to act spontaneously and chase down leads at a moment’s notice.  
On a personal level, I’m thrilled to share the highs and lows of new experiences with loved ones in person, and not 
just via Skype, email and blogs.  
*             *             *             * 
And so I enter my main field season with fresh eyes and ears, attuned not only to things relevant to my research 
project, but also to things relevant to family life (Gibb 2012, 12 October). 
Introduction 
The overarching research strategy can be neatly summarised: pre-fieldwork visit to the 
Philippines, language learning at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, testing of ideas at various 
conferences and academic events, ethics approval, main field season and data analysis. On paper 
the process is clear and linear, but in reality it was an iterative process – replete with frustration, 
with new knowledge and circumstances continually requiring modifications to the research 
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process. As the above excerpt from my PhD blog suggests, explaining this research project 
necessitates delving into diverse topics. These topics include: fieldwork and data construction, 
positionality, accompanied research, pre-fieldwork stages critical to research design, blurring of 
the professional and the private in the field, writing, reflexive research, expectations and 
constraints, and the importance of various modern technologies. Like any methodology chapter, 
this one justifies the research design, and clearly explains how I went about finding answers to, 
and analysing, the overarching research question and specific research objectives. To these basic 
requirements, I layer in selected aspects of my personal life. My rationale for writing my family 
into this chapter, is not to turn the chapter into a mommy blog32 or a confessional tale. As several 
critical scholars point out “autobiography is a useful mode for analyzing structures of power and 
generating theory” (Frohlick 2002, 50, Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998). Instead, the chapter 
probes the professional and the personal for the following three reasons.  
First, to heed to the feminist call to do and write reflexive, embodied research that both illustrates 
how research is actually constructed (cf. Moss 1993, Parreñas 2009), and disputes the dominant 
image of the lone (usually male) researcher conducting objective ethnographic fieldwork 
(Frohlick 2002, Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009). Writing such a methodology chapter 
exposes the research process as full of questioning, wrong turns and revisions, and interspersed 
with serendipitous events, relationships, frustrations and “aha” moments. Presenting a linear 
anaesthetised chapter would betray the actual process and hide the personal aspects of carrying 
out this research, which, I believe, had an enormous impact on the research project. For the 
reader, a glimpse into the joys and frustrations of the research process, and especially the 
fieldwork component, will help to explain why certain results are privileged, and to clarify the 
necessary limitations and scope of the project.  
Second, the epistemological stance of this dissertation posits that reality is constructed. Applied 
to the research context, a constructivist stance means that data are not simply out there awaiting 
discovery by a researcher but are necessarily shaped by the research process itself. How the 
                                                          
32 Urban Dictionary defines mommy blogging as “A new mother’s unfortunate need to talk endlessly 
about their new children despite the fact that no one actually cares. Updates and pictures and stories are 
plastered all over social media. Can continue indefinitely and is not limited to only new mothers and their 
babies, but that is what is most common.” The word most frequently associated with mommy blogging is 
“annoying” (Urban Dictionary 2013). 
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researcher interacts with others and is perceived to interact with them affect research outcomes. 
Put another way, and “the nature of our personal and professional relationships and the multiple 
blurrings between them will affect the knowledge produced” (Cupples and Kindon 2003, 212). 
Accordingly, a reflexively written methodology chapter acknowledges my complicity in 
constructing knowledge.  
Third, and related to the second point, the inclusion of the personal reinforces the theoretical 
arguments presented in Chapter 2 on the constructed nature of space and the relational nature of 
power. That is, space should be conceived as social relations that individuals and groups 
experience differently at particular moments in time (Massey 1994), and power is necessarily 
relational insofar as the actions of one affect the possible and actual, present and future actions of 
another (Foucault 2003a). In other words, by making explicit social relations and power – 
necessarily influenced by the positionality of people involved in the research – inherent to the 
research process, I show the creation and modification of research space. By intertwining the 
research process and the world it seeks to understand, I avoid what Alvin Gouldner (1970 in 
Burawoy 1998, 10) called “methodological dualism” in which “social scientists are exempt from 
the theories they develop about others.” 
Theoretical positioning 
Thus far, this thesis has emphasised the relational character of space, mobility, and power, and 
how each of these concepts is differentially experienced by individuals or groups at a given point 
in time. In other words, there is no singular true reality. Rather, the real world is not absolute; it is 
instead constructed and shaped by social, economic, cultural and environmental factors. 
Moreover, these constructions are manifested in material differences among individuals and 
stratified by gender, class, and race (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). This position has implications for 
the research design.  
This study’s ontology is constructivist, its epistemology interpretivist. Such a theoretical stance is 
conducive to understanding the nature of post-disaster spaces and places. An alternative, a 
positivist approach in which the researcher ascribes to an objectivist ontology and empiricist 
epistemology, is inadequate for this study. A model could have been built based on existing 
literature, and then tested. The results, however, would likely have only yielded a simple list of the 
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various places survivors go after a disaster. They could not adequately explain the creation, 
interventions and experiences of post-disaster spaces.  
Michael Burawoy’s (1998) distinction between positive science and reflexive science is useful for 
further explaining this study’s epistemological starting point and research principles. He argues 
there are two co-existing models of science. Positive science presumes scientists are separate 
from the subjects they study, requires an objective and detached observer, and strives to 
accurately map or mirror the world. Positive science suffers from context effects, that is the 
effects that stem from the subjectivity of the researcher and the research subject, the field as 
inseparable from political, social and economic contexts, and the impossibility of “sampling from 
a population of social situations” (Burawoy 1998, 12). Reactivity is taboo, while reliability, 
replicability and representativeness are imperative (Burawoy 1998). In contrast, reflexive science 
begins with context and situatedness. It “elevates dialogue as its defining principle and 
intersubjectivity between participant and observer as its premise. It enjoins what positive science 
separates: participant and observer, knowledge and social situation, situation and its field of 
location, folk theory and academic theory” (Burawoy 1998, 14, emphasis in original). In other 
words, reflexive science does not hold the positivist premise that “there is an external world that 
can be construed as separate from and incommensurable with those who study it” (Burawoy 
1998, 10). Unlike its positive counterpart, reflexive science values intervention, process, 
structuration and theory reconstruction (Burawoy 1998, 4).33 Consequently, positive science is 
limited by “power effects,” notably domination, silencing, objectification and normalisation, all of 
which researchers should seek to reduce (Burawoy 1998, 30). Burawoy’s conception of reflexive 
science is at the core of the feminist methodologies that inspired the research design of this 
study. 
Doing feminist geography 
As Linda McDowell (1997, 382) reminds us,  
                                                          
33 Burawoy (1998, 4) elucidates the following terms. The simple act of conducting an interview is an 
intervention in the research process. Process refers to the aggregation of situational knowledge into social 
processes. Structuration is the simultaneous shaping and being shaped by an external field of forces. Theory 
reconstruction locates social processes in the context of their external determination; it is an alternative to 
representativeness. 
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[d]oing feminist geography means looking at the actions and meanings of gendered 
people, at their histories, personalities and biographies, at the meanings of places to them, 
at the different ways in which spaces are gendered and how this affects people’s 
understandings of themselves as women or men.  
Yet, for feminist scholars, the content of the research topic is insufficient to characterise the 
research as feminist (cf. Moss 1993, Parreñas 2009). Indeed, many of the key concepts in feminist 
geography have been studied in conventional, positivist, non-feminist research. To actually do 
feminist geographical research, the research must actively engage with issues such as positionality, 
representation, legitimacy, research relationships, reflexivity, and gender. Researchers must assess 
the nature of knowledge, its production, and its connection to truth, belief and justification. In 
other words, how research is conceived, how data are constructed and how researchers act are 
crucial components (Sharp 2005). Instead of pursuing a specific feminist method, feminist 
scholars should explore processes of producing and legitimising knowledge (Moss 1993). The 
following paragraphs summarise key methodological considerations for feminist geographers. 
The authors cited in this section are not all feminist geographers; instead, all authors have 
critically engaged with the issues in their own disciplines. 
Positionality 
Positionality usually refers to “who a researcher is in the eyes of the community, and who 
community members are in the eyes of the researcher” (Caplan 1993, 178 in Flinn 1998, 9). A 
researcher’s positionality is based on his or her class, gender, race, age, ethnicity, social status, 
education, values, sexual orientation, language ability and social network. Positionality affects 
fieldwork because positions shape which data sources and informants are accessible to the 
researcher (Flinn 1998, Cornet 2010). Certain personal traits are conducive to obtaining particular 
insights, which enable some researchers to understand specific phenomena better than their peers 
(England 1994). In understanding a fieldworker as a positioned subject and social actor, particular 
aspects of one’s positionality are magnified or minimised; for example, in some contexts gender 
and family status play a greater role in accessing informants whereas in other contexts the 
ethnicity and social class of the same researcher may be more important (cf. Cupples and Kindon 
2003, Cornet 2010). Acknowledging and reflecting upon positionality and its impact on fieldwork 
“both elucidates the organisation of the society one is examining and reveals the limits of one’s 
fieldwork according to varying degrees of integration in the field” (Cornet 2010, 135). 
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Unfortunately, as Rose (1997a in Cloke, Cook et al. 2004) aptly points out, researchers can never 
be fully aware of or represent their own positionality. 
It is not only the positionality of the researcher that counts. Positionality-based power hierarchies 
emerge not only between the researcher and the research subjects, but also among the research 
subjects, particularly if group-based methods are employed. In a study in Turkey on gender-based 
constraints faced by women micro- and small entrepreneurs, Simel Esim (1997) observed that the 
different positionalities of the individual women confirmed critical class, generational and 
regional differences among them. She concluded that these positionality-based dynamics 
influenced her research results. The positionality of the people who accompany researchers also 
matters. Accompanying research assistants or interpreters (cf. Turner 2010), family members (cf. 
Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998), and colleagues (cf. Cupples and Kindon 2003) all affect 
how research subjects see the primary researcher and how they engage in the research process. 
Representation 
Closely linked to the challenges posed by positionality are those associated with representation. 
How can an academic researcher, whose training, education, and often class, race and citizenship 
affords them the privilege of conducting research, possibly represent or speak for oppressed 
people? At many stages throughout the research process the researcher has the power to control 
what is and is not included: in defining the research question, in selecting and implementing 
research methods, in designing data analysis, in choosing which results to foreground and share, 
and in deciding where, how and in what language to present the research findings. But to assume 
research necessarily exploits research subjects wrongly implies that they have no power 
(Scheyvens and Leslie 2000). Research subjects do have power, mainly through whether or not 
they participate and how much or how truthful is the information they reveal (De Sardan 1995, 
Scheyvens and Leslie 2000). De Sardan (1995, 8) describes the power play between researcher 
and interviewee as an “invisible negotiation” in which each person “manipulates” the other to 
attain their individual objectives. Such negotiation puts the researcher in a double bind because 
she must both maintain control of the interview so that her research progresses while 
simultaneously leaving the interviewee to express themselves in their own way (De Sardan 1995). 
Robinson (1994) argues that it is impossible for a researcher to represent the people she is 
studying, even if the researcher is an insider of the community, defined in terms of ethnicity, 
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sexuality, gender, (dis)ability or other shared markers of social location. Despite noble 
emancipatory intentions, attempts at representation can elicit accusations of othering, objectifying 
and silencing research subjects (cf. Robinson 1994). Unresolved positionality and representation 
dilemmas can thus lead researchers to find themselves in a crisis of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy 
In a seminal article reflecting upon the feminist research process, Kim England (1994) describes 
the crisis of legitimacy researchers experience when conducting work in developing countries. It 
occurs when they first realise that dominant discourses (e.g. development discourse) legitimise 
voices of Western “experts” while undermining those of the local people, in effect colonising and 
reinforcing patterns of domination, and second, that through “academic voyeurism” they are 
advancing their own careers without necessarily helping their research subjects. The main 
responses of researchers are: (1) to abandon development research, (2) to adopt a relativist 
perspective which privileges the knowledge and understanding of those in developing countries, 
and (3) to continue research while trying to redress inequalities in post-fieldwork stage. The issue 
of legitimacy in research raises questions about accuracy, precision and the implications of 
methods, particularly when research results can impact the well-being of the research subjects 
(Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000). Ignoring the issue risks co-opting knowledges and 
marginalising research subjects to legitimise the academic project (Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 
2000). Such problems can be lessened or avoided by developing a collaborative research agenda, 
sharing resources and clearly establishing project management roles (Hyndman and Walton-
Roberts 2000). 
Research relationships 
The implication of Hyndman and Walton-Roberts’ (2000) proposition is that feminist 
geographers must attend to the relationships they develop or do not develop with their research 
subjects. Wilson (1992 in England 1994, 129) underscores the importance of research 
relationships, “[l]ocals remember researchers and learn from them through their personal 
relationships – not their monographs.” The researcher’s intimidating, approachable, self-
promoting, pleading or ingratiating stance determines whether the research relationship is 
reciprocal, lop-sided or manipulative (England 1994). Feminist scholars typically adopt the role of 
supplicant (England 1994), although they may take on various roles throughout the research 
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process, such as technology expert, academic expert, egalitarian feminist, and care and connection 
(Lennie, Hatcher and Morgan 2003).  
Knowing your research has the potential to exploit your research subjects is a harrowing thought. 
In fact, the potential for exploitative relationships is greater with feminist geography methods 
(e.g. betraying and abandoning subjects, raising expectations, inducing dependency) than with 
surveys and conventional methods (McDowell 1997, Lennie, Hatcher and Morgan 2003). Yet, 
feminist researchers can use their positionality and power to directly advance social justice by re-
positioning marginalised social locations as compelling intellectual and political vehicles (Harding 
and Norberg 2005).  Similarly, Scheyvens and Leslie (2000) insist that research can yield valid, 
valuable and sensitive findings, can empower local participants, and work towards reducing the 
power gradient between researcher and research subject. Addressing the power differential 
requires acknowledging it (Staeheli and Martin 2000), and shifting the power to the research 
subject, and acknowledging that his or her knowledge is greater than that of the researcher on a 
particular topic; this process is called supplication (England 1994). 
Speaking alongside 
To mitigate the potential dangers of positionality, representation, illegitimacy and exploitative 
research relationships, feminist researchers can strive to speak “alongside,” “with,” or “nearby” 
their research subjects, often marginalised groups, instead of aiming to “speak for” or “give voice 
to” them. Claiming to give voice to research subjects is problematic because the researcher has 
editorial control over the final research products (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). Kindon (2003) argues 
that certain research tools, such as participatory video, lend themselves to speaking nearby 
research subjects and can even reduce hierarchical researcher-research subject relationships. 
Robinson (1994) notes that by using a model of speaking with research subjects, the researcher 
necessarily reflects on their own positionality and its impact on the research. Similarly, a speaking 
with model of engagement in which the researcher is consciously open to exploring negotiated 
and partial meaning can disturb the effects of positionality without eliminating them altogether 
(Robinson 1994). It is critical to avoid framing the process of speaking alongside, with or nearby 
marginalised groups as merely giving power. In their analysis of ethical dilemmas on cross-
gendered and cross-cultural research, Scheyvens and Leslie (2000) point out that such framing is 
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problematic in that it reinforces the colonial discourse of the powerless Third World woman, and 
ignores the social and political contexts in which power relations are situated.  
Reflexivity 
Another option for dealing with epistemological challenges is to integrate reflexivity into the 
research process. Reflexivity is the “self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious 
analytical scrutiny of the self as researcher” (England 1994, 244). It recognises that research is 
extremely permeable to the researcher’s own identity and experiences and inseparable from the 
social context and power hierarchies within which it occurs (Hall 2002). Although it can improve 
fieldwork, inspire new insights and hypotheses, and make us more aware of asymmetrical or 
exploitative relationships, it cannot remove them (England 1994). Certain research methods, such 
as field-noting and journaling, can facilitate reflexive research (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, Heller, 
Christensen et al. 2011). Simply thinking reflexively is insufficient to yield material improvements 
in the research process; subsequent action is required.  
Engaging with the methodological considerations discussed here yields better results than could 
be obtained otherwise. But perhaps the most insightful note is that research is often “a mixture 
of hard slog, serendipitous coincidences and pure chance” (McDowell 1997, 393). While 
researchers should critically examine their research, such examination should not prevent them 
from capitalising on serendipitous coincidences and pure chance. In the rest of the chapter, I 
present how these elements, plus the aforementioned methodological considerations, apply to the 
research design, its implementation, and subsequent data analysis. 
Case study research 
The case study suffers from a much maligned reputation, and yet persists as a popular research 
approach in the social sciences. It is the one used for this study. The political scientist John 
Gerring (2004, 341, emphasis in original) articulates the paradoxical character of the case study: 
“although much of what we know about the empirical world is drawn from case studies and case 
studies continue to constitute a large proportion of work generated by the discipline, the case 
study method is held in low regard or simply dismissed.” An equally disparaging view is held by 
sociologists who “see the case study as barely better than journalism” (Stoecker 1991, 88). In this 
 
 
 115   
 
section I elaborate a definition, unpack the critiques and counter-critiques of the case study, and 
defend its appropriateness for this research project.  
What is a case study? 
The term “case study” is a “definitional morass” (Gerring 2004, 341); the plethora and diversity 
of definitions being used by researchers contribute to the confusion surrounding and critiques of 
the case study. In the literature, case study research variously refers to ethnographic, qualitative 
research, to a study with a small-N, to an investigation of a single site, event or phenomenon, and 
to a process-tracing investigation (Gerring 2004). To be useful, however, the case study should 
not be conceived as a particular method for data collection and analysis (Stoecker 1991, Gerring 
2004). Instead, it is best understood as a “particular way of defining cases” (Gerring 2004, 342), 
or a “frame determining the boundaries of information gathering” (Stoecker 1991, 98, emphasis in 
original). Rethinking the case study as a design feature allows for greater flexibility and 
responsiveness throughout the research process while still producing rigorous research results. 
The research frame must consider the researcher’s role, multiple methods, the role of theory, and 
the historical perspective (Stoecker 1991, 101). The researcher delineates the frame by 
“specif[ying] the event, arrang[ing] the facts, and analyz[ing] them” (Stoecker 1991, 105). Such 
enjoining of researcher and researched and the emphasis on reflexivity in the research process 
echo feminist methodological considerations. Moreover, these points situate the case study within 
the reflexive science model of science. The case study is a particularly effective way of combining 
multiple methods to investigate a particular temporally and spatially bounded social phenomenon 
(De Sardan 1995). Grounding a case in theory and in its historical and structural contexts allows a 
researcher to extend out from the field (Stoecker 1991). Burawoy (1998), for example, uses what 
he calls the extended case method to extend out from his investigation of the microworlds of 
Zambianisation in the copper mining industry in newly postcolonial Zambia to analyse the 
sources of underdevelopment. The extended case method “applies reflexive science to 
ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the 
‘macro,’ and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on 
preexisting theory” (Burawoy 1998, 5). Because (1) an ethnography entails multiple methods (cf. 
Cloke, Cook et al. 2004), (2) reflexive science requires attention to the researcher’s role (cf. 
Burawoy 1998), (3) connecting the past to the present demands an historical perspective, and (4) 
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building on preexisting theory presupposes a consideration of theory, the extended case method 
fulfils Stoecker’s (1991) four criteria for rethinking the case study as a research frame.   
The case study can thus be defined as: 
a research frame with structural and historical boundaries, an integral theory component, 
an involved rather than distanced researcher, and multiple methods which include 
collaborative methods, [that] provides different standards from which to judge the 
adequacy of our work (Stoecker 1991, 108-109). 
The case study in this research project is an investigation of the short and medium term 
environmental migration in Cagayan de Oro following Typhoon Sendong, which can be extended 
out to understand the production of post-disaster spaces. Stoecker’s (1991) four considerations 
are discussed in Chapter 2 (theory), Chapter 3 (structural and historical boundaries) and Chapter 
4 (researcher role and multiple methods). 
Critiques and counter-critiques 
Many critiques of case study research centre on issues related to theory, reliability and validity. 
With the rise of quantitative research in the social sciences came a growing number of case study 
critics. They charged that because N=1, “objectivity is more difficult to maintain, falsification 
criteria are more difficult to meet, and generalization is impossible” (Stoecker 1991, 91). In other 
words, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the case study to uphold the standards of reliability, 
replicability and representativeness, and to avoid reactivity as required by the positive model of 
science (Burawoy 1998). Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) expands on Stoecker’s (1991) list of case study 
critiques. He summarises five “common misunderstandings:” (1) theoretical knowledge is more 
valuable than practical knowledge; (2) a single case cannot be generalised, therefore a single case 
study cannot contribute to scientific development; (3) case studies are good for developing 
hypotheses whereas other methods are preferred for testing hypotheses and building theory; (4) 
case studies tend to confirm a researcher’s preconceived ideas; and (5) it is difficult to summarise 
specific case studies (Flyvbjerg 2006, 219).  
In response to the critics, case study researchers have attempted either to infuse greater rigour to 
their methods or to critique the critiques (Stoecker 1991). The first option has largely failed 
(Stoecker 1991); just as positivist research is necessarily limited by context effects, a research 
frame designed for a reflexive model of science cannot attain positivist research standards. The 
critique of critiques have been much more successful, and even highlighted the strengths of the 
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case study. In his counter-attack, Flyvbjerg (2006, 223) argues the first misunderstanding is 
irrelevant because “[s]ocial science has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent 
theory and has […] nothing else to offer than concrete, context-dependent knowledge.” 
Moreover, statistically significant results do not guarantee accurate explanation (Stoecker 1991). 
The strategic choice of a case study, for instance those elaborated by Marx, Freud and Darwin, 
does permit generalisability (Flyvbjerg 2006). There is, however, a tendency to overvalue 
generalisability and to undervalue examples in scientific development (Flyvbjerg 2006). To the 
third critique, Flyvbjerg (2006) simply posits that a case study is useful for both creating and 
testing hypotheses, but is not limited to these research endeavours. The methods preferred by 
positivist quantitative researchers, such as surveys, are not especially insightful for applied 
research questions (Stoecker 1991). Case study research is no more likely than other methods of 
inquiry to demonstrate a bias towards verification (Stoecker 1991, Flyvbjerg 2006); moreover, 
researchers conducting intensive in-depth case studies often report their initial pre-fieldwork 
notions were wrong (Flyvbjerg 2006). Finally, Flyvbjerg (2006) concurs with the fifth 
misunderstanding, adding that the difficulty in summarising is reflective of the properties of the 
reality studied rather than reflective of the case study as a research approach. Moreover, he 
contends that the narratives of good case studies near “the complexities and contradictions of 
real life,” and that it is undesirable to reduce the narrative to a concise, generalisable account 
(Flyvbjerg 2006, 237).  
Suitability for this study 
Various characteristics inherent to case study research make it the most appropriate option for 
this study. The so-called “fuzziness of case studies” is particularly conducive to exploratory work 
or the generative moment of scientific progress (Gerring 2004, 350). In designing a research 
project, researchers must choose between knowing more about less or knowing less about more. 
Case studies offer the former option; they are good for depth and bad for breadth (Flyvbjerg 
2006). Gerring (2004, 348, emphasis in original) expands: “one of the primary virtues of the case 
study method is the depth of analysis that is offers, [where depth is] […] the detail, richness, 
completeness, wholeness, or degree of variance that is accounted for by an explanation.”  This 
depth of analysis is attractive to researchers who study topics poorly or erroneously covered in 
the literature, or not covered at all (Gerring 2004). As outlined in Chapter 1, existing literature on 
environmental migration is framed in dominant, masculinist terms, and it focuses primarily on 
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politically and humanitarian salient features. So far, there has not been intensive study of the 
topic through a feminist geography lens, nor has an alternative framing been proposed. 
Moreover, although many migration studies have been conducted in the Philippines, few social 
science studies have investigated the role of the environment in migration (Mahmud 1994 is one 
notable exception). A Philippine case study challenging conventional framings is thus highly 
appropriate. Case studies also produce context-dependent knowledge, a nuanced view of reality 
(Flyvbjerg 2006), and an “historical and idiosyncratic” understanding of processes (Stoecker 
1991, 94). The creation of and subsequent intervention in post-disaster spaces, and the mobility 
within and between them, are highly context-dependent. Finally, case studies can stimulate a 
researcher’s own learning process through the continued proximity to the study’s reality and 
feedback from research participants (Flyvbjerg 2006), a point especially relevant to doctoral 
students as fledgling researchers. In addition to the academic considerations to study a single 
case, there were personal considerations that made the case study a desirable option.   
“Fieldwork” in the “field”  
The rich narrative characteristic of good case study research often draws upon “fieldwork” in 
which data are constructed in the “field.” Delineating the parametres of the field or fieldwork is 
difficult and requires unpacking. 
Geography’s legacy of “exploring, mapping and colonizing the globe” and its emphasis on 
“bringing the field home” in the teaching of geography obliges critical geographers to closely 
scrutinise the way they locate the field, set spatial and temporal borders around the field, situate 
themselves in or apart from the field, and construe findings from the field (Staeheli and Martin 
2000, 145). In mainstream geography, there is a clear delineation of the field: it is a naturalised 
place or people or an unambiguously defined physical location. But articulating the field as 
“somewhere else” is to understand the world-as-exhibition (Hyndman 2001). Without troubling a 
narrow conceptualisation of the field, it is impossible to meaningfully engage with 
epistemological issues such as legitimacy, positionality and representation and to develop 
accountable analysis and theory (Hyndman 2001). Feminist geographers recast the field as a site 
of embodied experiences (Frohlick 2002, Sharp 2009), disrupted power (Harding and Norberg 
2005), and purposeful interference in other people’s lives (England 1994). The field is 
constructed and unbounded; it is a “leaky space” where personal and professional roles and 
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relationships overlap (Burns McGrath 1998, Hyndman 2001, Cupples and Kindon 2003, 212). 
Instead of defining the field as a place or a person, feminist geography locates and identifies it in 
terms of specific political objectives or social networks of people, capital and ideas that span 
political borders (Hyndman 2001). Candice Cornet (2010), an anthropologist, contends that the 
field is more process than locality because the field is where the researcher assumes various roles 
through her engagement with informants, interpreters, friends and colleagues, which, in turn, 
enable her to gradually develop insights. 
Fieldwork, or the construction of data, in this complex, situated and leaky field, is similarly 
complex, situated and leaky. Fieldwork is part data collection, part relationship-building, and part 
personal and professional development (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). It is a “compromise 
between one’s research plan and what is actually feasible, and between one’s own cultural ways of 
being and trying on local customs” (Shea in press, 17). It is simultaneously a political, personal and 
professional endeavour (Hyndman 2001), and a very particular, even peculiar, scientific activity in 
which a researcher goes somewhere, observes something, returns home, and analyses that 
something. Iterative fieldwork, proceeding by “intuition, improvisation and bricolage” is the sine 
qua non of good qualitative fieldwork (De Sardan 1995, 3). It necessarily entails “detours, delays 
and blunders” (Cornet 2010, 146), and “getting lost in the field” for extended periods of time (De 
Sardan 1995, 3), which allow the researcher to better – but never perfectly – grasp the local 
context (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). The periods in which the researcher feels like she is 
wasting her time on tangents or has unwittingly committed social faux-pas are essential for 
learning local codes, observing unspoken messages and meanings, probing beyond a pre-designed 
question guide (De Sardan 1995), and identifying who should speak on certain issues – even if the 
link between the person and the research topic is not obvious at first (Heller, Christensen et al. 
2011). For example, at the beginning of my fieldwork, which initially focused exclusively on post-
disaster mobility and livelihoods, so many people insisted I speak to the archbishop that it would 
have been ludicrous to not interview him and ignore the potential significance of religion in post-
disaster mobility. Just as the field is fuzzy in terms of time, space, relationships and interactions, 
Cloke, Cook et al. (2004, 4) contend that fieldwork comprises “the whole range of human 
encounters occurring within the uneven social terrain of the field, in which case it is marked as 
much by social ‘work’ as by the practicalities of getting there, setting up and travelling around.”  
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Consistent with such portrayals of the field and fieldwork, I acknowledge my fieldwork 
transpired in a large field encompassing many different places. These places included all the field 
sites and offices I visited during the preliminary and main field seasons. Although some 
experiences did not contribute directly to the CDO case, they did provide additional contextual 
insights into relevant socioeconomic, political, cultural and ecological conditions. The field also 
intruded into my personal life, particularly during the main field season. Finally, the field crossed 
over into the preparation, dissemination and analysis spaces in which I tested ideas with other 
researchers and conducted research-related activities. One of the first steps in delineating the field 
was selecting an appropriate case. 
Case selection 
The best cases focus on explanation rather than prediction or representativeness (Stoecker 1991). 
If the goal is to obtain the greatest amount of information on a given problem or phenomenon, 
then a representative or random sample may not be the most appropriate strategy, and therefore 
the typical or average case will not yield the richest information (Flyvbjerg 2006). Atypical or 
extreme cases have greater explanatory power than their typical representative counterparts 
because they provoke “more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied,” and 
they reveal “deeper causes behind a problem and its consequences” (Flyvbjerg 2006, 229). I 
sought an atypical case of environmental migration in Southeast Asia that would allow me to 
investigate post-disaster space at a site without a lot of previous experience with natural hazards 
and disasters. My first attempt to select a case study transpired during a pre-fieldwork visit to the 
Philippines. 
Pre-fieldwork visit 
A pre-fieldwork visit is a valuable component of the research process because it enables a 
researcher to build and maintain social networks and chains of contact (Cornet 2010). From 
September to December 2010 I conducted an exploratory field season in the Philippines. It was 
especially helpful as I had never before conducted research or even set foot in Southeast Asia, 
and was thus unfamiliar with the particularities of conducting research in the Philippines. The 
most useful outcomes of the pre-fieldwork visit were connecting with key contacts, developing a 
greater understanding of migration in the Philippine context, and whittling down the list of 
potential sites. Sites were evaluated based on three main criteria: (1) quality of access to local 
respondents, information and support; (2) lack of research overload in study site and among 
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potential participants; (3) suitability to address research objectives. The two finalists selected for 
the study were Real, Infanta and General Nakar (ReINa) in Quezon province and Ormoc, Leyte. 
Both sites had experienced severe flash flooding. In the end, neither option became my study site 
because of pragmatic research considerations and altered personal circumstances. 
A study site in Cagayan de Oro 
One year after I left the Philippines, Tropical Storm Sendong hit Northern Mindanao. In the 
aftermath of the disaster thousands of residents were displaced temporarily or permanently from 
their homes. The environmental migration provoked by this storm in this part of the country – 
which I had not considered during my pre-fieldwork visit – became my case. From the research 
perspective this case offered several advantages over both Ormoc and ReINa. The flooding was 
much more recent, making it easier to locate survivors and to reduce the effects of confounding 
factors such as the modification of individual and collective memories over time (cf. Kansteiner 
2002) and the differences in migratory experiences attributable to life histories (cf. McLeman 
2013). Furthermore, Northern Mindanao better exemplifies the atypical case described by 
Flyvbjerg (2006) because of low incidence of natural hazards in the region relative to other parts 
of the Philippines (LGU of CDO 2012).  
The other motivation for choosing a Sendong-affected site was personal; I would be doing 
“accompanied” fieldwork. My gendered roles as a wife and a new mother, in addition to my role 
as a primary researcher, forced me to seriously reflect upon Susan Frohlick’s (2002, 50, emphasis in 
original) question: “how do our positions as gendered subjects and as feminists shape our choices 
of research sites?” I sought a city that promised to be a pleasant and safe place to live for a young 
family, and that had quality health care facilities. Of the affected areas in Northern Mindanao, the 
city of Cagayan de Oro was the best match for reconciling research and family considerations. 
CDO thus became the primary site for data construction.  
Construction, or data collection  
In their book Practicing human geography, Cloke, Cook et al. (2004) present a helpful frame for 
thinking about geographical data. They contend that geographers must situate data within 
processes of construction. 
How we come by them [data], and all the many procedures which we then operate upon 
them from the most basic of sorting to the most complex of representation, are all in one 
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way or another constructions found, created and enacted by ‘us’ (human geography 
researchers) as people living and working within specific economic, political, social and 
cultural contexts. There is nothing natural here; nothing straightforwardly pregiven, 
preordained or untouched by human emotions, identities, relations and struggles (Cloke, 
Cook et al. 2004, xiii, emphasis in original). 
It is within these processes of data construction that I situate the research methods used.  
Several critical steps were accomplished prior to the main field season. Among the most 
important research activities were the acquisition of ethics approval and the design of oral and 
written consent protocols (Annex 1), the development of a flexible research protocol for data 
collection, and the finalisation of a partner agreement between my host organisation in the 
Philippines (the Third World Studies Center at the University of the Philippines-Diliman) and the 
International Development Research Centre in Canada. I took introductory Tagalog language 
classes through the Southeast Asian Summer Studies Institute (SEASSI) based out of the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Eight weeks of intensive language training in 2011 gave me 
rudimentary speaking and writing skills, which proved helpful in navigating daily life when I was 
based in the Tagalog-speaking regions of Luzon. Because few Cagayaños can or choose to speak 
Tagalog, the main benefits of participating in SEASSI were the opportunities to exchange ideas 
with other scholars working on the Philippines and to establish relationships with them. In this 
way, the blurring of the professional and the personal launched data construction in the main 
field season.  
The main field season 
The main field season ran from October 2012 to May 2013. It began with the collection and 
preliminary review of library and grey literature, or what Cloke, Cook et al. (2004) call “pre-
constructed data.” These data are created by other agencies (e.g. governments, companies, 
journalists, poets, etc.) that geographers extract and use for their purposes. After, the methods 
concentrated on creating what Cloke, Cook et al. (2004) call “self-constructed data,” which are 
produced through the active field-based research of the geographers themselves. This part of the 
research was conducted in three distinct steps; each employed a combination of ethnographic, 
qualitative and participatory research methods. The first step consisted of site visits, non-
participant observation, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and key informant 
interviews; each method contributed to answering all three research objectives. The second step 
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involved the creation of participatory videos and collecting GPS data to make counter-maps. 
Following the production of the participatory videos, the final stage of the data construction 
period centred on two group workshops in which participants and Filipino researchers discussed 
the research results, and evaluated my interpretation of preliminary research results. A summary 
of the main data construction activities is given in Table 4.1. Because this study derived mostly 
from self-constructed data, the allocation of space is weighted heavily toward explaining the 
issues related to them, and less on issues around pre-constructed data. 
Table 4.1. A summary of the main data construction activities. 
Method 
Counter-map-making  
Focus group discussion (3) 
Interactive presentation to share and evaluate preliminary results with researchers (2) 
Key informant interview (47 men, 60 women) 
Non-participant observation 
Participatory video (2 men, 5 women) 
Semi-structured survivor interview (23 men, 56 women) 
I used ethnographic methods and adopted an ethnographic methodological framing for data 
construction, but I did not do an ethnography, per se. Ethnographic research requires prolonged 
immersion at the research site thereby enabling the researcher to acquire in-situ, contextualised, 
situated and ordinary knowledge gleaned from everyday life interactions with the local population 
(De Sardan 1995, Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). In ethnographic research, fieldworkers are neither 
insiders nor outsiders but somewhere in-between and dependent on the social actors and 
situation at hand; put another way, guests but more than guests, a kind of family or a “long-term 
guest-hybrid family” (Shea in press, 11). My relatively short field season, inability to fluently speak 
Bisayan, and the separation of my living quarters from the relocation sites where many of my 
research subjects lived precluded such prolonged immersion. Despite these limitations, the 
research design reflects an ethnographic methodology. That is:  
[Ethnography] treats people as knowledgeable, situated agents from whom researchers 
can learn a great deal about how the world is seen, lived and works in and through ‘real’ 
places, communities and people. […] [I]t is an extended, detailed, ‘immersive,’ inductive 
methodology intended to allow grounded social orders, worldviews and ways of life 
gradually to become apparent (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 169). 
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The research design also uses ethnographic methods, some of which are also called qualitative 
methods. The anthropologist Jean-Pierre Olivier De Sardan (1995, 25) divides field data from 
ethnographic studies (l’enquête du terrain) into four large types, namely participant observation, 
interviews, the devices of census, and written sources. The first three, being constructed by the 
researcher, yield self-constructed data, while the fourth yields pre-constructed data. I used 
variations of all four types plus participatory video and counter-map-making. The mixing of 
methods – also described as the “eclecticism of data” (De Sardan 1995, 10) or the 
“methodologically opportunist combination of research methods” (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 169) 
– is characteristic of ethnographic research. It helps to ensure the complexity of the studied social 
reality is reflected in the study and improves the rigour of qualitative research (De Sardan 1995, 
Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Multiple methods enable a researcher to triangulate data, thereby 
improving their reliability and validity. Triangulation, like the epistemological underpinnings of 
this study, recognises the incoherence and heterogeneity of culture (De Sardan 1995). Thus, just 
as triangulation from various sources can yield reinforcing and complementary narratives and 
findings, triangulation can also yield conflictual ones. Both situations occurred; seemingly 
conflicting results are discussed in subsequent chapters.  
In the following paragraphs each method is described separately. In actuality, however, methods 
were frequently used simultaneously and bled into one another in the field. As Gerring (2004, 
346) aptly points out “[t]here are few “pure” methods. And this is probably a good thing. 
Chastity is not necessarily an attribute to be cherished in research design.”  
Pre-constructed data 
Pre-constructed data are the primary inputs from the field into a research project that have not 
yet been interpreted by the researcher (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). They are frequently, but not 
necessarily, written works. Written works can assist in exploring and supporting hypotheses and 
research questions; they can complement or refute other data sources; or they can even become 
their own corpus of data (De Sardan 1995). When examining pre-constructed data, the focus 
must be on how these sources are constructed, on contexts, influences and forces that affect the 
data, and on their categorisation as fact or fiction (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004).  
The first type of pre-constructed data used in this study is official sources, the textual, graphical, 
numerical, statistical, aural and financial data produced by the state (e.g. government agencies or 
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public authorities) (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). Often, these data are assumed to be reliable and 
accurate because they are “official.” Although governments may have the resources, legal power 
and breadth of involvement to acquire or produce good data, official sources should be treated 
skeptically; state trustees are motivated to obtain, process and present certain information that 
they can use to produce the nation or other social realities (Scott 1998, Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). 
Official government statistics influence the society they represent by defining and categorising 
society in particular ways and not others. Put another way,  
official data do not provide complete or transparent pictures of social reality. Rather they 
are influenced and conditioned by the interests at stake in their production. The demands 
of government policy or the moral concerns of the middle classes are reflected in the 
statistics that are constructed. […] Not only are statistics sometimes an inaccurate picture 
of ‘reality’ but, by being collected at all, they also change the nature of that ‘reality’ (Cloke, 
Cook et al. 2004, 48).  
The official pre-constructed data sources used in this study are: government reports, census data 
and statistics, land titles and contracts, government-issued identification, and natural hazard 
maps. Their political and constructed character is especially evident in the focus of the post-
Sendong reports, and in the discrepancies between official and non-official data, and even among 
official data sources. 
The second type of pre-constructed data used in this study is what Cloke, Cook et al. (2004) call 
non-official sources, which are produced by non-state entities. Non-official data sources used in 
this research project include: newspaper articles, unpublished master’s theses, flood maps, 
museum displays and archives, Facebook pages, books on folklore and local history, event 
pamphlets and other promotional material, relocation site engineering and architectural plans, 
relocation site posters, short documentaries, press releases, project documents, memos and 
reports. Although these materials mostly claim to be “factual” (as opposed to “imaginative”), 
they, like official sources, are social products. As such, these data should be considered for their 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness, meaning and biases (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 68).  
The third and final type of pre-constructed data used in this study is imaginative data. Cloke, 
Cook et al. (2004) outline a range of possible imaginative sources, but the most pertinent ones for 
this study are buildings and built environments. This is because “buildings are expressive of 
human imagination but they are also functional objects that are used for all kinds of purposes by 
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people who may rarely if ever think about the imaginative meanings bound up in their 
construction” (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 113). Even the seemingly smallest of architectural details 
can reveal a deliberate intent to exclude, to exercise power, or to help or hinder mobility 
(Weizman 2007). In this study, imaginative data are found in the built environment of the city, 
and especially in the official post-disaster sleeping spaces specifically designed for Sendong 
survivors. Evacuation camps, transitional housing sites and permanent relocation sites are 
important data sources that demonstrate attempts at governmentality. As observable entities, 
these imaginative sources helped confirm, refute, nuance or otherwise triangulate claims made by 
official and non-official data sources, and by informants during self-constructed data activities. 
Self-constructed data 
In contrast to pre-constructed data, self-constructed data are produced by the researcher. 
Presenting and evaluating self-constructed data should consider the roles played by researchers in 
the field, which methods are used, the relations between researcher and research subjects, and 
textualisation (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). The following pages address these issues for each of the 
self-constructed data methods I used. 
“Non-participant” observation  
The research method that best characterises ethnography-inspired research is participant 
observation. In participant observation, the researcher “stud[ies] both what people say they do 
and why, and what they are seen to do and say to others about this” (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 169, 
emphasis in original). The method targets everyday behaviour and ritual activities that can be seen, 
heard and actively participated in by the researcher, as well as the local discourses in which the 
researcher does not directly participate but can learn about by listening (De Sardan 1995). 
Observation must be done “openly” so that the researcher observes the unanticipated, and is 
willing to change her hypotheses (De Sardan 1995). Typically, the observations and interactions 
that form participant observation are focused on events, people and places perceived as relevant 
to the research topic.  
De Sardan (1995, 6) extends the concept of participant observation to things that may not seem 
to be directly related to the research topic but that are acquired almost unconsciously through 
practice; he groups these elements and activities under the concept of “impregnation.” 
Impregnation, acquired through lived experience, differentiates between studies based on self-
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constructed data and studies based on the pre-constructed data of others. The researcher’s brain 
is the equivalent of a black box – everything the researcher observes, sees, hears, experiences 
during her fieldwork passes through this black box, informing subsequent analyses, 
conceptualisations, interpretations during the fieldwork, and later during the writing period. For 
me, this black box metaphor is particularly useful in explaining how my off-duty time in the 
Philippines (e.g. experiencing environmental migration firsthand, running through rural barangays, 
buying food at the market, exploring different sites and cultures in the archipelago on mini 
vacations with my family) has filtered the entire field experience, helping to structure and 
interpret my data. Many of the research activities carried out during the 2010 pre-fieldwork visit 
can be classified as an impregnation form of participant observation because they assisted in a 
broad contextualisation of the CDO case.  
Researchers using a participant observation method often fully immerse themselves in their 
research context, for example by living among and working alongside research subjects for an 
extended period of time (Burawoy 1998, Luker 2008). These researchers are more like 
participants and less like observers. During my fieldwork, I was more an observer, and less a 
participant; I mostly observed other people participate, and only occasionally participated in the 
activities and events I studied. Accordingly, my use of the participant observation method is 
more aptly described as “non-participant” observation. In this research project, non-participant 
observation included site visits to former evacuation camps, current and former temporary 
housing sites, completed and under-construction relocation sites, and attendance at a mass 
wedding and baptism, a values training session and graduation ceremony, a livelihoods training 
for Sendong survivors, a public demonstration, a local chamber of commerce meeting and 
various Sendong memorial events. I frequently brought my daughter with me for these activities, 
except when I judged the sites unhealthy (e.g. city landfill) or unsafe (e.g. relocation sites only 
accessible by motorcycle) for her.  
Interviews  
The “talking with people” component of my research was more reflective of “interviewing,” 
defined as “a qualitative exercise aimed at teasing out the deeper well-springs of meaning with 
which attributes, attitudes and behavior are endowed,” than of “questionnairing,” defined as “a 
wider quantitatively driven strategy of a social survey where representative samples of people can 
be questioned in order to produce numeric measures of behavior, attitudes, attributes and so on” 
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(Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 127). As “conversations with a purpose” (Webb and Webb 1932 in 
Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 149), interviews are the most economical and therefore the most 
privileged research method to acquire emic, local discursive data (De Sardan 1995). Interviews can 
shorten and focus data gathering on a particular issue that would be impossible to glean from 
participant observation alone. Interviews are good for probing experiences, feelings and 
meanings (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004), and for understanding some component of social life (Luker 
2008).  
De Sardan (1995) divides interviews into two main, and sometimes overlapping, types: 
consultation and narrative. Consultation interviews are done with a “consultant” who has a 
known expertise or competency on a particular subject, usually unrelated to their own personal 
experience. In contrast, narrative interviews are done with a “storyteller” who has had a particular 
personal experience pertinent to the particular research subject. Both types of interviews are 
necessarily co-constructed because the interviewer and the interviewee are complicit in producing 
the narrative. Together, they  
work their way through questions which begin as the ‘property’ of the researcher but 
which become co-owned and co-shaped in the unfolding interactivity of questioning, 
answering, listening and conversing. Here, the original scheme of intended data 
construction can be diverted or even subverted by both the researcher and the 
researched: the former as he or she follows up with what appears to be interesting 
conversation angles; and the latter as he or she demarcates consciously or subconsciously 
the boundaries of what he or she will reveal in the interview (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 
149).  
As such, interviews are less “extracting truth from the vessel-of-answer” and more creating “an 
interpersonal drama with a developing plot” (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 156, 150). The researcher 
must therefore consider both the content and the process of the interview, and remain alert to 
the ways participants support and subvert access to their knowledge, opinions and personal 
thoughts (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). 
I did both consultation and narrative interviews. Interviewees were identified predominantly 
through the snowball method in which informants directly or indirectly identified other potential 
informants. It is a non-random method reflective of real social networks (De Sardan 1995). These 
social networks informed subsequent analyses of how social networks shape post-disaster spaces. 
I stopped interviewing people when little or no new information was gleaned from additional 
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interviews. This is called the saturation point, where “saturation means that no additional data are 
being found whereby the sociologist [or geographer] can develop the properties of the category. 
As he [or she] sees familiar instance over and over again, the researcher becomes empirically 
confident that a category is saturated” (Glaser and Strauss 1973, 61, in De Sardan 1995, 14). 
Because the research project aims to explore the production of post-disaster spaces, and mobility 
within and between these spaces, and not to examine the representativeness of such spaces, 
stopping interviews based on the saturation principle was appropriate. 
In my study, consultation interviews were done with “key informants.” Key informant interviews 
were done with health workers and government, humanitarian and United Nations agencies, and 
non-governmental organisations based in CDO, Manila and other parts of the Philippines (Table 
4.2). These interviews were aimed at identifying vulnerable groups, migratory routes and 
contextual factors underlying susceptibilities to disasters. In CDO, these interviews were 
additionally focused on elucidating the specific roles of organisations in relief, recovery and 
relocation efforts, and on understanding their interactions with and perspectives of other actors. 
In a few instances key informants were also Sendong survivors. Key informant interviews ranged 
from 25 minutes to a full day, with the majority lasting between 30 to 90 minutes. Most key 
informant interviews were conducted in English; one was done in Bisayan with a smattering of 
English. Because of the limited availability of my interpreter Kuki and the excellent English 
language skills of my key informants, all but two key informant interviews were conducted 
without the assistance of an interpreter. I was accompanied by Ada and Frank for five interviews, 
and by Ada only for three. I opted to conduct most of my interviews with government officials 
without Ada, a decision partly motivated by a desire to present myself as a researcher instead of 
as a mother. 
Almost one third of key informant interviews from the 2012-2013 field season were audio-
recorded and transcribed verbatim. The other key informant interviews were not recorded for a 
variety of reasons: (1) the informant did not want to be recorded, (2) the informant started 
talking before I had a chance to ask for their permission to record the interview (and interrupting 
them would have been rude under the circumstances), (3) my audio recorder got a virus that went 
undetected for several days, and (4) the interview site was very noisy (e.g. construction site). 
During the interview, I acquired relevant research reports from the organisation represented by 
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the key informant (i.e. pre-constructed data sources). I met with many key informants on multiple 
occasions in diverse settings (e.g. interview at their office and then at subsequent public events at 
a relocation site; interview in their home, and later at focus group discussion at an NGO office 
and International Women’s Day demonstrations at the main public square). De Sardan (1995) 
contends that opportunities that allow for follow-up conversations throughout fieldwork enhance 
a researcher’s understanding. I also found that by observing and interacting with the same person 
under different circumstances I could better grasp the content they divulged in the interview, and 
the context in which they conduct their work and they engage with other actors. 
Table 4.2. Summary of key informant interviews. 
Type of key informants Number of 
interviewees 
City and barangay politicians and government agency officials 5 men, 5 women 
Regional government agency officials 2 men, 9 women 
National government agency officials (based in Manila) 1 woman 
Other state institution employees (e.g. police) 1 man, 3 women 
Research institute staff employees 4 men, 7 women 
University employees (in CDO) 5 men, 2 women 
University employees (based elsewhere in the Philippines) 2 men, 3 women 
Local NGO employees and volunteers; local chapters of national and 
international NGO employees 
6 men, 5 women 
National NGO employees (based in Manila) 6 men, 7 women 
Staff members at evacuation camps, transitional housing sites, and 
resettlement sites 
2 men, 6 women 
Private sector employees and business owners 6 men, 7 women 
Religious officials and organisation staff members and volunteers 4 men, 3 women 
Other (e.g. lawyers, journalist, historians)  4 men, 2 women 
 
Narrative interviews were done as semi-structured interviews with Sendong survivors (hereafter 
survivor interviews); these interviews were equivalent to De Sardan’s (1995) narrative interviews. 
Because environmentally-displaced people typically return home and do not migrate very far 
(GOS 2011), the majority of the survivors were expected to reside in or in close proximity to 
CDO. For practical reasons, all of the survivors I interviewed were living in CDO during my 
fieldwork. Seventy-nine survivor interviews were conducted with 56 adult women and 23 adult 
men. The discrepancy reflects the availability of interviewees during daytime hours. Interviews 
were conducted inside and in front of people’s homes and work sites, and at temporary and 
permanent relocation sites throughout the city. Interviews lasted between 30 to 60 minutes, and 
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focused on the individual’s migratory experiences during and after the December 2011 disaster. 
Survivor interviews were not recorded because the majority were conducted in Bisayan, and 
frequently in situations where people were talking simultaneously. It was more effective for me to 
write notes while my interpreter translated, and later elaborate upon these notes in a private 
debriefing with her.  
My main interpreter, Kuki, conducted almost all of the survivor interviews. Before we began the 
survivor interviews, she had translated interview questions and instructions for the participatory 
video activity into language that made sense to research participants. As De Sardan (1995) points 
out, researchers craft questions to answer their specific research question using academic 
language; these questions benefit immensely from translation. Moreover, ensuring interpreters 
both know what type of data is required by the primary researcher and have the flexibility ask 
questions in a culturally appropriate manner (i.e. not necessarily translating the researcher’s 
question verbatim) improves the research process and outcomes (Turner 2010). Ada, but not 
Frank, accompanied me on many of the survivor interviews in part because I knew people would 
be more inclined to come and speak with a foreigner with a blond-haired blue-eyed baby than to 
a lone woman foreigner. 
Compensating interviewees was another research consideration. Heller, Christensen et al. (2011) 
suggest that immediate, culturally-appropriate compensation can be helpful, and the question of 
how to meaningfully give back to research participants is an important methodological 
consideration. In my fieldwork, I sought the advice of experienced researchers at my host 
organisation the Third World Studies Center on appropriate compensation, and then checked 
with Kuki and university professors in CDO to ensure I would not violate any CDO-specific 
norms. I did not pay any participant. Instead, during the survivor interviews I provided snacks, 
drinks or small meals. Whenever possible, foodstuffs were purchased from the participant or 
from an establishment they recommended. I also patronised the businesses of my interviewees; 
for example, I returned to the home of a seamstress I had interviewed several weeks prior to have 
some zippers replaced, and I hired the husband of another interviewee to drive us around on his 
motorela for a participatory video-making activity. During key informant interviews I was usually 
offered something to eat and drink, and it would have been rude to refuse or for me to offer 
them something else instead.    
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Annex 2 contains the key informant and survivor interview guides. Before moving on to the next 
research method a brief mention of how I concluded the interviews is warranted. It is perhaps 
best explained by a blog post I wrote after a particularly spirited exchange with women residents 
at a temporary housing site for Sendong survivors. Ada, but not Frank, was with Kuki and me.  
DO YOU EAT RICE? 
At the end of each interview and focus group discussion, I ask respondents what (if any) questions they have for me. 
About half of the respondents don’t have any questions and prefer to move on with the rest of their day. Of the 
respondents who elect to pose questions, most inquire about the research itself or how I am enjoying life in the 
Philippines. If Ada is with me, then I am often asked “lalaki or babae?” (boy or girl), “how many months?,” 
and “is the father Pinoy?” This ‘second interview’ typically lasts only several minutes. 
Today, the second interview was much longer. There was a back and forth of questions, a comedic performance, a 
round of pass-the-baby, and peals of laughter. I tried to answer the questions as fully and truthfully as I could but I 
didn’t have all the answers. Here’s a smattering of their queries. 
They inquired about the Canadian climate and weather: 
 What kind of precipitation is there in Canada? 
 How cold is it? 
 Do you like snow and cold? 
 What are the seasons in Canada? 
 Do people freeze in the wintertime? 
Other questions delved into family and personal matters: 
 Do you have more children? 
 How old are you? 
 Where do you stay here in the Philippines? 
 When did you arrive in the Philippines? 
 Where is your husband? What does he do here? 
 What is your husband’s job? Does he have a salary here in the Philippines? 
Then, there were the food questions: 
 Do you eat rice? 
 Why don’t you eat rice three times a day? 
 What do you eat? 
 Is it true that there are people in the USA who only eat fruits and vegetables and bread? 
 What is your favourite Filipino food? 
There were questions about social issues in Canada: 
 Are there poor people in Canada? 
 Is there a social safety net for poor people and unemployed people in Canada? Does the government 
provide them with free housing? 
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 How does the welfare system work? 
And, some questions about transportation: 
 How long does it take to get to the United States? By car? By plane? 
 Are there buses in Canada? 
 How do people travel long distances in Canada? 
Other inquiries focused on their observations of foreigners (i.e. white) in the Philippines: 
 Why do foreign men like Filipina women?  
 Why do foreigners always walk [instead of taking a motorela, jeepney, motor] even when it is so hot 
and only 7 to 10 pesos? 
 Why do American men walk so fast - like this [imitation of a man taking enormous strides]? His 
Filipina wife has to walk so fast just to keep up [imitation of a women hurrying around taking four or 
five tiny steps just to keep up with the husband], and she’s usually pregnant [arm gestures to indicate a 
pregnant belly]. 
The questions you ask can reveal a lot about you, perhaps even more than the response. It’s an issue I’ve considered 
in the process of designing and carrying out my research. In asking respondents to take a turn as the interviewer, I 
can learn about values, stereotypes, cultural biases, among other things. And, in answering questions, I can satisfy 
their curiosity and hopefully help to nurture cross-cultural understanding (Gibb 2013, 6 March). 
Group activities  
Initially I had planned to lead a group workshop after all the participatory videos were completed. 
In the workshop, participants would watch and discuss the videos, and evaluate the research 
team’s interpretation of preliminary research results. Such a workshop never materialised for two 
main reasons. One, I was unable to edit the videos in the field so that the participants’ faces 
could not be recognised, and thus the videos could not be shared without compromising 
participants’ anonymity. Two, I was cognisant of the fact that research has the potential to be 
extractive because research outputs are inevitably less than what the participants contribute in 
terms of their time and knowledge (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). Participants had already given 
significant amounts of their time to the research project through individual or group interviews 
and a day-long video making activity, and they had other interests and responsibilities. 
Instead, the group activities included three focus group discussions and three interactive 
presentations. I did two presentations for the researchers and staff at the Third World Studies 
Center (TWSC), one before my fieldwork and the other after. The pre-fieldwork presentation was 
done as a round-table with an extensive question and answer period. It was aimed at fulfilling one 
of my requirements as a TWSC foreign research fellow, troubleshooting potential problems with 
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the research design, identifying contacts in CDO (including potential research assistants), revising 
research questions, and obtaining further confirmation that CDO would be a safe place to bring 
my young family. The second TWSC presentation gave me the opportunity to obtain critical 
feedback on my preliminary results. In the third presentation, I presented my preliminary 
research results to research participants, friends and other people interested in my research in 
Cagayan de Oro. It was a nerve-wracking experience because they were the ones who had had 
intimate experiences with Typhoon Sendong and could invalid my results. (Luckily, they 
confirmed them). It was also the most enjoyable and rewarding presentation I have given, 
especially the ensuing discussion. Ada and Frank attended each presentation. 
Focus group discussions were an efficient research tool for triangulating data from key informant 
and survivor interviews, and for probing specific questions. Their purpose was to acquire the 
opinions and an overview of the experiences of three different groups of people (Table 4.3). One 
was conducted with women Sendong survivors-turned-activists who began volunteering on 
behalf of a Filipino women’s rights organisation after their Sendong experiences. A second was 
tacked on to a natural family planning session co-hosted by the archdiocese’s Responsible 
Parenthood and All Natural Family Planning ministry and the local Imam. Most attendees were 
women, and all attendees were Muslim Sendong survivors. It was held in both the Maranao and 
Bisayan languages, with the Imam translating from Maranao into Bisayan for Kuki, who then 
translated into English for me. A third focus group discussion was carried out with a small group 
of men and women Sendong survivors living in the temporary bunkhouses at the Xavier Ecoville 
relocation site. This group was handpicked by site staff. Ada accompanied me in all focus group 
discussions; Frank was present for the first one only. Kuki directed all three; we had gone over 
the design together, and she understood the information I sought. I acted as recorder, filling in 
flipcharts with the participants’ responses and making my own notes, only interrupting Kuki if 
there was a point requiring additional probing. A summary of the focus group discussion itinerary 
is given in Annex 3. 
Table 4.3. Summary of focus group discussions in CDO. 
Focus group discussion Number of participants 
With urban poor women survivors and activists  7 women 
With survivors living at Ecoville  4 men, 3 women 
With Muslim survivors  2 men, 7 women 
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Participatory video 
Participatory videography is a variation of the photo voice method. Photo voice is a process in 
which participants are asked to capture their personal perspective on a particular topic using 
photography, with the goal of identifying, representing and improving their community 
(Hurworth 2003). The photographs are later used as the basis for a critical discussion, either as 
part of a group workshop or a dialogue with decision-makers. Similarly, by enabling the research 
subjects to control the camera and storyline, participatory video can be a democratising and 
empowering method (Kindon 2003). It ultimately remains an unequal power relationship because 
the researcher decides which elements to accentuate and which elements to obscure in their 
analyses and research reports. Still, participatory video is perceived as an effective means of 
reaching and including the most powerless and increasing equitable outcomes, a useful tool for 
participatory research that works in both developing and developed countries, and a helpful 
means to enable communities to critically analyse their own realities and to explore the 
construction of meaning (Kindon 2003). It also has its drawbacks; for example, it requires a lot of 
time and commitment from everyone involved, there may be concerns about confidentiality, the 
relationship between the researcher and the participants can be negatively affected, and there is a 
high degree of selectivity in choosing a focus and deciding what is allowed to be filmed (Kindon 
2003). 
In my study, participatory video can be thought of as an intensive, long-duration, traveling (in-
situ) interview coupled with a transect drive through the city. Seven participants created videos 
about the places significant to them during their post-Sendong migratory experiences. 
Participants were given the choice of remaining anonymous or not in their video (via post-
production film editing software to blur faces). They were also given the option of limiting which 
audiences could view their video: the research team, research participants, Philippine-based 
organisations, internationally-based organisations, etc.  
My initial naïve plan to have research participants go out on their own to create videos – a 
method I had successfully used with participant photography for my master’s research (Gibb 
2007) – failed. Despite assurances that I would not hold participants responsible if the 
smartphones (i.e. cameras) I provided were damaged or stolen, nobody would take a phone. 
Moreover, the shooting locations were far apart from each other and would incur a significant 
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burden in terms of time and money. Finally, participants suggested that it would be better if Kuki 
and I were present to actually hold the camera and to remind them which issues to cover in their 
videos. Acquiescing to this third consideration meant forgoing the goal of a participant-
controlled gaze. In hindsight, I am glad my initial plan failed because accompanying the 
participants throughout the video-making process provided excellent opportunities for non-
participant observation, for probing certain issues, and for developing rapport with the 
participants. The informal conversations travelling between sites often yielded insightful 
comments that were not made explicit in the official interview or videos. The revised method 
also helped the participants to process and confront their experiences, and in the case of the 
group video-making, to selectively share their past with their new neighbours. 
Several steps were involved in preparing for and carrying out the participatory video-making 
activity. One or more days before shooting each participant was interviewed. Kuki explained the 
objectives, process and very limited in-kind compensation of the video-making activity, and then 
asked the participant to prepare a list of locations where they wanted to shoot videos. I arranged 
transportation and refreshments, and made sure the video and GPS recording equipment were 
ready. Filming took place on two separate days. On the first day, the activity was done with one 
survivor who was then living at the Xavier Farm temporary relocation site. I hired her husband, a 
motorela driver, to take us to all the sites she wanted to include in her videos. That day, we used a 
smartphone as a video camera. The research team on this first day consisted of the woman 
survivor, her husband, their five year old son, Kuki, Ada and me. The second day of shooting 
was a very different experience because it was done with a cohort of survivors living together at 
the Xavier Ecoville temporary housing site. Kuki had borrowed a high quality camcorder from a 
film studies friend (see discussion on gatekeepers in the Social networks section of the chapter). I 
had hired a jeepney driver to drive us, and had purchased snacks through the Ecoville catering 
cooperative. The research team was larger this time: four adult women participants and two of 
their young children, two adult men participants, Kuki, the jeenpney driver, Frank, Ada and me. 
Perhaps the best way to explain the dynamics, logistics and surprises of the group participatory 
video-making day is to reproduce an abridged version of my blog post based on the experience. 
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A FILM SHOOT 
9:15 am – Arrival at Ecoville. There are no staff on-site, and no group of participants waiting (as per our 
arrangements). Uh oh. We head to the carinderia of one of the participants who has agreed to come out on today’s 
activity. He helps gather the other participants, while I go collect and pay for the snacks I’d ordered from the 
Ecoville cooperative.  
10:00 am – There’s an air of excitement. Transport from Ecoville into the city is relatively expensive so it’s a rare 
splurge for many of the Ecoville residents, particularly for those with no or sporadic employment. When Kuki 
explained the activity at a workshop last week, there was an enthusiastic response. It would be like a school trip - 
back to the sites of their old homes and the other places that had a significant impact on them in the months after 
Typhoon Sendong. It would also be an opportunity for them to learn more about their new neighbours and their 
pre-Sendong lives.  
10:30 am – First stop is the Xavier Heights covered court. It’s a few side streets off the national highway in 
barangay Balulang. A goat grazes at the edge of the property. A half-dozen boys play basketball in the covered 
court. We all dismount and tour the site. Kuki interviews one woman who lived here from December 2011 until 
February 2012. The army brought her here. We film on the spot where she and her family slept. On the walk out, 
a group of men stop Frank, and inquire about our activities. Upon hearing our interest in Typhoon Sendong, they 
offer an explanation on the root causes of the devastation: illegal logging, mining, unchecked development. Everyone, 
it seems, has an opinion on the calamity. 
11:20 am – It’s a harrowing ride through the backroads of Balulang down to Isla Puntod, the former home of two 
of the women. The road is used mostly by big trucks carrying crushed gravel from the river quarries. Much of the 
soil was carried away with the floodwaters, leaving only large boulders and giant potholes. The driver’s grimace tells 
me he was not anticipating this kind of off-road driving when he quoted me his pakyaw price. 
 
There used to be two bridges connecting Isla Puntod to the mainland, a hanging bridge for pedestrians and a 
cemented bridge for motors (motorbikes), quarry trucks and the multicabs that served as the main mode of 
public transportation here. The former bridge was completely washed out and has not been rebuilt. The latter is 
cracked and doesn’t look like it could withstand another flood, but is still used. Looking at the river and the main 
Taguanao bridge upstream, it’s easy to see that Isla Puntod would inevitably be flooded if the river level ever rose. 
There is no other place for the water to go. During Sendong, the water rose to within one metre of the bridge. 
Yet, the lots on Isla Puntod were titled. There used to be plenty of houses. One woman moved here in 2003, paying 
a monthly mortgage of $2.48 to eventually own the land. Her place was connected (legally) with electricity in 2008. 
She will not receive any reimbursement for the money she has paid for the lot. We film in front of her old house. 
She points to the site where a coconut tree once stood. When the water began rising (up to 25 feet), she and her 
husband climbed the tree to escape. The tree was knocked over by a barrage of uprooted trees. It was very dark so 
they kept shouting “where are you?” They crossed from one treetop to another, eventually making it to the safety of 
a neighbour’s place several hundred metres away. Her family has rebuilt a house with locally-sourced materials. 
They return occasionally to harvest mangoes, papaya, kamote and other vegetables and root crops. It’s very 
peaceful; the river air and breeze is welcome respite from the summer heat. 
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The only new structure on the Isla is on a quarry site. The building serves as an office. Quarrying activities 
continue unabated. 
12:40 pm – The next stop is Isla Delta in barangay Consolacion. The young mother who used to live here talks 
rapidly. She calls cheerfully to former neighbours who seem happy to see her. She points out the spot where 
her amakan house once stood. It’s just past a junk shop and adjacent to a small creek whose waters are more 
stagnant than flowing. The water is barely visible under a thick mass of bright green aquatic plants. The house was 
given to her from the Celebration Church. She lived at the house for 15 years.  
A two minute walk away is her brother’s house. She returns here on a regular basis to visit family; she sleeps here 
whenever she comes into the city. The house has a concrete foundation and amakan walls on the upper floor. He 
continues to stay here with his family, even though they have a bunkhouse (temporary shelter) in Ecoville. They will 
move permanently to Ecoville once the construction of the permanent houses is complete. 
We continue walking and stop under the Marcos bridge. She came here on a daily basis to collect relief goods given 
by the Catholic Church and some non-governmental organisations. Across the dirt road is a giant billboard. On 
the night of 16-17 December 2011, her mother and cousin were carried by the flood waters and stranded in the 
struts of the billboard. Luckily, they survived.  
We leave on a somber note. She points to a stretch of road where the bodies were laid out, brought there by 
members of the police and armed forces. In the days after the calamity, families gathered on the bridge and looked 
down, trying to identify loved ones. 
1:15 pm – We drive past the pier and into barangay Macabalan. Most of the houses are constructed with light 
materials. It is densely populated, and lacking in trees and greenspace. It’s an estuary barangay, located at the 
meeting of the Cagayan River and Macajalar Bay. Salty air wafts into the jeepney. It’s a refreshing change from 
the diesel, charcoal and refuse stench in the downtown core. The roads are very narrow with deep gutters on either 
side. It is barely wide enough for the jeepney to pass. Our driver demonstrates his expert driving skills when he is 
forced to creep around a wake extending onto the street. Kuki explains that when someone dies, there is usually a 
wake in which family, friends and neighbours come to pay their respects and maybe share a shot of Tanduay rum. 
In poorer neighbourhoods, where most people have tiny houses with very limited space for accommodating visitors, 
these wakes extend onto the street. It is socially acceptable to appropriate public space for the duration of the wake. 
We shoot a video looking out onto the river. The former resident explains that his house was built on a seawall 
and extended over the river. It was entirely washed out. All along the river side of the road are empty concrete house 
ruins and newly planted vegetable gardens. Children play in the abandoned houses. On the other side of the road is 
a thriving community - sari-sari shops, carinderias, residential homes, etc. No building is vacant. 
Many of his former neighbours are waiting to be relocated to the Calaanan and Indahag relocation sites. Initially, 
no Macabalan residents were supposed to be given relocation housing, even though many of houses were washed out. 
The city’s rationale was that nobody in the barangay died in Sendong. It took a very tragic incident for this 
position to change. One woman died by suicide in an evacuation centre; she had been denied relocation housing 
because she was a renter and not a homeowner, was too traumatised to return to her old place, and felt she had no 
alternative. The Catholic parish priest in Macabalan was afraid that his parishioners may follow suite, so he 
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lobbied the city on their behalf, advocating for relocation. He is credited with helping a lot of former and soon-to-be 
former Macabalan residents. 
3:45 pm – We finally arrive back at Ecoville, exhausted. We do a final video in one of the bunkhouses, where the 
Macabalan man and his family now stay. It’s small but cheery. A motorcycle helmet hangs on one wall. Bags of 
donated clothes and linens line one wall. He narrates his video in a mixture of English and Bisayan. 
*      *       *       * 
The day is long, emotionally taxing and physically exhausting. And rich, revealing and rewarding. I will go back 
to Ecoville again next week to deliver copies of the video to each participant. Before the videos can be shared with 
others outside the research team, they need to be translated, edited, and, in some cases, altered to conceal the identity 
of the participant (Gibb 2013, 25 March). 
At the end of each day of filming, Kuki and I debriefed the day’s activities. I wrote copious notes, 
especially on the discussions in the motorela and jeepney travelling between locations. Later, Kuki 
translated and transcribed the content of each video; these transcriptions and the videos were 
included in the corpus of textual data that was analysed. Each of the seven participants received a 
DVD with all the videos from either the first or second day of filming.  
Critical topographies and counter-maps 
Understanding CDO’s post-disaster landscape is a critical component of this research project; the 
research question posits an exploration of the “where” of post-disaster spaces, and the second 
research objective aims to map where survivors go in the short and medium term following a 
disaster. Because this research project also ascribes to feminist geography principles, the way in 
which I understand, produce, and use topographies and maps requires elaboration. 
Feminist geographer Cindi Katz (2001, 1232) is well-known for employing topography as a 
critical research method that yields a “spatialized understanding of the problems.” She explains:  
To do a topography is to carry out a detailed examination of some part of the material 
world, defined at any scale from the body to the global, in order to understand its salient 
features and their mutual and broader relationships. Because they routinely incorporate 
both ‘natural’ and social features of a landscape, topographies embed a notion of process, 
of places made and nature produced. […] [A] critical topography makes it possible to 
excavate the layers of process that produce particular places and to see their intersections 
with material social practices at other scales of analysis. Revealing the embeddedness of 
these practices in place and space in turn invites the vivid revelation of social and political 
difference and inequality. […] [Critical t]opographies provide the ground – literally and 
figuratively – for developing a critique of the social relations sedimented into space and 
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for scrutinizing the material social practices at all geographic scales through which place is 
produced (Katz 2001, 1228-1229). 
Inspired by the similarities she observed in the effects of globalisation on the social reproduction 
of the Howa in central eastern Sudan and the working class in New York City, Katz (2001) went 
a step beyond creating critical topographies to create counter-topographies. A counter-
topography connects multiple critical topographies of vastly different places that are similarly 
affected by global processes (Katz 2001). A counter-topography approach “suggests tracing lines 
across places to show how they are connected by the same processes, and simultaneously 
embedding these processes within the speciﬁcs of fully contextualised, three-dimensional places” 
(Pratt and Yeoh 2003, 163). Because they are rooted in historical moments that at once eliminate 
possibility through social exclusion and mobilise opportunities through social movements and 
political struggles lived, counter-topographies can be used to connect people and ideas, to 
navigate political space, and to bridge theoretical and empirical work on marginalised populations 
(Mountz 2011). Counter-topographies can expose the intricate weaving of gendered state policies, 
cultural ideologies, familial obligations, transnational householding, and conflicting mobilities, 
among other aspects of the migration experience – a task that, as Piper (2006) contends, is 
urgently needed.  
I aimed to create a critical topography of CDO’s post-disaster spaces, but not a counter-
topography, which would entail comparative research with another vastly different site 
undergoing analogous processes. Like other scholars developing critical or counter topographies, 
my objective in using a critical topography approach was to destabilise dominant, naturalised 
knowledges, and social structures, and to expose the people and institutions who draw the lines 
and the ways in which they do it (Pratt 2004). In CDO, such an endeavour revealed the 
“spatialized understanding of the problems” in official post-disaster spaces (Katz 2001, 1232). In 
addition to producing a critical topography as a written analysis, I co-produced maps that 
illustrate salient features of this topography. The maps fall into De Sardan’s (1995, 25) data type 
of “devices of census” or the “systematic and intense process of observation and measurement.” 
These devices of census include the list of all the post-Sendong places deemed important to 
people (emic data), and the maps produced based on the interpretation of these data (etic data). 
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The maps produced in this research project are better characterised as counter-maps than 
conventional maps.  
Maps are anything but banal or apolitical because mapping is an entry point for studying power, 
agency, identity, categorisation, lines of inclusion and exclusion, diversity and resistance 
(Rocheleau 1995, Mitchell 2002, Radcliffe 2010). Conventional maps are typically two-
dimensional, produced by governments, privilege land use (Rocheleau 1995); they reflect the 
projects, identities and culture of dominant groups (Radcliffe 2010); and they are designed to 
abstract and summarise (Scott 1998). Maps simplify a complex world, transcribing only the 
aspects “that are of immediate interest to the mapmaker and ignore the rest” (Scott 1998, 87). As 
such, map-making is not a neutral process, but is instead a highly selective and political process in 
which the map-maker has the power to emphasise and exclude. In other words, “[e]very act of 
measurement [i]s an act marked by the play of power relations” (Scott 1998, 27).  Maps are a 
useful tool for increasing the legibility of a place to outsiders.  
As a substitute, feminist geographers produce alternative maps, ones that challenge conventional 
representations and attempt to engender more equitable power relations. These counter-maps 
depict interpretations of the world that subvert prevailing representations, distinguish among 
diverse understandings of resources, places and spaces, and acknowledge oppression and conflict 
(Rocheleau 1995, Kwan 2002). They are used throughout the research process as a starting point 
for discussion with research subjects, a basis for understanding the context, a venue for 
negotiating, a vocabulary, and a means for coding and quantifying data (Rocheleau 1995). The 
significance of a counter-map does not lie in its artistic appeal or accuracy, but rather in the rich 
commentary on the uses, values, access to and control over components of the landscape that is 
elicited in counter-map-making.  
A valuable contribution of this research tool were the insights gleaned from the process of 
creating counter-maps. During both the survivor and key informant interviews respondents were 
asked about the places that were important to them after Sendong, and the reasons why. I 
compiled a list of all locations (including locations beyond the city limits), then collected GPS 
points for the CDO and city outskirts sites. Data points were collected using an application on a 
smartphone. I also photographed each location. For logistical, security and financial reasons, I 
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did not collect data for locations in other parts of Mindanao or in Luzon and the Visayas. Getting 
to each of sites underscored the difficulty, time and expense incurred in survivors’ commutes, 
thereby providing insight into mobility, and the inclusive and exclusive nature of particular post-
disaster spaces (Chapters 7 and 6, respectively). Some GPS data were collected during the 
participatory video-making activity. The process of actually visiting these sites opened 
opportunities for frank, personal, thoughtful conversations.  
Although I set out alone for most of the GPS work, I did not always work unaccompanied. 
Because GPS work did not require translation assistance, I did it on days when Kuki had other 
engagements. Unlike the other more sedentary research activities, I felt GPS work would be 
unsafe for Ada because of all the different modes of transportation I used (e.g. jeepney, motor, 
motorela, multicab, transport truck, private car, taxi, sikad, construction vehicle, and running), and, 
furthermore, that her presence would slow me down. But I was rarely alone. When I arrived in an 
unfamiliar barangay with multiple sites to visit I would arrange a pakyaw deal with a sikad driver in 
which he34 would take me everywhere on my list for an agreed-upon price. Sikad drivers were my 
preferred drivers because they frequently had an intimate knowledge of the area through living 
and working there for several to many years. Their geographic knowledge of the barangay enabled 
them to plan an efficient route. The small size of the sikad permitted us to travel down narrow 
paths that were inaccessible to larger vehicles, and the window height and low speed of the sikad 
allowed me to see more than I could sitting inside another type of vehicle. Most important, the 
sikad drivers often had personal experiences with Sendong and its aftermath. They were generous 
in recounting personal stories of their families and clients. On several occasions, they added 
stops, explained the significance of these places, and introduced me to Sendong survivors along 
the way. In retrospect I should have done sikad tours of Sendong-affected barangays at the 
beginning and not the end of my fieldwork because of the richness of these informal interviews.  
Field notes 
Studiously recording all field observations is critical for good case study research. Field-noting is 
important for recording and organising descriptions and accounts of the data, which will be 
analysed later (De Sardan 1995). Writing field notes is a creative, “sense-making process” that 
                                                          
34 All the sikad drivers in CDO were male. 
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enables the researcher to recognise, manage and interpret positionalities (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 
197). Heller, Christensen et al. (2011, 67) argue that it is important to write beyond field notes 
and to keep a field journal, which they describe as a “reflexive tool” that promotes fieldwork 
rigour and “better research.” The journals assist in data collection as an additional source of data, 
as a log recording changes in the research design and the rationale for these changes, as well as a 
decisional trail, and in reflexive engagement with issues including ethics, gatekeepers, 
positionality, power, reflexivity, rigour and subjectivity (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011, 80, 68).  
During both the pre-fieldwork and main fieldwork seasons, I made shorthand jottings during all 
research activities throughout the day. For activities where it was not appropriate to take notes, I 
wrote my jottings and notes a posteriori. On the days when I worked with Kuki, we would review 
the day’s activities on the jeepney or motorela ride back into town or over lunch. I would make 
additional notes based on Kuki’s observations and insights. These debriefing sessions were 
important to openly discuss interview dynamics, and to clarify any erroneous assumptions. All of 
these jottings and reflections were then fleshed out into much longer and reflexive field notes 
that I typed up in the evening or during a day when no field visits were planned. As such, my 
completed field notes were a combination of De Sardan (1995) and Cloke, Cook et al. (2004) type 
field notes and Heller, Christensen et al.’s (2011) field journal. I purposefully thought and wrote 
reflexively about diverse facets of fieldwork and the blurring of the professional and the personal. 
These writings, together with the other forms of self-constructed data and pre-constructed data 
described in the previous pages, form the corpus of data used for interpretation. 
Interpretation, or data analysis  
In the Theoretical positioning section of the chapter I cited McDowell’s (1997, 393) description of 
research as “a mixture of hard slog, serendipitous coincidences and pure chance.” This 
description applies to data analysis, too. After defining data analysis as a process of interpretation, 
this section presents the hard slog, serendipitous coincidences and pure chance elements. 
In the course of a research project data undergo two major processes: construction and 
interpretation. Cloke, Cook et al. (2004, 4, emphasis in original) distinguish between the two 
processes: “a process of construction necessarily occurs as these data are extracted from the field 
through active research, ready for a further process of interpretation designed to ‘make sense’ of 
these data (to substitute their ‘rawness’ with a more finished quality).” Interpreting data entails re-
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presenting or constructing geographical texts. It begins with “sifting and sorting” or the “filed 
work” that proceeds fieldwork and that is generally omitted from research reports because it feels 
like “an unglamorous almost clerical process” (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 217). Yet, this step is 
imperative for organising large amounts of data and identifying relationships among derived 
categories. This step, frequently called content analysis, is “a research method for the subjective 
interpretation of the context of text data through the systematic classification process of coding 
and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1278).  
The sifting and sorting began with transcribing 32.5 of hours of recorded interviews. I made 
notes during the transcription process, which informed my initial codes. From there, I did a 
careful reading of all self-constructed data (e.g. interview transcriptions, participatory video 
transcriptions and field notes) and pre-constructed data. The text data that were coded included: 
field notes, transcriptions of recorded interviews, interview notes, workshop notes, government 
documents, newspaper articles (print and online), NGO documents, government identification 
cards, relocation housing agreements contracts and organisational promotional material. I did a 
second reading to develop the “in vivo” or “emic” codes derived from terms in the text. To the 
text-generated codes I added my researcher-generated or “etic” code to ensure my coding would 
fit within the conceptual framework and answer the research question and objectives. In the third 
reading, the texts were coded according to both emic and etic codes. Based on this coding, codes 
were then further subdivided into sub-codes as well as grouped into broader categories. Links 
between codes and categories were identified, and the type of linking relationship examined. 
Finally, I did selective coding to refine the codes, sub-codes and categories, and to clarify how 
they were systematically related. Such a close reading of texts reflects an artisanal mode of 
understanding (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). Based on textual coding, I then set about explaining and 
understanding processes and mechanisms behind the environment migration provoked by 
Typhoon Sendong, in particular the creation of and governmental interventions carried out in 
post disaster spaces (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
This type of coding is called open coding (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004) or conventional data analysis 
(Hsieh and Shannon 2005). In conventional content analysis a study begins with observation 
(fieldwork), codes are defined during data analysis (not before), and codes are derived from the 
data (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Conventional, as opposed to directed or summative, content 
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analysis is appropriate when a study aims to describe a phenomenon or when existing theory or 
literature on a phenomenon is lacking (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Its main advantage is that 
codes and categories emerge from the data themselves (i.e. the research participants) instead of 
from preconceived categories and theories (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Its two main 
disadvantages are the risk of the researcher not fully understanding the context and thus failing to 
identify key categories and misrepresenting findings, and a limited ability to advance theory 
(Hsieh and Shannon 2005). The former problem of internal validity or trustworthiness can be 
mitigated through data triangulation, peer debriefing and presenting preliminary results back to 
the research participants themselves (cf. Hsieh and Shannon 2005). As explained in earlier 
sections, all of these methods were used. 
Counter-maps were produced by Marc Girard based on GPS data collected in the Philippines. 
The specific locations frequented by survivors were overlaid on political and topographical maps 
of the city. Data were used selectively on each map to conduct specific analyses. For example, to 
illustrate the relative remoteness of relocation sites Figure 6.2d in Chapter 6 depicts only data 
points of the relocation sites. As such, the counter-maps are suited for diverse analytical 
purposes. They show the propensity of vulnerable people to live in hazard prone areas (especially 
to flooding) that are near hubs of economic opportunities. They underscore how relations in 
space are affected by axes of difference such as gender, religion, class and ethnicity. They 
illustrate the mismatch between the official spaces where disaster relief is dispatched, and the 
spaces actually frequented by vulnerable survivors. They highlight the increasing distance of the 
living spaces of survivors from the social and economic hubs of CDO. The counter-maps, 
however, are imperfect reflections of the lived experiences of Sendong survivors. For example, 
the increased distance between pre-Sendong and post-Sendong housing and the city centre is 
apparent on the map, but the greater difficulty and time required to commute into the city for 
work, shopping, services, etc. is not. Counter-maps do not show the paucity of public 
transportation or the poor condition of roads.  
Interpreting reflexively 
Interpreting data necessarily entails writing. Indeed, the act of writing itself is a reflexive activity 
(Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). Cloke, Cook et al. (2004, 336) explain that “writing is a form of 
representation (or indeed re-presentation) which helps to create, rather than simply reflect, our 
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geographical experience.” Representation is about producing knowledge and ways of seeing or 
conceiving the world. Representation is typically done using three distinct types of writing: 
expository, which seeks to analyse, understand, explain or argue; expressive, which seeks to 
express feelings; and narrative, which seeks to tell stories (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). In producing 
this research project, I used all three types of writing to achieve different objectives. For example, 
most of the chapters in this thesis are of the expository writing type – as per the requirements 
and objectives of a geography PhD. The results chapters are filled with narrative writing, key to 
explaining and understanding the how and why of post-disaster spaces. To better enact a feminist 
way of research and writing, which I strive for, I have included expressive writing in this 
dissertation. I have also explored expressive and narrative writing in my field notes and in a 
research blog. Because there is currently little published literature on the use of blogging as a 
research or self-reflexive tool, I indulge in a brief tangent on the subject. 
Blogging about the research experience, and mixing it with observations about life in the 
Philippines, was my foray in translating the fieldworker experience into something my friends and 
family back in Canada could understand. Perhaps more than any other form of communication, 
blogs blur the lines between public and private, individual and group, and fact and fiction (Saka 
2008). I deliberately wrote for a non-academic audience, striving to clearly interpret elements of 
the world of the field to others. Similar to my field notes, my blog was akin to the group 
journaling of Heller, Christensen et al. (2011); blogging was a form of public journaling, it was 
reflexive but carefully curated and timed. The blog forced me to conduct mini analyses of the 
research and quotidian life experiences and to explain them somewhat coherently. Indeed, 
research blogs motivate the author to narrate what would normally remain as fragmented in field 
notes (Saka 2008). Unlike other forms of scholarly writing, research blogs are typically written in 
short, emotive language with details limited only by “self-control” (Saka 2008, 7). In my case, this 
meant judicious editing of topics and details to avoid compromising the identity and safety of 
research participants and eliciting worry among family members. The blog also proved successful 
in obtaining timely feedback, usually via a personal email. Immediacy is characteristic of blogs: 
they are written in the present tense, by people actively engaged with the issue, and responded to 
by people almost immediately, thereby adding elements of participation and researcher 
accountability (Saka 2008, 1). Regularly publishing blog posts was easier in 2010 when I was 
unaccompanied than in 2012-2013 when Frank and Ada were with me. This discrepancy is largely 
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attributable to the amount of free time and how I filled it. Even though more than half of the 
posts were left unfinished and unpublished, the exercise of reflexively thinking through an issue 
has been helpful to data interpretation during and after fieldwork. 
The “hard slog” part of data interpretation was mostly done indoors tapping away on my laptop 
– reading, coding, categorising, re-reading, re-coding, analysing, etc. The “serendipity and 
chance” parts, or what I consider the creative and insightful elements of interpretation, were 
done on the run. Literally. I would read, write, think, write, get frustrated, and then head out for a 
run. The run would focus my attention on my immediate surroundings – Filipino nannies 
pushing expensive strollers in Outremont, the Rocket’s boxy black tombstone in the Cote-des-
Neiges cemetery, the colourful ice fishing huts on Lac des Deux Montagnes, the rhythmic drilling 
of pileated woodpeckers on insect-infested trees, the bitter winter wind mercilessly freezing 
exposed skin. Without exception, my mind would wander back to the Philippines and my writing. 
Without the visual cue of the laptop and self-imposed pressure to produce when sitting in front 
of a computer, I found it much easier to see connections and generate ideas. In writing Girl 
Runner novelist Carrie Snyder had a similar experience:  
[R]unning had become, for me, kind of a meditation. It helps me formulate ideas but in a 
strange way, I would say. I don’t go out and start thinking about plot or character. Or I 
may go out thinking that I will think about it, and then discover that my mind completely 
empties out, which is kind of a meditative quality. My mind goes still, and then when I’m 
finished my run I’ll have an amazing idea (Snyder 2014). 
Like Snyder, I have used running as a way to remain grounded throughout the processes of data 
construction and interpretation. Indeed, engaging in a favourite activity is highly recommended 
by early career human geographers as a way to reduce researcher fatigue (Heller, Christensen et 
al. 2011). I would add that it can offer opportunities to think reflexively about the research 
process. One particular issue that preoccupied me during my runs in the Philippines were the 
dynamics of accompanied research.  
An accompanied research project  
This part of the chapter forms part of a general reflection on academia, and specifically on how 
to make academic life and family life work. Together. The issue is addressed in casual 
conversations among graduate students and their advisors, in side events hosted by career 
development offices at major conferences, and in a growing number of scholarly books like Do 
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babies matter? Gender and the ivory tower by Mary Ann Mason, Nicholar H. Wolfinger and Marc 
Goulden (2013). My own questions and ideas on academia-family balance began to crystalise 
during fieldwork, in that “leaky space” where personal and professional roles and relationships 
inevitably overlap (Cupples and Kindon 2003, 212). Perhaps this is because “successful fieldwork 
is […] a peak life experience, a time of sensual bombardment with new stimuli, of incredible 
intellectual excitement, of self-discovery” (Oboler 1986, 50 in Cupples and Kindon 2003, 221). I 
include the following discussion on accompanied research for several reasons. It more truthfully 
reflects the actual processes of constructing research. It illustrates the manner in which 
relationships affect research dynamics and research spaces. It disputes the myth of the solitary 
unattached geographer immersing himself in a remote and difficult field site for extended periods 
of time. It helps to explain some of the epistemological and practical research decisions, and the 
limitations of this study. 
Being accompanied in the field has epistemological and practical implications. It affects the 
choice of research topic, field site, research methods, and the timing of research activities (Flinn, 
Marshall and Armstrong 1998, Frohlick 2002, Cupples and Kindon 2003, Mose Brown and de 
Casanova 2009). The gendered, classed, and ethnic positions attributed to a researcher are 
different depending on whether or not he or she is accompanied (Seiler Gilmore 1998, Cupples 
and Kindon 2003, Cornet 2010, 2013). The identities and positions of the accompanying family 
members or members of the research team also matter in determining access to resources in the 
field and in shaping research outcomes (Flinn 1998, Turner 2010). Being accompanied permits “a 
form of mutual exploitation” in which researchers “retain the power to interpret other cultures in 
our writing but […] we might simultaneously find that the identities constructed for us by our 
hosts are different from those we had imagined or planned for ourselves” (Cupples and Kindon 
2003, 223). Indeed, Cornet (2013, 96) suggests that the challenges of being an accompanied 
researcher “push reflexivity one step further,” and Flinn (1998, 18) writes that “fieldwork with 
family forces more honesty.”  
The myth of the solitary unattached geographer 
Despite a plethora of critiques, there is a persistent myth that legitimate research is produced by a 
solitary researcher who leaves his or her family and home community for months or even years 
to conduct ethnographic fieldwork under difficult conditions. Matthew Sparke (1996, 212 in 
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Frohlick 2002, 50 emphasis in original) describes the portrayal of geographical fieldwork as a 
“character-building rite of passage” in which the field is  
cast as a seductive but wild place that must be observed, penetrated and mastered by the 
geographer who, having battled with it, reveled in it, and, in the end, triumphantly risen 
above it, returns to the academy his education complete, his stature assured and his 
geographical self proven, definitely, his. 
Flinn (1998) criticises the persistent model of the lone male ethnographer, pointing to the 
colonial roots of the image popularised by Bronislaw Malinowski who argued that “proper 
conditions for ethnographic fieldwork […] consist mainly in cutting oneself off from the 
company of other white men” (1961, in Flinn 1998, 6).  
The dominant paradigm is profoundly gendered, erroneous and misleading. It is gendered in that 
presupposes the fieldworker is either unaccompanied or has a nonworking spouse to attend to 
personal matters (Linnekin 1998). It is erroneous in that most fieldworkers are accompanied, even 
if the presence of these family members, friends or colleagues is relegated to a brief 
acknowledgement (Flinn 1998, Cupples and Kindon 2003). Writing people out of the research 
report is misleading because “the work that we do when with others is different from the work 
we do when alone” (Cupples and Kindon 2003, 222). Being accompanied shapes and destabilises 
the positionality of the researcher, which, in turn, has implications for power relations and 
research outcomes (Cupples and Kindon 2003, Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009).  
The dominant model perpetuates the myth that fieldwork is, or should be, a disembodied 
practice. Portraying research as disembodied erodes the gains that feminist geographers have 
made in contesting the masculinist depiction of the field (Frohlick 2002). Moreover, as the 
narratives of many accompanied researchers demonstrate, fieldwork is “an example of embodied 
entanglements that play out between our selves or subjectivities and our research sites, both 
before and while we are in the field” (Frohlick 2002, 50). Put another way, “since when are our 
children and spouses and friends not a part of our field sites in some manner, if only to 
complicate how we negotiate our research time and place?” (Frohlick 2002, 52). Presenting 
research as an embodied practice means crossing boundaries between the private and the public 
during fieldwork and writing stages, making visible the private aspects of fieldwork (Cornet 
2013), not compartmentalising “our research selves and our selves” (Cupples and Kindon 2003, 
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223), and unmasking “the unevenness and serendipity” inherent to all field research (Mose 
Brown and de Casanova 2009, 55).  
Although all researchers do embodied research, few acknowledge it in their research reports. 
Frohlick (2002) affirms that publically admitting to having done accompanied research is still 
taboo, even when these personal relationships enhance our understanding of our research topic. 
Ethnographers have been reluctant to describe the blurring of the personal and the professional 
in fieldwork because “such revelations risk being constructed as nonscientific, subjective, and 
unprofessional” (Flinn 1998, 6). Linnekin (1998, 74) remarks that “in practice, details about 
family and other close relationships are still inadmissible in ‘straight’ scholarly writing; discussions 
about personal dramas and entanglements are acceptable, if they are compartmentalized in 
volumes specifically dedicated to the theme.” When young scholars do disclose personal field 
experiences, these accounts are usually published after establishing a reputation as a serious 
scholar (based on one’s discipline-based research) (cf. Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998, Friedl 
1998, Sutton 1998, Frohlick 2002). Even when researchers want to integrate the theoretical and 
methodological implications of accompanied research into their entire writing, it can be difficult 
or even impossible; the resulting omission perpetuates the myth of unaccompanied research 
(Burns McGrath 1998).  
In challenging the myth of the solitary, unattached geographer, which people should be written 
into research reports? Or, as Frohlick (2002, 53) more eloquently asks, “when opening up our 
methodological framework to include others, whose bodies count and what might they have to 
do with the spatiality of our sites?” The accompanying “bodies” who had the greatest impact on 
the scope, content and spatiality of this particular research were a host organisation, a host family, 
an interpreter, a husband, and a daughter. These accompanying bodies affected, albeit in different 
ways, what Cupples and Kindon (2003) contend are the two critical issues of accompanied 
fieldwork: dependence and access.  
Social networks 
Unlike in other countries where it can be extremely difficult and time-consuming to gain access 
to information or to obtain in-country research permits (cf. Cornet 2010, Heller, Christensen et 
al. 2011), conducting research in the Philippines is relatively easy. That is, if you can demonstrate 
your place in a locally-relevant social network. When a researcher can be ascribed a place within 
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locally-relevant social networks, she or he becomes less anomalous (Counts and Ayers Counts 
1998, Thurston 1998). In my case, these networks connected me to a host family in Cagayan de 
Oro and to several Philippine host organisations. 
Many of the interviews, both key informant and survivor interviews, began with me situating 
myself within a locally-relevant social network. I would explain who put me in touch with them, 
and the reasons why. This explanation would segue into a brief description of my research 
project, which would then be followed by the interview. The referral was almost always perceived 
as more important than demonstrating my affiliation with the Quezon City-based University of 
the Philippines-Diliman or producing the ethics approval certificate from the Université de 
Montréal. Even in government offices, I was never asked to produce official documentation, only 
to describe my social network. At the end of the interview, there were frequently additional 
questions about my place in a locally-relevant social network, usually about with whom I was 
living and where. Interviewees often recommended potential informants and insisted that I 
mention their name as the referral. Often, the interviewee would inform the other person(s) so 
that when I did follow up, the recommended person would say that they had been expecting me. 
Interviewing people who have learned about your research interests from others can be 
challenging and can shape the content and tone of the interview (cf. Cornet 2010). But, it can also 
facilitate access to certain people and information. 
In many cases informants doubled as gatekeepers. Typically characterised as “authority figures 
with whom access has to be negotiated, or as obstacles to be overcome” (Mandel 2003 in Heller, 
Christensen et al. 2011, 73), gatekeepers structure a researcher’s access to others, actively steering 
her toward people and organisations the gatekeepers judge as helpful or safe (Cloke, Cook et al. 
2004). This description is rather pejorative. An alternative framing put forth by Heller, 
Christensen et al. (2011) better reflects my field experience of gatekeepers as facilitators. The 
authors describe gatekeepers as “persons who control and facilitate access to respondents, 
resources and knowledge, such as interpreters, social contacts and research participants 
themselves, who hold the ultimate power to allow or deny our [i.e. the researcher’s] work” 
(Heller, Christensen et al. 2011, 73). Here, resources can be logistical, human, institutional or 
informational. The term gatekeeper is usually reserved for persons within a community that 
enable a researcher to conduct research, where the term “within” refers to a specific geographic 
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location; they are in-situ. Illustrative of the porous field, some of the gatekeepers involved in my 
research project were ex-situ. At the beginning of each of the preliminary and main field seasons, 
for example, I relied upon “absentee gatekeepers” – people I had met in Montreal or Madison 
who facilitated my entry with contacts in the Philippines.  
The most influential gatekeepers in my locally-relevant social network were my host family and 
host organisations. Somewhat serendipitously, my family and I ended up living in the compound 
of a generous middle-class Filipino family directly involved in my research topic. The family 
owned a construction and manpower company, which happened to be building permanent 
houses at various relocation sites. My status as an honorary family member meant I could use the 
air conditioned office, hitch rides into town or to construction sites on the flatbed truck or the 
company vehicle, and inquire about the structural (in the engineering sense) elements of 
relocation houses. The family invited me to observe business-related relocation housing meetings, 
arranged interview key personnel in the organisations with which they did business (e.g. Habitat 
for Humanity Philippines), and shared the practical challenges of building relocation houses. 
Additionally, the fact that our host family had five young boys, including a baby only two months 
older than Ada, made research in an unfamiliar environment relaxed and enjoyable. The boys’ 
pediatrician accepted Ada as a patient, assuaging parental health worries. Living with a Filipino 
family also gave Frank, Ada and me a routine in which we partook in many of their activities, 
such as attending Sunday Mass, celebrating birthdays and holidays, and weekend swimming 
parties at the Marcos Hotel pool. By associating ourselves with a middle-class Catholic family, 
commuting in their vehicles, and participating in typical middle-class activities in city spaces that 
exclude the majority of the city’s urban poor, we were positioned as affluent and connected to 
local power networks. The fact that we are also white foreigners further entrenched this 
positioning. 
Officially, I was a Visiting Research Fellow with the Third World Studies Center based out of the 
University of the Philippines’ Diliman campus in Quezon City. This affiliation demonstrated the 
legitimacy of my research project because it provided me with a connection to a recognised 
Philippine educational institution. It was useful in introducing my research to Manila-based 
organisations and universities. In CDO, however, demonstrating a link to a local educational 
institution proved to be a more fruitful approach, particularly for the survivor interviews. I was 
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also able to draw on the connections I had established at national organisations based in Quezon 
City back in 2010; these contacts introduced me to local chapters and local partners of the 
national organisation during the 2012-2013 field season in CDO. 
Interpreters 
Researchers are dependent on others because they cannot speak a language or because they 
cannot directly access certain people. Although I hired a field assistant primarily because I am not 
fluent in Bisayan and needed help conducting survivor interviews, Kuki’s role in the research 
project was much more significant than mere translation. Kuki was recommended to me by her 
sister, who was recommended to by researchers at the Third World Studies Center but was too 
busy studying for the bar exam to work as a full-time research assistant. The following paragraphs 
briefly reflect upon Kuki’s positionality as a research assistant, and how her own concerns and 
constraints affected our fieldwork. This type of reflection is an underappreciated task that Sarah 
Turner (2010) contends can increase the rigour of fieldwork. This section also demonstrates 
Turner’s (2010) assertion that research is conducted with, and not through, interpreters. 
Just as research participants edit their revelations based on their reading of the primary 
researcher’s positionality, they also respond to the positionality of other members of the research 
team (Cupples and Kindon 2003, Turner 2010, Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). The way Kuki 
was seen by research participants, as revealed by her language skills, professional and educational 
experience, social network, and gendered and social positions, shaped the content of interviews 
and other components of the research process. She is well educated, middle-class, of Visayan 
descent in her late twenties. She is fluent in Bisayan and English, speaks excellent Tagalog (but 
preferred to speak in English with non-Bisayan speaking Filipinos, a trait common among 
Filipinos of Visayan descent), a bit of French and almost no Maranao. She has extensive 
experience working with foreign researchers, including a former master’s student of one of my 
advisors. Her experience with Western researchers, our pre-interview preparation, and regular 
debriefing sessions were helpful in ensuring she understood the specific types of information I 
sought in each fieldwork activity and my expectations of her. 
Kuki’s religious affiliation, family situation, advanced educational attainment, and middle-class 
standing set her apart from almost all of the people we interviewed. Unlike most Filipinos she is 
atheist, but does not bring it up unless asked directly. Many informants assumed that, as a Filipina 
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not wearing any overtly religious attire such as a hijab, she was Catholic. In contrast, interviewees 
frequently inquired about my religious beliefs. Unlike most Filipinos, her parents – both 
successful lawyers – are divorced. Her entire family is politically active, albeit outside of official 
politics; they focus on advocacy, including promoting the rights of survivors, especially the urban 
poor, in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong.  
Kuki’s familiarity with the city, excellent sense of humour and ability to quickly put people at ease 
enabled her to quickly build rapport with interviewees and encourage them to open up. She had 
grown up in CDO, was proud of her Visayan roots, and had extensive ties with people in the city, 
including highly visible and vocal advocates. As a result of her social networks, she facilitated 
access to key informants and drew upon her family’s connections to arrange interviews within a 
few days with people I had been trying to interview for months. In this way, Kuki, like others in 
my social networks (and also in the experience of Heller, Christensen et al. 2011), acted as a 
facilitating gatekeeper. Her personal history in CDO and the fact that some of her relatives died 
during Typhoon Sendong motivated her to better understand the disaster.  
When a researcher begins fieldwork in a new place, he or she frequently assumes “the role of 
naïve idiot” (Robson 1997, 47 in Turner 2010, 211). A researcher’s ignorance can lead to social 
faux-pas and misleading research results. To overcome such problems, interpreters and field 
assistants are frequently called upon to be cultural consultants, cultural brokers, analysts and 
translators (Turner 2010), or “gatekeepers of meaning” (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011, 7). Kuki 
was no exception. In addition to linguistic translation, she translated between the systems of 
meanings of the academic research world and the systems of meanings in CDO barangays, or what 
De Sardan (1995, 14) describes as “semiotics translation.” She acted as a cultural broker, a role 
that ensured the research proceeded smoothly, through careful negotiations and social 
positioning not immediately apparent to Western researchers (Turner 2010). For example, I 
dictated the research topic, the overarching questions and follow-up questions inspired by 
informant revelations, but it was Kuki who guided the survivor interviews and focus group 
discussions. She steered the conversation as she saw fit, and chose when and how much to 
translate. While often a frustrating experience for me, this system kept the interviews to a 
manageable length, yielded the data I required, and left us with the opportunity to discuss the 
interview at length later. The translation also enabled Kuki to translate potentially sensitive 
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questions into clearer and softer language. Inevitably, her personal values, beliefs and 
preconceptions influenced the way she saw and translated field experiences, which, in turn, shape 
my interpretation of the data (cf. Cornet 2010, Turner 2010).  
The language barrier prevented me from conducting survivor interviews alone. Thus, my survivor 
interview schedule was almost entirely dependent on Kuki’s availability, which became 
increasingly constrained near the end of the fieldwork. She had begun chef school, and so the 
interview schedule was arranged to accommodate her classes. This situation illustrates Turner’s 
(2010) finding that research assistants consider assisting foreign researchers as a short-term job 
and one they would gladly exchange for something else. Most of the time when Kuki was 
unavailable, I visited field sites alone to do non-participant observation, or I conducted key 
informant interviews. Occasionally I worked with another translator, an older man recommended 
to me by a local organisation. 
The Frank and Ada effect 
Being a parent affects all stages of the research process from conceptualising the project, to 
entering the field and gaining access to participants, to writing up the results (Flinn 1998, Mose 
Brown and de Casanova 2009, Johnston 2015). Personal, methodological and theoretical issues 
are all at stake in accompanied research because a researcher’s family situation in the field shapes 
behaviour, influences research relationships, affects access to information, informs 
interpretations and attitudes, constrains mobility, imposes practical and logistical constraints, and 
thwarts attempts at impression management (Flinn 1998, Linnekin 1998, Mose Brown and de 
Casanova 2009, Cornet 2013). Just like life at home, life with children is different from life 
without them; you go different places, you talk to different people and you proceed at a slower 
pace (Johnston 2015). This section depicts fieldwork as an embodied process influenced by the 
involvement of my husband Frank and our daughter Ada.  
The decision to bring children into the field or not reflects a researcher’s own cultural 
interpretations and expectations of “family” and “parenthood” (Flinn 1998, Sutton 1998, Shea in 
press). Bringing children along assuages a socialised gendered mother’s guilt about leaving her 
children for extended periods of time while she indulges her own “ambitious research 
sights/sites” (Frohlick 2002, 50, Cupples and Kindon 2003). It remedies the problem of a lack of 
childcare options (Cupples and Kindon 2003, Cornet 2013). It is based on the researcher’s belief 
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that his or her children and partner will benefit from the experience (Burns McGrath 1998, Seiler 
Gilmore 1998, Cupples and Kindon 2003). For me, the decision to bring a three-and-a-half 
month old baby into the field was easy. I wanted to pursue PhD research in the Philippines, and 
was confident that none of us would be in any serious harm. Going as family was professionally 
and financially feasible because the Quebec government’s parental insurance program enabled 
Frank to take seven months of paid parental leave and resume his job upon return.35 We expected 
Ada to continue nursing and have limited mobility for the duration of the fieldwork, so it would 
be relatively easy to feed and entertain her, to travel with her and to control her exposure to 
harmful substances. Finally, Frank and I believed that the experience would enrich our lives. It 
was not a question of if my family would accompany me, but a question of how to make it work. 
Pre-departure 
Ada’s presence modified the study site selection criteria. This change to the research plan was 
only one of many pre-departure adjustments and preparatory activities. Like Ingrid Johnston 
(2015) who brought her children and husband with her to Fiji while she carried out doctoral 
research, I treated accompanied fieldwork with a baby as requiring greater preparation than solo 
fieldwork. In addition to health and safety measures, pre-departure preparation involved planning 
for regular communication with family back in Canada; for instance, installing Skype and 
Dropbox on Frank and my parents’ computers and teaching them how to use the programs. 
With the immediacy of the internet, and the possibility of live video chats, we did not face what 
previous generations of overseas researchers faced in terms of the difficulty in maintaining 
regular and meaningful conversations with loved ones at home (cf. Gallagher Goodenough 
1998).  
Another critical preparatory activity was negotiating parental leave with Frank’s employer. 
Although both parents are eligible for paid parental leave (RQAP 2015), and most eligible 
Quebec fathers take some paternity and/or parental leave (e.g. 78% took 7 weeks of leave in 
2011, Tremblay 2012), it is still unusual for the father to take extended leave because he fears it 
will be perceived negatively by supervisors, colleagues and clients (Rehel 2014). Moreover, Frank 
                                                          
35 There are two variants of the Quebec parental insurance plan: the basic plan (longer leave with lower 
benefits) and the special plan (shorter leave with higher benefits) (RQAP 2015). We opted for the basic 
parental plan. Without parental leave, it is unlikely that Frank could have joined me in the Philippines. 
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works in a male-dominated industry in which new fathers do not take extended leave and for an 
employer based in a Canadian province with five days of paternity leave. The timing of Frank’s 
parental leave and Ada’s pre-departure vaccinations dictated clear start and end dates for 
fieldwork. 
Breaking the ice 
Like other graduate student-parents, I intended to, and did, bring Ada with me on a variety of 
fieldwork activities (cf. Young Leslie 1998, Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009). In her research 
proposal Heather Young Leslie (1998, 48) described “using my [18-month old] daughter as a 
passport to the women in the village.” Other parent-researchers have similarly recognised the 
potential for their children to break the ice with their host community, and actively “used” their 
children for this purpose (Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998, Johnston 2015). I had hoped that 
having a baby would help Filipinos see me not only as a privileged, white, Canadian woman 
researcher, but also as a mother. And it worked. Men, women and children frequently announced 
that the “Americano baby” looked like a “doll” or “Barbie” with her blond hair and blue eyes – 
just like in the movies of the former American colonial rulers. Ada piqued people’s curiosity, and 
helped to create a relaxed, informal conversational environment. Cornet (2010, 145) recounts a 
very similar experience in China where “many women were curious to meet my daughter with her 
blond hair and blue eyes. These encounters generated numerous informal conversations and 
chances to interact.” Through interacting as a mother with local mothers, Cornet (2010), (2013) 
revealed her value system and a willingness to understand theirs, and slowly built rapport. The 
conversations “provided peripheral, serendipitous knowledge that contributed to explanations of 
issues more directly related to my research question” (Cornet 2013, 93). In this way, the children 
of parent-fieldworkers can accelerate the process of building rapport with community members 
who are also informants, and of gaining access to information and people (Counts and Ayers 
Counts 1998, Johnston 2015). Mose Brown and de Casanova (2009) further clarify how 
motherhood affects access: it can provide a different type of access to participants, or it can 
provide access to a different set of participants.  
Shattering attempts at impression management 
Parent-fieldworkers have commented about the ability of children to facilitate more egalitarian 
relationships with research participants because children humanise the researcher (Flinn, Marshall 
and Armstrong 1998, Cupples and Kindon 2003, Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009, Cornet 
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2010, 2013, Johnston 2015). When accompanied, hosts have the opportunity to study researchers 
interacting with members of their own culture and to ask that researchers account for these 
interactions. Put another way, accompanied researchers are “observers observed” (Cupples and 
Kindon 2003, 211) who “are simultaneously looking both ways through the looking glass” (Seiler 
Gilmore 1998, 35). Bringing children into an unfamiliar environment humbles the parent-
researcher, unravelling the myth of a powerful, unattached fieldworker who “is more rational and 
objective than the people under study” (Linnekin 1998, 73, Cornet 2013). The host community 
observes the researcher’s professional and personal performances, including the scenes the 
researcher would prefer to hide. As such, family members, especially children, render impression 
management almost impossible (Linnekin 1998).  
It is not uncommon for parent-fieldworkers to publically display behaviour or critical judgments 
that are normally kept private, especially when they feel the well-being of their child is threatened 
(Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998). For me, one particular incident stands out. It happened 
during a values formation graduation ceremony at the Xavier Ecoville relocation site. Normally I 
had no problem letting people hold and play with Ada. Like Cornet (2010, 2013) and Johnston 
(2015), I felt that sharing my daughter revealed my vulnerability and demonstrated my trust in my 
informants. But, when my nine month old was returned to me sucking on a yellow lollipop – 
which I saw as a choking hazard and an unhealthy sugary treat she was not supposed to have 
until she was at least a year old – I was upset. I removed the candy from her mouth, tried to 
discretely step on it, and then said I would give Ada some milk. My research assistant Kuki was 
not around to politely explain my overreaction and smooth things over. The woman who had 
given her the candy would have had to spend some of her very limited money to successfully 
appease my crying baby, and I had just stomped on her efforts – literally. In this incident I was 
clearly not an objective, distant observer but very much an emotional and embodied researcher-
parent, showing her guilt, fear, anger and fatigue. Embarrassing cases like this, when researchers 
lose control and thus violate cultural norms about appropriate behaviour, can shatter attempts at 
impression management, alter field relationships, and positively or negatively affect the research 
process (Burns McGrath 1998, Linnekin 1998, Cornet 2013).  
Cultural relativism 
The lollipop incident illustrates two other issues that accompanied researchers frequently wrestle 
with: the construction of culture and the limits of cultural relativism. Jeanne Shea (in press, 11-12) 
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explains how culturally-based ideas became apparent to her when she brought her daughter along 
-for her fieldwork in China: 
[N]o one person or family can be representative of all people or families in one culture 
[…] but what all persons or families within a culture do is to reflect and to cobble 
together some aspects of the contested mélange which is their culture. […] Rather we are 
both active cultural agents influenced by our surrounding cultures in particular ways 
based on our social positioning and the idiosyncrasies of our personal and family 
histories. 
David Sutton (1998) arrived at a similar conclusion after reflexively engaging with his experiences 
as a parent-anthropologist and contrasting them with available academic literature on the 
fieldwork experiences of other North American and European parent-researchers – people with 
whom he shared a similar social and cultural position (e.g. middle class, professional, left-leaning 
intellectuals) but who also held very different ideas about parenting. This realisation provided 
him with an embodied understanding of culture as something that is not shared by all members 
and is instead “refracted through unequal relations of class, race, gender, age, etc.” (Sutton 1998, 
135). It also offered a cautionary note in interpreting research data: differing responses to our 
personal ways of doing things is frequently dismissed as “narrow-mindedness” when done by 
people in our culture, whereas the exact same response is considered a “cultural difference” in 
another culture (Sutton 1998, 135). 
Cultural relativism is not the opposite of ethnocentrism, but rather “the respect for and valuation 
of other forms of practice, including other systems of organization and prioritization” (Young 
Leslie 1998, 45). Aspiring ethnographers are taught to employ cultural relativism as a research 
tool in which they temporarily suspend their own cultural views and practices during their 
fieldwork to better grasp local explanations for everyday practices of the community under study 
(Sutton 1998, Shea in press). Relativism is a comfortable position because it permits researchers to 
observe and record other people’s actions without addressing pesky and potentially distracting 
ideas of right and wrong until some later point in the future (Burns McGrath 1998). The practice 
of cultural relativism, also called “methodological relativism” or “pragmatic relativism,” is much 
easier if a researcher’s own ideologies, practices and symbolisations are not threatened (Young 
Leslie 1998), and if the associated risks apply to the researcher and not to his or her children 
(Sutton 1998, Cornet 2013). Children make it hard to compromise between short-term 
professional methodological practice and diplomacy with hosts on the one side, and personal 
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beliefs about what is best for one’s children and long-term personal family expectations on the 
other (Sutton 1998, Young Leslie 1998, Cornet 2013, Shea in press). While parent-fieldworkers are 
often rationally aware of “native” child-rearing practices (and would accept them 
anthropologically), they are unwilling to apply them to their own children (Friedl 1998, Sutton 
1998, Cornet 2010, 2013). Our public child-rearing practices demonstrate to our research 
participants the boundaries of our cultural relativism, which, in turn, reduce our capacity for 
impression management, require us to be more honest, and make us aware of how our own 
culture shapes our behaviour. 
Recognising fieldwork as an embodied practice 
To illustrate how Ada highlighted that fieldwork is necessarily an embodied practice, I recount 
how nursing shaped data construction. Recall that my research topic does not cover 
breastfeeding (nor parenting nor children, except indirectly), yet this very intimate practice 
became an integral part of my interactions in CDO and indirectly helped with research insights.  
From the perspective of my informants and the broader host community, two highly visible parts 
of my positionality were seemingly at odds with each other. I was a white foreign mother and I 
was a nursing mother. I was told repeatedly that Filipinos did not think white mothers breastfed 
their babies; in Hollywood movies and American TV shows women bottle feed. By nursing my 
daughter, I was reflecting and cobbling together child-rearing practices that did not fit with my 
hosts’ understanding of my culture. Like Sheila Seiler Gilmore (1998, 42) who found herself 
explaining that, unlike the American television series broadcast on local channels at her field site 
in French Polynesia, “not all Americans devote their time to extramarital intrigue, cocktail parties, 
and crime,” I found myself explaining media distortions about parenting practices “back home.” 
The topic of nursing and related childcare topics provided an opening for people to freely 
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dispense parenting advice and opinions on traditional practices such as usog36 and the 
consumption of malunggay to improve milk production.37  
When Ada accompanied me for data construction activities, she was a focal point for starting the 
conversation. People inquired about her sex and age, and if and where she was baptised. Once 
they learned that I was breastfeeding, the conversation would frequently turn to nursing: who 
nurses, who doesn’t, and why? Shortly thereafter, we would segue into a broader discussion of 
class, government programs (or lack thereof, or lack of implementation), parental, maternity and 
paternity leave, or the reasons why people have children. From there, the interview would 
transition into more research topic-focused questions. Such opening exchanges were more 
common with women informants, but also transpired with men informants.  
While several mothers have mentioned nursing as a practical consideration during their 
accompanied research (cf. Linnekin 1998, Young Leslie 1998), it is Frohlick (2002) who best 
articulated its potential for generating research insights. She explained that nursing emphasised 
the “embodied presence of her children and all their bodily needs,” especially her breastfeeding 
baby, whose “body unwittingly became the locus of much of the dialogue and many of the social 
relations through which my understanding of the spatiality of the mountaineering encampment 
unfolded” (Frohlick 2002, 54). As a nursing mom in the Philippines, I was very much attuned to 
young babies and breastfeeding mothers during my fieldwork. This attention coincided with my 
research topic after Super-typhoon Pablo hit Mindanao on 3 December 2012 and a young 
mother in CDO decided to help the orphaned babies by organising a “milk letting” drive at the 
city’s trendiest, most exclusive mall. The event, together with the conversations about nursing, 
shaped my broader understanding about class-specific practices and where they occur. The 
following blog post comments on how class is intertwined with the very bodily practice of 
                                                          
36 Usog is a Tagalog word, but the practice is widespread throughout the Philippines. It involves a parent or 
well-meaning adult licking their finger then putting it on a baby’s forehead. Usog is thought to prevent 
illness. If you ask people to refrain – pero usog – and the baby gets sick afterwards, the adult who wanted to 
do it will feel badly.  
37 The malunggay tree (Moringa oleifera) is indigenous species widespread in the Philippines. Its leaves are 
used in many soups and as a traditional medicine. In recent years, it has been refined into gels, tablets 
other health food products.  
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breastfeeding and the separation of spaces accessed and used by the urban poor and the middle 
class. 
LIQUID GOLD 
After Typhoon Pablo, there’s an outpouring of support to the affected areas. Donations range from noodles, water 
and canned sardines to blankets, clothes, cash and medicines. And chain saws - to cut all the felled trees so that the 
lumber can be sold or used for rebuilding. 
A young twenty-something mother and a few of her friends opt to collect another sort of relief good. These first-time 
mothers created an awareness and advocacy group in November to educate themselves and others about baby-
wearing, cloth diapers (the enthusiasm of middle class mothers for porte-bébés and couches lavables in la belle 
province has not yet spread throughout the Philippines), breastfeeding and related baby matters. A natural 
extension of their education project is a milk letting drive. 
At a milk letting drive, nursing mothers pump and donate breast milk. The set-up is similar to a blood drive:  
preliminary medical screening, semi-private areas for mothers to pump milk, medical professionals who seal the 
collected milk in sterile milk bags, post-donation water or juice for donors. The intended recipients for this 
particular milk letting drive are the orphans of Typhoon Pablo in the eastern parts of Mindanao. 
The group’s founder is Nadine. She’s a confident, poised and educated woman. When she talks about 
breastfeeding, her face lights up and her voice becomes animated, drawing in the listener. She wants to pursue her 
passion as a professional lactation consultant. Unfortunately, there are no such certification options available locally 
in CDO. 
Three days after Pablo struck the Philippines, Nadine contacted the management at the Ayala Centrio Mall, the 
newest and trendiest of CDO’s malls. They were receptive to the idea of allocating some space for the collection of 
this ‘liquid gold for Typhoon Pablo orphans’ and agreed to waive the usual exhibitor rental fee. The group is still 
responsible for paying for security and janitorial services. 
Convincing middle class mothers at the mall to pump and donate a few ounces of breast milk is an arduous task. 
Nadine explains that breastfeeding is not strongly encouraged at the hospitals. Moreover, the prevalent attitude is 
that, for those families who can afford it, commercial formula is a desirable and maybe even preferable baby food 
choice. Of the nursing mothers she encounters at the mall, many decline to donate for fear they won’t have enough 
milk for their babies.  
It’s a different story among women whom Nadine refers to as “marginalised.” These women breastfeed. They don’t 
need to be convinced of the benefits of nursing for mother and child. They nurse out of necessity. They nurse at 
home, at work, on jeepneys and non-Air Con buses, in churches, in carinderias (small cafeteria style eateries), 
in covered courts, in barangay halls, in wet and dry markets, outside roadside shops. But these women aren’t at 
the mall. 
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At the end of the three day milk letting drive, Pay it forward CDO has netted just over three litres of milk and 
has raised an immeasurable amount of awareness. Given the limited number of eligible donors, the mall crowd’s 
reticence to nurse and donate milk, and the minimal amount of event promotion, this is a remarkable achievement. 
A laudable goal and effort by a caring group of young middle class mothers. Still, I can’t help but wonder what 
results would a milk letting drive located outside of the mall, in a locale frequented by marginalised women, in a 
sitio devastated by last year’s Typhoon Sendong, have yielded (Gibb 2012, 30 December)? 
Children are not in a position to make informed consent (Burns McGrath 1998). As a baby, Ada 
clearly had no choice in doing accompanied fieldwork. She did not consent to being 
“instrumentalised” for the purposes of breaking the ice with community members, gaining 
rapport, improving access to research resources, and developing more egalitarian relationships 
with research participants. Nonetheless, her selective presence during various fieldwork activities 
was beneficial. And her selective absences, similarly critical to fieldwork activities, were made 
possible by another member of the accompanied research team. 
Frank’s roles 
Frank assumed the full-time role of househusband, a role not uncommon in the Philippines, 
which focused on childcare, cooking, cleaning, communicating regularly with family in Canada 
and planning short family vacations. Most of these tasks took much longer than comparable tasks 
in Canada; for example, Ada’s bath water had to be boiled to kill pathogens an infant might 
inadvertently swallow, her cloth diapers had to hand-washed, and a lengthy commute using 
multiple modes of transportation was required to buy groceries and drinking water at various wet 
and dry markets and supermarkets. And then there was the thankless, ongoing challenge of 
ridding the house and kitchen of fire ants, giant cockroaches and mice. Like other new North 
American fathers who naïvely thought paternity leave would grant them ample time to pursue 
personal hobbies (Rehel 2014), Frank’s goal of eliminating his “pile of shame” (video games 
purchased but unplayed) in the Philippines remained unachieved. He did not want to be a full-
time research assistant, but he did consent to a part-time fieldworker role which included “tech 
guru,” GPS data collection research assistant, and on-site “yaya” (nanny) for some research 
activities. His professional background in engineering and his personal interest in technology 
proved helpful in understanding context issues indirectly related to the research (e.g. how power 
plants work), ensuring multiple and regular data back-ups, and fixing broken technical equipment. 
In the course of his everyday interactions with people, he identified research leads and introduced 
me to key informants. As househusband, yaya and part-time fieldworker, Frank played a pivotal 
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part in ensuring our accompanied field season together went smoothly. Frank’s hybrid role is 
perhaps best illustrated in the blog post below. 
THE PRESENTATION 
One of my key informants at Ateneo de Manila University kindly invited me to present a paper as part of their 
social sciences guest lecture series. I jumped at the opportunity. But it didn’t unfold exactly as planned. 
The lecture was set for Friday January 25 at 4:30 pm. As luck would have it, Frank received a text message 
from the MSI service center earlier that week, informing him that the long-awaited hard drive for our beleaguered 
laptop was finally ready for pick-up. We were in Manila for only a few days; Friday was the only available day for 
pick-up. Because the trek to the MSI office entails a short stint on the body-crushing MRT (Metro Rail Transit), 
bringing Ada was not an option. So Ada spent the day with me. 
Shortly before the scheduled start time I asked a fellow student if he’d hold the baby during the presentation. He 
replied that it would be his pleasure. As the lecture hall filled up, Ada started to fuss. She was getting into one of 
those moods, the one in which she refuses to be held by anyone except mom and papa. I sent a frantic text to 
Frank. 
When I was introduced, the remarks included the usual info - name, degrees, country of origin, research interests, 
etc. The remarks also included some commentary about changing gender relations (in which the father takes time off 
work to care for the children), work-life balance, parental leave in Quebec, and conducting research with a baby.  
I walked up to the podium, notes in one hand, baby in the other. I don’t remember much about the words 
alternately flowing and stumbling from my lips. I do remember bouncing my daughter up and down on my hip, 
listening to her babble into the microphone, watching her make eyes at the audience. I remember feeling mortified 
and guilty; the guilt comes from wondering whether or not I am exerting white privilege by bringing my baby to 
work and expecting others to ignore the inconvenience. I remember stealing frequent glances at the door, willing 
Frank to enter the room. 
A half hour later he does. Waltzes down the stairs to the podium, picks up the baby and exits the room.  
Despite (or perhaps because of) the distraction of my co-presenter, the lecture was well-received. I am very grateful 
that everyone I have met here in the Philippines, without exception, has been extremely understanding and receptive 
to accommodating a baby. Even when it entails listening to a lecture delivered (in part) by a seven-and-a-half 
month old (Gibb 2013, 12 February). 
Not all it’s cracked up to be 
While I’ve painted a mostly rosy image of my field experiences with Frank and Ada, this section 
ends with a cautionary note about overemphasising the purported impacts of accompanied 
research with family members. Researchers unaccompanied by their family members also 
experience ethical dilemmas, researcher fatigue and power relations, and they also develop 
rapport and relationships with their research subjects (cf. Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). The 
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benefits of shared experiences and hardships with a loved one from home are counter-balanced, 
for example, by the extra burdens of finding personal space and caring for other people, and the 
potential to minimise the time spent learning local languages and cultural practices (Cupples and 
Kindon 2003). Moreover, research subjects respond positively to solo researchers; Cupples, for 
example, recalls an informant who thanked her for being prepared to spend time away from her 
children to find out about women’s lives (Cupples and Kindon 2003). In a country with high 
levels of internal and international migration, where it is relatively common for spouses to reside 
in different provinces, many of participants would likely have responded in a similar way to an 
unaccompanied researcher.   
Overstating motherhood as a shared identity with research subjects is similarly misleading. 
Bringing Ada to interviews and other research activities made my motherhood “concrete,” as 
opposed to a “symbolic or abstract motherhood” in which the researcher’s child is not in the 
field (Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009, 49). But my recognisable position as a mother did not 
eliminate my identity as a cultural “other.” While the presence of her daughter repositioned her 
from “a scholar linked with the authorities” to “a mother far from home, caring for her child,” 
Cornet (2010, 145) acknowledges she never became (and will never become) an “insider.” 
Graduate student parent-fieldworkers are often seen as having a privileged position relative to the 
people they study. They are foreigners who have more education and money than the research 
participants (Cornet 2013), and parents who have the luxury of being full-time students (Mose 
Brown and de Casanova 2009). The disparate living conditions of researchers and participants 
belie a claim of a shared experience of motherhood. Accompanied research with a family has its 
constraints, upon which other research limitations can be added. 
Limitations  
Given the time, spatial, human and financial constraints of doctoral research and the specific 
conditions in the field, this research project is necessarily limited. There were language and 
cultural barriers, especially at the barangay level. Important nuances were likely lost in translation. 
Despite studying Tagalog for one semester, my language skills were insufficient to carry out in-
depth interviews. Moreover, Bisayan, and not Tagalog, was the primary language spoken by many 
CDO residents. Most Muslim participants spoke Maranao as a first language, and had to express 
themselves in their second language (Bisayan) or with the help of two translators. Working with 
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an interpreter helped reduce the language and cultural barrier, as did the use of triangulated data, 
in particular the participatory video-making. While participatory methods are often portrayed by 
supporters as empowering, inclusive and effective for conducting research in a second language, 
they have generated an equally large body of critics who dismiss participatory research as overly 
time-consuming, potentially exploitative and non-analytical (Cornwall 2003, Kindon 2003, 
Lennie, Hatcher and Morgan 2003). Moreover, focus group discussion and other group-based 
methods can re-inscribe positionality-based power hierarchies among the research participants 
(Esim 1997). By working with Filipino researchers and personally engaging in reflexivity 
throughout the research process I tried to minimise the limitations of participatory methods. 
Another constraint pertains to mobility and the fact that I could not track survivors who could 
not be traced through government, humanitarian aid agency and other public records, and those 
who had severed all of their ties with the study site. Thus, their experiences are omitted from the 
study. 
Another set of limitations was precipitated by the family element of accompanied research. An 
anthropologist couple who collectively conducted over 30 years of accompanied research with 
their children cheekily described the drawbacks of bringing children into the field: “[t]hey get 
sick, they insist upon eating regularly, and – being children – they consume parental time and 
energy” (Counts and Ayers Counts 1998, 143). Indeed, satisfying Ada’s needs and keeping her 
healthy, and attending to family responsibilities more generally, made me less efficient in the field. 
Field activities with Ada were carefully scheduled; for example, I avoided jeepney rides during the 
hottest and most polluted times of the day, and I timed interviews between nursing sessions and 
diaper changes. As compared to previous fieldwork I had done without my family, I had less 
flexibility to just hang out after the official research activities, to add last-minute overnight site 
visits, or to participate in somewhat risky participant observation activities such as white water 
rafting on the Cagayan River. During Super-typhoon Pablo, we went to a hotel; had I been alone 
I would have gone to an evacuation camp to observe firsthand the experience of living 
temporarily in an official post-disaster sleeping space. Put another way, Frank and I felt that to 
protect Ada we needed to constrain our mobility.  
I also tried instituting a no-work-on-weekends rule and a regular after-dinner routine which 
consisted of reading bedtime stories, then pumping milk, typing up field notes and perhaps 
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sending a quick email. I was generally too tired to go out again to collect data in the evenings, 
which is why I did not pursue some potentially interesting research angles on the impacts of 
Sendong on vulnerable groups such as sex workers who were most accessible at night. Similar to 
the experiences of other parent-fieldworkers (cf. Linnekin 1998, Cupples and Kindon 2003) and, 
unlike my previous field seasons without a husband and baby, I found that I was too tired to 
regularly engage reflexively on field experiences beyond writing field notes and blog posts. In 
spite of the limitations brought about by the constant navigation between fieldwork and family 
life, the constraints of doctoral research, and the specific conditions in the field, the methodology 
enabled the construction of a richly textured data set.  
Conclusion 
This methodological chapter has justified the research design, and clearly explained how I went 
about finding answers to, and analysing, the overarching research question and specific research 
objectives. I deliberately wrote my family into the chapter to depict the research project as an 
embodied process intertwining the professional and the personal. The results of these data 
construction and interpretation processes are presented in the next three chapters.  
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Chapter 5. Who are the vulnerable survivors?  
Introduction 
Vulnerability is not natural. Instead, it is a function of economic, political, social and cultural 
elements that form societal structures, which necessarily interact with biological, geological, 
hydrological, geographical – or more broadly “environmental” – factors (cf. Walker 2005, 2006, 
2007). This chapter delves into vulnerability in Cagayan de Oro, in the context of the aftermath 
of Typhoon Sendong. The goal of this discussion is to elucidate who exactly are the vulnerable 
survivors of the disaster. Understanding vulnerability is important because a natural hazard only 
progresses into a disaster if normal conditions are disrupted, people are affected, and the capacity 
of the local community to cope exceeded. In other words, if there were no vulnerable people in 
CDO, then Typhoon Sendong would not have been a disaster. It would have merely been a 
tropical storm.  
The findings in this chapter are based on a conventional content analysis. The Defining vulnerability 
part of the chapter draws primarily on key informant interviews conducted in 2010, 2012 and 
2013, disaster-themed conferences in the Philippines that I attended in 2010, and a review of 
disaster-themed Philippine government and NGO documents. These data sources reflect the 
positions of trustees who are in a position to create and implement targeted post-disaster 
interventions. The A continuum of vulnerability section is heavily informed by survivor interviews, 
focus group discussions, CDO-based key informant interviews, and my field notes. These data 
sources point to the missing or misleading elements of prevailing definitions of vulnerability. The 
final section, Vulnerability discourses, draws on all the aforementioned sources, as well as on the 
participatory video-making and reports on the post-Sendong rescue, relief, recovery, and 
rebuilding efforts of government agencies, international humanitarian aid organisations, and 
religious trustees. When analysing these data, I paid particular attention to the use of language 
and the discrepancies between the claims made by trustees and the perceived impacts of their 
interventions by survivors and by other trustees.  
Before analysing the CDO case, the chapter presents the relationship between vulnerability and 
disaster as set out in the political ecology literature. Next, the chapter lays out how diverse 
disaster response and rebuilding actors conceive of vulnerability, and how these discourses 
inform their actions or lack thereof. There was no common, coherent understanding of 
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vulnerability among local, national, and international trustees delivering humanitarian aid and 
assisting in the rebuilding processes. Furthermore, these actors repeatedly confused a structural 
understanding of vulnerability in the political ecology sense with a structural understanding of 
vulnerability in the engineering sense. The disparate narratives had practical implications for 
short-term post-disaster assistance. They also have broader societal impacts in which structural 
problems and prejudices are reinscribed, left unresolved, and even replicated in other parts of the 
archipelago when natural hazards strike.  
Political ecology and the disaster-vulnerability relationship 
Political ecology is an approach to analysing how society and nature interact. A political ecology 
perspective on disasters insists upon the unnaturalness of natural disasters (Sen 1981, Hewitt 
1983). Mark Pelling (2001, 183) contends that so-called “natural disasters” are more aptly 
described as “humanitarian disasters with a natural trigger” (hereafter simply “disasters”). Political 
ecologists reject an apolitical characterisation of environmental crises and their impacts (Forsyth 
2003), and posit they are not “unfortunate accidents under advanced capitalism” but rather 
“consistent symptoms of various logics and trajectories of accumulation” (Peet, Robbins and 
Watts 2011, 26). Political ecology can thus help to reveal not only the ecological aspects, but also 
the underlying historical, political, economic and social dynamics of a disaster and the pre-
existing social and economic inequalities in a society (Walker 2005, 2006, 2007). 
Some basic definitions are a useful starting point for teasing apart the disaster-vulnerability 
relationship. According to Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (2002, 4), a disaster is  
a process/event combining a potentially destructive agent/force from the natural, 
modified or built environment and a population in a socially and economically produced 
condition of vulnerability, resulting in a perceived disruption of the customary relative 
satisfactions of individual and social needs for physical survival, social order, and 
meaning.  
A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that carries a potential for 
social, infrastructural or environmental damage is called a hazard (Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004). 
Hazards are categorised as natural (e.g. atmospheric, hydrological, geological and biological), 
technological (e.g. dangerous materials, destructive processes, mechanical and productive) and 
social (e.g. war, terrorism, civil conflict, and the use of hazardous materials, processes and 
technologies) (Oliver-Smith 2002). Natural hazards can result in catastrophic disasters (e.g. 
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hurricane, flood) and in more common but less visible chronic disasters (e.g. everyday risks to 
human health and wealth brought about by poor sanitation or no drinking water) (Pelling 2001). 
The likelihood that hazards precipitate disasters is based on risk, which is the probability of 
harmful consequences or expected loss. It is a function of exposure, capacity to mitigate hazard 
impacts, and vulnerability (Enarson 2000). Wisner, Blaikie et al. (2004) define the relationship 
according to the risk equation, R = H x V, in which risk (R) is a function of a hazard (H) that 
interacts with vulnerability (V). The unequal distribution of risk is based on access to and control 
over resources (e.g. via class, age, physical ability, citizenship status, racial/ethnic and cultural 
group, and gender).   
A structural understanding of vulnerability 
Structural vulnerability, pared down to its most basic elements, involves an individual or group’s 
exposure to, capacity to cope with, and potential to recover and minimise damage from crises, 
stresses and shocks (Watts and Bohle 1993, 45). The structures in structural vulnerability refer to 
the institutions, power, and historical factors in society that create inequalities and make some 
individuals and groups more vulnerable than others (Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004, O'Brien, Eriksen 
et al. 2007). Structural vulnerability is variously called “contextual,” “starting-point,” “social,” or 
“type II” vulnerability (hereafter “vulnerability”) (Cutter 1996, Kelly and Adger 2000, Adger 
2006). Each term serves either to emphasise a particular aspect of this understanding or to 
distinguish it from a physicalist view of vulnerability. Wisner, Blaikie et al.’s (2004, 11) definition 
of vulnerability as “the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard” has become the 
general standard in hazards and disasters research. Put another way, vulnerability is defined by 
prior damage and not by a future stress; the vulnerability of an individual or social group to a 
particular stress is primarily determined by their extant state, or their capacity to respond to a 
stress. So, characterising the vulnerability of survivors requires an understanding of their capacity 
before the occurrence of a natural hazard. 
In contrast, the dominant “geophysicalist and technocratic reductionism” (Hewitt 1983, 7), or 
simply “physicalist” (Pelling 2001), paradigm attributes disaster to an unavoidable extreme 
geophysical event occurring in a nature independent of society. It assumes that scientific expertise 
and technological solutions are always the best options for predicting and preventing threats, 
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thereby reducing risk and vulnerability. It emphasises the preeminence of bureaucratically 
organised institutions that hire and pay specialised professionals (Hewitt 1983, O’Brien, Eriksen 
et al. 2007). The physicalist paradigm treats vulnerability as a function of mainly biophysical and 
sometimes technological risk (Cutter 1996). It privileges “end-point” or “type I” vulnerability, in 
which vulnerability is a characteristic or a state after recovery and rehabilitation efforts have been 
implemented (Cutter 1996, Kelly and Adger 2000, Adger 2006). The physicalist framing reflected 
new ideas and discourses emerging in academia and spreading throughout society in the post-war 
era: an elevated status for mainly Western experts, technology and knowledge (Mitchell 2002), a 
pervasive capitalistic worldview producing uneven development and cementing the separation of 
nature from society (Smith 1984), an end of nature and emergence of risk societies (Beck 1992), a 
gross mismatch between the welfare state’s ability to address external collective risks and the 
prevalence of new manufactured risks in contemporary societies (Giddens and Held 1982), and 
widespread uncritical acceptance and adoption of orthodox science (Forsyth 2003). The 
physicalist approach endures as the dominant paradigm in most governments and their agencies, 
United Nations bodies and multilateral funding institutions, and continues to heavily influence 
national and international decision-making (Bankoff 2001, Pelling 2001). 
A thorough understanding of vulnerability, however, demands that researchers situate a case 
within spatialised social processes that begin before the disaster. In Interpretations of calamity, 
geomorphologist Kenneth Hewitt (1983) suggests a starting point. He stresses that it is the 
everyday social interactions and structures embedded in broader historical circumstances, and not 
the particularities of a natural hazard, that ultimately determine the nature, causes and 
consequences of a disaster. The corollary of such a framing of disaster is that vulnerability is 
necessarily driven by economic, social and political influences. Vulnerability is not exclusively 
based on socioeconomic and political conditions, but also on environmental forces (Oliver-Smith 
2002). In other words, vulnerability is a function of both biophysical and socially constructed 
risks, or what Giddens (1999) would call traditional and manufactured risks. 
Pelling (2001, 179) argues that the root cause of a disaster is always marginalisation, defined as 
“the exclusion of certain individuals and groups from economic, social or political resources.” 
The result of the inequalities in a given society (Bankoff 2001, Pelling 2001, 2006, Cutter 2006), 
marginality influences people’s control over basic needs and rights (Watts and Bohle 1993), 
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which, in turn, determines who is vulnerable and whether a hazard unfolds into a disaster (Pelling 
2001). Marginalisation and vulnerability are thus constructed in social systems that apportion 
risks unevenly among citizens who exert different demands on the physical environment (Wisner, 
Blaikie et al. 2004, Bankoff 2006). 
A structural understanding of vulnerability thus rejects the physicalist one-dimensional portrayal 
of disasters (e.g. caused by natural forces) in favour of a multidimensional portrayal. Wisner, 
Blaikie et al. (2004, 367) contend that disasters   
are rooted in everyday life, are manifestations of development failures, have distant and 
remote precursors, are linked to livelihood resilience and household capabilities, and 
result in the need to release pressures through changes in institutions, structures of 
domination and improved access to resources.  
Hence, disasters reflect the “totality of relationships” of a particular social context that prefigures 
a disaster precipitated by environmental forces (Oliver-Smith 2002, 28). Feminist scholars 
applaud this multidimensional depiction of disasters and vulnerability because it focuses on 
current and future vulnerabilities arising from power differentials, gender ideologies, historical 
changes, and the inseparability of society and nature (Bolin, Jackson and Crist 1998, Enarson 
2000). It also closely examines individuals’ relative access to or control over key resources within 
societies, which are necessarily influenced by gender (Enarson 2000). 
The practical benefit of recognising the multidimensionality of disasters is that it aids in 
explaining the production, reproduction and consequences of natural hazards and disasters, and 
in prescribing solutions. For example, Pelling (1999) uses a political ecology approach to study 
vulnerability to floods, climate change and sea-level rise in Guyana, which he estimates affect 
90% of the population. He examines how the country’s colonial history, decades of poor political 
leadership and perverse power structures established under the International Monetary Fund’s 
structural adjustment reforms all coevolved with an increasing risk to flood hazards to create a 
particular political and environmental space shaping present-day vulnerability. Drawing on two 
case studies, Pelling (1999) argues that remedies should deal with the political, social, and 
economic processes that render individuals and groups vulnerable, rather than the actual 
vulnerabilities themselves. Hence, the multidimensional character of disasters highlights 
opportunities to alter unfair political, social and economic structures. 
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The corollary of this observation is that disasters create opportunities for exploitation, including 
by those who deny the multidimensionality of disasters. The dominant physicalist paradigm 
legitimises the discourse and actions, or lack thereof, of Western governments whereby disaster, 
poverty, disease and the environment are treated as isolated issues to be addressed in accordance 
with the preferred timelines and strategies of Western governments (Bankoff 2001). The 
paradigm’s assertion that destruction is caused by natural hazards validates the idea that nature is 
responsible for poverty and for the uneven distribution of material goods, conveniently absolving 
a global capitalist system and neocolonialism of any wrongdoing. It allows engineers, scientists 
and bureaucrats to appropriate the hazards and disasters discourse, quarantine it away from non-
experts, thereby stymying efforts to understand, prevent and mitigate disasters (Hewitt 1983). 
While not written as a critique of disaster discourse and management, insights from Timothy 
Mitchell’s (2002) Rule of experts are useful in illustrating this point. Mitchell (2002, 41-42) reveals 
three significant but overlooked features of the politics based on technological expertise that 
guided the development and modernisation in 20th century Egypt. First, so-called expertise was 
merely a concentration and restructuring of pre-existing knowledge. Second, each technical 
project failed, forcing experts to learn from nature and to continually adjust their science and 
technology. Third, the extra-scientific origins of technical expertise were actively covered up, as 
was the fact that each new technology was itself a reaction to difficulties stemming from earlier 
failed techno-science projects. Mitchell (2002, 52) concludes that deliberately misapprehending 
complexity in favour of generating “neatly separate realms of reason and the real world, ideas and 
their objects, the human and nonhuman” was necessary for the production and reproduction of 
techno-power in Egypt, and in the 20th century in general. Parallel lessons exist in the history of 
disaster management (cf. Bankoff 2001, Pelling 2001). 
Parallel lessons can also be found in post-Sendong Cagayan de Oro. This short discussion of the 
disaster-vulnerability relationship has outlined the salient points for analysing the vulnerability of 
survivors and the discourses that informed disaster relief, recovery, and rebuilding processes.  
Who is vulnerable? 
Defining vulnerability 
In Cagayan de Oro, government agencies, humanitarian organisations, religious groups and 
NGOs alike claim that their disaster risk reduction, relief and recovery activities target “the 
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people who need help the most.” Yet, these same actors share neither a coherent definition of 
vulnerability nor a consensus on delimiting one or more target populations. Instead, different 
actors invoke diverse interpretations of “vulnerability” in guiding their post-disaster efforts. They 
use three main approaches: (1) they ascribe to the physicalist paradigm; (2) they single out certain 
demographic groups; and (3) they specify particular risk factors. Each of these approaches is 
developed over the following pages. This discussion is based on key informant interviews with 
individuals who can be broadly categorised as “experts” or what Tania Murray Li (2007a) calls 
“trustees” whose aim is to problematise and render technical anything and everything pertaining 
to the disaster response and recovery efforts. Key informants included barangay, city and regional 
government employees, elected officials, academics, local and national NGO workers and 
activists, Catholic and Islamic clerics and lay organisation members, evacuation camp managers, 
private sector employees, police and technical consultants. Several informants also provided 
organisational reports that help reveal their employer’s approach to vulnerability. 
The physicalist paradigm 
Engineers are among the most respected and most frequently consulted experts on disaster risk 
reduction and management in the Philippines. According to the lead researcher of the Disaster 
Risk and Exposure Assessment for Mitigation (DREAM) Program, a government-funded 
initiative to produce and disseminate hazard maps and models, engineers define vulnerability as 
the probability of something bad happening multiplied by the base value of the affected sector. 
They ascribe to the physicalist paradigm (cf. Hewitt 1983, Pelling 2001). He explained that 
assessing vulnerability is a thorny issue for engineers, who prefer working with hard facts and 
numbers over terms that are “too relative for us.” For his engineering colleagues, there’s a 
difficulty in defining vulnerability; is it the risk of fatality or is it the risk of property damage? 
Moreover, how should the vulnerability of people and property be measured? Calculating the 
vulnerability of property is relatively easy; historical data can be used to evaluate a property’s 
value, which can then be used to generate a risk assessment and to plot an assessment curve. To 
assess vulnerability, government engineers and members of the DREAM team calculate the 
number of buildings (or other physical variable) predicted to be affected by a particular hazard 
event. The type of industry present in an area also informs the vulnerability calculations, insofar 
as if industry X is here, then there are Y vulnerable sectors that must be taken into account. In 
contrast, measuring the vulnerability of people is much harder, so the DREAM team opted 
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instead to single out certain demographic groups without considering how and why they are 
affected. The fuzzy social, political and micro economic components of vulnerability are 
relegated to a simple list, leaving engineers to concentrate exclusively on the technological and 
physical elements of vulnerability that they are trained to address. In other words, they behave 
like the trustees that Li (2007a) describes who problematise and render technical an issue (e.g. 
vulnerability) in terms that only they can adequately address. 
The engineering conception of vulnerability matters. The dominance of the physicalist paradigm 
has significant material, financial and political implications. It results in Philippine hazard maps 
and forecasting models that depict geophysical risks only. It is the main discourse used to inform 
government spending and policies on everything from city planning to funding and building 
infrastructure. Because it privileges infrastructure, industry and property over people’s lives and 
livelihoods, it typically results in spending and policies that reflect technocratic solutions. After 
Sendong, for example, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency conducted a year-long 
feasibility study investigating potential technical interventions on the Cagayan River, and 
committed $107 million for construction in October 2012 (cf. ReliefWeb 2012, Sun Star 2012). 
Based out of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Japanese engineers and experts on 
water, dams, and institutional capacity developed a plan for a 12-kilometre megadike (Jerusalem 
2014). If the plans are approved, construction should begin in 2016. 
Like the technocratic fix proposed by Japanese experts, solutions are frequently recommended 
and carried out by the multibillion dollar disaster industry, which is composed primarily of 
engineering firms based in the global North (Pelling 2001). This situation repeats a pattern of 
economic exploitation instituted in the European colonial era (Forsyth 2003, Davis 2004), in 
which business opportunities are sought out in the Third World-cum-hazardous nations whose 
resources are drained through the purchase of expensive disaster risk reduction and rehabilitation 
technologies (Pelling 2001). Furthermore, these firms have a bias for technology-based solutions, 
which may not be available, accessible, affordable, socially acceptable, or advisable on 
environmental grounds (Moser 2009), thereby fulfilling Bertrand Russell’s (1925 in Hewitt 1983, 
3) fear that “science will be used to promote the power of dominant groups rather than to make 
men [and women] happy.” As Pelling (2001) points out, when used in isolation, the technology-
based solutions endorsed by the physicalist paradigm may actually prolong or increase losses 
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associated with a disaster because they fail to engage with root causes, they create a false sense of 
security thereby encouraging increased risk-taking, and they are open to meddling by powerful 
economic, political or social actors. In fact, politics and ideology can and have trumped real 
disaster risk reduction efforts (Smith 2006). 
Singling out particular demographic groups 
A second approach to defining vulnerability is to target a particular segment of the population. 
Many actors extend the same categories of vulnerable groups they use for their regular (non-
disaster related) programs to their disaster relief and recovery interventions. Table 5.1 lists all 
groups identified as vulnerable in the context of disasters. These groups are typically defined in 
demographic terms. Each group is presumed to exhibit particular characteristics that render them 
vulnerable.  If an individual falls into two or more categories, his or her vulnerability is presumed 
to be exacerbated. For example, an urban poor child with a disability or an unemployed single 
mother has less capacity to cope with and recover from a disaster than their single category 
counterparts.  
Key informants expressed various rationales to explain each group’s vulnerability. Some 
explanations were bodily and biologically-based. For example, pregnant women, the elderly, very 
young children, and persons with disabilities were described as weak and having limited mobility. 
These characteristics reduce their chances of survival in the case of a sudden-onset hazard event, 
and increase their susceptibility to illness in the immediate aftermath. Other explanations were 
geographically-based, and are discussed later on. Many of the explanations, however, can be 
framed in terms of exclusion or a lack of access. For instance, some groups of vulnerable people 
cannot access adequate economic resources; they have difficulty in covering daily expenses (e.g. 
urban poor, women, single mothers), or they cannot acquire sufficient resources to rebuild their 
lives and to restart a livelihood post-disaster (e.g. Indigenous Peoples, women, farmers). The 
inadequacy or absence of technology and infrastructure accessible to certain groups is another 
attribute that renders certain groups vulnerable. For instance, Indigenous Peoples lack modern 
technology to deal with disasters, while the urban poor reside in poorly constructed houses made 
of flimsy temporary materials. Particular groups, especially the elderly and persons with 
disabilities, were described as vulnerable because they are “invisible victims;” they rarely go to 
evacuation centres and they cannot easily access mainstream services. While their invisibility is 
not unique to the disaster period, it is amplified during this time. In a few cases, vulnerability was 
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linked to precarity and exclusion from formal economic and legal structures. For example, 
informal settlers are deemed vulnerable because they have no land or no title. In these latter 
cases, the vulnerability of demographic groups stems from their exclusion from critical resources, 
which, in turn, is rooted in the exclusionary powers of regulation, force, the market and 
legitimation (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011; Chapter 6). 
Table 5.1. Vulnerable groups, as articulated by Philippine organisations implicated in disaster risk 
reduction and management.  
Vulnerable group Expert who identified this group 
Children, especially children under 5 
years old and babies 
Local, Provincial and Regional government agencies, Local 
and National NGOs, Engineers, Academia, Police, Disaster 
research centre 
Elderly (over 60) Local, Provincial and Regional government agencies, Local 
NGO, Engineers, Camp manager, Disaster research centre 
Farmers Local NGO  
First responders Disaster research centre  
Indigenous Peoples (IP)  Local, National and International NGOs, Engineers 
Informal settlers Academia 
Injured people Disaster research centre 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 
queer, intersex and asexual (LGTBQIA) 
Disaster research centre 
Orphans and children living with 
grandparents 
Barangay-level politician, Camp manager 
Out-of-school youth Regional government agency 
People living in very disaster-prone or 
flood-prone areas 
National NGO, Local government agency 
Persons with disabilities, especially 
children with disabilities (e.g. deaf, blind, 
autistic, wheelchair-bound, paralysis) and 
persons with severe health conditions 
Local, Provincial, Regional government agencies, Local and 
National NGOs, Engineers, Camp manager, Power 
company, Disaster research centre  
Poor, urban poor Provincial government agency, Local NGO, Engineers, 
Academia  
Pregnant women Local and Regional government agencies, Camp manager 
Sex workers Camp manager, Local NGO 
Single mothers Camp manager, Local NGO 
Unemployed Regional government agency, Academia 
Women (mothers) Local NGOs, Disaster research centre, Local, Provincial 
and Regional government agencies, Academia, Police 
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A purported moral failure characteristic of particular demographic groups was another 
explanatory factor for their vulnerability. One local state actor in a position of authority, for 
example, pronounced that children were vulnerable because they had irresponsible parents who 
permitted them to roam around everywhere, and sometimes even allowed their daughters to 
become “minanga” (literally a type of freshwater fish, and the colloquial term for a sex worker 
who is a minor). The same informant claimed that women’s vulnerability could be attributed to a 
lack of guidance and education, and to being forced to work as a sex worker. Left unsaid, but 
implied, is that these children and women are urban poor. Many other key informants inferred 
that the urban poor are lacking in morally upright behaviour and that their values and behaviour 
are “so different” from the middle class. For example, in explaining the vulnerability of persons 
with disabilities, one informant who works with this population relayed that, unlike their 
counterparts born into middle or upper class families, autistic children born into poor families do 
not receive special care and are likely to be neglected by their family. Household-level economic 
constraints of urban poor families underlie the tacit approval of minanga and the denial of 
expensive services for autistic children. Yet, the economic aspect was denied as an explanation of 
vulnerability. By framing vulnerability as a moral failure, trustees individualise a problem; by 
ignoring the salience of poverty in producing vulnerability, trustees ignore the failure of the state 
to ensure an adequate standard of living for all of its citizens. These moral judgements, articulated 
by mostly middle to upper class informants, had real implications; as argued in Chapters 6 and 7, 
assumptions about the moral character and the values of the urban poor informed the eligibility 
criteria to access certain resettlement sites, and the rules imposed on residents. As such, moral 
standards and values acted as powers of exclusion and justified class hierarchies.  
Key informants frequently singled out women – mothers, pregnant women, sex workers and 
urban poor – as a vulnerable demographic. This identification of the gendered causes and 
consequences of disasters has significant empirical support in the academic literature (cf. Delica 
1998, Enarson 2000, Hunter and Davis 2009). In CDO, the vulnerability of women was 
attributed to their gender roles. After the disaster, women retained their private responsibilities 
such as cooking, cleaning, laundry and childcare, and had additional responsibilities such as 
waiting in line to obtain relief goods. The statement of one informant heading the regional 
chapter of a national feminist activist organisation summarised the scope of urban poor women’s 
and men’s responsibilities according to the extant gender division of labour: “It is the right and 
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responsibility [of the woman] to care for the children, house, and community – while the 
husband goes to work.”38 Another common explanation for women’s vulnerability was a 
biologically-attributed maternal instinct, which prevents a mother from leaving her children to 
save herself and compels her to always prioritise the well-being of her husband (or male partner) 
and children over her own well-being. The fact that this instinct was biologically and not socially 
attributed illustrates the extent to which a specific gender ideology privileging the “care” aspects 
of a woman’s identity is embedded in people’s psyches. Such gender ideologies had practical 
implications on the design and delivery of resources after the disaster. Interestingly, a paternal 
instinct compelling a man to save his family was never mentioned, despite ample evidence of 
men saving (or trying to save) their children, and later becoming the primary caregiver either 
temporarily or permanently after Sendong.  
Trustees presumed “women” were “mothers” and that it was the maternal component of their 
identity that rendered them vulnerable. Not surprisingly then, there were no targeted programs 
for survivors who did not fit into a rigid gender binary or who fell outside the woman-mother, 
man-provider narrative. The specific needs and concerns of Sendong survivors from the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex and asexual (LGTBQIA) community, for example, 
were left unaddressed. Moreover, the tendency to lump women together into a few vulnerable 
categories repeats a problem in the gender and disaster literature: it universalises or essentialises 
the category of woman, and neglects to systematically consider axes of social difference and 
inequality concurrently with gender. Just as moralistic claims about the urban poor parents of 
minanga and autistic children conceal underlying economic problems and state failures, an 
uncritical discourse reducing “women” to “mothers” masks the ways in which gender interacts 
with class, race, religion, disability, kinship, sexuality and rural or urban affiliation to produce and 
exacerbate vulnerability in Philippine society (cf. Gaetano and Yeoh 2010). 
For the most part, vulnerable groups were recognised as having pre-existing characteristics that 
render them susceptible to a shock from which they cannot recover without external assistance. 
This articulation reflects the structural conception of vulnerability described earlier. Responders 
are the exception; they exhibit end-point or type I vulnerability (cf. Cutter 1996, Kelly and Adger 
                                                          
38 The direct quotations of interviewees are close but not exact transcriptions of what was said. For 
example, I edited out most Bisayan and Tagalog interjections, words like “um,” and word repetitions. I 
also modified some citations slightly so that there is subject-verb agreement.  
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2000, Adger 2006). Their vulnerability is attributed to the trauma they witnessed during rescue 
operations, and not to a pre-existing condition. While not an insignificant group, responders are 
not examined in this thesis. 
Singling out specific demographic groups presumed to exhibit certain characteristics was a 
popular approach to defining vulnerability. It simplified post-disaster interventions because it did 
not require the trustee to consider within-group differences necessitating different types of and 
degrees of intervention. It was especially helpful in enabling rapid disaster rescue, relief, and 
rebuilding operations. Frequently, it correctly identified vulnerable individuals and groups. But it 
did not resolve the underlying problems that make vulnerable groups vulnerable. Nor did it 
recognise that vulnerability is relationally-produced. The approach did not tackle the structures 
and processes in society that render certain people vulnerable. Instead, this approach reveals that 
the trustees’ understanding of vulnerability mirrors societal beliefs, assumptions, values and 
ideologies.  
Indicators of vulnerability 
The same trustees who conceived and operationalised vulnerability by singling out particular 
demographic groups simultaneously used another closely related approach. They articulated 
specific factors that increase or demonstrate vulnerability, and then assisted individuals with these 
factors. In contrast to the singling out approach, which starts with an informed assumption on 
which groups are vulnerable, the indicators of vulnerability approach starts with an informed 
assumption on which factors or indicators increase vulnerability. Alone, or together, certain 
characteristics were recognised as rendering a person, household, or community “vulnerable” to 
disasters. An archetypal vulnerable person in CDO is a poor migrant with one or more health 
conditions, is part of a large family (seven or more), has no, one or two household members 
working a precarious job in the informal sector, lives in a poorly constructed house made of non-
durable materials on a lot to which they have no title, and which is located in an informal 
settlement along the riverbank. A complete list of the indicators of vulnerability identified by 
state, religious, NGO and academic trustees is presented in Table 5.2. The remainder of this 
section explores each indicator. The discussion of the indicators approach, similar to the people it 
identifies as vulnerable, has considerable overlap with the singling out approach.  
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Table 5.2. Indicators of vulnerability, as articulated by Philippine organisations implicated in 
disaster risk reduction and management.  
Indicator 
Cannot swim  
Food insecurity  
Gender roles and responsibilities that penalise women 
Geophysical susceptibility (living or working in natural hazard-prone areas, especially close to 
the river) 
Informal sector job, insecure livelihood, livelihood with irregular pay 
Illiteracy or lack of education 
Lack of preparedness 
Large family  
Likely to get sick 
Migrant from the provinces, limited or no family network in CDO 
No land and no title (no stable housing) 
No or limited awareness of available services and how to access them 
Poorly constructed house built with non-durable materials 
Poverty 
Reliance upon government and NGO assistance because they cannot access resources to 
rebuild house and livelihood post-calamity 
Unemployment 
 
Underlying the seemingly tidy checklist of vulnerability indicators are complex and intertwined 
economic, political, technological, biological, geographic, cultural, legal, and social issues. Nearly 
all of the indicators have both an economic and political basis, even if the connections are not 
apparent at first. Take, for example, geophysical susceptibility, in which people are susceptible to 
harm because they live in natural hazard-prone areas. In CDO, portions of several barangays are 
located on reclaimed land. Public schools, churches, registered tax-paying businesses, local 
government-approved housing developments and informal settlements are all located on 
reclaimed land, illustrating the complicity of municipal governments in allowing construction in 
areas that, at some point in the future, will be reclaimed by the rivers and the sea. While building 
on reclaimed land can be justified by the technological ingenuity and historical geological and 
hydrological processes that went into making the land safe, the same claims cannot be made by 
people who reside in clearly unsafe locations. Why do they settle there? In the Philippines, 
riverbanks are usually not allocated for state-endorsed planned developments. Thus, a sliver of 
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flood-prone land is available. As one engineer who creates hazard maps for the entire archipelago 
described to me, the riverbanks and the coastal areas offer land that is “essentially free” where 
“no one will accost them.” His statement is telling. There is an economic component to 
geophysically-based susceptibility insofar as land can be difficult to obtain; land is expensive, 
especially near the city centre where many urban poor work, and the people trying to live there 
do not have money to buy land. In fact, one of the reasons why the CDO mayor initiated his 
famous piso-piso program in which small lots were sold to poor households for a symbolic ₱1 
($0.02) is because the poor were falling behind on their very modest monthly mortgage payments. 
The second part of the engineer’s statement is indicative of further economic and political factors 
at play in the Philippines. No one accosts the residents because the land is unattractive for private 
sector investment, in part because there is inadequate or no technological infrastructure in place 
to mitigate hazard risks. There is no or only limited economic or political pressure on politicians 
to impose mass evictions and to demolish informal settlements in hazard-prone areas.  
The inability to swim is a particularly interesting indicator of vulnerability. It seems 
straightforward: if there is a flood and you are swept into turbulent waters, your ability to swim 
can mean the difference between life and death. But it is not so simple. Learning to and being 
able to swim is part biological, part geographic, part economic, part cultural. Obviously babies, 
very young children and the infirm do not have the physical strength or learned skills of 
swimming. Swimming skills are also geographically linked because working class Cagayaños who 
live near the city’s rivers or Macajalar Bay typically learn how to swim as children because it is a 
popular pastime. The adult men who live in riverside barangays where quarrying river sand is the 
main livelihood (by diving into the water and pulling up river sand) are also, by necessity, good 
swimmers. The ability to swim is also a class issue. Urban poor families do not send their children 
for swimming lessons. The local pools offering swimming lessons are located at expensive hotels, 
spaces typically inaccessible to the urban poor. The children who learn to swim through official 
lessons belong to the middle class. Finally, there are cultural factors that hinder certain groups 
from learning how to swim. Muslims in CDO, for example, rarely know how to swim, and 
especially Muslim women who do not have places where they can swim in culturally appropriately 
modest garb. The ability to swim, similar to geophysical susceptibility, is indicative of larger 
societal structures and processes. 
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The assertion that vulnerable people are recent arrivals and have no or limited social or family 
networks in CDO is misleading. Migrants may not have the deeply entrenched networks of 
Cagayaños whose ancestors resided in the city. But, the specific sites where migrants settle are 
frequently based on social networks; they settle near relatives or acquaintances from their old 
homes, and they rely upon these contacts to jumpstart a livelihood in their adopted city. Roughly 
half of the survivors I interviewed was born and raised in CDO. Yet, the type of social networks 
and contacts of certain segments of vulnerable people, migrants included, do occlude them from 
accessing valuable resources. For instance, Sendong survivors who were not aware of the specific 
requirements necessary for obtaining assistance, or who were uninformed about the date, time, 
and location of relief distribution were usually excluded from the benefits to which they were 
entitled. Being connected to church or civic groups, or to a charismatic champion, had major 
benefits. People lacking such connections were severely disadvantaged because they did not know 
what they did not know, and as a result, they missed out. 
The wide-reaching effects of poverty 
Most of the indicators of vulnerability are rooted in or linked to poverty. Poverty manifests itself 
in different ways that increase vulnerability. Take, for example, the three indicators linking 
education, health and family size to vulnerability. Poverty can be linked to lower levels of 
educational achievement and literacy because the costs of so-called “free” primary education are 
prohibitive (e.g. uniforms, transportation, meals, books, school supplies, etc.), or because having 
children attend classes instead of participating in the family business or earning other income 
represents a significant opportunity cost. Poverty is also connected to the “likely to get sick” 
vulnerability indicator. While biology is an important determinant of health, poverty is a greater 
predictor of health and longevity than individual choices such as healthy eating and regular 
exercise (CSDH 2008). In CDO, poor people living in informal settlements are not served by 
proper waste management, may not have access to clean water, likely do not have screens on 
their windows, bed nets, or air-conditioning to keep dengue-carrying mosquitoes out of the 
home. And, when they do get sick, the cost of “getting better” can be prohibitive. Finally, poor 
Filipino families are typified as large families. The official poverty threshold calculated by the 
National Economic and Development Authority is for a hypothetical family of five (NEDA 
2009). Yet, in CDO – an urban centre where families are generally smaller as compared to rural 
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areas – the average urban poor family has seven (or more) members.39 The issue of large families 
and the discrepancy between a state-sanctioned ideal household size and the actual household 
size in the design of relocation houses and the rules about the number of inhabitants per house is 
addressed in the next two chapters.  
Poorly constructed houses made of non-durable materials are also symptomatic of insufficient 
means. Impoverished residents in CDO often possess neither the knowledge nor the financial 
resources to implement disaster-resistant building methods. With limited means, the city’s urban 
poor ingeniously use available and affordable materials to build their own living quarters, with the 
intention of upgrading their abode as additional means become available. A local developer 
explained to me that the typical Filipino mode of building is to purchase or somehow acquire 
land and an unfinished house, and then renovate it as money becomes available. This observation 
is true in both the affluent government-approved residences and in the informal settlements that 
pepper the cityscape. Building with flimsy corrugated cardboard or iron sheets, plastic sheets, or 
amakan or non-durable lumber (e.g. cocolumber) that only lasts a few years is not the preferred 
option of most Filipinos, including the urban poor I interviewed. When possible, the urban poor 
build concrete houses. Indeed, many of CDO’s urban poor living in informal settlements have 
concrete or partly concreted houses (Fig. 5.1), so the widely-held stereotype that inhabiting or 
owning a concrete house is indicative of middle class status is erroneous. According to an 
informant from a national NGO that builds houses all over the Philippines, concrete houses are 
the preferred housing of most Filipinos outside of Muslim Mindanao. Another informant leading 
the infrastructure and housing team at the Ecoville relocation site explained this preference in 
terms of durability: 
                                                          
39 In 2010, I attended a Senate meeting debating the proposed reproductive health bill that would require 
the government make family planning services available. It is difficult to obtain birth control or safe access 
to abortion in the predominantly Catholic country because they are illegal. The Chair and sponsor of the 
bill wanted to make a point about why poor Philippine families tend to be large families. She began by 
sharing a story about a poor family in Manila. There were eight children that the husband was trying to 
support on just $2.40 per day. The wife did not want more mouths to feed but could not access birth 
control and found herself pregnant again. This is a common story among the urban poor. The Chair then 
asked the room full of middle and upper class individuals putting forth arguments in favour of or against 
the bill to raise their hand if they had at least one child, two children, three children, four children, etc. 
Apart from the Catholic priests, most hands shot up at one child and stayed up for three children. No 
hands remained once she reached five children. She’d made her point: Filipinos with the financial means 
can largely control their family size and access birth control, whereas the urban poor cannot. 
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In the Philippines concrete is the most, I mean, people perceive concrete structures as the 
highest level of a shelter. So if you give them a choice between a wooden house, an 
amakan house and a concrete house, they definitely choose a concrete house – because 
people are more concerned with strength of the material and how long it will last. 
Because they don’t want to be renovating every so often. 
 
Fig. 5.1. Many of CDO’s urban poor living in informal settlements have concrete houses (top, 22 
March 2013) or partly concreted houses (bottom, 7 March 2013). 
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Another reason why the urban poor erect poorly constructed houses is due to insecure land 
tenure. As many of these houses are built on untitled land, there is little incentive for residents to 
invest in sturdy, disaster-resistant houses because of the perpetual risk of eviction. Why spend 
money on something that could be taken away at any time? Given this risk, it is a rational 
decision to allocate scarce household resources to the contents of the house and not its physical 
structure. To use McLeman’s (2013, 176) terms, the urban poor invest in “portable capital” that 
enables them greater mobility, as opposed to non-portable “place-based capital” that ties them to 
a particular location. This point is not recognised in the municipal and national compensation 
packages for survivors; government guidelines aim to compensate damaged physical structures 
instead of the contents of the house. This and other examples of how the most vulnerable are 
further marginalised through disaster are explored in Chapters 6 and 7.  
Poverty is also correlated with the livelihoods of vulnerable people. The urban poor typically 
have insecure, irregularly paying jobs in the informal sector. In CDO, the household incomes of 
the urban poor range from $1.11 to 6.68 per day, indicating families are at or below the provincial 
2009 poverty threshold in Misamis Oriental of $5.50 per day for a family of five (NEDA 2009). 
The majority are informal sector workers occupying livelihoods such as jeepney, sikad or motorela 
drivers,40 port worker, construction worker, sari-sari store owner, buy-and-sell vendor, or junk 
shop collector (also called a gleaner or canvasser). Those employed in the formal sector typically 
hold low-paying, precarious jobs as office, restaurant, hotel and mall workers. The conditions 
associated with a job, and not the livelihood itself, increase vulnerability. For example, a freelance 
carpenter who does short-term contracts and spends long periods of time unemployed is in a 
very different position from a carpenter who is employed full-time with an established 
construction company and receives employee benefits. Informal sector jobs, and even the 
majority of formal sector jobs, do not provide employee benefits. Unskilled or low-skilled 
positions in the formal sector are usually offered as contract positions with a fixed term just shy 
of the minimum period mandated under the Philippine Labor Code requiring an employer to 
register and pay benefits to the employee. Even though workers often stay in the same position 
                                                          
40 There are many forms of quasi-public and private transportation in Cagayan de Oro. A motorela is a 
small motorised scooter with an attached cab used for public transportation on set routes. A jeepney is a 
converted U.S. military jeep used for public transportation on set routes. A sikad is a non-motorised cycle 
rickshaw for private hire. 
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over several contract periods, they live without the job security and employee benefits that enable 
long-term planning. Similarly, in the informal sector, it is unlikely a worker has access to credit 
from their employer (e.g. emergency workplace loan), is eligible for mandatory employee benefits, 
has colleagues advocating on their behalf to people in positions of authority, receives legal 
protection, has job security, and has insurance protecting their livelihood capital. The livelihoods 
of many of CDO’s urban poor are thus characterised by precarity and uncertainty. 
Living so close to the financial edge, many vulnerable people require daily income to survive. In 
fact, most require a daily infusion of cash to pay their creditors. For example, many urban poor 
regularly rely upon high interest “5-6 loans”41 from moneylenders to meet their subsistence 
needs; the 5-6 lenders collect payment on a daily basis. Similarly, the urban poor men who drive 
rented sikads, motorelas and jeepneys as a livelihood must pay the vehicle owner the rental fee every 
day. Most of the urban poor purchase their foodstuffs in small quantities because they do not 
have enough money at any one time to purchase a larger quantity and store it, even though they 
could save money with the latter option. The urgent need for a daily income also affects the 
livelihood options available to and preferred by the urban poor. As a city official put it, the urban 
poor “belong to the sector wherein it’s really to work to be able to eat tomorrow.”  
Poverty is most visible at the individual or household level. Trustees recognised that poverty at 
the micro scale is revealed through multiple indicators of vulnerability. What was left unsaid, and 
thus unresolved, was that poverty in the Philippines reflects the perpetual state of 
impoverishment of the national economy. In turn, this is a product of, for example, a colonial 
past (Church 2003, Tan 2009, Batalla 2010), urbanisation without accompanying economic 
growth (Gibb 2012), political nepotism (McCoy 1994), the imposition of landholding elite 
families views on the bureaucratic apparatus and even elections (Sidel 1994, 1999, Bello, Docena 
et al. 2004, Caouette 2010), rent-seeking and kleptocratic tendencies of some political dynasties 
(Kelly 2009, Batalla 2010), an unwavering commitment of the central administrations to a 
globalisation discourse of deregulating, liberalising and decentralising the national economy and 
development (Kelly 1997, 1999, Francia 2010), and the unfulfilled commitment of every 
                                                          
41 A 5-6 loan carries a 20% interest rate. For every five pesos borrowed, six must be repaid over the agreed 
upon period. Typically, 5-6 moneylenders are not affiliated with accredited financial instutions, and they 
do not require collateral or documents from their borrowers. The latter characteristic makes their loans 
appealing to the urban poor. 
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Philippine administration to agrarian reform and breaking up huge, landed estates (Bello, Docena 
et al. 2004, Takigawa 2004, Francia 2010).  
Food insecurity is another example illustrative of the complex processes and structures producing 
poverty. Food insecurity stems from more than a mere financial difficulty in providing sufficient 
healthful meals. For some of CDO’s recent urban poor migrants, it is reflective of dispossession 
of land, whereby large multinational corporations acquire leases for large swathes of fertile 
agricultural land on which to expand their plantations. These leases are negotiated with the upper 
echelons of the national government, and the decisions taken in Manila are imposed on the 
people inhabiting and using the land. It is, according to activist NGOs and people’s 
organisations, nothing more than land-grabbing, albeit legitimised and euphemised as “land 
conversion” by national government approval. Small-scale farmers are dispossessed of their land, 
their means of livelihood, their means of subsistence, and are faced with the choice to move into 
ever more marginal lands (e.g. higher up, in small parcels of land, along steep slopes, etc.) or to 
take their chances as migrants in cities crowded with other rural escapees just like them. The 
livelihood skills they possess are not needed or wanted or are in oversupply, so many find 
themselves competing for scarce low-skilled, low paid informal employment. As described above, 
the livelihood situation of the urban poor makes it difficult to feed a large family, especially with 
food prices higher than in their former rural homes. 
The unsaid indicators of vulnerability 
In addition to the vulnerability indicators identified by trustees, there were other indicators of 
vulnerability that emerged throughout the research process. Interviews with survivors, 
participatory video-making and participant observation made these additional factors very 
apparent. They include inexperience with floods, little or no savings, dependency on public 
transport, exclusion from supra-household decision-making processes and being Muslim or 
indigenous. Clearly identifiable indigenous and Muslim survivors were less able to access 
mainstream official conduits of aid than their Christian and non-clearly identifiable indigenous 
and Muslim counterparts. Deeply rooted prejudices and omissions entrenched in state 
organisations, policies and structures imbued with Catholic worldviews have real impacts and, as 
such, belonging to a stigmatised group increased vulnerability. That all of these factors were not 
recognised by the trustees creating and implementing disaster relief, recovery and rebuilding had 
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major impacts on the experiences of survivors in post-disaster spaces and in their post-disaster 
mobility. 
A continuum of vulnerabilities 
The trustees’ approaches to vulnerability are clearly limited. A more useful way of framing 
vulnerability and understanding vulnerable people is to visualise the CDO survivors of Typhoon 
Sendong along a continuum. Variation exists within communities, households, and even 
individuals depending on their situation in relation to other people at a given time. This section 
develops these ideas showing which groups of Cagayaños are less or more vulnerable. It also 
delves into “invisible vulnerability” and the difficulties faced by Sendong survivors who are not 
officially “vulnerable” and are therefore excluded from official conduits of disaster relief. Their 
exclusion can render them even more vulnerable than the officially vulnerable people.  
The less vulnerable 
Vulnerability can be grossly simplified to mean the inability to respond to and recover from an 
external shock without external assistance. Accordingly, any person receiving external aid is 
vulnerable. Thus, the vast majority of people are vulnerable, at least to an extent. There are, 
however, many conditions, circumstances, abilities, and structures that reduce the vulnerability of 
an individual, household, community, or other defined group. 
In the case of Typhoon Sendong, the less vulnerable survivors can be grouped according to their 
economic circumstance: they are middle class. The concept of class is developed in an extensive 
body of academic literature, and can only be selectively summarised here. In a traditional Marxist 
approach, class is articulated according to “common structural positions with the organizations 
of production,” and class stratification according to “the concept of exploitation and property 
relations” (López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez 2014, 25). The Weberian concept of class groups 
individuals according to shared “economic life chances” that delimit their income opportunities, 
and defines the middle class as individuals possessing education and marketable skills (López-
Calva and Ortiz-Juarez 2014, 25). Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of class aligns with the way many 
Cagayaños understand class. Bourdieu (1987 in Kroeker 2014, 4) insists that “members of a 
particular class have a certain way of behaviour, a specific habitus and a particular taste, which 
distinguishes them from other social groups,” which, in turn, is a product of “economic, political, 
educational and cultural entanglements and thus a large variety of factors that strengthens or 
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weakens someone’s position in society.” The Cagayaño articulation of the middle class refers to 
what Kroeker (2014, 6) describes as a “social group in the middle of society with a middle income 
and middle societal position,” and possessive of “a minimal standard of formal education, 
economic stability and an orientation towards social security and savings.”  
In CDO, this concept of middle class is operationalised by key informants as “those who work,” 
“those who can afford to build a second or third floor onto their house,” and “those who live in 
middle class [planned and government-approved] developments.” The middle class usually hire 
someone else to build or renovate their titled concrete houses. They typically hold relatively 
secure mid-level or higher professional jobs in the public or private sector, or own a registered 
business. They pay income taxes and often receive workplace benefits.  
Certain middle class houses were flooded and partially or totally damaged. Middle class 
Cagayaños died. Middle class residents were forced to evacuate from their homes and relocate – 
just not to the official evacuation camps or relocation sites. Instead, they went to hotels or to 
their relatives’ and friends’ homes. They paid for secure and comfortable temporary housing. 
They had the financial capacity and social networks required to construct their own safe space 
after the disaster. They did not rely upon external assistance from humanitarian organisations, 
NGOs, religious groups, government agencies, and individual donors, although many middle 
class survivors accessed available resources, especially to claim compensation for damaged 
property and indemnities for dead or missing relatives.  
Several key informants were also middle class survivors; they were candid with me about their 
personal experiences and those of their neighbours, relatives, colleagues, and friends. They noted 
that Sendong was the first time they had received money from friends and relatives living outside 
of CDO. One woman described being “so ashamed on our part to receive money.” Many middle 
class recipients used the donations from their kin networks to hire acquaintances to clean and 
repair their houses, or to wash each article of clothing multiple times. Other middle class 
survivors used the donations to build a second or third story on their concrete house, or an easy 
access route onto the roof. These high-rise additions are called “panic rooms.” They are a logical 
solution for homeowners who are heavily invested in non-portable place-based capital, such as a 
house on titled land. In still other cases, some middle class survivors received such a large influx 
of donations that they invested the money in developing or expanding their personal businesses. 
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For example, some families opened water filling stations or expanded a family-owned grocery 
store. Although most of the small-scale enterprises, such as small pharmacies and grocery stores, 
run by middle class residents were not insured, the cost of replacing lost and damaged supplies 
was not necessarily borne by individual shop owners. Instead, it was often the suppliers who 
replaced the stock as part of a corporate social responsibility initiative. In contrast, urban poor 
entrepreneurs typically bore the costs of replacing washed out or damaged capital and of repaying 
the items bought on credit. 
A brief note on remittances and assistance from overseas relatives is warranted here. The 
Philippines has a vast overseas diaspora (cf. De Koninck and Caouette 2012); the latest numbers 
from the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (2015) estimated that over 10 million Filipinos were 
living outside of the archipelago as of December 2013. These numbers are reflective of a weak 
domestic economy that cannot provide enough quality jobs with a living wage and government 
policies instituted since the Marcos era of encouraging emigration (Bello, Docena et al. 2004). 
Many of these Filipinos maintain links with family back in the Philippines, returning every couple 
of months or years, and sending remittances back to family members. Many of the survivors with 
whom I spoke, both urban poor and middle class, received financial or other material assistance 
from members of their social network within or outside the country. The amounts received by 
the two economic classes were very different. The discrepancy helps to explain the differential 
capacity to rebuild lives and the speed at which it is done. For example the amounts received by 
the urban poor typically ranged from $24-240, whereas the amounts were tens or hundreds of 
times greater for the middle class. One regional government employee described the assistance 
received by her neighbours living in a heavily affected middle class development.  
I have a friend. Before the flood they have this small house but after the flood they were 
able to purchase a house at Camellia homes [an affluent gated community in CDO] 
because of the rich amount of money that he received from relatives and friends. It was 
enough to buy a house. I have another friend [who was] able to reconstruct [her] house. 
Now it’s two-story because they received half a million [pesos] from her sister’s friends in 
the U.S. Her sister is working in the U.S. so her officemates and friends gave money and 
then sent it to the Philippines. So, they were able to build a two-story house. 
This quote reveals the magnitude of difference between the resources available to urban poor 
survivors versus those available to some middle class survivors. $12,000 goes a lot further than 
$240, especially if the family already possesses the means to cover its daily expenses. The huge 
 
 
 192   
 
differential also helps to explain the different rebuilding strategies of middle class and working 
class survivors living in flood-prone parts of the city. Those with financial means mitigate risks 
with expensive techno-fixes. The middle class build stronger and taller houses. They can even 
“move” the Cagayan River, as is the case with the private Paseo del Rio skyscraper which 
required redirecting the river’s flow. 42  
A personal tangent 
In situating middle class survivors along the less vulnerable side of the vulnerability continuum, I 
do not mean to diminish their very real and traumatic experiences, and the difficulties they 
underwent in rebuilding their lives post-disaster. I listened attentively to many harrowing and 
often very tragic stories of middle class victims and survivors during my fieldwork. To a limited 
degree I can relate to, but never fully understand, the fear that middle class households might 
have experienced during Sendong. To explain this point I share another excerpt from my blog, 
one that I wrote during my own family’s evacuation for Super-typhoon Pablo, and posted after 
we had returned home safely to our compound. 
SUPER-TYPHOON PABLO/BOPHA 
12:35 pm – I am lying on a dorm bed in the Marigold Hotel – ironically the very same hotel I visited last week 
asking to speak with management about their Typhoon Sendong experiences. 
Ada is finally napping. J., after a very long bout of crying, is also asleep. A. is calling her husband to check if he’s 
left their home for the safety of the Nestlé compound located on the other side of the national highway on higher 
ground away from the seashore. The Ates (literally ‘older sisters’ but used here as a term of respect for the hired 
help who care for A. and E.’s boys) and baby E. are sleeping on two single beds pushed together in the corner of 
the room. The three older boys are tearing up and down the halls, into and out of the room. Tito Frank is out on 
the balcony watching the storm. 
Frank and I talked a lot about what to do yesterday. Looked up every weather website we could find. Diligently 
read up on typhoons. Calculated contact time with Mindanao and with CDO. Discussed the hazards most likely 
to affect us: typhoon, storm surge, flooding. Debated which details to divulge to our families and when to share 
them. 
                                                          
42 The Paseo del Rio has earned a notorious reputation in its short history. The mixed-use riverside 
development is the pet project of a prominent CDO family. It required significant political arm wrestling 
in order to acquire the necessary permits, in particular for permission to redirect the river’s flow. This 
redirection is accused as being the reason why several previously flood-free barangays outside of the flood-
risk zones were flooded during Sendong.  
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The main event should hit around 2 pm. It’s raining harder now. There are big gusts of wind. The girls I saw 
playing baseball on a first floor porch earlier this morning have left. The occasional cab, motorela and motorcycle 
drive by. Otherwise, the streets are eerily deserted. Corrugated sheet iron roofs threaten to cave in or fly off. Papaya 
trees bend in the wind. 
There’s nothing we can do at this point. Except pray. And write. And wait. The knot in my stomach is gone. It 
was there yesterday afternoon and evening and night. Maybe it’s time, or maybe it’s the fact that we’re on the fifth 
floor or a solidly constructed building. Or because there’s nothing we can do at this point. 
Last night was long. We drove from hotel to hotel to hotel. First, we tried the hotels on high ground near the 
airport: Prycegas, Korseca and Condotel. Booked solid. Then, we tried the clubhouse at Xavier Estates. It’s not 
exactly a hotel, but it has a roof and it’s located on high ground. The next option was to go downtown - lower 
ground but multistory buildings. Hotels were full, full, full. Finally, one with an empty dorm room. 
In the room are eight single beds. Each is covered with starched white linens, not the mismatched assortment of 
bargain sheets that cover typical dorm beds at budget hostels. Air Con. Cable T.V. Two enormous wooden 
wardrobes. It’s the swankiest dorm room I’ve ever entered. 
It was after midnight when we finally checked in. Ada was wired. I was exhausted. Frank paced the halls with 
her. Brought her outside to the fire escape, but the city lights only revved her up more. 
Not much sleep was had by anyone that night. The babies took turns crying. Babies sense trouble. A. was 
constantly on her mobile, checking in with her husband, father and hired help who stayed at the compound. 
I had wild dreams. The rat. Ada wakes up crying. I reach my hand over to comfort her. A large dark rat scuttles 
along the bed frame in the space between Frank’s mattress and mine. It dives down as I pull Ada in close. She 
screams. Loud. I shift again and the rat resurfaces a little farther down the bed. I silently curse dirty, grungy hotels. 
I pat Ada down, like in a first aid secondary survey, trying to identify where the rat has bitten her. I don’t find 
any blood or tender spots. She feeds then snuggles into the crook of my neck. Frank pushes our beds even closer 
together. 
Several hours later I shift positions. Shadows dance. My hands are a puppeteer. The rat was me; my hand motions 
its scurrying. Daylight, even with an imminent storm, brings calm. 
3:00 pm – It’s still raining - a constant, steady downpour. The eye of the storm has passed us, along with the 
strong winds. It's not the super-typhoon that has A. on edge; it’s the rain in the mountains of neighbouring 
Bukidnon province.  The mountains are the water catchment area for the rivers and creeks of Tablon, where we 
live, as well as the tributaries feeding into the Cagayan River. 
An ambulance topped with a rubber boat (the white water raft kind) drives by. Sirens blare. Though huge puddles 
cover the roads they are still passable. Cars, vans, motorelas and taxis drive by. The visibility of the distant 
mountains waxes and wanes. 
I am crouched in the doorway looking out onto the road, enjoying a rare cool breeze, listening to the rain. Two 
children dash across the street. Two people drive by on a red motorbike. The passenger holds up a purple umbrella 
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to shelter them from the rain. Off in the distance at the unfinished Paseo Del Rio hotel is a white crane. The rain 
begins to let up. People begin milling around near the wall of the Capitol. 
6:20 pm – Normalcy returns with surprising speed. The brown out ends. Street lights switch on. Street vendors 
bring out their stalls. Stores and eateries re-open. Karaoke microphones crackle (Gibb 2012, 29 December). 
The more vulnerable 
The survivors located at the “more vulnerable” end of the vulnerability spectrum share two traits. 
First, they have one or more pre-existing conditions that render them susceptible to a shock from 
which they cannot recover without external assistance; they exhibit structural vulnerability. 
Second, these survivors are identified by trustees as being “officially” vulnerable, and are thus 
eligible for, and often receive, disaster assistance from government agencies, religious and non-
governmental organisations.  
The invisible vulnerable 
Lying along the vulnerability continuum, but hidden from official eyes, are the “invisible 
vulnerable.” Invisible survivors experienced the classic Type I error – the rejection of a true null 
hypothesis (i.e. a false positive). Put another way, legitimate survivors, including many at the 
more vulnerable end of the vulnerability continuum, were denied benefits for which they should 
have been eligible.  
The omission of many people who exhibit characteristics of vulnerability was linked to their non-
recognition by official conduits of aid. For example, the elderly, persons with disabilities and 
persons injured during the natural hazard event were described by several regional government 
actors and a disaster research centre as “invisible” because they typically avoid evacuation centres 
and cannot access mainstream services. Their invisibility is not unique to the post-disaster period, 
but it is exacerbated during this time. One CDO-based activist for an urban poor organisation 
succinctly summarised the problem and its consequences. “Even in normal circumstances people 
with disabilities in the Philippines do not have legislation or any special attention given to them. 
So in times of crisis, it’s the basics that they attend to, so sometimes they’re just left out. And a 
lot of them already died.” As such, disasters can reinforce or deepen pre-existing injustices. 
This section briefly introduces five overlapping groups of people who exhibit many indicators of 
vulnerability, and who land on the “more vulnerable” side of the spectrum, but for various 
reasons were largely beyond the purview of official disaster assistance. These invisible groups 
partially overlap with the official vulnerable people identified by the trustees’ three vulnerability 
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approaches. Yet, for reasons discussed here, they are invisible and hence excluded from disaster 
relief, compensation, or other benefits.  
One caveat for this section is that, by their very nature, invisible vulnerable groups can be 
difficult to identify and analyse because they are obscured from the public (and the researcher’s) 
gaze. Despite efforts to seek out diverse informants who have worked with vulnerable people, 
the following discussion is undoubtedly limited by my access to informants and information. 
Furthermore, there are likely additional invisible groups that remain unknown to me. 
The Muslim community 
Cagayan de Oro has a significant minority Muslim population. Muslims share many city spaces 
with non-Muslim city residents, especially commercial spaces where Muslims own, operate and 
patronise small shops, market stalls and malls. The regional office of the national government 
agency dedicated to Muslim Filipinos, the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF), is 
headquartered near the city centre. Muslim households inhabit(ed) many of the barangays heavily 
affected by Typhoon Sendong, including in Carmen, Balulang, Consolacion, Nazareth, 
Macasandig and Iponan. According to NCMF-X records, in Balulang alone there were 407 
Muslim households affected by Sendong. Yet, the Muslim community was conspicuously absent 
from the official post-disaster spaces. Actors in charge of post-disaster housing, including 
representatives from regional and city government agencies, local universities and NGOs, noted 
that in the vast majority of cases “Muslims just don’t go to evacuation camps or temporary and 
permanent housing.” Instead, Muslim survivors typically sought refuge in the houses of local 
relatives and friends or in their mosque, and availed of the financial and material assistance from 
their Muslim compatriots. There were a few exceptions in which a very small number of Muslim 
individuals (and not families) went to evacuation camps and received relocation housing. 
However, these individuals did not remain at either the camps or the relocation sites. There were 
plans to open a joint Muslim and Christian relocation site in Opol, and a request of the NCMF-X 
to fund a Muslim-only relocation site. Neither site has been built as of July 2015. 
The NCMF-X is framed as a Muslim and not a state trustee for two reasons. One, it is isolated 
from other government agencies. Two, it operates almost exclusively in association with and on 
behalf of the Muslim community. The official government agency acting for Muslim residents is 
largely invisible to and excluded by all other government agencies at the municipal, provincial and 
 
 
 196   
 
regional levels in CDO. Indeed, no other government agency reported on the issues of Muslim 
survivors, or on any activities or funds allocated to or accessed by them. Instead of lamenting 
their isolation from other regional government offices, NCMF-X officials emphasised the 
assistance from various Muslim donors. The national governments of Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, 
the Red Crescent International Society, and other Muslim donors sent money, halal food, Muslim 
clothing and other material support specifically intended for Sendong-affected Muslim 
communities in Region X. Not all the money, however, was actually received by the NCMF-X 
office, and was speculated to be lost somewhere in the coffers of the national government.  
In CDO, the coexistence of communities separated along religious lines persisted in the 
aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. The usual habit of the Christian majority – including state actors 
– to not interfere with the city’s Muslim population went uninterrupted. The result of such non-
interference, with a few notable exceptions discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, was that the plight of 
Muslim survivors of Sendong went largely undetected by the official conduits of aid. 
Just-above-the-poverty-threshold 
Formal sector workers whose income teeters just barely above the poverty line were invisible 
vulnerable survivors, too. They typically work as administrative and support staff (such as drivers 
and cleaners) in government offices and businesses. A manager at a regional government office 
described these survivors as “taxpayers [working in] the government sector” who “are also 
vulnerable, receive very meager salaries and were also hard hit by the calamity.” Their salaries 
place them above the poverty line and their employment in the formal sector provides them with 
some employee benefits, so they are ineligible for many of the formal government assistance 
programs aimed at vulnerable populations. Yet, this population shares much in common with the 
urban poor working in the informal sector. They frequently live in hazard-prone areas in houses 
constructed with temporary materials and just eke by pay cheque to pay cheque.  
The poverty threshold itself plays an important role in creating and maintaining the invisibility 
and vulnerability of this group. The latest numbers published by the National Economic and 
Development Authority (NEDA) estimated the 2009 poverty threshold for a family living in 
Misamis Oriental at $2,168.76 per annum (NEDA 2009).43 This amount is the average for the 
                                                          
43 No data on the poverty threshold for the city of Cagayan de Oro were available. 
 
 
 197   
 
entire contiguous territory of the province, and is significantly below the minimum required to 
meet basic needs in CDO. The leader of a women’s rights organisation in CDO contended that 
Philippine politicians misconstrue numbers to wrongly suggest that poverty is dropping: 
The government says, ‘the level of the poverty is lowered,’ but the truth is that the level 
of the poverty is rising. The government today said, [president] Noynoy Aquino said, ‘if 
you have 30 pesos in your pocket, you are not considered poor.’ But when you take a 
look with the 30 pesos, what these 30 pesos can buy? 1 kilo of rice is already 42 pesos. So, 
is it true that if you have 30 pesos in your pocket you not considered poor? We eat only 
once.  
In other words, she suggested that the poverty threshold is set artificially low, which, in turn, can 
partially explain why formal sector employees who earn more than the poverty threshold are 
vulnerable. They do not have the reserves to rebound after a disaster; they do not have the 
capacity to withstand and recover from an external shock such as Typhoon Sendong. 
Unlike the plight of Muslim survivors, the difficulties of the just-above-the-poverty-threshold 
Sendong survivors were made visible. According to the Philippine Disaster Act (R.A. 10121), 
national and subnational government agencies have a mandate to assist vulnerable people when 
there is a calamity (GoP 2010b). But, as CDO-based Sendong-affected government employees 
found out, they receive nothing. At a meeting of regional government agencies convened six 
months after Sendong, affected employees endorsed a resolution that the government should 
help government workers. They proposed a compensation scheme based on the degree of 
damage. The Office of the President approved the resolution in August 2012 and disbursed 
funds in November 2012. Eligible regional government employees with fully damaged houses 
received $2,400, and those with partially damaged houses received $720. The funding was 
available to all eligible regional government employees, regardless of position or income. There 
was no specific targeting of the most economically precarious employees. No equivalent funds 
were made available to other formal sector employees working in barangay and city government 
offices, private companies, and educational institutions. As such, this example demonstrates an 
exception in which some just-above-the-poverty-threshold Sendong survivors obtained access to 
official disaster aid. The example also underscores that many more just-above-the-poverty-
threshold Sendong survivors working outside of regional government agencies remained invisible 
to official conduits of disaster aid. 
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Renters and sharers  
The “renters and sharers” who do not own a house or have title to land were invisible Sendong 
survivors. Their damages and losses were ineligible for financial compensation from municipal 
and regional government agencies. They could, however, obtain relief goods such as food and 
blankets, and they could participate in livelihood assistance programs. The rationale for their 
exclusion, according to a regional government actor, was that “if you are a renter you can just 
rent anywhere. You can just leave that house and move somewhere.”  
The housing compensation package for survivors reveals the economic and political priorities of 
the national government, as represented by regional government offices. Sendong-affected home 
owners are eligible for up to $120 from each of the City Social Welfare and Development Office 
(CSWD) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for a partially 
damaged house, and up to $240 from each of CSWD and DSWD for a totally damaged house. 
Municipal and regional government agency workers presumed, frequently erroneously, a 
beneficial trickle-down effect whereby sharers would receive a portion of the financial 
compensation given to the owner of the house. The amount of compensation is independent of 
the total value of the house. In distinguishing between totally damaged and partially damaged 
houses and the corresponding compensation, a regional government officer explained the official 
state stance that structure trumped contents – regardless of the value placed on those contents by 
the residents themselves:  
We are talking of the structure. Even if all the posts are there but it is not livable then we 
consider it [the house] totally damaged. [We consider it] partially [damaged] if it is just a 
portion of that house that is damaged. [Survivors] try to argue with us that their things, 
their appliances were all broken or all damaged. But we’re trying to tell them [what] we’re 
talking [about] here is the structure of the house, not the belongings. 
The unified position of municipal and regional governments that the physical structure of a 
deeded house is more important than its contents disproportionately punishes renters and 
sharers. From a state standpoint, however, a position that rewards home ownership is desirable: 
owning a house with a deed immerses an individual or a household into the market economy and 
renders them legible to the state, which, in turn, permits the state to collect taxes or otherwise 
intervene (Scott 1998). But the position fails to address the reality of vulnerable renters and 
sharers. Even more so than the urban poor homeowners introduced earlier, who scrimp on 
building materials and spend on personal belonging and livelihood capital build, renters and 
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sharers (often urban poor themselves) opt to allocate their scarce resources to portable capital. 
Yet, these carpentry tools, sari-sari store merchandise, sewing machines, or rented sikads or 
motorelas – the very things that permit a livelihood – are not recognised as valuable by state 
trustees. In other words, the very government agencies mandated to support the recovery of the 
survivors of a disaster clearly discriminate against people whose net worth is tied up in the very 
things that allow them to eke by, instead of a physical, deeded house. The government rewards 
investing in the physical structure of a legible house and lot (i.e. non-portable, place-based 
capital) over investing in an individual or a household’s livelihood capital (i.e. portable capital). 
Renters and sharers were initially ineligible to receive relocation housing. A regional government 
actor explained how the change to include renters and sharers at resettlement sites came about: 
Under the guidelines of DSWD renters are not considered [for relocation housing]. It is 
very clear: you are the renter [and] you may have lost your belongings but who lost [the 
most]? It is the owner of the house. But I think our secretary [gave] consideration to 
them – for the renters and the sharers – because [of what happened] during the first 
summit vice president Pinay and our secretary attended [here in the city]. One of the 
IDPs came to that and asked, ‘Ma’am, what about us? We are just renters and we are 
[victims too].’ [The] secretary is pro-poor so she said, ‘Ok, we’ll give consideration to 
that.’ That is why in the last turnover there were renters and sharers. [The secretary] was 
also moved by the valid concern of a renter [insofar as] they’re survivors and should be 
[eligible for some compensation]. But as far as the guidelines of DSWD [are concerned,] 
renters are not. 
The statement exposes some of the barriers faced by renters and sharers in accessing disaster 
assistance. Many of the important disaster management and planning meetings occurred in spaces 
where vulnerable people normally cannot access. The summit, for example, took place at a 
swanky CDO restaurant, a place rarely frequented by the urban poor. It was only after a renter 
snuck into the summit and implored their case to the top government officials in attendance, 
including the vice president and the national secretary of DSWD, that renters and sharers were 
reclassified as legitimate victims.  
The explanation for the change in government guidelines – “the secretary is pro-poor” – reveals 
the informant’ attitude toward her superior and her understanding of the role of her agency. That 
is, the state is not officially responsible for certain people (e.g. renters and sharers), but thanks to 
the generosity and benevolent character of the secretary these people can obtain benefits and 
resources. The beneficiaries, however, still remain in a precarious situation. Anything given to 
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these people from the state is akin to a generous gift, and not something to which they are 
entitled as members of Philippine society. The original decision to exclude renters and sharers 
from obtaining disaster compensation and relocation housing in the design of the compensation 
guidelines reflects a neoliberal position that privileges ownership, and legible participants of the 
market economy. The modifications to the criteria indicate a willingness to extend some of the 
benefits to those currently outside it. 
Upland communities  
Communities inhabiting the rural uplands encircling three sides of CDO were also affected by 
Typhoon Sendong. The communities are relatively isolated because of the distance and the poor 
condition of the roads and the availability of transit connecting the communities to the main 
highways and cities. The population is a mix of lumads and non-lumads. The Higaunon, the only 
Indigenous Peoples currently inhabiting Misamis Oriental, lived along the Cagayan River and 
closer to the mouth of Macajalar Bay in pre-colonial times (Demetrio 1995, Montalvan 2002, 
2009). Beginning in Spanish colonial times, they were driven inland and upland into the plateaus 
and mountains with the expansion of coastal cities and large-scale agricultural plantations. The 
post-Sendong invisibility of the Higaunon and their non-lumad neighbours is not surprising given 
the physical, economic, political, and social isolation of upland communities surrounding CDO, 
and the economic and political exclusion and social ghettoisation of Indigenous Peoples 
prevalent across the Philippines.  
Sendong’s catastrophic impacts were clearly visible in the lowlands (i.e. urban barangays in CDO): 
hundreds of dead and missing persons, thousands of families crammed into evacuation camps, 
damaged infrastructure, piles of rubble. In contrast, Sendong’s impacts in the uplands were 
harder to see. There were no recorded deaths, and all routes connecting the upland communities 
to the outside world were impassible except for a precarious footpath. The main impacts of 
Sendong on upland communities were on people’s livelihoods and their access to outside services 
and resources.  
The hilly terrain, thin soil and thick forests that characterise the uplands are ill-suited for 
agriculture. The preferred, and often the only feasible, livelihood option of the Higaunon is 
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small-scale, manual gold panning in upper portions of the Cagayan River and its tributaries.44 To 
minimise commuting time and maximise livelihood efforts, many families live in two sites: one 
official residence in the village centre where limited services are provided, and one temporary 
camp on the riverbank near the gold panning activities. Although the village residences are where 
people’s official residency are registered, and their land titled, many households live almost 
exclusively in their so-called “temporary” riverbank houses located on public land. Sendong 
floodwaters destroyed many temporary riverbank houses, and the ensuing turbidity of the 
Cagayan River forced a temporary halt of gold panning. Compounding these difficulties was the 
destruction of routes to the outside. Not only were upland communities prevented from 
receiving aid, but they were also isolated from the middlemen who regularly travel to the uplands, 
purchase gold, and bring it to gold buyers based in CDO.  
The only trustee who identified Indigenous Peoples (and upland communities more generally) as 
vulnerable Sendong survivors was a CDO-based international research institute. The invisibility 
of the Higaunon in the relief efforts is partly attributed to government bureaucracy. In the 
current system, any issue pertaining to Indigenous Peoples is automatically forwarded to the 
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), even when it would be better addressed by 
another government agency. After Sendong, for example, the government agencies specialised in 
disaster risk reduction and management have more appropriate resources to deliver timely post-
disaster interventions than the NCIP. The government agencies responsible for collecting data on 
Sendong-affected areas did not actually visit Higaunon communities. Instead, they requested 
information from an organisation working in affected Higaunon communities. It is unclear 
whether these data actually informed official relief and recovery activities. The inattention from 
government agencies appears to have been anticipated, as demonstrated by the disaster recovery 
and rebuilding initiatives taken by the Higaunon. For example, a member of the local tribal 
council donated land for on-site relocation. As such, the invisibility of upland communities (and 
especially lumads), like that of CDO’s Muslim population, illustrates that disasters can exaggerate 
or amplify existing exclusionary and punitive structures and processes embedded in society. 
                                                          
44 According to Philippine mining laws, the manual gold panning activities of the Higaunon are classified 
as illegal mining. The mining equipment and gold stock of the Higuanon are regularly confiscated by 
government officials. 
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Hors-système survivors 
The final example of invisible survivors are the people who, either deliberately or inadvertently, 
avoided official post-disaster spaces. Consequently, they remained largely unbeknownst to the 
state and non-state trustees directing and distributing disaster relief and recovery assistance. I call 
these invisible people “hors-système survivors” or outside-the-system survivors. Two groups of hors-
système survivors have already been introduced. Lying near the less vulnerable end of the 
continuum, the middle class survivors who used various means at their disposal to avoid 
evacuation camps and relocation sites are the first group. The second group comprises the 
invisible Muslim survivors. Muslim survivors typically self-selected themselves out of official 
post-disaster spaces for reasons discussed in the following chapter.  
A third group of hors-système survivors consists of survivors who demonstrate characteristics of 
vulnerability and who employed self-initiated strategies for rebuilding their lives and livelihoods 
with minimal or no official assistance. That this group of vulnerable non-middle class, non-
Muslim hors-système people exists was made clear in December 2012 when Super-typhoon Pablo 
hit Mindanao. Religious, state and NGO trustees all noted that many of the city’s evacuation 
centres were full, including from pre-emptive evacuations in anticipation of the storm. The 
people at the centres were predominantly urban poor who (1) continued to reside in flood-prone 
areas, (2) had not received a house at a relocation site, and (3) were aware that to be eligible for a 
free concrete house, you must stay at an evacuation site. The post-disaster trajectories of this 
third group, and the city spaces most critical to them will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 6.  
Summing up the vulnerability continuum 
Laying out vulnerability along a continuum is helpful in unpacking the range of Sendong 
survivors and their experiences. The continuum is informed by the three major approaches to 
vulnerability, and takes into account the variation that exists within communities, households and 
even individuals. It acknowledges that less vulnerable survivors were affected by Typhoon 
Sendong. At the same time, it shows which people (e.g. those clustered at the more vulnerable 
end of the spectrum) lack the resources and capabilities to quickly recover from a disaster. It also 
gives a place to invisible survivors who span the continuum, so called because of their neglect by 
the official conduits of disaster relief. Before delving into the post-disaster spaces accessed by and 
off limits to all of the Sendong survivors lying along the vulnerability spectrum, a discussion on 
one more aspect of vulnerability is required. In the next section, I present the major discourses 
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characterising the survivors located at the more vulnerable end of the continuum. These 
narratives are created, advanced, modified and endorsed by trustees; they are accepted, rejected 
and perpetuated by the subjects themselves. These narratives also play an influential role in the 
targeting of beneficiaries, the design and delivery of disaster assistance and resettlement 
programs, the mobility of more vulnerable and invisible survivors, and the exclusionary nature of 
post-disaster spaces. 
Vulnerability discourses 
In Cagayan de Oro, five major discourses were used to designate and characterise vulnerable 
people affected by Typhoon Sendong. These discourses are apparent in the language used by and 
the attitudes of trustees, the types of disaster assistance, and the formal and informal rules over 
access to assistance. The five narratives overlap, and occasionally contradict each other. Each one 
advances or hinders a specific agenda. Not surprisingly, intervening actors adopted one or more 
discourses to support their particular agenda. The discourses had real repercussions on the lives 
of Sendong survivors, in determining their access to resources, and in shaping where they went to 
rebuild their lives. The ensuing discussion is based on things said explicitly in interviews and 
official reports, as well on other things unsaid, but understood and often reinforced by the 
decisions and actions of trustees.  
Data from key informant interviews are especially relevant to uncovering the vulnerability 
discourses because interviews can reveal the “mental maps that people carry around inside their 
heads, and that it is this, rather than some videotape of reality, which is of interest to us” (Luker 
2008, 167). The interviews do not portray “a realistic account of some aspect of social life;” 
instead, they expose “ ‘narratives’, stories about what the person being interviewed thinks 
happened, or thinks should have happened, or even wanted to have happen” (Luker 2008, 167, 
emphasis in original). Because the same narratives or mental maps were repeated by different 
sources, the following discourses are socially-, and not just individually-, held. In labeling and 
characterising each of the discourses, I have tried to use the specific terms used by the trustees 
and the survivors.  
The Internally Displaced Person (IDP) discourse  
To discuss their work, “IDP” was the default descriptor used by most representatives of regional 
and municipal government agencies directly implicated in Sendong relief, recovery and rebuilding 
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efforts. This choice may reflect a recent proposal for the Philippine government to enshrine the 
United Nations guiding principles on internal displacement into law. It is the term used by many 
humanitarian organisations and Catholic institutions, as well as by many of the survivors 
themselves. In CDO, the use of the term “IDP” is generally restricted to people who lived at 
evacuation centres, and temporary and permanent housing sites. As such, the IDP discourse in 
CDO became associated with the official more vulnerable category of survivors who lack the 
capacity to recover from the disaster without external assistance. Yet, the official international 
definition of an internally displaced person could apply equally to all persons displaced 
temporarily or permanently by Sendong, irrespective of where they lie along the vulnerability 
spectrum. According to Article 2 of the United Nations guiding principles on internal displacement, IDPs 
are  
people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or 
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State 
border (OCHA 2004). 
The pervasiveness of the IDP discourse in CDO proclaims the idea that disaster relief is and 
should be devoid of partisan politics. Yet, the narrative’s local focus on a subset of IDPs reveals a 
decision to concentrate efforts on certain people and not on others – a decision that could not be 
entirely divorced from political influence. 
The widespread adoption of the IDP language reflects the implementation of the cluster 
approach and its targeting of “IDP” beneficiaries in the overall coordination of disaster relief in 
CDO. As part of the United Nations Humanitarian Reform process, the cluster approach was 
established in 2006 and has since been used in more than 30 developing countries (WHO 2015, 
Humanitarian Response no date). By grouping agencies into 11 needs-based thematic clusters 
(Fig. 5.2), the cluster approach aims to improve coordination among UN and non-UN 
humanitarian organisations and to clearly delineate responsibilities, thereby ensuring predictable, 
rapid and effective disaster response, and eliminating the duplication of efforts (WHO 2015). In 
CDO, it was the regional government agencies, and not the United Nations, that coordinated 
disaster relief and recovery. These agencies, however, used a slightly modified version of the UN 
cluster approach, and received significant on-the-ground support from UN staff and international 
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humanitarian organisations accustomed to working under the approach. 
 
Fig. 5.2. The cluster approach groups agencies into needs-based thematic clusters. The cluster 
approach helps improve coordination among UN and non-UN humanitarian organisations and 
clearly delineate responsibilities, thereby ensuring predictable, rapid and effective disaster 
response, and eliminating the duplication of efforts. Acronyms are: International Federation of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), 
World Health Organization (WHO). Source: Humanitarian Response (no date).  
Which survivors self-identified as “IDPs” demonstrates the penetration of the IDP discourse in 
official post-disaster spaces. The Sendong survivors most likely to describe themselves and their 
former neighbours (including the people who avoided official post-disaster spaces) as IDPs were 
those who were living in temporary and permanent relocation housing and who had lived in 
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evacuation sites for many weeks or months. Their community-based counterparts who had spent 
minimal time in official post-disaster spaces and were not living in one when I interviewed them 
in 2012 and 2013 were less likely to self-identify as IDPs. As such, the former group has 
internalised the official IDP discourse presented by trustees operating in post-disaster spaces, and 
encouraging the participation of IDPs in trainings and other interventions. 
The prevalence of the IDP discourse in official government reports, politicians’ speeches, and 
conversations among staff working in evacuation camps, and temporary and permanent 
resettlement sites derived from its perceived neutrality and technicality. The UN, international 
humanitarian organisations, and more importantly, the international standards they endorse were 
carefully crafted to be seen as politically neutral. Employing the IDP discourse to describe the 
target beneficiaries or programs at relocation sites reflects an attempt to depoliticise and to render 
universal the activities of trustees. The discourse also helped depict a trustee as fair and impartial; 
this attribute was especially important for the Local Inter-Agency Committee (LIAC) in charge of 
coordinating and distributing relocation housing. According to a senior staff at a municipal 
government office, it was imperative that LIAC was perceived as non-partisan and adhering 
strictly to the official housing eligibility guidelines, especially given the committee was headed by 
the mayor. 
The way Catholic trustees used the IDP discourse illustrates how the international IDP definition 
was reworked into a locally-relevant IDP discourse. Representatives, including the archbishop, 
the camp managers recommended by local Church officials, and the staff members working at a 
resettlement site run by a Catholic university, emphasised that IDPs had pre-existing indicators of 
vulnerability in terms of their political standing, housing situation and economic opportunities. In 
the passage below, a member of the clergy describes the conditions that explain the structural 
vulnerability of internally displaced persons. To underline the difficulties they face he articulated 
which opportunities should be given to them post-Sendong: 
[T]hese internally displaced persons were maybe already marginalised – on the fringes, 
literally, of society and the riverbanks. But now, with Typhoon Sendong, they’re given a 
chance to be relocated and given even permanent housing. So the challenge is really to 
also provide livelihood activities and to make them more stable, to give them more 
regular employment or self-employment. And to create, in that sense, communities of 
hope, [so that] they’re not only always living in, maybe, conditions that are like the slum. 
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Catholic trustees adopted IDP language to indicate their work targeted structurally vulnerable 
Sendong-affected people. For example, available church spaces were opened up to temporarily 
house “IDPs” and the grounds of the archdiocese’s two seminaries were converted into 
transitional housing sites for “IDPs.” Clerical and lay religious groups were also encouraged to 
“minister to the IDPs” in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong as part of the twelfth cluster – a 
CDO archdiocese-initiated religious or spiritual needs cluster. The religious cluster attended to 
the “assure individual salvation in the next world” component of the old pastoral power 
exercised by religious institutions (Foucault 2003a, 132). The IDP discourse was used to insinuate 
non-discriminatory selection of beneficiaries, and to legitimise the governmental interventions of 
Catholic trustees. 
The IDP discourse was not the only vulnerability discourse invoked by humanitarian, state and 
Catholic institutions in describing their various post-disaster activities. Many of these same 
organisations, along with CDO-based NGOs and activist groups, also used variations of a 
survivor and victim discourse in justifying other aspects of their post-disaster efforts. 
Survivor and victim discourses  
Different interviewees and documents bandied about the terms “survivor” and “victim.” In some 
instances, the word was carefully chosen to advance a specific agenda or to adhere to a strict 
definition. In other cases, the terms were used interchangeably. As explained in Chapter 1, I use 
the term “survivor” to describe persons directly affected by Typhoon Sendong who did not die in 
the hazard event, and the term “victim” for people who died or went missing during Sendong. 
This distinction was also used in the archdiocese’s survivor and victim database. In this section, I 
interrogate the meanings of survivor and victim, who uses which term and why, and the 
ramifications of such usage. 
Creating legitimacy and rendering legible 
The default term to describe the people affected by Sendong, including people who lived, went 
missing and died, was “victim.” The term “Sendong victim” referred to individuals who were 
deemed legitimate persons affected by Sendong. “Sendong victims” were the intended recipients 
of the generous relief packages donated by prominent Filipino politicians and celebrities who 
toured CDO in late December 2011. “Sendong victims” benefited from sympathetic provincial 
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politicians who permitted them to camp on Capitol grounds for almost a year. “Sendong victims” 
even obtained “too much assistance from the Church,” according to one archdiocese worker. 
Because victims were entitled to various forms of disaster assistance, Sendong-affected people 
were motivated to self-identify as “victims.” Victims classified as legitimate were identified by 
special identification cards, which rendered them legible to state and non-state actors. Official 
proof of residence was required to obtain a card. Sometimes, it was sufficient just to provide an 
address because the barangay officials who issued cards knew which streets were flooded. The 
cards enabled state actors to record information about household members, former address, 
length of stay in CDO, etc., and to track each time a victim received relief goods or participated 
in disaster assistance activities. According to a senior official at a regional government agency 
issuing the cards, the official government records are incomplete because the individuals who 
distributed the cards left many blanks. She attributes this error to a lack of training and to the 
high demand for cards immediately after the disaster. Victims had to show their card every time 
they obtained relief goods at evacuation centres or other sites where official aid was distributed. 
The amount of aid for which a victim was eligible was related to their address. On known middle 
class streets, victims received the card and little else, whereas victims with a known working class 
address were allocated greater benefits. The card was also required for participation in short-term 
income-generating opportunities such as cash-for-work or food-for-work programs in which 
victims were paid a nominal honorarium.  
Not only were the identification cards critical for obtaining disaster relief goods, but they were 
also essential for government benefits such as compensation for totally and partially damaged 
houses, and indemnities paid to the surviving family members of dead and missing persons. The 
private sector also gave special treatment to the people with these cards. For example, airlines 
allowed middle class “victims” to postpone their flights over the Christmas holidays without 
paying a penalty so that they could clean and repair their houses. Thus, there was a monetary 
incentive to claim the “victim” label. Unlike the IDPs who were presumed to be poor, Sendong 
victims included people from all economic classes and who spanned the entire vulnerability 
continuum. 
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Promoting healing 
The survivor and victim narrative was also used to promote healing. For example, distinguishing 
between survivors and victims was especially important in the design and implementation of 
psychosocial counseling of Sendong-affected persons. From 17 to 25 December 2011, a team 
from Ateneo de Manila University trained CDO-based faculty members, graduate students, and 
other interested individuals to help debrief the adults affected by Sendong, while recruiting artists 
to help the children. From Christmas into January 2012, volunteer counselors met with survivors 
in evacuation centres and churches, and referred serious cases to professional health workers. 
The Manila-based team drew on their experience assisting people after Typhoon Ondoy back in 
2009. They emphasised talking not to “victims” but to “survivors.” One volunteer counselor, a 
sociology professor, explained that this “first aid counseling” really helped survivors in 
“process[ing] the experience.” Telling their stories to an attentive listener “allows people to 
ventilate their feelings, their emotions during the flood.” As such, the counselors promoted 
psychological healing by reinforcing the positive image of a survivor who works through difficult 
experiences by expressing themselves and moving on with the help of others. 
Shifting from a victim to a survivor narrative was also important in promoting other forms of 
healing. According to several trustees, the shift must be internalised by the survivors themselves 
so that they stop relying on aid from government agencies and NGOs. One senior staff at a 
regional government agency explained the challenge of changing an established narrative partway 
through the post-disaster period.  
During the first few months in the transitory [phase] we’re trying to explain to the people 
that we are no longer in the emergency phase. As far as [our agency] is concerned, we 
have already provided livelihood at the camp for them, so I think that is also the time 
when they have to start standing on their own feet. And, although there are some who 
feel [cheated and use] an excuse [of] being a vict- a survivor of that calamity. 
Ironically, the “victim or survivor excuse” that she lamented as problematic draws upon the 
“legitimate victim” and “IDP” narratives developed and perpetuated by the very same agency.  
A final example of using – or in this case eliminating – a victim narrative to promote healing was 
emphasised in a speech delivered by an NGO worker who oversaw the building of nearly half of 
all resettlement houses in Cagayan de Oro and Iligan. In December 2012, he was a guest of 
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honour at a symbolic housing turnover event at Ecoville,45 the Jesuit University-run relocation 
site. He stressed the need to stop thinking of Ecoville residents as “victims” and to start thinking 
of them as “homeowners.” “Victim” connotes dependence, whereas “homeowner” connotes 
self-sufficiency and agency. His remarks were aimed as much at Ecoville residents as they were at 
the other attendees – people in positions of power to craft and disseminate discourses. The 
speaker’s comments also reinforced the community-oriented philosophy guiding Ecoville’s 
development. His deliberate attempt to change the conversation also served to depoliticise the 
potentially empowering language and behaviour of a victim and survivor discourse. 
Inspiring advocacy 
Several NGOs invoked another iteration of a survivor and victim discourse to advance their 
advocacy agenda. These NGOs strategically employed the terms “survivor” and “victim” to rally 
support for their causes and to call out state failures. The discursive power of language was 
harnessed as a form of resistance against the improvement schemes woven into post-disaster 
efforts. Resistance, according to Li (2005, 391) “involves not simply rejection but the creation of 
something new, as people articulate their critiques, find allies, and reposition themselves in 
relation to the various powers they must confront.” Local NGOs and activists encouraged 
Sendong-affected persons to use the term “survivor” to represent proactive methods and ideas, 
an unwillingness to just sit around and wait to be given your just due, and a rallying cry to 
unmask injustice and demand remedies. These trustees emphasised the passivity of the term 
“victim” and its connotation with something done to you over which you have limited capacity to 
do anything about.  
A federation of urban poor people organised groups of Sendong-affected persons into “survivor 
collectives” or “SOS collectives” (Survivors of Sendong). It was through these collectives that the 
federation and other local NGOs delivered services and distributed relief goods. Survivor 
collectives met regularly to discuss their problems and needs, to develop strategies to lobby the 
government to meet their demands, and to organise picket rallies. Survivor collectives were 
                                                          
45 No houses were actually turned over to beneficiaries during the ceremony. Ecoville residents had agreed 
to move from their temporary bunkhouses into their new concrete resettlement houses en masse once all 
houses were ready. The move happened in July 2013. 
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conceived as a long-term tool for building capacity and meeting community needs long after the 
foreign humanitarian agencies left CDO. As one organiser put it: 
We try to empower these communities that have survivors. We form mass organisations. 
We train them as health workers, train them as psychosocial workers. We also conduct 
discussions on [environmental] awareness and [how] to prepare for disasters. We try to 
maintain these services because most of the foreign funding, for example, just went there 
to give relief for a few months. After that, they just took off. So it’s our collectives that 
have been working [since] that time helping out in providing different services.  
Survivor collectives were also used as spaces for replacing a charity-based notion of development 
with an advocacy and benefits-come-after-struggle one. The destruction precipitated by Sendong 
was a propitious opportunity for achieving the agendas of local activist organisations. The same 
informant recounted that, 
We’ve been trying to educate people. When the typhoon came and aid was happening [i.e. 
pouring in] all these people were just expecting aid to come in. So this is a very charity-
based notion of development. They were just receiving [aid] without having to do 
anything [for] it afterwards. So, we’ve been trying to upgrade their consciousness [so] that 
they can demand better services [from] the government. It’s a good opportunity for us to 
organise communities [around] other issues as well. We have urban poor organisers but 
sometimes we can only organise them when there’s threat to their house, like demolitions. 
[When] there’s an urgent threat, they [see] that the only way for them to surmount this 
[obstacle] is to organise. For example on Earth Day, we have been able to mobilise these 
collectives to be in the streets and to demand the local government do something about 
disaster prevention and stuff. So they were talking about mining and plantations and 
stuff. There’s no other people who can demand it better than the people who have been 
victimised themselves. 
Indeed, survivors wielded power. The power of survivor collectives derived from the coordinated 
pressure of large numbers of people. Without constant pressure from a significant voter base, 
there was a tendency for government agencies to ignore the plight of those in need. In her dual 
roles as the leader of a women’s advocacy group in Region X and the head of a survivor 
collective, one informant observed that protesting collectively was the most effective way of 
ensuring demands were acknowledged and acted upon by government officials. She noted that 
survivors must first learn their rights and then ways to assert them. 
Once you educate the people they know how to assert their rights, assert their ‘I want to 
avail this one. I want to because I am qualified. I am Sendong survivor.’ Because the 
government will just wait, [and justify their inaction by saying] ‘no one came here to ask.’ 
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That the survivor collectives were effective was demonstrated by skyrocketing membership 
numbers in urban poor advocacy groups post-Sendong. Membership in an urban poor federation 
doubled from 3,000 to 6,000 after Sendong, with “survivors” constituting the greatest number of 
new members. The local leader attributes the jump to the fact that  
most people, after Sendong, [were] looking for an organisation to deal with the problems 
of victims. If they have a problem, the government doesn’t hear them. So, people need an 
organisation to hear grievances, problems. That’s the reason why most victims become a 
member voluntarily.  
A similar rise in membership in a women’s advocacy group was also observed after Sendong, 
with women “victims” joining the group and later redefining themselves as “survivors.” At an all-
female focus group discussion, women survivors explained that they, along with their female 
neighbours and friends, joined the group and began doing advocacy work on behalf of survivors 
and urban poor women more generally after Sendong. For them, the typhoon was a catalyst to 
get involved, educate themselves, and advocate for their rights. In other words, the narrative held 
by the urban poor about themselves was reframed from “victim” to “survivor advocate.” The 
NGOs they joined post-Sendong were instrumental in directing and supporting this discursive 
shift. 
Another critical incentive for joining an NGO advocating on behalf of survivors was gaining 
access to resources, especially information. As explained by the leader of a women’s advocacy 
group in Region X, actively participating in church or civic groups increased access:  
Only those who were very active on the barangay, active on the church, active on the civic 
organisation know about it [e.g. times and locations of relief distribution, requirements 
for obtaining disaster assistance, rights and entitlements of survivors, etc.]. How about 
those who are not active on that field? They [women survivors] were just at home [in the 
community]. They were just busy, busy thinking on how to survive. So there was a 
problem. And that factor is information dissemination. And, including, maybe, education.   
In addition to membership in organised groups or associations, regular exchanges with a 
charismatic leaders were also essential in accessing important and timely information. For 
example, the above-cited informant was singled out in several survivor interviews with survivors 
living in her barangay and in the neighbouring barangays as someone who had successfully 
demanded benefits for survivors in her community. Urban poor survivors frequently referred to 
these leaders as “barangay champions.” The relevance of social networks was particularly 
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important for people who remained in the community, outside of the official evacuation sites. 
People lacking connections were severely disadvantaged because they did not know what they did 
not know, and consequently, they missed out. 
The same organisations that coordinated “survivor collectives” simultaneously referred to 
“Sendong victims.” Here, the NGOs deliberately play upon the helpless victim discourse to 
emphasise state failure and obligation. By pointing out the inadequate response to meet the needs 
of Sendong “victims,” NGOs reminded people of the responsibility of the government to fulfil 
its legal and moral obligations. An insistence upon helping Sendong “survivors,” presumed to be 
back on their own two feet, would not have had the same discursive power. The following 
statement of an NGO advocate is illustrative; it shows that (1) the NGO thought of people as 
“survivors,” (2) the government disbursed limited support to “victims” and (3) support was 
obtained by proactive “survivors.” 
The Sendong survivor, as of now, has a lot of struggle. The government, actually, gives 
minimal, minimal support to the victims, actually. This support is not merely or simply 
given to the survivors, but this support is obtained by the survivors though struggles.  
People’s organisations also cited a Sendong victim discourse to achieve broad, long-term 
organisational goals such as promoting fair agrarian reform and stopping the land-grabbing 
activities of multinational corporations. For example, on 19 February 2013 the New People’s 
Army (NPA) launched simultaneous attacks on the Dole Philippines and Del Monte Philippines 
Inc. (DMPI) pineapple plantations in Bukidnon and the canning plant in Bugo, just east of CDO. 
Local spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) Mindanao Jorge Madlos justified the 
attacks, contending that pineapple plantations in Bukidnon had worsened the impact of Typhoon 
Sendong in CDO. The two newspaper excerpts below remind readers that the state and its allies 
failed Sendong victims.  
‘The punitive attacks against the multinational plantations have long been demanded by 
the indigenous people and peasant masses in Bukidnon and other parts of Mindanao 
whose ancestral lands have been seized, plundered, despoiled and poisoned by big foreign 
multinational corporations,’ said NDF-Mindanao spokesperson Jorge ‘Ka Oris’ Madlos. 
Madlos said the raids were ‘measures against the multinational corporations whose 
operations in the province are among the root causes of the massive flooding in Cagayan 
de Oro in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong in December 2011. […] This is one way of 
delivering justice to the 2,000 people who died in the floods.[…] We have been calling on 
the owners and operators of these plantations to reorient their businesses and stop the 
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expansion of their plantations in Mindanao. These plantations have caused grave damage 
to the environment’ (Fernandez 2013).  
And, 
Madlos said ‘pineapple plantations in Bukidnon’ worsened the impact of the storm. He 
said DMPI and Dole Philippines are the same multinational corporations that allegedly 
abused laborers, amassed large plantation areas that could have been subjected to land 
reform, and damaged the environment. ‘This is our way to search for justice for the 
Sendong victims,’ he said (Balane 2013). 
The NDF clearly relied upon the strategic use of a Sendong victim narrative to garner public 
sympathy. The careful deployment of survivor and victim narratives was similarly demonstrated 
by other trustees, advocates, and even the subjects of the discourses themselves. The strategic use 
of language was also evident in other discourses, notably the illegal squatter and informal settler 
discourse. 
Illegal squatter and informal settler discourses  
The illegal squatter and informal settler narratives underline the precarious housing situation of 
vulnerable Cagayaños, which, in turn, is linked to larger economic, political and legal processes. 
These discourses were primarily narrated, advanced and used by trustees, and not by the people 
to whom the labels were applied. These discourses strongly influenced the post-Sendong efforts 
of many trustees, notably the mass relocation of thousands of urban poor households into newly 
constructed resettlement sites. This is because most of the city residents who were heavily 
affected by Typhoon Sendong and did not have the capacity to recover on their own were and in 
some cases remain illegal squatters and informal settlers. A city official explained these people 
had been identified for resettlement prior to Typhoon Sendong:  
There are a lot of people residing within areas where [it is] not really a dignified place or a 
suitable place for these families who came in the city. The city is growing. There are 
opportunities for livelihood. So the situation cannot be avoided. The areas badly hit by 
Sendong were already occupied by these people. [With the help of a municipal office,] 
they are being organised [into a] landless association [whose] main purpose is [to help] 
them to avail of security of land [tenure] where their houses were rebuilt. So when 
Sendong strikes in the city, these areas were badly hit by that flood so there are thousands 
of people being victimised. Now, during that time [a municipal office] has already listed 
all the names of those residing on those areas. You might say those are danger areas. 
As revealed in the statement, the beneficiaries were vulnerable for several reasons: they lived in 
substandard housing, they needed work, they fled a worse economic situation, they were 
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newcomers to the city and likely have a limited social network, they did not belong to 
associations and were thus denied the indirect social and informational benefits of membership, 
they were landless, they were likely poor. Yet, the overriding factor driving their vulnerability was 
presumed to be an insecure and unsafe housing situation. 
As my research assistant succinctly summarised, illegal squatters and informal settlers are people 
who “don’t have lot numbers” and thus don’t pay property taxes. So-called informal settlements 
(i.e. slums) are “unplanned, usually overcrowded, have poor sanitation and other basic facilities, 
and are not in compliance with current planning regulation and building standards” and “have 
been constructed on land that the occupants have no legal claim to” (OCD 2012, 13). In the city, 
the landowners may be absentee landlords, speculative developers, or the municipal or national 
government. Frequently, these sites are located near the city centre on prime real estate where the 
government could be collecting taxes and generating significant revenue. As one academic 
informant explained, “when people squat on prime real estate, it’s more expensive to keep people 
in informal areas than to resettle them in the city somewhere else.” This issue is especially 
relevant in Manila with several mostly failed relocation attempts, but also exists to a lesser extent 
in other urban hubs in the archipelago where land is deemed more valuable than certain people.  
Cagayan de Oro has a history of transferring people from land when it is economically and 
politically desirable. For example, prior to the 1960s and 1970s CDO and its environs were 
densely forested; the areas and the people living there have since been cleared out to make way 
for logging and mining activities. More recently, the mayor’s piso-piso program let poor city 
residents purchase a small lot for one peso upon which he or she could build a house. Residents 
living on a designated piso-piso property lived with uncertainty, never knowing if and when the city 
might evict them. An urban poor federation worker described his wariness of the program:  
You only borrow [the land for] as long as the government doesn’t use the land. But when 
the government needs land for other purposes you can be demolished. That’s why we 
critique that kind of program – no security to live there. In our experience here, when the 
government or private interests want the land, they’ll demolish the people. 
The regional leader of a national women’s organisation recalled her personal experience with 
demotion (albeit not on a piso-piso lot). In 2000, she was living in barangay Puntod and the alleged 
landowner asserted that he wanted the so-called illegal squatters off his land. The city 
government supported his claim. It planned to relocate them to barangay Canitoan, which at that 
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time was poorly serviced by roads and was considered very remote. For two months, she and her 
neighbours staged protests in the city’s main square, demanding to be relocated to a part of the 
city near their livelihoods. The protestors won and were relocated to flood-prone Consolacion. 
The Puntod lot is still vacant. The experience had a lasting impact both on the woman’s personal 
trajectory as an activist and a community leader, and on her household’s livelihood and living 
situation. She elaborated:  
We are afraid of maybe, someday, we will be demolished again, and we’ll be displaced 
again. Actually the program of the government on housing, especially piso-piso, has no 
guarantee and security of tenure. That’s the reason my husband works much [in the 
Middle East as an overseas Filipino worker]. Because he doesn’t want that our kids would 
experience the same terror with demolition. 
In her story, the informant connects different scales of intertwining economic and political 
processes. Private interests at the local scale are prioritised by elected officials who impose 
evictions and, only after much protesting, acquiesce by allocating inexpensive untitled lots to the 
evictees near their livelihoods. Yet these sites were hazard-prone and severely affected by 
Sendong. Land tenure there is uncertain. The traumatic experience of forced eviction and 
demolition spurred a desire to purchase a titled house and lot. Yet, there are limited job options 
in CDO that pay enough to turn this desire into a reality. It thus became a rational choice to split 
the household and send one member to work overseas for most of the year. This temporary 
situation has been going on for eight years with no foreseeable end date. As illustrated by these 
examples, political and economic quandaries underlie illegal squatter and informal settler 
discourses. 
In written and oral communications, academics, municipal and regional government workers, 
businesspeople, and Catholic Church officials defaulted to a euphemistic “informal settlers” 
language. These trustees only applied the “illegal squatters” label to people living in places where 
they were expressly unwanted (as opposed to being in places where they were tolerated as 
“informal settlers”) or to people presumed to be illegitimate claimants. According to a city 
official, some beneficiaries of the city’s ongoing relocation program were “squatters living in sites 
that were to be demolished by private companies and public groups like the city,” thus illustrating 
the squatter-as-an-unwanted-person-living-where-he-or-she-is-not-wanted narrative. The 
illegitimate claimant narrative was demonstrated by a government bureaucrat recalling a case of 
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fraudulent Sendong claimants who “squatted” on the provincial Capitol grounds long after the 
last legitimate “Sendong victims” had been transferred to transitional or permanent relocation 
sites:  
The city government and the DSWD issued a statement [demanding the evacuees 
demonstrate that] they are really the persons affected during the typhoon and that their 
residences or their houses are located in this [Sendong-affected] areas. They cannot 
comply with the requirements, so they remain there. So these [evacuees] are part of the 
squatters. They cannot comply with the requirements so they cannot be placed in the 
resettlement areas.  
These two examples clearly show the negative association of a squatter discourse.  
During two field seasons interviewing people in Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao, not a single 
person actually called him- or herself an “illegal squatter” or an “informal settler.” Nobody 
described their neighbourhood as a “slum” or an “informal settlement.” Rather, the so-called 
squatters and informal settlers talked about themselves and their neighbours as “residents of 
barangay or sitio X” or “survivors or victims of Typhoon Y” or “IDPs.” By distancing themselves 
from the terms, the residents rejected the imposition of external labels and their negative 
connotations. This observation elucidates two key elements of the informal settlers and illegal 
squatter discourses. 
First, being called a squatter in a slum is denigrating; the social perception of such living 
conditions is pejorative and dehumanising. This sentiment has been largely internalised by the 
people who live in such places, and by the people and agencies who aim to “build capacity” or 
otherwise assist the people living there. While trustees purport to intervene in slums, they refuse 
to have the final results of their work associated with these same slums. This fear drives the 
shelter-related disaster rebuilding programs of some trustees. For example, a project coordinator 
based out of the national headquarters of a major international humanitarian organisation 
explained that her organisation’s solutions to post-disaster shelter needs are only temporary. 
Although the organisation could distribute building materials to survivors, they opted against it 
because of potential legal and financial repercussions for the organisation. As she put it, “what if 
[the organisation’s] logo goes up in an illegal squatter area?” 
CDO-based trustees were also afraid that Sendong relocation sites might deteriorate into slums. 
Some of the major donors to Ecoville were explicit in their instructions that “Ecoville should not 
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be a slum like some of the other relocation sites.” Consequently, Xavier University took concrete 
measures to avoid such an outcome; for example, it insisted upon building housing units that 
exceeded the minimum standard, and its on-site team is set on creating a community and not just 
houses. The aversion to slums is also shared by the members of a local foundation whose aim is 
to promote investment and tourism in CDO. The foundation’s president even expressed his 
members’ concern to the city that each of the relocation sites may not be receiving enough 
support to “prevent it [from] becoming a slum area.” 
Second, the illegal squatter and informal settler discourses are imposed by politically, 
economically and socially powerful actors onto less politically, economically and socially powerful 
actors. The terms are employed by those in positions of authority. The discourses reinforce the 
difference between “us” and “them,” creating or accentuating sometimes artificial differences, 
and reinscribing power differentials. The narratives thus perpetuate difference and hierarchy. 
Even the politically correct “informal settler” euphemism stresses the outsider character of the 
person; he or she is informal, and therefore outside of the system – be it the economic, political 
or legal system. The term emphasises the difference between those within the system (e.g. formal 
settlers living in formal settlements) and those living outside of it, and the precarity and exclusion 
this location imposes. This outsider aspect of the informal settler and illegal squatter narrative is 
especially pertinent to the design of permanent post-disaster spaces. Resettlement sites are 
designed to bring informal settlers and illegal squatters into the fold of formal societal structures 
by relocating these people into formal settlements in which the residents have signed a legal 
agreement ensuring their entitlement to a house and lot.  
The deficiency discourse  
The deficiency discourse was another narrative that heavily influenced the post-disaster programs 
of trustees. To a lesser extent, Sendong survivors clustered at the more vulnerable end of the 
spectrum accepted the discourse – as evidenced by their participation in these programs and by 
the retelling of their Sendong stories. The deficiency discourse is about what is missing or 
inadequate in the lives of vulnerable survivors. It focuses on everything from material objects to 
morals and values to awareness of social norms to inclusion in social and cultural institutions. 
A lack of material goods and financial resources is one component of the deficiency discourse. It 
is perhaps the most visible and visceral aspect of the discourse. It compelled trustees, Cagayaños 
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(including some urban poor survivors themselves), and people from around the world to donate 
generously to the disaster relief efforts. Vulnerable people lack sufficient quality food, they don’t 
have spare cash to buy their children toys, they do not have sturdy houses built on lots to which 
they hold a legal deed, etc. If someone in the household falls ill, they do not have enough savings 
to cover medical bills, prescription drugs, and sometimes even the transportation fare to the 
clinic or hospital. These deficiencies were attributed to a lack of stable, secure, well-paying 
livelihoods. Consequently, the subjects of this discourse lack money and are thus compelled to 
avail of free or cheap options. The founder of an NGO providing free health services explained 
that  
the low income class – D, E, F community – [consists of] the low income families are 
usually dumped in a relocation area. They don’t have any choice where to live. They don’t 
have money, they don’t have relatives to accept them. They are just waiting for the 
government, and some other non-government organisations to accommodate them [in 
evacuation centres and transitional and permanent relocation housing sites]. 
Trustees quickly addressed the specific needs evidenced by this aspect of the deficiency discourse. 
For their immediate disaster relief activities, trustees provided food, water, blankets, mosquito 
bed nets, shelter, clothes, medical missions, medicine and small amounts of cash. For their short 
to medium term activities, they continued providing this type of aid and also added building 
materials, construction labourers, school supplies and school fees and livelihood assistance. For 
their medium to long term activities, they reduced their distribution of relief items and 
concentrated instead on allocating concrete relocation houses to eligible survivors. 
Included in the deficiency discourse is the idea that vulnerable Sendong survivors lack 
appropriate morals, values, and spiritual guidance. Informants expressed the idea in various ways. 
The police, for example, noted that theft increased in Sendong-affected barangays in December 
2011 and was rising in the relocation sites. It is not this observation but the officers’ explanation 
that insinuates a moral deficiency: “the Sendong survivors came from everywhere in the city,” 
and some of them were “already thieves.” Only after much discussion did one officer suggest an 
underlying economic rationale for the theft: “maybe because Sendong survivors were already 
thieves because of poverty.” One camp manager attributed some of the difficulties faced by the 
“IDPs” to a lack of moral support and spiritual guidance. She recalled her interventions in a 
domestic disputes, musing “it’s, maybe, they need some advice. The family lacks moral support 
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or spiritual advisers.” A perceived absence of religious piety among Sendong-affected persons 
was not restricted to trustees. In key informant and survivor interviews alike, interviewees 
proposed that the devastation wrought by Typhoon Sendong was retribution from a higher 
power (usually God) judging immoral people. For example, at several points during the interview 
one camp manager suggested that God sent Typhoon Sendong to spur people living in “squatter 
areas” to change their sinful ways. 
Before when they are staying in I., they are prostitutes, dancers. Prostitutes are rampant in 
O. Gamblers. Maybe God wants them to be changed. [I told my IDPs,] ‘Please change. 
God is giving us time to change because Sendong [was] really sent by God to help a 
change in lives.’ Men and women, the old, the young, they are crying maybe because they 
are living in the squatter area here in O. Changing wives, changing husbands is rampant in 
O. But now maybe they are changed. Some [now] have motors for livelihood. [I tell them,] 
‘You go to church, whatever is your religion, go to the church. In the morning you just 
say ‘Lord, thank you for the new life. Thank you Lord we are still alive.’ God is happy 
because God is waiting for us, for a change.’ 
As such, the deficiency discourse emphasises the purported deviant, uninformed and non-
Christian individual behaviour of vulnerable people. 
The narrative also suggests that vulnerable people operate outside of the social and cultural 
norms of Philippine society, where the norms are set primarily by the middle and upper classes. 
For instance, a staff member who worked closely with Sendong survivors noted that they did not 
possess cultural knowledge about “the Pinoy way of getting along” and trusting other people. 
Another informant working at a municipal government office pointed to cases in which children 
were abused by their parents in the evacuation centres, insinuating that evacuees lacked a respect 
for the family institution in general and for their children and partners in particular. The 
perceived lack of adherence to major social and cultural institutions is perhaps best illustrated by 
the efforts of various Catholic trustees, led by the archdiocese, to join unwed IDP couples in holy 
matrimony and to baptise their children. To remedy this purported deficiency in certain Sendong 
survivors, trustees implemented diverse initiatives to bring into mainstream social and cultural 
institutions those previously outside of them. 
A final component of the deficiency narrative is a claim that vulnerable survivors lacked the 
personal drive or motivation to improve their situation. Some government workers and 
humanitarian aid workers expressed disgust at the oft-repeated “survivor excuse” and a desire for 
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survivors to be independent, and rely on their own livelihood income instead of “dole-outs from 
the government.” This position was the national government’s rationale for spending millions of 
pesos on livelihood assistance for survivors.  
So in fact there was an order from Manila [headquarters] to saturate all [the livelihood 
assistance program] because there is really money for that. Because, you know, we wanted 
people to be independent, we don’t want people to just make an excuse that they are 
survivors. So that is why the direction also of the office is really to capacitate them and 
have their own livelihood.  
Not all government workers agreed, however, that it was the government’s responsibility to 
provide economically deficient people with livelihoods.  
What these explanations all have in common is that the purported deficiencies of vulnerable 
survivors point to individual or household level failures and not to larger processes and structures 
in society that bar these same people from accessing resources. 
The different-from-us discourse  
Vulnerable people, mainly those living in slums, informal settlements, or particular sitios with a 
large portion of urban poor were frequently portrayed as “different from us.” This statement is 
true in some ways. The urban poor are different from the middle class because they cannot 
access the same resources and privileges available to many of the middle class. Yet, when the 
different-from-us narrative was evoked, it rarely referred specifically to economic differences. 
Instead, it usually referred to presumed social, cultural, moral, or religious differences. Like the 
four other vulnerability narratives, the different-from-us discourse profoundly shaped the post-
disaster efforts of trustees. 
In one version of the different-from-us narrative, there are two categories of people separated 
along economic lines who exhibit distinct behaviours, practices and aspirations. One municipal 
government worker distinguished between the urban poor working in the informal sector and the 
middle class working in the formal sector:  
The culture of the formal and the informal is really different. Even if they [Sendong 
survivors from the informal sector] were already transferred to houses, still, they claim 
not to have recovered even if they were given this package of house and lot that cost 
300,000 [pesos for a quadruplex relocation house]. And [they] are liability of the 
government.  
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The informant’s statement indicates that the urban poor expect government assistance and 
remain unsatisfied with what they have been given, whereas the middle class do not exert such 
expectations. In addition to the obvious economic differences, many of the middle class who 
work in the very agencies that design and implement official aid spaces assume the urban poor 
have particular pejorative social and cultural attributes. This is evident in part by the workers’ 
reluctance to stay at evacuation centres and to move into relocation sites. Several regional 
government employees expressed the social differences between “us” and “them” quite clearly; 
one informant’s middle class neighbours just did not like the relocation sites because they did not 
like the community there and the houses are too small. Another regional government agency 
director explained why affected employees in her agency – one of the main agencies responsible 
for collecting and analysing post-disaster needs data – avoided evacuation centres, opting instead 
to stay with relatives, at a hotel, or in the upper floors of their flooded home. 
Life in the evacuation centres [is] very difficult because there are limited facilities. [It was] 
very terrible because [at] first [there was no] water. I think electricity was restored after a 
week. It’s very congested. Then [there is the issue of] different practices among families. 
[That is] different habits. Now the problem is more on cleanliness and sanitation.  
In this quote, the director suggests that not only do the urban poor staying at the evacuation sites 
tolerate lower living standards, but also that their practices and habits are distinct from hers and 
those of her middle class colleagues.  
The different-from-us narrative was not limited to distinguishing between economic classes. 
Many residents at the official aid spaces used it to distinguish among residents coming from 
different geographic locations. The story of a stall helper in the meat section of Cogon market is 
illustrative. Pre-Sendong, he lived in Isla de Oro, and he currently lives in one of the Calaanan 
relocation sites. His former neighbours from Isla de Oro are his current neighbours in Calaanan 
because they petitioned to be kept together. Outsiders can cause trouble, and so he and his 
neighbours actively avoid them. As an example of outsider-caused-trouble, he cited high levels of 
theft in the relocation site, attributing it to the mix of people coming from different barangays and 
that people do not necessarily know their neighbours. Chapter 6 expands upon the repercussions 
for survivors who were not accepted into the cliques at evacuation sites and temporary housing 
areas. It is particularly difficult for recent migrants to city whose “normal” social practices were 
learned outside of urban centres. 
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That the more vulnerable survivors distrust each other was recognised by state and religious 
trustees. Like the assertion of the stall helper introduced above, a regional government officer 
who oversaw all the camp managers in Region-X confirmed barangay-based stereotypes lead to 
rifts.  
You cannot just avoid conflict within the camp because they all came from different 
barangays and you know sometimes when you are coming from this barangay, they are 
known to be like this. And when they stay together as one family in the camp you can’t 
help but there is some rifts. So, sometimes you cannot help but have one quarrel or 
misunderstanding [from] one IDP to another but I think we [camp managers] were all 
able to manage it. 
To ensure minor rifts did not escalate into major problems, camp managers at evacuation and 
transitional housing sites were trained to diffuse conflicts and mediate disagreements. Trustees 
working in post-disaster spaces implemented additional measures to mitigate problems stemming 
from difference. At several relocation sites, for example, the Catholic NGO Gawad Kalinga ran a 
values formation program aimed at bringing about a change in the values, attitudes and behaviour 
of residents. One of the NGO’s staff explained that the curriculum was based on a standard 
national curriculum, and then adapted to the particular perceived needs (i.e. deficiencies) of 
Sendong survivors. The implementation of such training was justified by observation that 
residents were coming from different barangays and different backgrounds and do not trust each 
other, and so need to be taught.  
People who actively avoid evacuation camps, temporary and permanent relocation housing sites, 
and other official spaces of aid, also subscribed to a different-from-us discourse. For example, 
the desire to remain in the community instead of moving to a relocation site was expressed by a 
Carmen-based sari-sari shopkeeper. He preferred to stay because “I know this place and the 
people around here” and because he did not want to go to a place with new people who he did 
not know. He conceded, however, that he would consider resettlement at a site where many of 
his former customers currently reside.  
The importance of perceived and real difference in shaping post-disaster routes is perhaps best 
illustrated by Muslim survivors. Nearly all of the Muslims I interviewed, including key informants 
at a regional government office serving Muslims, recounted that Muslim households typically 
avoided the evacuation centres to avoid Christians and situations in which they would be socially 
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ostracised. At a focus group discussion with low income Muslim Cagayaños, participants agreed 
that most Muslim Sendong victims do not like living with Christians, even though the 
participants themselves “didn’t really mind being with Christians.” The participants and their 
acquaintances detected animosity directed at them, and consequently sought to “avoid chaos.” 
Differences in religious beliefs and practices also made it difficult for Muslims to share an open, 
yet confined space with Christians. The group also perceived that their local barangay officials 
actively disliked Muslims even though he publically boasted that Muslims and Christians get 
along in the barangay. One Muslim government employee explained that what happened during 
the aftermath of Sendong was an extension of everyday life in CDO: “The Muslim doesn’t 
mingle with Christians because of cultural barriers. We mingle with our relatives and other 
Muslims. So we don’t mingle in recovery.” He then situated the attitudes of individuals within the 
broader Mindanao conflict introduced in Chapter 3: “Several Muslims were not helped by relief 
aid. This is because of a characteristic of Muslims – they would rather go to relatives and friends 
for help than to Christians. That’s why we have a Mindanao problem.” In this way, presumed 
religious difference compounds other presumed social, cultural and moral differences evident in 
different-from-us narratives. 
Conclusion 
The chapter discussed vulnerability in Cagayan de Oro, in the particular context of the aftermath 
of Typhoon Sendong. It demonstrated that vulnerability is not natural, and is instead a function 
of constructed economic, political, social and cultural elements that form societal structures, 
which necessarily interact with environmental factors. It situated vulnerability as structural 
vulnerability, wherein people are unable to cope with a stress due to pre-existing difficulties. It 
showed that in selecting beneficiaries for their disaster relief, recovery and rebuilding efforts, 
trustees typically single out particular demographics or identify people demonstrating particular 
indicators of vulnerability. These approaches indicate trustees did not share a common 
understanding of vulnerability. Furthermore, these approaches do not encapsulate all the 
different types of people who lie along the vulnerability continuum. While those lying at the less 
vulnerable end of the spectrum had the capacity to recover from a disaster without official 
assistance, there were many “invisible survivors” who were excluded. When invisible survivors 
are clustered at the more vulnerable end of the continuum, disaster reinforces their 
marginalisation. Ideas about vulnerability were worked in five main discourses, which, in turn, 
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informed and shaped post-disaster efforts. These vulnerability discourses had real repercussions 
in the lives of Sendong survivors, particularly in determining their access to resources and in 
shaping where they went to rebuild their lives. The discourses enabled trustees to problematise 
and render technical the purportedly underlying causes of vulnerability, thereby ensuring they 
were experts best able to implement solutions. The discourses also had broader societal impacts 
in which structural problems and stereotypes were reinforced and reinvented in other spaces.  
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Chapter 6. Where do survivors rebuild their lives post-
disaster? 
Introduction 
Where do survivors go after a disaster? Recall that in a disaster (as opposed to a mere natural 
hazard event) affected individuals, households and communities do not possess the capacity to 
cope and recover without external assistance. Do survivors remain in the usual spaces in which 
they lived their pre-Sendong lives, waiting for assistance to find them and accessing assistance 
from their usual networks? Do they seek out places where they have occasionally received 
assistance in the past or have heard that their peers received assistance? Or, do they venture into 
new spaces altogether? Are such movements voluntary or choices of last resort? This chapter 
answers these questions, mapping the trajectories of survivors and the specific places where they 
rebuild their lives and livelihoods post-Sendong. To draw out the exclusionary character of post-
disaster spaces, the discussion is framed within a spaces of exclusion framework inspired by Hall, 
Hirsch and Li’s (2011) book Powers of Exclusion.  
The chapter draws heavily on what Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011) call the “powers of exclusion” that 
deny certain people access to land. It investigates how these powers apply to the CDO case in 
excluding certain people from accessing a broader suite of resources after Typhoon Sendong, and 
not just land. It presents the results of a conventional content analysis of the survivors and key 
informant interview data. These results are supplemented and triangulated with a conventional 
content analysis of my field notes on the GPS, participatory video, and non-participant 
observation activities – especially site visits to former evacuation camps, and to transitional and 
permanent relocation housing sites. Government documents and Sendong-related reports round 
out the data sources used to inform the discussion.  
The chapter analyses the three generalised post-Sendong trajectories followed by all survivors 
lying along the vulnerability continuum. It concentrates, however, on the experiences of those 
clustered at the more vulnerable end, looking at the different strategies they employ and the 
rationale for their choices. The chapter presents the various urban spaces accessed for critical 
rebuilding activities, namely sleeping in a safe space, obtaining money and relief goods, accessing 
medical, educational and safety services, enjoying recreational and spiritual activities, and 
engaging in advocacy or political activities. I call these spaces “post-disaster spaces;” they are 
 
 
 227   
 
spaces that specifically target or appeal to a particular subset of survivors, and aim – in some way 
– to help them to survive, to cope with, and to recover from the disaster. The analysis of post-
disaster spaces, and especially the official post-disaster spaces created and run by trustees, 
emphasises the extent to which the vulnerability approaches and vulnerability discourses laid out 
in Chapter 5 rely upon the powers of exclusion. Together, the approaches, narratives and powers 
combine to produce profoundly gendered post-disaster spaces where power hierarchies are 
reinscribed, gender roles are remade and pre-existing prejudices are perpetuated.  
The operation of the powers of exclusion post-Sendong 
The powers of exclusion shape access to myriad resources, not just land, in a post-disaster 
context. Tropical Storm Sendong, itself a natural hazard fitting within a broad “environmental 
change and environmental phenomena” category of power, was a catalyst in spurring changes in 
access to land in Cagayan de Oro. Variations on the other seven powers of exclusion were 
similarly influential in shaping the type and quantity of disaster assistance for which Sendong 
survivors were eligible. Legitimation, for example, was critical in justifying the post-disaster 
interventions of trustees. Exclusion was also essential in determining beneficiaries of their post-
disaster assistance. With limited resources, trustees necessarily restricted assistance to people 
whom they deemed legitimate and needy survivors; their choices were strongly influenced by 
vulnerability discourses. The exclusionary power of regulation played a key role in determining 
where survivors went and what they built (and rebuilt). As Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011, 15, emphasis 
in original) explain, regulation serves four main roles:  
it determines boundaries between pieces of land; it prescribes the kinds of land use 
acceptable or not within the boundaries; it seeks to determine the kinds of ownership and 
usufruct claims to certain kinds of land; and it makes claims about which individuals, 
households, groups, state agencies have rule-backed claims to any particular piece of land.  
Together, the first three roles are the basis of zoning. Zoning changes made by the local 
government, and the threat to forcefully implement them, have effectively forced residents living 
in newly created no-build zones out of their neighbourhoods. In contrast, survivors living outside 
the no-build zones retain the option to rebuild and renovate their flood-affected houses. 
Regulation also played a central role in resettlement sites; for example, there were a plethora of 
rules about acceptable land and house use, and the conditions of owning, transferring and selling 
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a relocation house. The other powers of exclusion similarly affected access to resources after 
Typhoon Sendong.  
The rest of this chapter traces the post-disaster trajectories of Sendong survivors and explores 
how the powers of exclusion shaped these trajectories. The powers of exclusion alternately 
enhanced and hindered Cagayaños from accessing a broader suite of resources as they sought 
spaces to sleep, obtain relief and income, and fulfil their recreational, spiritual and advocacy 
needs.  
Sleeping pathways 
A sleeping pathway describes the specific places where a survivor is based over a given period of 
time; it is a list of where he or she sleeps. All survivors who were forced to leave their usual 
homes temporarily or permanently after Typhoon Sendong followed a similar pattern, or what I 
call “a generic pathway.” This generic pathway can be subdivided into three broad categories of 
sleeping pathways: institutionalised, hors-système and hybrid pathways. In the institutionalised 
pathway, survivors sleep exclusively at the official post-disaster spaces created by state, religious 
and humanitarian trustees. In the hors-système pathway, survivors do not sleep at these same 
official spaces. In the hybrid pathway, survivors sleep in a mix official and non-official spaces. 
A sleeping pathway does not reveal the other post-disaster spaces used by survivors, such as sites 
for receiving food or medical assistance, or important worksites, although they may be correlated. 
Instead, sleeping pathways present the various options available to survivors lying along the 
vulnerability continuum, and their preferences. These options and preferences are necessarily 
linked to the different constraints and resources of individuals and households, which, in turn, 
are underpinned by larger processes, structures, and institutions in CDO and in Philippine society 
that have the power to exclude. Together, these elements explain why some survivors went to 
one place and not to another.  
The generic pathway 
The generic pathway for persons directly affected by Typhoon Sendong – those people who can 
be considered environmental migrants because they had to leave their usual place of residence 
either temporarily or permanently – is straightforward. On 16 December 2011, the survivor 
began at his or her house, then went to what is frequently called “higher ground” for several 
hours or a few days. This stopover was then typically followed by a temporary stay at one or 
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more intermediate “safe space(s)” for one night to several weeks, days, months, or even more 
than one year. In some instances where there was little more than a bit of water flooding the first 
floor of a multi-story house, the person may have skipped the interim safe space, opting to return 
home immediately and possibly living in the upper floor(s) until the flooded areas were cleaned 
and repaired. In most cases, however, the person would have had a temporary stay elsewhere 
before moving into a “home” where they intend to stay.  
Higher ground 
Taking refuge on higher ground literally means moving up a higher elevation. Higher ground 
includes second or third stories, rooftops, and even the upper tresses of metal billboard 
scaffolding. It includes flyovers (i.e. overpasses) and highways, which are typically raised above 
the mean height of residential areas. It includes parts of each affected barangay with elevations 
slightly above the water level. Survivors recounted spending hours clinging onto treetops as 
turbulent floodwaters raged by; for example, a mango tree in Isla de Oro reportedly saved more 
than 50 of people during Sendong who clung onto its branches (Fig. 6.1). Reaching higher 
ground was a sequential process; as the water rose, survivors sought higher and higher structures 
that would place them above the floodwaters and, ideally, on a structure firmly rooted to the 
ground. While these places and physical structures were not used for a long period of time, 
survivors emphasised their significance in recounting their personal experiences on Sendong 
night and their personal healing processes. Some survivors, for example, return to these sites 
almost like a pilgrimage; the visits remind them of their survival and help them remember the 
family and friends they lost during the disaster. There is thus symbolic meaning attributed to 
these places binding survivors to their past. Some of these physical structures, like the mango tree 
in Isla de Oro, are even formally recognised. Unlike the subsequent destinations in the generic 
pathway of survivors, higher ground spaces included both public and private spaces, and were 
used by working and middle income classes alike. At this initial stage and in a restricted area, 
social and economic stratification did not significantly shape where survivors went. Within a 
bounded geographical area, the powers of exclusion did not determine access to the most sought-
after resource: higher ground above raging floodwaters. 
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Fig. 6.1. On the banks of the Cagayan River in Isla de Oro, a plaque commemorates Sendong 
victims and marks the tree credited with saving lives (7 March 2013). It reads, “ ‘The tree of life’ 
This mango tree saved more than 50 people, residents of Isla de Oro, at the height of the 
unprecedented flooding caused by Tropical Storm Sendong last December 16, 2011.” 
Safe spaces 
In contrast, there was a wide range of interim safe spaces frequented by survivors. In CDO, and 
as is frequently observed in other Philippine post-disaster situations, the divide of which people 
went to which safe spaces mirrored socioeconomic lines and market forces. The most 
recognisable interim spaces are evacuation camps and temporary housing sites (e.g. tent cities and 
bunkhouses); these official post-disaster spaces are perhaps the most compelling visual of the 
disaster’s human impact. Middle class survivors usually avoided the public post-disaster spaces 
run by state, religious, and non-governmental trustees – the very spaces targeting and accessed by 
urban poor survivors. Instead, middle class survivors gravitated toward private temporary safe 
spaces. They rented apartments for a few weeks or months. Occasionally, small offices at the 
survivor’s worksite were repurposed into temporary living spaces for the survivor’s family for up 
to three months. The latter option was available more to middle class than to urban poor 
survivors because they were more likely to work in a building separate from their personal house 
outside flooded neighbourhoods. Those with financial means also booked hotel rooms. The city’s 
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largest, poshest, most expensive, most secure, and most central hotels were filled with staff from 
United Nations agencies, big international NGOs and national government agencies. CDO-based 
middle class survivors did not stay at these swanky hotels. Instead, they went wherever was cheap 
and available, and stayed for several days. The only private safe spaces that were accessed by 
survivors with a range of means were the homes of family and friends whose houses were not 
directly affected by Sendong.  
Home 
In this study, the generic pathway ends when the survivor finally moves into a home. Similar to 
the differential access to and use of safe space(s) by urban poor survivors and middle class 
survivors, socioeconomic status shaped the choice of homes. Based on qualitative interview data, 
a close reading of the implementation of political decisions about instituting no-build zones post-
Sendong, and anecdotal evidence, the following generalisations can be made. First, most middle 
class survivors returned to their previous house, and, if required, built additional stories. Second, 
of the middle class survivors who moved, most relocated to another middle class development 
within the city. Third, very few middle class or urban poor survivors actually left CDO 
permanently. Fourth, the home options for the urban poor were mostly restricted to returning to 
a previous house (and frequently just the site itself) or moving into a relocation house at a 
resettlement site. Fifth, few urban poor had sufficient resources to invest in major renovations or 
to move into more affluent private neighbourhoods. In one exceptional instance, an urban poor 
family did move post-Sendong from a makeshift house in an informal settlement into a concrete 
house located outside of a relocation site and very close to the old residence. The house was 
loaned to the family by the husband’s employer, an affluent lawyer belonging to one of the city’s 
historically prominent, and still affluent, families. Most trajectories of urban poor survivors, 
however, did not lead them to a better quality house in a desirable central location, irrespective of 
whether they resorted to an institutionalised, hors-système, or hybrid pathway. 
Institutionalised pathways 
Survivors slept at official post-disaster spaces when they followed an institutionalised pathway. It 
was a migration through a series of official spaces conceived and run by the state, religious, and 
humanitarian trustees who managed post-disaster efforts. The assistance of these trustees is 
required by “trapped populations” – populations who want to move away from environmentally 
risky or hazardous areas but are unable to do so because their asset levels are insufficient to 
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enable migration (GOS 2011, McLeman 2013). These trustees designed a linear progression: 
survivors first went to an evacuation centre, next they went to a temporary or a transitional 
housing site until a space opened up for them in a permanent relocation site. In exceptional cases, 
survivors were transferred directly from an evacuation centre into a permanent relocation house. 
In most cases, however, after leaving higher ground, survivors slept in multiple evacuation 
centres and temporary housing sites (i.e. safe spaces) before moving into a permanent 
resettlement site (i.e. home). 
The official post-disaster spaces were scattered throughout the city limits and into the 
neighbouring municipality of Opol (Fig. 6.2a). Figures 6.2b-d show that survivors moved farther 
and farther away from their pre-Sendong homes with each move through official post-disaster 
spaces. Evacuation centres were clustered along the flooded portions of the Cagayan River and 
minor rivers east of the city centre, near people’s old homes (Fig. 6.2b). Transitional housing sites 
were further away, with some sites overlapping with evacuation camps and relocation sites (Fig. 
6.2c). Finally, permanent resettlement sites were all far away from the major residential and 
commercial areas in CDO; they were located in the city outskirts and even beyond the city 
boundaries (Fig. 6.2d). 
The ensuing discussion of institutionalised pathways analyses the three main types of official 
post-disaster sleeping spaces. These spaces are distinguished by where they are located, when 
people stay there, what type of housing they reside in, and the types of assistance given there. 
The discussion characterises each space. It shows how the vulnerability discourses and powers of 
exclusion informed the objectives, day-to-day operations, and lived experiences at each space. It 
explores the strategies of resident survivors, delving into how they employed limited resources 
and capacities to survive and rebuild their lives and livelihoods.
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Fig. 6.2. Institutionalised post-disaster spaces in and near Cagayan de Oro city that were accessed by study participants. (a) Evacuation 
centres (red), transitional housing sites (yellow) and permanent relocation housing sites (green). (b) Evacuation centres. (c) Transitional 
housing sites. (d) Permanent relocation housing sites. © Marc Girard, 2015. 
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Official post-disaster spaces 
Evacuation centres 
The first in a trio of official post-disaster spaces designed and run by trustees, and accessed 
primarily by urban poor survivors, evacuation centres are spaces of exclusion. That is, evacuation 
centres are spaces where people are prevented from benefiting from things. They were typically 
public spaces repurposed as temporary housing for dozens to hundreds of families whose pre-
Sendong houses either no longer existed or were unfit for habitation. These spaces began 
opening on 17 December 2011, the day after the flooding began, and started shutting down when 
survivors were transferred to temporary housing sites or returned to their old houses. Most 
evacuation camps were open for three to four months, until March 2013. At its peak, there were 
between 45 and 80 evacuation centres in the city. Humanitarian organisations and municipal and 
regional government offices used different numbers; the discrepancies reflect whether or not the 
agency had a physical presence at a camp or considered the site official.  
Evacuation sites served as shelter, as distribution hubs for relief goods, and as on-site emergency 
medical clinics. They were sites of education, religious instruction, economic pursuits, and 
violence. They were spaces where social norms, cultural quirks and privately-held prejudices 
normally hidden from public view were prominently displayed. The constantly changing 
portrayals and perceptions of evacuation sites, strategically deployed by various interests in 
pursuit of particular objectives, demonstrated the fluidity and porosity of space. Evacuees and 
trustees sharing a given locale each had a unique lived experience there. This observation 
underscores the salience of social relations, which are necessarily felt and interpreted differently 
by different individuals, in producing place. Over the next few pages, I explore these ideas. 
Repurposed spaces 
Because they must be immediately available, evacuation centres consisted of extant public 
buildings and public grounds converted into emergency shelters. They were located within 
walking distance of flooded portions of the Cagayan River and minor rivers east of the city centre 
(Fig. 6.2b). They were near homes, work sites, markets, and services. According to a municipal 
official, the number of people affected by Sendong far exceeded the capacity of designated 
evacuation centres, especially because some were themselves flooded. In addition to the 
designated covered courts or barangay centres, the city was forced to use non-designated sites 
such as primary and secondary schools, the grounds at the Provincial Capitol, and a former 
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regional government office as evacuation camps. Christian and Islamic officials also sheltered 
survivors in churches and mosques. In contrast, a year later for Super-typhoon Pablo, no schools 
or government properties were used as evacuation centres, only covered courts and churches. 
Public buildings and grounds, or portions thereof, were temporarily repurposed to meet the basic 
needs of Sendong survivors. The usual activities that occur in these spaces – like playing 
basketball, attending classes, hosting church activities – were temporarily suspended. Changes in 
the use of space were accompanied by changes in the people accessing the space. For example, 
people who regularly participated in the usual activities either chose or were forced to avoid the 
space. Or, these same people began using the space in a different capacity – either as a survivor 
or as a volunteer or paid employee assisting with relief efforts. In many cases, people who did not 
normally access these spaces did access them – as survivors. Repurposing public spaces as 
evacuation centres frequently entailed making physical changes to a space; for example, setting up 
additional toilet, washing and laundry facilities, and subdividing an open area into tiny spaces 
designed to give a family some privacy with blankets or other fabric strung up as partitions (Fig. 
6.3).  
 
Fig. 6.3. Evacuation camps are usually repurposed public spaces, such as this covered basketball 
court, that require some physical changes to turn them into temporary living spaces. Source: 
Dennis M. Sabangan (in Bernal 2013). 
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Survivors generally preferred schools because they usually had electricity, water and sanitation 
facilities, and they had closed areas. Schools offered a slightly greater degree of security because 
of the clear physical boundaries of the school grounds, surrounded by a fence and usually 
protected by security guards. According to one camp manager, it was difficult to ascertain “who 
is really an IDP” and to keep so-called “illegitimate survivors” out unless there was a fence or 
other control system to limit entry. Yet, physical barriers are not the only way to exclude people 
from accessing post-disaster spaces and resources. Regulatory, political, economic, social, and 
cultural means of exclusion can be as, or even more, effective tools. Schools were also some of 
the first evacuation centres to be shut down. There was concern about exceeding the capacity of 
the school’s facilities; comfort rooms (CRs or washrooms) engineered to meet the needs of 200 
children and a few dozen adult staff for several hours a day could not handle the full range of 
water, sanitation and health (WASH) needs of one hundred or more families 24 hours a day for 
weeks. As one WASH specialist at a major international humanitarian organsation explained, 
even if the flood (or other disaster) did not destroy the evacuation site, the pressure from 
hundreds of families beyond the facility’s capacity could. School officials also invoked a sanitised 
version of the illegal squatter discourse in which undesirable residents should be cleared out of a 
location where they are not wanted. Citing the need to restart classes as a step toward resuming 
normalcy, school officials actively campaigned to close school-based evacuation camps and to 
transfer survivors into other evacuation centres or to temporary housing sites. By appealing to 
the high regard Filipinos place on education, school officials used legitimation as an 
uncontestable moral basis for their exclusion claim. 
Why go to an evacuation centre? 
The obvious answer to this question is “because my house is gone or is currently uninhabitable 
and I have nowhere else to go.” But it is not the only answer. All sorts of people and 
organisations had a presence in CDO’s evacuation camps, each motivated by a variety of 
objectives and informed by discourses on vulnerability. 
For survivors following an institutionalised sleeping pathway, the primary reason for going to 
evacuation centres was to obtain shelter and disaster relief goods and services. Evacuation centres 
were perceived as bountiful sites. They were where most relief goods, cash donations, and 
vouchers exchangeable at grocery stores were distributed, and where government agencies, 
NGOs, and many religious groups concentrated their efforts. Several survivors recounted they or 
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people they knew stopped working during the time they lived at evacuation camps because they 
did not require money to buy food; food was simply given to them by myriad donors. These 
survivors attributed the lack of theft at evacuation sites to the abundance, even overabundance, 
of relief goods. In contrast to the prevalence of theft in relocation sites (where residents lack 
jobs, food and money), there was no need to steal in the evacuation camps.  
Accessing abundant resources frequently required a physical on-site presence. Disaster assistance 
disbursed at evacuation camps was often exclusively given to the people staying there. Once an 
evacuee resumed living in their cleaned and repaired former house, or in a new house, he or she 
was denied access to the relief goods distributed at the evacuation centre. The leader of a 
Sendong survivor collective explained that “when you [leave] the evacuation centre and decide to 
go home in your community, you will not [be] given any support or any relief from any of these 
[government] agencies.” For survivors who remained in the community, this concentration of 
resources in official post-disaster spaces was perceived as neglectful and unfair. The same leader 
recalled the response of several SOS collective members to this injustice: 
So, what they did, they went to DSWD and told them, ‘how come the communities do 
not receive relief operations [and] relief goods at all?’ And then they [DSWD] said, ‘it 
should not be part of our job, it should be the CSWD.’ So there was no clear definition of 
who should do this job and who should focus on specific areas. That [is] one of the 
conflicts: they [CSWD and DSWD] did not know which areas they are assigned. Second, 
both only focused in evacuation areas. So the evacuees, which are lesser in numbers, 
received more relief goods than those who just stayed in the community because, first of 
all, the evacuation centre is already very full. 
For government agencies, especially the regional Department of Social Welfare and Development 
office (DSWD), this concentration of efforts was justified because their organisational mandate 
restricted their intervention to evacuation sites. In contrast, the City Social Welfare and 
Development office (CSWD) was officially responsible for providing aid to the entire 
community. The mismatch between organisational mandates and survivor needs, and 
miscommunications over organisational restrictions exacerbated the frustration of survivors. 
Although Sendong survivors remaining in the community were eligible for disaster assistance, 
and did obtain some, they clearly did not have the same access as their counterparts residing in 
official post-disaster spaces. 
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The trustees disbursing aid and other services were present in the evacuation camps. Some 
trustees, such as government agencies, were legally obliged to be there. Other trustees, such as 
humanitarian agencies, were motivated by organisational missions (and poignant photo-ops, 
according to some cynical observers). Yet other trustees, such as religious actors, came to 
evacuation camps out of a sense of moral obligation. Trustees, including a variety of 
governmental and non-governmental actors, saw opportunities to disseminate their messages to 
large captive audiences.  
Images of exhausted and unkempt-looking people crammed into evacuation camps were a 
powerful visual. Trustees and survivors recalled scenes in which politicians, reporters, celebrities, 
or national and international NGOs handed out food, water, and blankets at evacuation camps. 
Some interviewees described the unfurling of an organisational banner, a short photo-shoot, and 
nothing else. Such incidents illustrate the instrumentalisation of evacuation camps and evacuees 
as tools for story-telling, gleaning votes, garnering sympathy, gaining reader- or viewership, and 
attracting donations on a local, national, and even international scale. The camps represented the 
urgent need to rally help and monies. They were constant evocations of the disaster. For local 
Cagayaños, the camps were visual reminders of what had been done to help the more vulnerable 
survivors, and what still remained to be done. They were impossible to ignore because of their 
siting throughout the city, including near prominent city landmarks.  
The power of evacuation camps in creating a fluid public narrative was perhaps best illustrated by 
the Provincial Capitol grounds site. Early on, this camp symbolised overcoming adversity, 
sustaining hope and government charity. Provincial government employees, for instance, would 
regularly cook and serve hot meals to the evacuees. A former camp manager describes the very 
public generosity of the provincial governor of Misamis Oriental in opening up the space and 
helping to make camp life more comfortable.  
The governor of Misamis Oriental let the IDPs get inside the Provincial Capitol. Maybe 
the governor pitied them, so they were temporarily sheltered at the Provincial Capitol. 
Governor Moreno helped us much. They [provincial government employees] did not 
leave us, they gave us free light and water in Provincial Capitol. They provided us free use 
of toilets. And free 10 units of washing machine. Every morning they [the IDPs] said, the 
children, ‘Ma’am B. is there.’ In Capitol, I used to bathe the children. Twenty children 
more or less, marching, going to the bathroom. The Provincial Capitol [staff] is laughing 
at me ‘Oh! Mrs. B., your children, plenty of children.’ 
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The camp was located in front of one of the major political buildings in downtown CDO. The 
site is frequently used for staging public events showcasing regional products, industries, and 
achievements. As such, the benevolence of politicians and political staff did not go unnoticed by 
CDO voters. In late 2012, there was significant political pressure to close the Capitol evacuation 
camp before the one year anniversary of Sendong. The mayor and other local politicians were 
seeking re-election and needed to demonstrate their capacity to rebuild the city and the lives of 
the Sendong survivors. The presence of urban poor “squatters” at a major government building 
in the city centre detracted from the message of “we delivered on our promise to assist the city’s 
poor in quickly recovering from disaster.” The symbolic meaning of the Capitolio camp had thus 
been transformed into a space of delay, protracted misery, something undesirable to be cleared 
away or at least hidden from public view. Consequently, Capitolio evacuees were given relocation 
houses in November 2012 – even though many of the remaining residents did not meet the 
eligibility criteria. Just before the first anniversary of Typhoon Sendong, the last evacuation camp 
at the Provincial Capitol was closed through a combination of force, pressure exerted through 
political relationships and alliances, and strategic neglect of particular relocation eligibility rules.  
A strong sense of moral obligation to assist those in need attracted Catholic trustees to 
evacuation camps. On 17 December 2011, religious and lay archdiocese staff began helping 
Sendong survivors. The head of one ministry explained how the Catholic actors first got involved 
in the evacuation centres, and then responded to perceived needs. 
December 17 was supposed to be our Christmas party of the Social Action [Center]. But 
when I wake up – because I stay here in the bishop’s house – 6 o’clock I saw people 
around. Then, when I went to the bridge at the back, there’s already [a] line-up of dead 
bodies [on the banks of the Cagayan River]. But Father N. our director still advised us to 
come to our venue for the party, yeah, to plan what will be our, ah, activities. We just 
have Mass, Eucharistic celebration, then after we volunteered to go to DSWD to pack up 
[relief goods]. Every one of us went to DSWD. Because in the archdiocese we have 
nothing to pack up. And we do not know what to do.  
Every ministry, we are asked [by the archbishop] to adopt an evacuation camp and stay 
there. And just observe what we can do, what we can offer. I chose Macasandig gym. I 
will be there. There are 15 youth who [are] also assigned to me. Then we went there in 
Macasandig. The barangay captain in Macasandig is very active, also the wife. They’re very 
active. They really, they manned the camp. When we asked ‘how many families?’ they 
[barangay captain and barangay officials] do not know. For the first three days, every day, 
everyone who came [was] registered. And every day they have separate lists. That’s why I 
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volunteered to make a system of their data. That’s the beginning. So we bring all the 
computers there, we encode all their data. But every day they will give us a number of 
families. Every day different. I really find hard, we really find it very hard. Emotionally, 
you are very down there because everything [every problem] will come to you, everyone 
will come to you, and you will listen. So we decide to come here [and work out of the 
archbishopric]. Then, that’s the time after one week the archdiocese decided that we will 
have the survey. A man from Manila helped us to make that database system. And we 
assigned [volunteers at] every camp to [conduct the] survey. 
As pointed out at the end of the quote, it is noteworthy that it was the archdiocese, and not a 
government agency, who initiated a system for collecting and tracking data. It was Catholic actors 
who initially responded to a lack of organised data, and tried to correct delays and errors with 
proper records. Catholic actors conducted other activities in the evacuation camps, too. Nuns 
delivered psychosocial debriefing sessions, priests came to say mass, youth volunteers came to 
lead theatre, arts, and other recreational activities, and the Catholic Church sponsored medical 
missions. Such interventions continued and grew in the temporary housing and permanent 
relocation sites. According to the archbishop, the archdiocese had simply identified two major 
gaps in the disaster response that it was qualified to fill (i.e. they problematised and rendered 
technical), and then acted accordingly. The first gap was disaster coordination. 
When the typhoon happened, there was a lot of immediate need for help because people 
were flocking to the evacuation centres that were public – that was like the public school, 
the barangay covered court, but the city itself, the – what do you call it? – City Social 
Welfare, CSWD group, were undermanned and not trained for emergencies like this. 
They did try to help but then there was sort of a lot of confusion. Many people also 
wanted to help but there was no coordination. So for our part, we called for a meeting of 
all the involved government agencies and also NGOs here in the sala [meeting room]. 
And I think that was where there was some kind of coordination that started. And then, 
the DSWD from Manila also came in, maybe after a week or two. After a week or two, 
they took over - the national DSWD. We helped set up what we call a Sendong Executive 
Committee where periodically, maybe once a month, or in the first phase it was about 
every two weeks, we would meet normally here or Xavier University. So all the groups 
that were willing to help, we brought them together. And then we followed the DSWD 
template that we formed clusters. 
The second gap pertained to the spiritual needs of survivors, and the response of the archdiocese 
of inserting an overtly religious cluster into the official disaster management scheme in CDO. By 
tending to the spiritual needs and salvation of survivors, this cluster exercised what Foucault 
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(2003a) described as old pastoral power. Prior to this insertion, United Nations, humanitarian, 
and state trustees were implementing a secular cluster approach, akin to the new welfare-type 
pastoral power (cf. Foucault 2003a), to Sendong disaster management. 
The other cluster we helped set up is the pastoral care or spiritual activities because that is 
the maybe surprising thing: that the international cluster approach or even the one of 
DSWD does not include the spiritual care. And for us, [we observed that] the affected 
families themselves find that [pastoral care is] one of the more significant way[s] to help 
them. Just like the presence of religious sisters in the evacuation centres was a reassuring 
presence for many of them. And also saying Mass every day and having Christmas mass 
even in the evacuation centres was one way, I think, of unifying the community.  
The other international approach and also here [the] DSWD [approach], they follow a 
secular approach. But we brought that up, that it’s not only really Catholics but [also] 
Protestants or even Muslims [who] should be brought in to minister to the IDPs. [The 
members of the pastoral care cluster, however,] were mostly our own church workers. 
Although we know that there were also Protestant groups that approached the residents 
in the camps to give their own services or activities. 
For their part, regional government agencies actively encouraged religious groups to do activities 
in the camps. A regional government official who oversaw the management of all evacuation 
camps in Region X justified her agency’s rationale for such inclusion. 
We acknowledge the spiritual act is very important so we encourage religious groups to 
come in and conduct activities within the camps. And so far, there were so many that 
also, I think, accepted that call and had sessions or activities in the camps. 
Not all faiths practiced in the city responded to the invitation. The same official cited above 
could not recall any Muslim groups conducting activities in the CDO evacuation sites. Instead, it 
was Christian organisations and churches, and especially the Catholic Church, that actually had a 
physical and spiritual presence. Rather than feeling threatened by Catholic actors arrogating state 
roles for themselves, all my informants at municipal and regional government agencies were 
grateful for, and highly praised the swift actions of the archdiocese and Xavier University. The 
intervention of Catholic actors was especially welcome during the immediate aftermath of the 
storm when municipal and regional government agencies were overwhelmed, under-staffed, and 
uncertain of official procedures. One informant recounted that 
We are just also thankful that our bishop was just taking the lead when the DSWD was 
not there, he took the lead in, I think, bringing the civil society and the volunteers in 
church to manage the camps. So we are having that multi-sectoral [disaster management] 
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meeting because he wanted to get updates on what’s happening in the evacuation centres. 
And we’re having that, I think every two weeks or weekly during the early phase. And 
because there were thousands in the evacuation camps, we encourage the religious groups 
[to assist] our social workers and psychologists [with] the psychosocial processing [that 
was] supposed to be done. We ran out [of] psychologists and volunteers to do that. 
As such, evacuation sites had a strong Christian, and especially Catholic, presence. They were 
public spaces with a large audience receptive to the interventions of religious actors. 
Evacuation centres were also spaces of economic opportunity for Cagayaños. Small businesses 
sprung up within camp borders. Some survivors restarted their former livelihood activities such 
as giving manicures or pedicures, selling sari-sari shop items, or engaging in micro-scale buy-and-
sell businesses. Survivors also partook in numerous limited time cash-for-work and food-for 
work programs offered by the city, various barangays, and NGOs. Tasks included cleaning debris 
from city streets and digging graves for the dead. Both men and women did the former activity, 
while it was mostly the men who did the latter. These programs were not exclusively for 
survivors living in evacuation camps, but it was easier for them to remain informed about 
opportunities than for their community-based counterparts. Because evacuation camps were 
located throughout the city at sites close to the affected barangays, it was possible for evacuees 
whose livelihoods were not home-based to simply resume their pre-Sendong work. They would 
leave the evacuation camp in the morning or at night and return after work to sleep. Some non-
evacuees had the opposite work pattern; they left their homes in the morning, worked all day at 
an evacuation camp as a paid employee for a state, religious or humanitarian organisation, and 
then returned home to sleep. The potential for economic gain in evacuation centres was an 
incentive that attracted some survivors to camps. On balance, however, the potential economic, 
material, and informational benefits did not compensate for the drawbacks of staying at an 
evacuation centre. These limitations explain why so many people avoided them or at least limited 
their time there. 
Why not go to an evacuation centre? 
Although thousands of Cagayaño households did access evacuation centres, many more avoided 
them. Evacuation camps garnered an unsavoury reputation as spaces to avoid. Despite their 
portrayal as inclusive spaces open to all, the experiences of people living and working in and 
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actively avoiding them suggest that evacuation camps were spaces designed, perhaps 
inadvertently, to exclude.  
Evacuation camps were typically described in pejorative terms. Many urban poor survivors called 
them “dirty,” “congested,” “unsanitary,” “unbearably hot and dusty,” and “not livable or even 
humane.” The camps had a reputation as spaces where disease and infection were rampant. The 
quality of relief goods distributed at the evacuation sites was sometimes deemed substandard. For 
example, the water being delivered to evacuation camps was rumoured to have been collected 
from the rivers with dead bodies. The water was reportedly cleaned, but many people still did not 
trust it as drinking water. Survivors described their former living conditions at one school 
evacuation camp: evacuees slept directly on cement floors with no mosquito nets, blankets or 
mattresses; there were no lights; bathing and washing were done in the Cagayan River. 
Evacuation centres were overwhelmingly perceived as spaces to be endured until it was possible 
to return to the site of a previous house or to move into a more comfortable temporary 
bunkhouse or even a concrete resettlement house.  
For the most part, sleeping at an evacuation camp was a last resort option. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, middle class survivors largely avoided them, even the people who designed and ran 
them. The director of a regional government agency in charge of the post-disaster interventions 
stated simply that “people who can afford to stay outside evacuation camps would stay 
elsewhere.” The number of Sendong-affected government staff who stayed at evacuation camps 
reinforces this statement. In a relatively small regional government agency of 50 staff members, 
five were affected by Sendong and temporarily left their homes. All opted to stay either with 
relatives, in a hotel or in an unused room at the office. In another regional government office, all 
200-300 full-time staff and roughly 600 contractual staff took turns going to the evacuation 
centres in a work capacity. Yet, only two of an estimated 270 affected employees at this agency 
actually slept in a camp. One of the two employees had the choice to stay with relatives in CDO 
but she wanted to better understand and assist the more vulnerable survivors. This tendency to 
self-exclude from evacuation camps in anything but a formal work or volunteer capacity recurred 
in all my conversations with middle class Cagayaños throughout my fieldwork. In addition to 
justifying their decision with negative characterisations of evacuation camps, informants would 
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invoke the different-from-us discourse claiming that they did not want to live alongside people 
whose values and ways of life were significantly different from their own. 
Previously private affairs were on public display at evacuation camps. Couple quarreling, 
domestic and gender-based violence, adulterous relationships, drug-dealing, prostitution, and 
other disreputable activities were no longer hidden in the secret enclaves of private houses in 
illegible informal settlements.46 They moved into the quasi-personal spaces (e.g. makeshift fabric 
tents) and spilled into the open spaces within the evacuation camps. Family disputes and 
domestic violence are not part of the public conversation in the Philippines. These issues are 
typically confined to the family, and it is rare for other people to intervene even if they are aware 
of the problem. My research assistant Kuki explained the phenomenon:  
There is a tendency for people not to intervene in marital affairs. There is this culture of 
Filipinos which isn’t really very helpful. Some people will not intervene if it’s a marital 
affair. Sometimes even if you call for help [from] some government, I mean like tanod [a 
security guard] or barangay officials, they will [say], ‘ah, because it’s you’re fighting as a 
couple’, so they will not intervene and it’s a family trouble. That’s just this underlying – 
it’s a Filipino thing. Even if you hear your neighbour, it’s not often people will just look at 
you when you and your husband are fighting. If they call the tanod they just let you 
separate, they will not help with your problems. It’s a marital affair. 
Despite the unspoken privacy rules, it became impossible to pretend nothing was going on. For 
example, two police officers and one camp manager employed by DSWD were assigned to each 
evacuation camp. Although the police and DSWD staff may have, on occasion and on an ad-hoc 
as-necessary basis, ventured into informal settlements where many of the urban poor survivors 
had previously lived, they were not there every day, and in the case of the police, 24 hours a day. 
But they were present in the evacuation camps.  
The officers, camp managers and other state, religious, and non-governmental trustees could not 
ignore what they saw and heard; they were tasked with being on-site, diffusing conflict, 
promoting health and safety, managing relief distribution, disseminating information, and 
ensuring a smooth day-to-day living. Put another way, their role was to intervene in people’s lives, 
or to encourage them to behave as they ought. Consequently, evacuation sites became sites of 
                                                          
46 As several state and non-governmental key informants aptly pointed out, these activities also occurred 
in the formal developments among middle and upper class residents. 
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instruction. The selected topics corresponded to problems identified by trustees. Experts came to 
the evacuation camps to teach about the protection of children, gender-based violence, conjugal 
law, women’s rights, and natural family planning.  
The evacuation centres, and more specifically the activities that transpired in these spaces, 
shocked some camp managers recruited through the Catholic Church. They described themselves 
as “previously naïve”; it was the first time they had observed firsthand and interacted with people 
engaged in violent or illicit activities, and so-called unchristian, immoral economic exchanges. 
The experiences of mainly middle class trustees working in evacuation camps reinforced their 
understanding of vulnerability discourses, especially the different-from-us and deficiency 
narratives. The public exhibition of these narratives also confirmed the biases of some survivors 
who had avoided staying at an evacuation camp based on their assumptions about the people 
living there. Over time, however, the close bonds nurtured through months of working alongside 
each other changed the way some trustees understood evacuees. As one camp manager 
recounted, she began seeing the survivors as “my IDPs” who “are like family to me.” They 
entered into her personal social network and she felt obliged to treat them as she would members 
of her own family: “I wash, feed, and care for them like they were my own children.” The sum of 
such trustees’ experiences thereby added another dimension to vulnerability discourses: a “but” 
suffix intended to reduce the stigma and outsider character associated with being vulnerable. The 
discourse thus became different-from-us, but… and deficient-in-some-way, but….  
These discourses were also deployed by another demographic of Sendong survivors 
conspicuously absent at evacuation centres. Many non-governmental organisations and 
government agencies working on disaster relief efforts noted a lack of Muslims in official post-
disaster spaces. Several Muslims, however, did stay at two of the city’s mosques in barangays 
Balulang and Nazareth, treating them like evacuation centres. Muslim survivors cited religious 
beliefs, norms, and prejudices as the major reasons why they deliberately avoided evacuation 
centres. They contended they would be misunderstood by Christians, with whom they would 
necessarily share private spaces at evacuation camps. This was especially problematic if, as 
sometimes happened, two families were forced to inhabit a single tent. As one informant put it, 
“if your tentmates are Christian they will misunderstand you.” Despite the good intentions of 
trustees to create inclusive evacuation camps, the fear of being socially ostracised in these spaces 
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was justified. Subtle and usually unspoken prejudices against CDO’s minority Muslim population 
persist, even though they do not escalate into overt or violent acts as happens in other parts of 
Mindanao. 
Muslim women interviewees contended that it is not easy for Muslim women to mix with men, 
but in the evacuation centre, you have no choice but to mix with men. The lack of true privacy in 
an evacuation camp makes it a public space with no truly private spaces. Consequently, for faith-
based reasons, a Muslim woman would have to be covered all of the time because she cannot 
reveal her hair to men other than her husband or close relatives. This assertion recalls two critical 
points made by scholars who study veiling. One, veiling is a socio-spatial practice that affects 
women’s mobility through urban spaces. 
We can best understand the socio-spatial experience of veiling or not-veiling if we 
consider the city to be comprised of different regimes of veiling, that is, different, spatially 
realized sets of hegemonic rules and norms regarding women’s veiling, which are 
themselves produced by specific constellations of power. Veiling regimes should be 
understood to differ in terms of formality, enforcement, stability, and contestation. For 
example, while some veiling regimes could be called formal and enforced, such as those 
of university examination rooms in Turkey where veiling is prohibited, others may be 
purely informal, such as the veiling regimes of some squatter areas, where it may be the 
social norm that women cover their heads (Secor 2002, 8, emphasis in original). 
Two, Muslim women wear the veil for a variety of reasons (Secor 2002, Marchand 2009, 
Mohanty 2010). In her book Politics of Piety, Saba Mahmood argues the veil should be understood 
as (1) an expression of the identity of Muslim women (similar to a Sikh turban or Jewish kippa) 
or (2) both a means to achieve piety, modesty, and other virtues and an end indicating the 
achievement of these attributes (Landry 2010). For Muslim women survivors in CDO, the veil 
primarily represented the latter option, and veiling was a socio-spatial practice. The social-spatial 
practice of veiling became evident over the course of a three hour group discussion and interview 
with Muslim survivors. The discussion took place at the madrasah, in the presence of several men, 
including an Imam. There, all the women wore veils. After leaving madrasah, we walked along the 
residential streets of Balulang, passing by the barangay hall, a motorela station and several sari-sari 
shops. One of the women removed her veil during the tour. When we entered into the private 
homes of some of the women, almost all of them removed their veils. 
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These gender-based restrictions make it more difficult for Muslim women than for Muslim men 
to adapt to coed post-disaster spaces. Adherence to these rules was likely one of the reasons why 
the few Muslim survivors who did venture into CDO’s evacuation and temporary housing sites 
were single men and not Muslim women or Muslim families. Here, religious norms affected 
gender-based access to and exclusion from private spaces. 
The geographical location of evacuation camps also dissuaded Muslim survivors from staying at 
official evacuation camps. The fact that many of the evacuation sites were far from mosques was 
problematic. Muslims pray five times a day. Women can pray anywhere,47 but men are expected 
to go to the mosque to pray. As such, geographical proximity to a mosque was a priority for 
Muslim men. In contrast to the religious norms about veiling and the need for truly private private 
spaces that dissuaded Muslim women from accessing evacuation camps, here it was the religious 
norms about men having to pray in a mosque and the need to go to a particular public space that 
dissuaded Muslim men from accessing evacuation camps. Although observance of gender-based 
religious obligations produced the same outcome for men and women, the impetus for each one 
was different.  
Given the considerations of Muslim survivors and the character of the official evacuation centres, 
it is not surprising that CDO’s Muslim survivors overwhelmingly chose to stay temporarily with 
relatives or Muslim acquaintances who understood their religious needs. The trustees who 
designed and ran evacuation sites did not set out to exclude Muslim survivors. In fact, some 
trustees tried to assist Muslim survivors. The archdiocese, for example, reached out to its Muslim 
contacts in Balulang to conduct a needs assessment of affected Muslim households, and 
subsequently provided them with material and financial assistance. It also helped in rebuilding the 
flooded madrasah and mosque buildings.  
Overall, however, the trustees’ intent to create inclusive evacuation camps failed because there 
was no systematic consideration of gender and religion-specific needs. The thinking behind the 
creation of official post-disaster spaces simply reflected the existing processes, attitudes, 
                                                          
47 For example, many Muslim women vendors who work at Cogon market close their stalls for short 
periods of time throughout the day to pray. 
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knowledge, and values embedded in the organisational culture of state and non-state institutions. 
Inertia thus operated as a power of exclusion. 
Evacuation centre as place 
Recall from Chapter 2 that places are “contested, multiple, layered, subject to shifting and porous 
boundaries, and constructed in relation to systems of power, including economic relations, 
racialization, ethnicity, and gender” (Staeheli and Martin 2000, 140). Places are uniquely 
experienced by each individual because each person has different experiences and interpretations 
of their social relations within and beyond a particular locale (Massey 1994). The variation in the 
lived experiences of individuals at different evacuation centres across the city thus indicates that 
these post-disaster spaces should be simultaneously read as unique places produced through 
ongoing and hierarchical social relations extending beyond the sites’ physical boundaries.  
To analyse the place-like character of CDO’s evacuation camps, this section delves into the story 
of one Sendong survivor, whom I call “Bonnie.” In the following paragraphs, I cite extensively 
from seven participatory videos that she made for this research project. The videos were 
recorded in Bisayan, then translated and transcribed by my research assistant Kuki. The other 
details of Bonnie’s story come from a focus group discussion in which she participated, a day of 
informal conversations (interspersed by participatory video-making), a series of text messages, a 
short informal meeting one month after the video-making, a key informant interview with one of 
her camp managers, and a review of pre-constructed material about the balbal. 
From December 2011 until April 2013, Bonnie lived in three different evacuation camps, one 
government safe house, one transitional housing site and one permanent relocation site. 
Although she followed an institutionalised pathway, she also identified spaces beyond the official 
post-disaster spaces as critical to rebuilding her life and livelihood post-Sendong. Her account 
demonstrates clearly that the particularity of a place is produced and given meaning through the 
human relationships and exchanges. Hence, no two evacuation centres are exactly the same, and 
no two people perceive a single evacuation centre as exactly the same place. Her story illustrates 
the earlier discussion: evacuation sites are crowded, hot, uncomfortable spaces to be endured; 
they are discriminatory spaces in which the distribution of relief goods is uneven; they are sites 
where formal and informal rules and norms are created and enforced; they are spaces where 
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domestic violence is put on public display, which precipitates intervention by state and religious 
trustees; they are spaces where gender, religion, stereotypes, and cultural norms matter.  
Bonnie’s first evacuation centre was at City Central School, several hundred metres away from 
her pre-Sendong home in Isla de Oro. She stayed there with her partner (whom she calls her 
husband even though they are not legally married) and her six year old son from a previous 
relationship. The proximity of this evacuation site to her husband’s work site made it relatively 
easy for him to continue his work in the informal sector as a motorela driver. 
This is the City Central, our evacuation after Sendong. We were brought here in the 
afternoon after the flooding. It was still okay. It recently caught fire. Inside, 3,000 plus 
families stayed here. Too bad it was burned. We stayed here for two to three months. [… 
The living conditions were] okay. We were well taken care of. Food was abundant, we 
had a lot. Water and electricity were for free. Then the foreign and private groups who 
helped us were usually Americans, coming from the U.S. This is also very important for 
me because this is where we fled and received help. That is why this place is also 
important for me. I will not forget our [first] evacuation centre. 
She noted the abundance of external aid in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, which 
allowed her family to access almost all of the resources they required. Yet, she characterised City 
Central as a crowded and uncomfortable evacuation centre. Classes resumed after Christmas 
holidays, during the time when Sendong survivors were staying at the school. Evacuees were 
made to feel like squatters residing in a space where they were unwanted. Within a few months, 
the City Central School evacuation camp was closed. 
Bonnie’s family was next transferred to the old DSWD building in barangay Macanhan, 
approximately three kilometres southwest and across the river from City Central.  
This is DSWD evacuation centre. I came from City Central Evacuation Centre. I was 
moved here during the months of March and April. When I lived here it was okay. It was 
peaceful – no confusion, not disturbing. I had a task here, I was vice president or leader 
of the camp. I check on how my members are doing, I also check on what they need. I 
also monitor who is smoking and drinking. If the camp manager is away, I am the second 
camp manager. I take care of the members. 
She emphasised that her second evacuation camp was important to her because she had a 
positive overall experience living there for two months, especially because she was elected by her 
fellow evacuees into a leadership role as the camp’s VP (i.e. assistant camp manager). In this role, 
she segregated relief, settled disputes and quarrels, monitored so-called vices (e.g. smoking and 
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drinking), did peacekeeping, and reminded people to clean. As a perk of being the camp VP, her 
family was allocated some private space within the camp; her family slept in an enclosed room 
with concrete (and not fabric) walls. She got along well with her fellow evacuees who trusted and 
respected her, and with the DSWD-appointed camp manager. In fact, after we made the video, 
the former camp manager walked by and had a long friendly chat with Bonnie. While the physical 
conditions for Bonnie’s family were better at the old DSWD building than at the other two 
evacuation camps, it was the positive relationships she developed with people that mattered most 
in Bonnie’s evaluation of each place. 
Bonnie’s stay at the old DSWD building was cut short because something that had previously 
transpired in private spaces was suddenly in full view of state authorities. 
The reason why I left here is because my husband beat me up. I did not know his reason 
[for] beating me up. But when I asked my husband after that time, it was because of the 
talk going around among my neighbours that a lot of people were attracted to [me] and 
so he was jealous. That was the reason why he beat [me] up suddenly. When he beat me 
up, I moved out of the camp and went to DSWD Region 10 office [in Lumbia]. I stayed 
there in the haven. Even though I was told not to see him, I went to see my husband to 
know how he is doing. Then I moved out of [the] DSWD [Lumbia office] and was 
transferred to Camaman-an evacuation centre where I experienced a lot of bad 
experiences. 
This citation raises several issues that help explain how gender ideologies, domestic violence and 
individual interpretations of events construct evacuation centres as uniquely expereinced places. 
Other points raised in the citation, such as the role of regional state authorities in shaping 
mobility and in using post-disaster spaces as an entry point for intervening in people’s lives, are 
explored in Chapter 7. Bonnie’s husband claims his jealousy over the attention directed at her 
incited his violent behaviour. It follows then, that Bonnie’s appearance might somehow shape her 
experiences living in evacuation centres differently than his experiences and those of other 
evacuees. While it is highly problematic and sexist to reduce the complex social causes of 
domestic violence to a woman’s appearance and the attention given to her, it is useful to reflect 
upon Bonnie’s experiences. Her experiences demonstrate the persistence of sexism and victim-
blaming in Philippine society. They also provoke questions about the experiences of other 
categories of women, such as disabled women or lesbian women, in post-disaster spaces, and 
they point to the importance of the body as a scale of analysis.  
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That the 25 year old is stunning and knows how to dress modestly to enhance her natural beauty 
did not go unnoticed by others in post-disaster spaces. For example, at City Central School, one 
evacuee thought Bonnie was a “guest relations officer” or “GRO,” the local term for a prostitute. 
He insinuated that he wanted to rent her. She and her husband reported the incident to on-site 
police officer, who detained the man. One of her former camp managers recalled the first time 
she laid eyes on her. She thought Bonnie “was a government employee or a United Nations or 
other humanitarian aid worker.” She did not think Bonnie “was an IDP because she was so 
beautiful.” In my field jottings, I too remarked on Bonnie’s stylish appearance,48 in part because 
she does not look the part of an urban poor Sendong survivor. These anecdotes illustrate some 
of the pre-conceived ideas about how a beautiful woman should behave, what she does as a 
livelihood, what social and economic class she belongs to, what her intentions might be, and her 
ability to cope with difficulties. Pre-conceived ideas about gender, class, and beauty play out in 
evacuation sites; for example, by informing how people interact with a beautiful woman, and who 
trustees select for removal in cases of domestic violence. Bonnie’s experience as a beautiful 
woman living in a series of evacuation sites, and her experiences as a victim of gender-based 
violence at the old DSWD building clearly shaped her unique understanding of each place. 
Bonnie herself suspects that erroneous preconceptions about her, her past, her character, and her 
intentions strongly influenced her negative associations with her third evacuation camp. Her 
feelings were so strong that she had not wanted to make a video at the Camaman-an covered 
court when we initially planned the day’s itinerary. But, by the time we finish the fifth video, 
Bonnie and Kuki had been talking almost non-stop for several hours. In my field notes, I wrote 
that “I think it is this trust, and Kuki’s explanation that ‘important places’ aren’t necessarily 
associated with positive experiences that convinced [Bonnie] to go to Camaman-an.” In the 
video, Bonnie narrates the following: 
                                                          
48 On 7 March 2013, I wrote about Bonnie’s attire: 
She was wearing beige slacks, a black long-sleeve V-neck t-shirt, dress black sandals with criss-
crossed straps and heels. She wear no necklace, but a stylish pair of sunglasses hangs in the crook 
of the V. Her toe nails were painted burgundy with sparkles. Her fingernails look like she recently 
removed red or orange polish. She has two rings on her left hand. Her long black hair is pulled 
back with a square plastic barrette. Throughout the day she alternates between having it pulled up 
(in various styles of twists and ponytails) and straight down. When it’s down, her hair reaches just 
below her belt. It’s long, straight and shiny, just like in one of the Pantene hair commercials they 
play on TV here. 
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This is my third evacuation centre. I lived here temporarily in this evacuation centre in 
Camaman-an. I could not forget this place because I experienced a lot of pain and 
difficulty in this place. Very painful. People think lowly of me. The camp manager here 
did not accept me, but there was also somebody from here who accepted me. I put a 
small tent made of blankets. When my neighbours sweep the floor, they deliberately hit 
my sleeping quarters. When there is relief, they do not give me even as I watch them. 
They don’t even give me water. But there was one camp manager here, Ma’am V. She 
would give me water and other support. She is usually the one who helps me but I don’t 
know where she is now. I know that she is from here (Camaman-an), she is the wife of a 
counselor. She always told me to let them be and ignore them, they are just jealous.   
There was one time when they destroyed my tent. When I got back, I asked around why 
it was destroyed. They told me kids played around my tent. I was very hurt but I ignored 
it. At this time of day, it was very hot, but I don’t go out of my tent because I don’t want 
to cause any trouble here. But they check inside my tent, and gossip and insult me, calling 
me names like ‘balbal’ [witch or ghoul] and suspect me of being a monster.  
Despite of the pain, at least someone [Ma’am V.] is on my side who advised me to leave 
them alone. There was also a time when UNICEF came. They just passed by my tent, 
ignored me. They did not give me relief because people from the DSWD considered me 
‘taga-gawa’ [outsider] already. They were thinking that I was already expelled from my 
previous evacuation centre, that’s why I was transferred here.  
I had a lot of experiences though. There was this one time when they took my urinal and 
placed it in the middle of the camp for everyone to see, somebody told everyone that 
“hey, this is the urinal of [Bonnie], that is very yellow and very dirty. Look, she did not 
even clean it.” I did not know what was the reaction of the other camp managers here. I 
just endured everything they did to me, despite the pain I felt. I did not fight nor bother 
anybody. I just leave everything to God, what they are doing to me, how they belittle me. 
These are the bad memories I have of this evacuation centre. 
Bonnie’s account illustrates how applications of certain vulnerability discourses can have material, 
emotional, and social consequences, notably bullying and denial of resources. Unlike her first two 
camps, she came there alone and was one of the last evacuees to arrive. The reason for the move 
was not disclosed to the other residents, who incorrectly assumed that she was the cause of 
problems (hence her expulsion and relocation to another evacuation camp), and not that she has 
been moved for her own protection. Bonnie was thus labeled as ‘morally and socially deficient’ 
and ‘different from the other evacuees’ right from her arrival. This reputation influenced 
subsequent interactions with her fellow evacuees and camp manager. She recalled many painful 
experiences, from the public humiliation of the urinal incident to the times when she would pack 
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up her tent and belongings leaving everything “closed and locked” only to find her tent open and 
belongings strewn all over upon her return. The evacuees claimed it was just children playing 
around, but she maintains it was either the adults or the children with tacit approval from their 
parents. Bonnie recounts that she was always passed over for the higher quality relief goods. For 
example, the bed she was given only had three legs. All the other evacuees received good beds 
and mattresses. She initially thought it was because she arrived late, but when the camp manager 
was distributing beds and mattresses they told her she could not have a good one and gave her 
the broken one instead. (Bonnie had the broken leg fixed and continued to use it in her 
transitional and permanent relocation houses.) Off-camera, Bonnie stated repeatedly that the 
camp manager did nothing to diffuse the tension and was just as prejudiced as the other 
evacuees.  
The timing of her arrival at Camaman-an covered court had spatial and social repercussions. 
Within any evacuation site, some sleeping spaces are better than others; there are more and less 
desirable micro-spaces within the larger space. Because Bonnie arrived last, all of the good ones 
were taken. She was left with a spot near the edge of the covered court near a loud, hot, busy 
road. The evacuees often sprayed water on the road so that the dust would not enter the covered 
court. They would spray her tent and belongings, too, claiming it was an accident. Bonnie’s late 
arrival also affected her acquisition of social norms. In all evacuation sites, new rules were 
instituted to govern the space – some formal, others informal, some created by trustees, others 
by the evacuees themselves, some applicable to all evacuation camps, others unique to one 
particular camp. There are rules about curfew, allocation of relief goods per family, cleanliness, 
and social cliques. Bonnie did not observe all the Camanan-an-specific rules because she moved 
into an established camp and was not present when the rules were being formed, and nobody – 
not even the state-appointed camp manager – helped her learn.  
She supposed that she was considered a taga-gawa (literally “from the outside” in Bisayan) because 
she did not mingle with people, and arrived after the others had formed cliques. Moreover, 
although she never stated that she is a lumad, she referred repeatedly to her family home in the 
mountains of Misamis Oriental, where she continues to farm and where many of the province’s 
Indigenous Peoples reside. As a suspected lumad, Bonnie would have been subjected to the same 
(usually) subtle but widespread prejudices against Indigenous Peoples living throughout the 
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archipelago. At the Camaman-an camp, the children and adults called her a balbal, one category of 
aswang, or mythical creature, in Philippine folklore. In many communities, aswang tales perform a 
social control function; invoking an aswang belief, for example, might be used to discipline an 
unruly child or to scare unwanted visitors from particular sites, or to coerce so-called deviant 
individuals into conforming to socially acceptable behaviour (Ramos 1971). The Spaniards first 
introduced aswang stories to the Philippines during colonial rule, and the stories later spread to 
Northern Mindanao as Visayan migrants moved south (Demetrio 1991, Burton 2013). Calling 
someone an aswang is a powerful insult; it is not done lightly. The balbal (literally a ghoul) is a 
witch or monster with long flowing black hair that helps her to fly at night (Demetrio 1991, 
Demetrio, Cordero-Fernando et al. 1991). Filipino parents warn their children about a possible 
visit from the balbal when they want to scare them into behaving. In labelling Bonnie a balbal, her 
fellow evacuees ostracised her; they invoked Philippine folkloric traditions to exclude her socially. 
Bonnie’s interpretation of her experiences at the City Central School, old DSWD building, and 
Camanan-an covered court evacuation centres demonstrate that these three post-disaster spaces 
are vastly different places. The types of exchanges she had at the old DSWD building, where she 
was assistant camp manager – a position in which she was respected, given responsibility, and 
treated well – and where she made friends and got along well with the other evacuees contrast 
sharply with the exchanges she had at the two other sites, especially in Camaman-an. Although 
the physical spaces of the three evacuation sites were different in terms of their comfort (e.g. 
level of crowdedness, dustiness, and quality and quantity of relief goods) and geographic 
proximity to the city centre, it was the people and Bonnie’s relationships with people in these 
spaces that really defined the character of each evacuation site. This finding reinforces the 
arguments of feminist geographers who emphasise the salience of power hierarchies, gender, 
race, and economic relations (Staeheli and Martin 2000), and the necessarily unique interpretation 
of social exchanges (Massey 1994), in the construction of ever-changing places. 
The above discussion has depicted evacuation centres as highly exclusionary spaces. In spite of 
their inclusive mandate to assist vulnerable survivors of a disaster, the design and character of 
evacuation camps deterred many survivors from accessing these spaces. Even the survivors who 
opted to stay in evacuation sites frequently found themselves excluded – from one-time 
evacuation camps returned to their original purpose, from quality relief goods, and from fellow 
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evacuees. The powers of exclusion operating in the evacuation camps were similarly present in 
other official post-disaster spaces, notably the temporary housing and permanent relocation 
housing sites. 
Temporary housing  
The second type of safe space in the institutionalised sleeping pathway was the temporary or 
transitional housing site. As its name suggests, this post-disaster space was conceived as a short-
term bridge where vulnerable survivors wait out the period between the closure of the evacuation 
camps and the availability of relocation houses or the return to their former houses. Transitional 
housing sites served similar functions to the evacuation sites: they offered shelter, relief goods, 
(limited) economic opportunities, medical care, and spiritual guidance. They similarly revealed 
private and sometimes violent activities, which provoked the intervention of state, religious, and 
non-governmental trustees. Like evacuation camps, transitional sites were spaces of exclusion 
informed by vulnerability discourses. 
In several ways temporary housing sites were distinct from evacuation camps. Instead of 
converting existing public buildings designed for non-residential purposes into emergency 
shelters, transitional sites were specifically designed for housing people. They were located away 
from the densely populated and built areas of the city (Fig. 6.2c). The availability of land at 
transitional sites meant that housing was typically more spacious, comfortable, and private than in 
the evacuation camps, with only one family assigned to each bunkhouse or tent. The quantity, 
quality, and type of disaster assistance available to residents was different in transitional site 
residents as compared to in the evacuation camps. The ensuing discussion analyses these 
differences, and how the vulnerability discourses and powers of exclusion operated in temporary 
housing sites. 
Types of transitional housing 
There were three main types of housing in CDO’s temporary housing sites: tents, bunkhouses 
with cement foundations, and transitory houses made from light, local materials. At each of the 
transitional sites, temporary residences were laid out in a carefully planned arrangement, usually a 
grid or other layout easily legible to outsiders. 
The tents were the first of the transitional housing sites to be erected; they were known locally as 
“tent cities” (Fig. 6.4). The largest ones were located in Calaanan and Lumbia, west and 
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southwest of the city, respectively, and at their peak housed tens of thousands of Sendong 
survivor families. Although the tents provided a quick fix for rapidly moving evacuees out of 
school-based evacuation camps (thereby enabling classes to resume after the Christmas holidays), 
they were less than ideal as a form of shelter. Several different types of tents were donated by 
international humanitarian organisations. The first tents provided by one organisation were 
rejected by the survivors because they were reportedly too short. The tents did not effectively 
protect people from the elements. According to former tent city residents, it was too hot to 
remain inside the tents during the day, it was uncomfortable at night because the tents were open, 
and when it rained, the tent’s contents got soaked. The tents even floated when it rained. The 
heat was especially difficult for survivors whose compromised health conditions push them 
toward the more vulnerable end of the vulnerability continuum; for example, one elderly 
gentleman recounted having a stroke in his tent, which was later linked to the extreme heat. Even 
a regional government officer in charge of camp managers underlined how hot and 
uncomfortable the tents were:  
Most of them [evacuees] cannot make it in the tents because it’s so hot, so most of them 
suffered when they were in the tents. It’s very uncomfortable, really. I have tried, and you 
know, I cannot really stay there even 15 minutes. [If] it’s [a] sunny day, then it’s really very 
hot. The tent is. 
 
Fig. 6.4. One of Cagayan de Oro’s tent cities. Source: GMA News Online (2012). 
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The geographical location of the tent cities exacerbated the problem. In their pre-Sendong homes 
and in the evacuation camps, survivors had options to escape unbearable heat and rainy weather. 
They could walk or take inexpensive public transportation to markets, restaurants, places of 
worship, air-conditioned malls, or other residences with electric fans, or they could simply jump 
into the Cagayan River or Macajalar Bay to cool off. No such facilities existed near the tent cities, 
and the cost of public transit away from the tent cities was prohibitive. With such conditions the 
tent cities were not really “safe spaces.”  
Other trustees were similarly disenchanted with the living conditions in the tent cities. Two of the 
professional staff members who helped to design the temporary and permanent housing at 
Ecoville went as far as describing life in the tents as “so dehumanising,” and the tent cities as 
another “sort of disaster.” The physical conditions in the tent cities served as a powerful 
deterrent in keeping survivors out. In fact, once the tent cities opened up and survivors had to 
choose between moving into a tent city and returning to their former houses (or house sites), 
they frequently chose the latter option if their houses were not located within one of the newly 
created no-build zones.  
The two other types of transitory houses were much better received than the tents. The majority 
of survivors who resided in a transitional housing site lived in amakan villages. Amakan is a type 
of locally available bamboo that is woven into large sheets. As a lightweight and inexpensive 
building material, it is frequently used as walls or partitions by the urban poor in informal 
settlements and by middle class Cagayaños in their rural retreat houses. Several NGOs, notably 
the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), partnered with regional government agencies in issuing 
amakan sheets to the IDPs, which were used as walls in their temporary houses. CRS selected the 
amakan house as their preferred transitional shelter design because it fit the following design 
parametres: culturally appropriate, moveable, quick to construct, economical, flexible, and 
upgradeable (Hirano 2012, 24). When the survivor was transferred into a relocation house, he or 
she could keep or sell the amakan sheets. Many opted to sell them; in 2013, the going price was 
$108. Most of the amakan houses had corrugated metal roofs, although some had nipa roofs.49 
                                                          
49 Nipa is a type of palm tree (Nypa fruticans) found throughout the archipelago. Its fronds are frequently 
used to make the thatch roofs of the quintessential Philippine nipa hut. It is ideally suited for a tropical 
climate. If damaged by typhoons, floods or earthquakes, it can be easily repaired or rebuilt. 
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Amakan houses were positively princely compared to the evacuation camps or tent cities. The 
houses were relatively cool, spacious, and private. The sites had access to electricity, and at some 
sites, connections were available inside each house. The sites had proper comfort rooms and 
(mostly) decent access to water. In my field notes, I described Bonnie’s amakan house at the 
Xavier Farm transitional housing site. 
The house is up on stilts. You walk up three wooden steps to get into the house. The 
bottom step is broken. Inside, the place is cool. It can get hot, because of the corrugated 
metal roof, but there is a 1.5’ gap between the top of the walls and the roof so when there 
is a breeze it’s quite comfortable. There is a woven mat on the floor at the back. The TV 
is on, and [Bonnie’s son] is watching a cartoon, the volume turned up quite loud. The 
blue and white ceiling fan is not turned on. There are fabric flowers (roses) in a vase. 
Bottles of nail polish, some blush and other make-up are on a small table. There are at 
least a dozen pairs of fancy women’s dress shoes, including some with 3+ inch heels. 
Kuki and I comment that she doesn’t need the extra height; she’s already quite tall for a 
Filipina. 
Amakan villages were opened later than the tent cities, beginning in February 2012. Most were 
situated in the city outskirts, for example in Calaanan and at Xavier Farm in Canitoan, although 
one was located near the city centre (Fig. 6.2c). All but two of the amakan villages were under the 
purview of state authorities; in a peaceful wooded plateau in Camaman-an, each of the city’s two 
Catholic seminaries had established amakan villages on their grounds.  
The third type of transitional house was built exclusively at Ecoville, the resettlement site of 
Xavier University in barangay Lumbia. Successful Ecoville applicants moved into bunkhouses on 
the Ecoville property between January and April 2012 and remained there until July 2013. A 
bunkhouse is a quick construction housing unit; it is easy to construct and easy to dismantle. Its 
main advantage is the speed of construction. It is light construction and can be built easily with 
minimal engineering. The bunkhouses were built with 2' x 2' wood. They had cement 
foundations, so the structures were very rigid as compared to the amakan houses and tents. After 
moving in, however, the wood foundations started to settle, so the residents cemented them to 
make them sturdier. Bunkhouses offered families privacy, space, and comfortable interior 
temperatures. The bunkhouses at Ecoville were funded by the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) and the DSWD, and built by the engineering brigade of the Philippine Army. 
Unlike the amakan sheet walls, Ecoville bunkhouses are not the property of individual survivors 
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and cannot be easily sold or transported to another location. As of April 2013, the University had 
no definitive plans for the bunkhouses after people moved into the permanent housing. 
Changes to disaster assistance  
The quantity, type, and conditions of disaster assistance offered to Sendong survivors differed 
among the three main types of post-disaster sleeping spaces, and also within each type. There was 
a gradual reduction in the volume of aid distributed at the transitional housing sites, especially 
once the disaster was no longer front page news. There was also a shift in the type of assistance 
so that survivors would be more independent; trustees, for example, implemented livelihood 
trainings designed to help residents support themselves financially. Transitional housing sites 
were thus spaces where disaster assistance transitioned from “a hand-out to victims” to “a 
conditional tool for building independent survivors.” 
At evacuation centres and many temporary housing sites, survivors received assistance from 
government agencies, religious groups, or non-governmental organisations. Often, basic goods 
were distributed, such as food (especially rice, canned sardines, and noodles), water, clothing, 
medicine, sleeping mats, and blankets. A small subset of households also received basic utensils 
or cooking implements. As noted above, evacuees received amakan sheets to build the walls of 
their temporary houses when they moved into amakan villages. Many of them sold the amakan 
when they moved into their permanent relocation homes, pocketing $108. Evacuees were also 
provided with amenities such as access to electricity, water, and basic washing and toilet facilities. 
Trustees covered these expenses at all of the evacuation sites and at most of the transitional sites 
until December 2012. As one regional government officer explained, various regional 
government agencies were obliged to provide light, electricity, and WASH facilities for one year 
after Sendong. National government offices provided additional funding to cover these expenses 
until Super-typhoon Pablo hit in December 2012; the response diverted resources to disaster 
relief efforts in Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley. The burden of paying for amenities was 
shifted to other trustees in 2013. It was the archdiocese that bore these costs.  
The transitional site at Ecoville had a different approach to cost sharing and disaster assistance, 
carefully designed to instill a particular attitude in the future homeowners. Some costs, such as 
electricity and water, were paid by the residents; each of the 518 households contributed for the 
privilege of charging cell phones, watching the site’s only television, having some electrical lights 
 
 
 260   
 
at night, and accessing clean water. The monthly bills were posted on the exterior wall of the 
Ecoville office, a committee collected money from each household, which was turned over to 
Ecoville staff who paid the water and utilities companies. Most households could afford their 
portion of the monthly bills, which were, for example, $1.68 for electricity and $2.45 for water in 
January 2013. Asking residents to start paying was a calculated decision taken by Xavier 
University and the Jesuit priests. It was intended to build independence among survivors, 
eliminate a so-called “dole-out mentality,” ease residents into covering their own expenses, and 
enable the university to eventually withdraw from its role of running the transitional and 
permanent relocation sites.  
Evidence from several relocation sites support the soundness of the Ecoville cost-sharing 
strategy at transitional sites. Survivors resettled at sites other than Ecoville were shocked that they 
were suddenly expected to cover all their own expenses and no longer received any relief goods. 
They had come to expect free services and goods from the government and NGOs. There were 
protests when the government agencies providing electricity and water tried asking the recipients 
of livelihood assistance loans to start paying their own bills in the transitional sites. The agencies 
rescinded their requests, and agreed to continue paying these bills. According to some survivors 
and trustees, it got to the point where some people living at the temporary shelters did not want 
to leave and settle in the permanent relocation housing.  
The quality of disaster relief at temporary housing sites was often inferior to that at the 
evacuation centres. During a focus group discussion at an amakan village, the participants 
complained about the deterioration of sanitary conditions at temporary housing sites over time. 
The discussion took place in March 2013, and many of the participants had spent more than a 
year living in transitional housing – first at the tent city in Lumbia, and later in the Xavier Farm 
amakan village. Broken toilets and taps remained unfixed for days or weeks. Evacuees suffered 
from “loose bowel movement” (diarrhea) at both sites, which they attributed to contaminated 
drinking water. The on-site water tanks, provided by the water district, “are so dirty” and the 
water “is so muddy.” They “really tried to drink mineral water, but it is so expensive” leaving 
them no option but to drink tap water. One entrepreneurial woman turned the water problem 
and demand for alternatives into a micro-scale business opportunity selling mineral water to her 
fellow survivors (Fig. 6.5), but she could not generate enough sales to support her household. 
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Given that transitional sites are (1) typically sited in unbuilt areas with no or limited pre-existing 
facilities, and (2) expected to close within several months to one year, it is not surprising that the 
trustees designing and running these sites did not invest in high quality, durable infrastructure. 
This lack of investment, however, affected residents; occasionally, it sparked economic 
opportunities, but more often, it negatively affected the health of residents, particularly the 
majority of evacuees who could not afford alternatives. 
 
Fig. 6.5. A motorela-based bottled mineral water enterprise at one of CDO’s transitional amakan 
housing sites (6 March 2013). The woman uses the revenue to supplement her income.  
Just as it distinguished itself from other transitional sites in terms of its cost-sharing strategy, the 
Jesuit University-run relocation site Xavier Ecoville also distinguished itself in planning and 
implementing sound water and sanitation systems. For example, based on the recommendations 
of the “sustainable sanitation” committee, a closed system for waste management was 
implemented. Urine is collected from the male urinals, and combined with other compostable 
materials at the on-site composting facility. The compost is used as fertiliser in the communal 
 
 
 262   
 
vegetable and flower gardens interspersed among the bunkhouses. A committee of Ecoville 
residents monitors the water and sanitation systems; any problems they cannot solve themselves 
are reported to and dealt with by Ecoville staff.  
The motivations for investing significant financial and human capital into a temporary living 
space were manifold. The transitional site borders the permanent site and Xavier University owns 
other parcels of land bordering the transitional and permanent sites. Ecoville also had a high 
local, national and even international profile, and carries the Xavier name. So, any lasting negative 
impacts from the transitional site would ultimately spill over into the permanent site, the 
university property, and even the university’s reputation. Encouraging residents to maintain 
facilities on their own water and sanitation systems advanced the Ecoville aim of creating 
independent homeowners. Most importantly, perhaps, was a genuine desire expressed by all of 
the more than two dozen people who worked in Ecoville in various capacities with whom I 
spoke. They wanted to turn Ecoville into a self-sustaining, well-functioning, and desirable place 
to live. But it was more than just lofty ideals and reputational threats that enabled the Ecoville 
transitional site to have good water and sanitation facilities. Ecoville had advantages the other 
sites did not. Not only could its trustees focus their efforts on a single site, but they could also tap 
into a highly-trained professional staff to imagine and plan the site, significant financial resources 
to fund the site, and a large pool of enthusiastic, able-bodied volunteers to carry out the work. 
Another change to the assistance offered to survivors in transitional housing was the emphasis on 
livelihoods and trainings. A variety of trustees sponsored and ran livelihood training sessions. For 
example, the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority in CDO offered free rug-
making, slipper-making training, massage, culinary arts, parlour and hairstyle, and cosmetology 
classes to residents at the Lumbia and Calaanan tent cities. When trainings were held off-site, 
evacuees were provided with free transportation and snacks. Municipal and regional government 
agencies, NGOs, and church groups also hosted livelihood trainings, which were frequently 
funded by the DSWD and major international NGOs like Save the Children. Survivors who 
completed certain livelihood training programs were eligible to receive zero-interest livelihood 
loans of up to $120 from either the DSWD or the archdiocese’s Social Action Center (SAC). 
Other trustees donated livelihood kits with basic hairdressing, carpentry, sewing, cooking, or 
other tools. Ecoville adopted a more comprehensive and long-term approach to its livelihood 
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assistance efforts. It hired a livelihoods coordinator who surveyed the pre-Sendong livelihoods 
and skills of residents, arranged for livelihood trainings, set up a cooperative to support the 
businesses of Ecoville residents, negotiated business contracts in which several private companies 
agreed to purchase products from Ecoville residents, oversaw the creation of on-site livelihood 
opportunities (e.g. tree nursery and small-scale vending), and supported the construction of a 
permanent livelihoods building. The focus on livelihood assistance underscores the concerted 
efforts of trustees to shift from the discourse from sustaining passive Sendong victims to 
supporting self-reliant Sendong survivors. Trustees presumed such a change could be spurred by 
eliminating presumed deficiencies (e.g. lack of skill, knowledge, money, tools and certification). 
Promoting livelihood assistance in post-disaster spaces also presented trustees with a means to 
draw people previously beyond the purview of the formal economy into it. 
The trainings that took place in the temporary housing sites were not all about livelihoods. 
Religious actors, occasionally supported by state actors, initiated, created and implemented 
activities aimed at improving the religious and moral character of survivors. The two following 
examples are illustrative. The adult residents at Ecoville must complete an eight-day values 
formation training before they are permitted to move into their relocation house. Ecoville 
trustees commissioned the Philippine-based NGO Gawad Kalinga to design and deliver the 
training because of its extensive experience in building relocation housing and providing social 
assistance to survivors throughout the archipelago. Gawad Kalinga is a self-described anti-
poverty and nation-building movement that carries out social engineering projects (Gawad 
Kalinga 2013). Its values formation program aims to bring about a change in values, attitudes, 
and behaviours among participants, which, in turn, fosters a cohesive, peaceful community. Local 
Gawad Kalinga staff adapted a national Couples for Christ training program to suit the needs of 
Sendong survivors. The values training has seven modules. The first part, called ‘Building 
community to end poverty,’ has three modules: (1) Called to care and share, (2) Building the 
community of our dreams, and (3) Together we can end poverty. The second part, called ‘Living 
a life of caring and sharing’, has four modules: (4) Loving the least, the last, the lost, (5) Loving 
without fear, (6) Loving is believing, and (7) Loving is life. As pointed out in Chapter 5, the 
values formation training reflects the deficiency and different-from-us vulnerability discourses 
held by some trustees. The values formation was expected to contribute to the long-term success 
of Ecoville; trustees assumed that once the residents were trained and assimilated the appropriate 
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values (which they purportedly did not have pre-Sendong), they would naturally ensure the 
proper social functioning of Xavier Ecoville.  
A special project of the archdiocese’s Responsible Parenthood and All Natural Family Planning 
(RP-ANFP) ministry illustrates another example of fixing moral wrongs. In response to the 
demand for “legitimising” otherwise sinful relationships, this ministry carried out all the 
ecclesiastical, legal, and logistic preparations needed to marry over 250 couples and baptise their 
children. The archdiocese paid for wedding expenses from a special Typhoon Sendong fund, 
except for the wine and wedding rings, and the bride and groom’s outfits, which were covered by 
local Congressmen and the couple, respectively. According to the head of the RP-ANFP, the 
archdiocese’s position was both pragmatically and theologically motivated; marriage helps 
children when they grow up and need official papers for a job, and marriage is a sacred sacrament 
between a man and woman who want to share a loving life together. When the program began, 
preparatory classes took place at or near the transitional sites; as survivors were relocated into 
resettlement sites, the classes (and subsequent workshops on parenting, all-natural family 
planning, etc.) have followed them.  
In each of the aforementioned types of assistance available at transitional sites, Ecoville 
demonstrates a unique approach. The approach reflects a careful distinction between 
“temporary” and “transitional.” Unlike the vast majority of other interim housing sites, the 
Ecoville bunkhouses were not constructed as “temporary” spaces where people merely wait out 
the time before moving into a concrete relocation house and moving on with their lives. Instead, 
Ecoville trustees deliberately constructed a “transitional” space where survivors were trained to 
adopt particular attitudes, values, and lifestyles, which they were expected to carry over into 
Ecoville’s permanent resettlement site. At the transitional site, disaster assistance, as expressed 
through the physical space, infrastructure, rules, and programs reinforced the Ecoville motto of 
“We are not just building houses. We are building a community.” 
How long is “temporary?” 
The irony of so-called “temporary” housing is that it is not so temporary. One informant on 
Ecoville’s infrastructure team questioned the temporary characterisation of houses, “I don’t know 
at what point it becomes transitory and [when it becomes] permanent. Houses are permanent.” 
While tents and amakan houses can be easily dismantled and moved to another site, the 
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transitional houses at Ecoville have cement foundations, a building material usually associated 
with permanence. It is not the physical structures, however, that challenge the temporary nature 
of transitional sites, but rather the long-term social and economic consequences of living in them. 
The temporary character of life in the transitional housing sites can yield permanent and 
unintended negative social consequences, too. For example, mothers living in evacuation camps 
and transitional housing sites for extended periods of time withdrew their school-age children 
from classes. In some instances, children had been out of school for over one year. The mothers 
explained that the school officials insisted their pupils have a permanent address and did not 
want students to attend classes for several weeks or months, only to leave for another school 
when the family was transferred to another evacuation camp, transitional housing site, or a 
permanent relocation housing site. Thus the threat of frequent moves indirectly contributed to 
absenteeism among Sendong survivor children residing in official post-disaster spaces. Because 
repeated and prolonged withdrawals from school are precursors to dropping out (Sabates, 
Akyeampong et al. 2010), it is likely that at least some of the school-age survivors who are kept 
temporarily out of school while they wait for a relocation house will be permanently denied a 
formal education. 
This repercussion underscores the hardships faced by survivors in temporary safe spaces. 
Keeping children out of school, especially at the primary level, is unusual in Philippine cities 
because parents of all economic classes typically highly value their children’s education and will 
take measures, such as scrimping on other expenses or living in an undesirable location because it 
is near the school, to ensure their children have at least a basic education. Moreover, among the 
urban poor survivors, many are recipients of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), an anti-
poverty initiative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development aiming to provide social 
assistance and to promote social development (DSWD no date).50 To receive the small – but not 
                                                          
50 DSWD describes the 4Ps as “a human development program of the national government that invests in 
the health and education of poor households, particularly of children aged 0-18 years old” that is 
“patterned after the conditional cash transfer scheme implemented in other developing countries.” To 
receive the cash grants, beneficiaries must comply with program conditions such as accessing pre- and 
post-natal care, attending Family Development Sessions, ensuring children receive preventative health 
care, and enrolling and attending school classes (DSWD no date).  
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insignificant – 4Ps stipend, a parent (usually the mother) must show proof that her children 
regularly attend school. Forgoing this money is not a desirable option. 
The risk of dropping out is further exacerbated by two additional factors characteristic to the 
transitional housing sites and the people living there: school inaccessibility and poverty. In her 
study on why Filipino children leave school, Fe Nava (2009) found that financial constraints 
meant families could not afford school-related costs such as school project fees, school 
contributions, uniforms, transportation money, lunches, etc. She found that a long distance 
between home and school also induced dropping out; if children lack transportation fare, or have 
to walk for hours, or must cross a busy road, they are unlikely to attend school regularly. This 
distance deterrent was noted by a municipal government agency in CDO in charge of relocation:  
Most of the families used to send their children [to] the nearby school and now that they 
are being relocated [to] the relocation site, most of their complaints are the distance for 
their children. In fact there were other children who were being stopped from their 
studies because of the distance.  
Interestingly, the regional government agency responsible for both the 4Ps and the design and 
operation of official post-disaster spaces was unaware that evacuees were pulling their children 
out of school for prolonged periods of time. This knowledge gap demonstrates, among other 
things, that information is not necessarily shared among levels of government and that there is no 
all-knowing, comprehensively-acting state.  
Together, the poverty of urban poor survivors, the enforcement of school rules about 
attendance, the ongoing threat of another government-induced move, and the distance of 
transitional, and later permanent relocation, sites from schools operate to exclude children from 
school. In other words, the temporary application of certain powers of exclusion (notably the 
market, regulation and force) effectively prevent a more vulnerable component of Cagayaños 
from accessing a critical resource in the long term. 
The potential problems associated with prolonged stays in temporary housing, including the 
uncomfortable and difficult living conditions for survivors and the financial and opportunity 
costs to government agencies, are compelling arguments for shortening the time survivors spend 
in temporary post-disaster spaces. In other Philippine disasters, the interim housing measures 
typically drag on for at least two years. After the eruption of Mt Pinatubo in 1991 and the 
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resulting displacement of the Aeta population living on the volcano’s slopes, the temporary tents 
were slowly replaced with concrete houses. In 2006, Typhoon Reming hit the Bicol region of 
Luzon, displacing more than 4000 families. The resulting tent city remained open until 2008. In 
2011, some Metro Manila-based Ondoy survivors were still living in temporary housing – two 
years after the 2009 Typhoon Ondoy. 
Yet, in CDO this waiting period was significantly shortened; survivor families began moving into 
resettlement sites less than one year after the storm. As one regional government officer pointed 
out, “the first turnover of the permanent site was in April 27 [2012] when the President came. 
Since then, I think every two weeks or every week, there is movement of IDPs to the permanent 
site. They say that we are the fastest so far.” In fact, the speed at which the transfer occurred was 
an aspect of rebuilding that was repeatedly remarked upon by organisations involved in many 
disaster rebuilding efforts throughout the archipelago, such as Habitat for Humanity Philippines 
and Gawad Kalinga, as well as by politicians from other municipalities and from the national 
government. Rapid recovery from Typhoon Sendong was a priority for state, religious, 
humanitarian, and academic trustees.  
Philippine and foreign researchers inquired into the reasons why CDO was able to develop and 
build resettlement sites, then transfer people into them so quickly, especially compared to Iligan 
City in the neighbouring province of Lanao del Norte, which was devastated by the same 
Tropical Storm Sendong. One NGO informant overseeing the construction of almost half of the 
resettlement houses in both CDO and Iligan identified the three “key ingredients” to CDO’s 
unusually rapid response as (1) the immediate availability of land and of money to build houses, 
(2) the willingness of political leaders to quickly take decisions, and (3) the modification of the 
usual building strategy. To this trio of key ingredients, regional and municipal government 
authorities added the outpouring of donations and technical assistance from NGOs, and the 
rapid disbursement of government funding to start construction. The mayor’s land-banking 
strategy in which the city purchased land that was subsequently prepared for piso-piso lots meant 
that CDO had land that could immediately be converted into resettlement sites. In contrast, 
Iligan had no comparable land reserves and had the additional steps of identifying and purchasing 
land before it could begin construction. Indeed, the lack of land is a typical bottleneck in the 
reconstruction process. The high profile of the disaster, the volume of donations, and the 
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pressure on politicians and bureaucrats to successfully implement the Philippine Disaster Act 
(R.A. 10121) meant that monies for rebuilding were quickly disbursed. In fact, even before the 
official paperwork had been approved, DSWD paid the organisations selected to build the 
resettlement sites because it wanted to expedite construction. The CDO mayor and other city 
officials also moved very fast; normally a builder must acquire all sorts of certificates and permits 
before beginning construction, but these restrictions were loosened for relocation house builders. 
Lastly, the usual building order was modified. Ideally, site development, including the building all 
water, road, electrical and drainage infrastructure, precedes house construction. In CDO, 
however, site development was done concurrently with, and even after, resettlement house 
construction. The Department of Public Works and Highways just shared the site development 
plans with the builders so that they would build the houses in the right locations. Many of the 
“key ingredients” for speeding up post-Sendong resettlement required that powers of exclusion act 
as powers of inclusion. For example, regulations that normally slow or even halt formal planned 
housing developments were relaxed, and political relationships and alliances were strategically 
employed to cut through bureaucratic red tape. 
The expedited building process was not without its problems. Certain trustees reported that the 
quality of the new and repaired projects was questionable. Furthermore, in trying to speed up the 
construction of resettlement sites and reduce the transitional period, trustees inadvertently 
introduced temporary problems for the people building the houses and the people living in them. 
Incomplete site development slowed down construction; for example, the lack of roads meant 
that when it rained, the trucks carrying building supplies got stuck in the mud; the lack of water 
on-site required trucking in copious amounts of water for mixing cement; and the lack of 
electricity meant bringing in generators to power the equipment. Site development was not 
always completed before survivors were transferred into the relocation sites. The lack of good 
roads and access to water and electricity was a major deterrent for full-time residency at the 
resettlement site, spurring circular migration strategies. As such, the temporary character of 
transitional sites was merely carried through to the permanent relocation sites.  
This section has illustrated one application of the powers of exclusion, namely to accelerate the 
building process. The powers of exclusion were also invoked by trustees for other purposes, 
including to address domestic violence and sexual abuse. 
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Invoking the powers of exclusion 
Similar to the evacuation camps, there were cases of domestic violence and sexual abuse at the 
temporary housing sites. Most acts of violence were committed by men against women, but there 
were exceptional cases in which women were the perpetrators or silent accomplices. As such, 
temporary housing sites were spaces of public and gendered violence. Although living quarters 
were much more spacious than at evacuation camps, it is impossible for on-site trustees and 
neighbouring evacuees to ignore what was happening inside a tent or bunkhouse.  
One camp manager recounted many incidents in which she observed gender-based violence and 
subsequently intervened. The following discussion is based on her account of two such cases. In 
her response, the camp manger demonstrates how transitional sites, like evacuation camps, are 
spaces of instruction and intervention. It shows how regulation, force, and legitimation were 
invoked as powers with the potential to exclude (e.g. to deny access to a relocation house). It also 
reveals the salience of the moral authority of the Catholic Church in shaping interventions, and 
consequently, in developing the religious character of transitional housing sites. 
In the first case, a 16 year old girl was raped on four separate occasions by her step-father. Her 
birth mother was aware of the violence, but kept silent. The camp manager intervened, and the 
daughter was taken away and kept in a safe house run by Catholic nuns. 
I have an IDP, her daughter was raped by her own husband. I was the one who called the 
church. The daughter now is at the hands of the nuns here in cathedral. The father is at 
large because he has already a warrant of arrest. The mother, before the Sendong, they’re 
staying in [barangay O.]. The accident happened three times [there]. So it came to my mind 
that the mother is just keeping silent because [she] is not the real daughter of [her current] 
husband.  
The fourth time she was raped by the father. It was 10 o’clock in the morning, when the 
daughter was washing clothes. We were having the second batch of [mass] wedding[s] at 
Xavier University. That is why not all of [the IDPs] were at the camp, [nor] the camp 
manager. The mother was in Xavier [University] for [the] wedding because [she was] one 
of the godmothers. 
The following day somebody told me, ‘Ma’am, the daughter of our neighbour is raped by 
the step-father’. So I acted then, I asked the mother ‘Where is your daughter? Where is 
your husband? If you will not go with us, I will file a case against you for connivance with 
your husband. So where is your daughter?’ So she cried.  
 
 
 270   
 
I talked to the daughter. The daughter told me ‘Ma’am, this is my fourth time. My step-
father raped me. We are still in [barangay O.], I was raped.’ ‘What did [your] mother [do]?’ 
‘My mother was just silent.’  
So after talking to the daughter, I talked to the [mother again]. ‘This is already fourth 
time, why did you just keep on? Your daughter, she might be pregnant with your own 
husband.’ She asked forgiveness from us. Maybe this is the will of the Lord. This will be 
stopped. [Then I told her], ‘If you do not agree with us, if you will not work with us, I will 
also file a case against you if you allow your daughter to be raped by your own husband. I 
will file a case against you as a DSWD [representative].’ So the mother was afraid. ‘Why 
[did] you not talk [about] or report this to the police or DSWD or to the barangay [tanod] 
to arrest him?’ She kept on crying and crying so I brought her here [to the] cathedral. She 
talked to Sister A.  
I brought the girl to here [the archbishopric] and talked to [the man in charge of child 
protection]. God’s will, the daughter is now in good condition. Before she could not talk, 
just roaming around the eyes because of trauma. She was now in safekeeping with the 
nuns here. For safety, she was not sent to the school because the father might be still 
there. Because we have a connection with the DepEd (Department of Education) a 
special arrangement [was made with] the DepEd, the principal of that school and the 
mother [to teach the daughter] here in the church. She will be graduating [from high 
school] this March. The nuns, the priests will be the ones to take charge of her schooling 
for college.  
So the father now is at large, wanted because the church is now filing a case against him. 
Warrant of arrest is waiting anytime, because we have pictures. The mother gave us the 
picture. ‘You give me the picture [of your husband]. If you want to be settle in a 
permanent house, just cooperate with us.’ She was able to give me the picture. 
Before the mother was transferred we talked to her.  ‘OK ma’am, you will be transferred 
to [relocation site I.].’ She told me ‘Ma’am, I’m very happy because my daughter is really 
in good condition. She is more beautiful.’ I also told her ‘OK, just cooperate with the 
sisters, this is for your own good and for the good of your daughter. That is why we are 
here, the camp manager – to protect you, not just keep on silent.’ So that is nine-two-six-
two. Violence against women and children. That is R.A. 9-2-6-2.  
The second incident was another case of gender-based violence. The camp manager intervened, 
but the family remained together.  
There is also a couple – the wife was choked. There was an evidence because of the 
bruises. So the wife went to the police station in B. The following day I talked to the 
husband because the wife did not [come] home [to the temporary housing site.] I took 
him to the multipurpose [court], our office. I told the husband ‘Why did you do that to 
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your wife? You are not allowed to do that against 9262.’ ‘Because of jealousy.’ ‘So how 
many times did you do this to your wife?’ [He] cannot answer me. He cried in front of 
me. ‘Ma’am I’m sorry. I’m ashamed,’ he told me. [I replied,] ‘Yes, because your children 
are growing up, they’re already ladies. Beautiful, they are beautiful.’ They have eight 
children.  
I [also] talked to the wife many times [and I talked to them together.] ‘If you will not 
change your attitude I will not give you [a] permanent house,’ this is what I told them, 
‘because the government, the church, the private organisations are here to protect and 
help you to change your way of life, to change your attitudes because God is warning us. 
We are here to help you to change your lifestyle.’ So the husband promised me, ‘OK 
ma’am.’  I talked to [him], ‘You sign here [agreeing] that this incident will not happen 
again.’ [He] promised me not to do it again. Why [did I give him a second chance]? 
Because there was already a report to the police.  
[The family] was transferred February 18 to [relocation site I.]. [After they moved] I 
openly asked the wife when I saw her, ‘How is your husband now doing?’ ‘Ma’am after 
you talked to my husband he was really sorry for that.’ [Now,] every time I see him from 
the wharf – because he’s working as [a] construction worker [and] passes by our offices – 
he [greets] me, ‘Ma’am, maayong hapon, good afternoon.’ ‘OK, maayong hapon.’ So, it’s, 
maybe they need some advice. The family lacks moral support or spiritual advisers.  
Setting aside whether or not the camp manager acted appropriately, these excerpts reveal 
transitional sites as socially-produced spaces. Attempts to fix one problem can inadvertently 
create other problems. For instance, the successful recruitment of many transitional site residents 
and employees to attend a mass wedding meant that there were too few people remaining on-site 
to deter a rape at an open-air washing station. As Jane Jacobs (1961) has shown, the mere 
presence of people, or having “eyes on the street” (or around the temporary housing site), 
enhances the safety of public spaces.  The two accounts paint transitional sites as spaces 
produced through uneven social relations and experiences that transpire within and beyond the 
physical and temporal boundaries of a specific locale. In both cases, the violence that occurred 
within the sites was part of a pattern begun before Tropical Storm Sendong. The camp manager 
had also developed a strong rapport with her charges, to the point where the evacuees trusted 
her, disclosed their troubles to her, responded apologetically to her reprimands, and made 
amends (albeit under the threat of not getting a relocation house). They accepted her duties as 
camp manager to protect “IDPs” and to speak up for “victims.” They allowed her to influence 
their behaviour. 
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The excerpts reveal transitional sites as spaces where the powers of exclusion are selectively 
invoked to produce certain behaviours and outcomes. The camp manager drew upon two 
irrefutable authorities – national laws and God – in explaining her position to and in requiring 
behavioural changes of the people involved in each case. For example, she referred to the 2004 
Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children (VAWC) Act (R.A. 9262) to defend why violence 
against women is wrong, and to “the will of the Lord” to support why the violence was brought 
to her attention and later dealt with. Force, or more accurately the threat of force, was employed 
to elicit a particular response. In the first case, the mother was threatened with a case being filed 
against her if she did not cooperate. That it came from the camp manager as a representative of a 
government agency, instead of from the camp manager as a friend and protector of IDPs, made 
the threat intimidating and authoritative. There was a stiff penalty for not cooperating; if the 
camp manager did not endorse a survivor, then he or she could not receive a house. The promise 
of a free concrete relocation house was a powerful incentive for enduring adverse conditions in 
the evacuation camps and the temporary housing sites, so it is not surprising that survivors 
cooperated.  
It is noteworthy that the camp manager called attention to the role of state authorities in dealing 
with gender-based violence within the family. She asks the mother outright, “Why [did] you not 
talk [about] or report this to the police or DSWD or to the barangay [tanod] to arrest him?” as if 
such reporting would have fixed the problem. As explained earlier in the chapter, in the 
Philippines, it is rare for non-family members to intervene in family disputes and domestic 
violence. The women involved would know this, which made the woman in the second case all 
the more unusual because she actually filed a report with the police. 
The excerpts underscore the importance of the Catholic Church as an (and perhaps even the) 
irrefutable and well-connected authority, and the pervasiveness of Christian values in post-
disaster spaces. The camp manager frequently cited religious and spiritual beliefs as justification 
for her interventions, and as elements missing in the survivors that she was qualified to 
ameliorate. In doing so, she ascribes to both the deficiency and the different-from-us 
vulnerability discourses. To remedy the situation she threatened to contact state authorities (e.g. 
the police and the DSWD) but she actually divulged her concerns to officials at the archdiocese, 
who subsequently dealt with the situation through Church institutions. Consequently, the 
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archdiocese placed a young woman in a safe house with nuns instead of at a government-run safe 
house, and used its strong connections with the secular Department of Education to enable her 
to complete her high school diploma by taking classes in a church instead of at a school. 
The discussion on transitional housing sites echoes the preceding discussion of evacuation 
centres. Both types of post-disaster sleeping spaces served similar functions, were highly 
exclusionary spaces, and were informed by vulnerability discourses. Temporary housing sites, 
however, were not mere replicas of evacuation camps where vulnerable survivors waited out the 
time between the closure of the evacuation camps and the availability of relocation houses or the 
return to their former houses. The geographical locations, the kinds of housing, and the quality, 
quantity, and type of disaster assistance at temporary housing sites were distinct. In some 
instance, such as at Ecoville, the sites were conceived as training grounds where residents 
transitioned from their old Pre-Sendong ways of life into ways of living better matched with the 
trustees’ visions of an ideal permanent resettlement site. The ideal and actual characters of 
CDO’s relocation sites are developed in the next section. 
Permanent relocation housing 
The third and final post-disaster sleeping space along the institutionalised pathway is the 
relocation site. It is “home.” A permanent relocation, or resettlement, site is a planned housing 
development. Its stated objective is to provide safe housing for vulnerable Sendong survivors, 
where safety is defined primarily in terms of a low risk of natural hazards. Similar to the other 
official post-disaster sleeping spaces, relocation sites were primarily conceived and run by 
trustees, highly exclusionary, and limited by financial and other constraints. In other ways, 
relocation sites are unique and underscore what trustees deem as the key tenets of the 
vulnerability discourses. These elements derive from the theoretically permanent character of 
resettlement sites. This section analyses the types, geographical location, look and feel, and 
functioning of CDO’s relocation sites. 
Three main types  
In CDO, there are relocation sites developed by the regional and municipal governments, others 
by the Catholic Church, and one by academe (Xavier University). Each of the three sponsors 
subcontracted the actual building of relocation houses to other organisations, namely Habitat for 
Humanity Philippines, Gawad Kalinga, and the Chinese donors. At each site, there are houses 
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built by one, two or even all three organisations. Table 6.1 lists the resettlement sites by type, and 
Figure 6.2d shows these sites on a map. 
Table 6.1. Resettlement sites for CDO’s Sendong survivors categorised by type. All but two sites 
are located within Cagayan de Oro city limits. 
Government relocation site Catholic Church relocation site University relocation site 
Berjaya Village Caritas Village Xavier Ecoville 
Calaanan (multiple sites) Divine Mercy Village (Opol)  
Canitoan (multiple sites) Opol (Opol)  
Indahag Phase I Tabang Cagayan Village  
Indahag Phase II   
Pagatpat   
 
Although Cagayaños distinguish among these three different types of sites, the on-site differences 
among them are relatively minor, with Xavier Ecoville as one notable exception. As the Sendong 
coordinator of the archdiocese’s Social Action Center ministry noted, the distinction among 
government, church and academe sites lies in who funds it, and not in what is there. Even this 
distinction is murky because all three types received funding from a variety of public and private 
sources.  
Basically it’s the same [for all relocation sites insofar as] the funds for the construction of 
the house and for the purchase of the land are donations from different sources. Even 
the permanent relocation program of the government, the funds for the construction of 
the house came both from the government and the private sector. Like, for example, for 
the relocation centres of the government [agency] Department of Social Welfare and 
Development, it came from San Miguel Corporation, it came from SM Foundation. The 
same is true of the one handled by Xavier University. It came from donations from 
private sectors. The only difference is for the academe and for the Church [relocation 
sites], all donations for the purchase of the property, for the building of the houses, it 
came from private sector because government cannot come in, they cannot use public 
funds in private property. These are donations from different sources, both here in the 
Philippines and abroad.  
All the stakeholders involved in building permanent housing were invited to join the “Local 
Inter-Agency Committee,” or LIAC, a task force headed by the mayor. LIAC was charged with 
creating and implementing guidelines for everything pertaining to resettlement sites, from 
eligibility rules to square footage. The committee agreed that all the houses – whether built by 
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Habitat for Humanity Philippines, Gawad Kalinga, or the Chinese donors – should be basically 
the same. The uniformity was a deliberate strategy to avoid jealousy among beneficiaries living in 
houses sponsored by various private sector, government, religious and other funders. As one 
LIAC member recounted, the rationale was that “survivors will not say ‘why is it that houses built 
by the private sector [are] better than [those] of the government?’ ” 
A peripheral location  
CDO is a sprawling city with very little unoccupied land near the city centre, so, not surprisingly, 
resettlement sites are located in the periphery and even in the neighbouring municipality of Opol 
(Fig. 6.2d), where undeveloped land could be purchased at affordable prices. Potential sites were 
selected based on their availability, and a successful inspection ascertaining whether the land was 
livable and safe. To a lesser degree, politics affected site selection. The availability and suitability 
of the lands identified as resettlement areas does not mean they are attractive to either future 
residents or trustees; in the TS Sendong strategic action plan, the National Economic and 
Development Authority points out that these sites “still have a long way to go for barren lands to 
be transformed into a promise land” (NEDA 2012, 42). Not only are they undeveloped, but all of 
the lands offered and used for resettlement sites in CDO are between three and 20 km from the 
city centre, or a 40 to 120 minute ride on public transit costing between $0.22 and 0.66 each way 
– several times longer, farther, and more expensive than commuting from their old settlements. 
As a consequence of their geographic isolation, resettled survivors have difficulty accessing 
livelihood opportunities, services, and amenities.  
All the relocation sites are situated on city land. Some sites, such as the Calaanan sites, are on 
land previously purchased by the city and prepared through the mayor’s land-banking strategy. 
Other sites are on land owned or purchased by other trustees, then subsequently donated to the 
city. As the vice president of a major power and utilities company explained, the city must hold 
the land deed before the Department of Public Works and Highways will issue a plan for road 
and drainage infrastructure, and the city must approve the overall development plan before 
permanent electrification can commence.  
Our problem [of the power and utilities company] is we cannot just drive in the lines 
inside the property. We need to have a development plan so we know where to locate our 
lines. We cannot remove and reinstall the lines whenever somebody says, ‘You trespassed 
on our property, remove the line.’ So we will want something permanent. So we are 
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requiring any relocation site to agree [to] a formal and formally-approved development 
plan so that we know where our lines should pass and we can get the easement or right of 
way. You cannot disrupt the service once it’s there just because we just crossed over the 
line of the people’s [property].  
Thus, setting up temporary or unapproved connections is not an option. It is the permanent 
quality of the resettlement sites that makes it all the more important that the critical steps of 
turning the land over to the city and obtaining approval of the development plan are fulfilled. 
The fact that relocation sites are located on city land cuts both ways: it facilitates the intervention 
of some trustees (e.g. for electrification), but it also imposes restrictions on what residents can do 
with their houses. 
In addition to their availability, relocation sites were selected according to a broadly defined safety 
criterion. Sites were considered safe if they had a low risk of natural hazards, especially flooding. 
To a lesser degree, safety also encompassed a lack of physical violence and crime, and the ability 
to carry out one’s livelihood. The characteristics of actual relocation sites, however, belie the 
safety claim.  
Many of the sites were identified as safe sites because “they are in higher grounds.” For example, 
barangays Lumbia and Indahag are plateaus in the southern part of the city and each contain 
several relocation sites, which are unlikely to experience flooding. Other relocation sites – in 
particular sites located on land previously purchased through land-banking and prepared for the 
piso-piso program – do not exhibit the same low hazard risk. Consequently, some houses were 
built next to what are locally called “live creeks” known to rise and flood nearby areas during the 
rainy season. There are houses located in landslide-prone areas at the bottom of steep, clear-cut 
valley walls (Fig. 6.6). According to an engineer involved in a national hazard-mapping project, 
building in hazard-prone areas reflects the tendency of Philippine politicians to routinely ignore 
hazard maps and local knowledge of flooding patterns when approving development plans.  
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Fig. 6.6. Relocation houses built between a steep landslide-prone hill (on the right) and a live 
creek (on the left) that floods nearby areas during the rainy season. 
The achievement of the social and economic components of safety is similarly unresolved at 
relocation sites. The security issue was addressed on-site, with mixed success, by maintaining a 
police presence and offering religious activities and values formation trainings. Dealing with the 
livelihoods issue was much more difficult. Accessibility to the city was a consideration, for at least 
some of the trustees who identified livelihood opportunities as a critical element of recovery. Yet 
these same trustees acknowledged that some sites, such as those in barangays Lumbia and Indahag, 
are not exactly easy to access. The choice to locate resettlement sites there was partially based on 
their growth potential, in terms of both residential and commercial growth. As one Sendong 
relocation site coordinator explained,  
The choice of Lumbia and Indahag [as relocation sites] is also because the city has 
identified these barangays as the growth areas in terms to be a residential place. [They are 
also growth areas for business.] As a matter of fact, the old Lumbia airport will be 
redeveloped into a commercial area. According to the politicians, it will be developed like 
another global city like in Taguig. 
But, the envisioned growth is targeted at the middle class, and would exclude many of the urban 
poor who reside in the resettlement sites. As a group, the urban poor largely self-exclude from 
the middle to high end malls in CDO (e.g. SM Mall and Centrio Mall), opting instead to go malling 
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(i.e. shopping or window-shopping) at the lower end Guisano and Limketkai malls. When I 
pointed out that a CDO adaptation of the Bonifacio Global City51 in Taguig City would be very 
exclusive and would most likely leave out most of the city’s poor (including the residents of the 
relocation sites), the Sendong coordinator wholeheartedly agreed.  
Another example illustrates the mismatch between the economic opportunities envisioned by 
trustees and the ability of the presumed beneficiaries at relocation sites to access them. An 
executive from the corporate social responsibility office of a major Philippine corporation noted 
that his firm was initially interested in building a business process outsourcing operation (BPO or 
call centre) in CDO as part of its post-Sendong disaster assistance package. If the city could 
provide the firm with land near the workers’ residences (e.g. near the Calaanan relocation sites), 
the company would hire thousands of English-speaking workers, train them, and pay them well. 
In the Philippines, BPOs do indeed offer good, well-paying jobs; as one informant lamented, 
these call centres are staffed by college graduates trained as chemists, nurses, architects, 
engineers, and biologists because they earn more by answering phone calls than by working in 
their chosen profession. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Sendong survivors living in 
relocation sites would be hired as BPO staff because they are not fluent in English. If a BPO was 
built in CDO, the urban poor would be excluded from these jobs.  
These two examples underscore the lacuna between the thinking underlying the plans of trustees 
(i.e. they identify future growth potential and economic opportunities for skilled and specialised 
workers) and the realities of many of the urban poor resettlement site residents (i.e. they need 
immediate work in a livelihood that does not require advanced formal education). Furthermore, 
the objective of ensuring safety through sustainable livelihoods is undermined by the 
geographical isolation of the relocation sites. Put another way, trustees have invested significant 
resources in bringing Sendong survivors into the market economy through a variety of livelihood 
trainings, starter kit donations, and no-interest livelihood loans, but will not see a return on 
                                                          
51 Bonifacio Global City, also called “The Fort,” is home to Manila’s financial district, many foreign 
embassies, hotels and conference centres, and numerous high-end retail, commercial and residential 
skyscrapers. Unlike most other parts of Manila, Bonifacio Global City is organised on a grid, is pedestrian-
friendly, and has large swathes of greenspace and designated parks. It is not a space typically accessed by 
the urban poor. 
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investment because the beneficiaries are essentially trapped at relocation sites and thereby 
excluded from market opportunities.  
Geographical isolation thus exacerbates economic constraints. The lack of jobs near relocation 
sites, the commute into the city, and the failure of skills trainings and livelihood assistance to 
produce livelihoods generating sufficient and reliable income left families with unattractive 
options: spend a significant portion of their time and money on commuting, cut back on 
expenditures, send some household members to live and work in the city, or steal food from 
neighbours or construction materials from nearby unfinished resettlement houses. Although state 
actors clearly recognise that failing to bundle livelihood opportunities with ongoing and proposed 
housing projects will cause “the quality of life of relocated families [to] further suffer, make the 
underprivileged poorer, and increase social ills and crimes,” no trustee – from any segment of 
society – had successfully addressed this challenge (OCD 2012, 11). 
Sights, sounds and smells  
Being located away from the noisy and polluted downtown core, resettlement sites boast a 
quieter and cleaner atmosphere than the informal settlements near the city centre where most 
residents used to live. One Ecoville resident described the site as “comfortable because it’s 
windy, cool, looks like a baryo,” then contrasted it with the city, which is “overcrowded, hot, 
abundant, busy [but] it has fish, meat and vegetables.” Her statement points to the sights, sounds 
and smells typical of CDO’s resettlement sites, which necessarily reflect what types of 
infrastructure and activities are present or absent.  
CDO’s resettlement sites are first and foremost housing developments. The basic minimum 
components of a relocation site are: houses, roads, and water and electricity hook-ups. Hook-ups 
for water are either communal on the street or in individual houses, those for electricity are 
installed in each housing unit. At the government-sponsored resettlements sites, the beneficiaries 
typically moved into their new houses and lived there for several months before the water and 
electricity were fully connected, and the roads paved. For example, in January 2013, the city’s fire 
trucks were still required to occasionally deliver water to relocation sites. By March 2013, the 
Indahag Phase I, Berjaya and most Calaanan relocation sites had been fully energised, and 
electrical hook-ups for Indahag Phase II were almost complete. In April 2013, the roads at 
Indahag Phase II were not yet fully paved. Residents considered the incomplete roads a mere 
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nuisance, but were much more frustrated by the poor or lack of access to water and electricity. In 
fact, the latter problem compelled many households to delay moving into their allocated 
relocation house or to adopt a circular migration or split household strategy. 
The focus on housing and the emphasis on economical building – in terms of both financial cost 
and space (e.g. maximum number of units per unit of land) – resulted in relocation sites lacking 
on-site spaces for commerce, leisure, public, and ecosystem services. To expedite and facilitate 
the building process, all the trees were felled and the landscape rebuilt with dense concrete 
housing, concrete roads and concrete gutters at all but two sites (both funded by religious 
donors), resulting in relocation sites that are frequently very hot during the day. According to 
LIAC guidelines, there is no requirement for other infrastructure, such as green space and parks, 
play areas for children, schools, medical clinics, markets or stores, restaurants, multipurpose 
courts, public transit stations, financial services, etc. All of these items, except for private 
businesses, are the responsibility of the local government. Some donors allocated funds for these 
extras; for example, religious donors typically built chapels and multipurpose courts at sites that 
were too far from neighbouring communities to avail of their infrastructure. The importance of 
this presumed non-essential infrastructure to the residents’ quality of life is illustrated by an 
incident at Xavier Ecoville. Shortly after new playground equipment was unveiled at the site, it 
was destroyed, perhaps partially attributable to the quality, but mostly because of the number of 
children using it. The head of the Ecoville infrastructure team elaborated on the team’s reaction: 
After it was being installed, about in two days, there was a mix of emotion. At one point 
we were dismayed because the facilities installed – the swing – were destroyed already. At 
one point we were saying, if you could just imagine children, not being able to play for a 
year and then you give them something. So you know, it’s even [expected with] so many 
children playing in the playground. They were really deprived of these facilities for a year, 
and then suddenly it appears in front of them. So, what would you expect? Imagine 
children, not being able to play for a year and then now – all of a sudden – you give them 
something. So, it’s something that you would expect would happen. So, well, we just have 
to repair it and repair it and repair it. It’s a pretty small equipment for 500 families. We 
were telling the [funder] we need more. This small space could not accommodate all the 
children in this community.  
The informant points out that the children “were really deprived.” They were not denied food, 
water, medical care, shelter, or other essentials; instead, they were denied opportunities for play, 
and a physical space specifically designed for play. If a lack of playground equipment deprives 
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children, imagine how the lack of other types of non-housing infrastructures affects the quality of 
life of residents accustomed to living in the city centre with all the infrastructure and services it 
offers. 
A municipal official recounted that the city is developing plans to erect markets, schools, 
churches, and multipurpose buildings at the relocation sites, but that houses were always the 
primary focus, with everything else a distant second. In most cases, space was allocated in the site 
development plan for an open area that can later be transformed into a covered court, 
community centre, or other community building. Most donors gave money for houses, and the 
three main building organisations were tasked with building houses. When non-housing 
infrastructure was built, it was paid for with funds specially solicited by the main sponsor of the 
particular resettlement site. According to regional government informants, it was difficult for 
non-government trustees to build most forms of non-housing infrastructure because of the 
official delineation of responsibilities.  
The housing units at all sites are densely packed and nearly identical. The houses are made of 
concrete and have a floor area of 21 m2 (± 1 m2), which can be expanded by 10 m2 if a loft is 
added. The loft is not standard, but some donors (mostly religious donors) paid for the addition. 
All Xavier Ecoville houses have a loft. Depending on the relief and hydrological features of each 
individual site and the preferences of the funder and the builder, the houses are built as single 
detached houses, duplexes, quadruplexes, or row houses. There are minor cosmetic differences in 
the external appearance of Habitat, Gawad Kalinga and Chinese donors-built houses, and in the 
design of the floor plan (Fig. 6.7). All the houses and other infrastructure at all relocation sites are 
arranged on a grid, which, as Scott (1998) points out, facilitates the work of trustees in everything 
from laying down power and water lines, to registering voters, to responding to emergencies. 
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Fig. 6.7. Relocation housing built by Habitat for Humanity Philippines (6 April 2013, previous 
page top), Gawad Kalinga (6 April 2013, previous page bottom), and the Chinese donors (19 
March 2013, above) in CDO resettlement sites. 
Most resettlement sites rapidly took on the look and feel of an informal settlement once Sendong 
survivors began moving in. Before the houses were turned over to survivors, the builders 
provided the city with guidelines for ensuring the long-term integrity of the houses, including a 
stern recommendation to not modify the house. The city shared this information with the new 
residents, but, as soon as families moved in they started building extensions, planting gardens, 
and subdividing their houses into separate commercial and living spaces. Within weeks, the 
sameness of the houses and the sterility of the development disappeared (Fig. 6.8). For example, 
small sari-sari shops and vulcanising enterprises appeared in the small front yards of people’s 
homes. The non-concreted spaces at the end of dead-end streets, or the neighbouring hills were 
converted into home gardens with vegetables and papaya and banana trees. Children and skinny 
dogs run up and down the hot concrete roads; women wash clothes at communal water pumps; 
people buy and sell prepared food, pre-paid mobile phone load, and household items from 
home-based carinderias and sari-sari stores; and chickens and pigs poke around in the gardens in 
search of food.  
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Fig. 6.8. Habitat for Humanity Philippines-built relocation housing just before residents move in 
(27 November 2012, top) and several weeks after residents have moved in (19 March 2013, 
bottom). 
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The attitudes of trustees towards this customisation vary: a university dean lamented that a 
particular city-sponsored site already looked like a “shantytown,” archdiocese staff expressed 
indifference, and the city mayor welcomed the initiatives of residents in taking ownership of their 
new houses. An executive at a power and utilities company tasked with energising relocation sites 
added that the spiraling of relocation sites into slums was not merely cosmetic. 
I think the message is [that the] government and the private sector should assume the 
responsibility to make sure that these relocation sites do not become slum areas. It’s so 
sad. Very pitiful. When there is a relocation site, the crime rate goes up [in the site and in 
the neighbouring communities]. We were also scared that the relocatees might have a 
stigma. [They] are from the areas of the banks of the river. A lot of these areas have been 
inhabited by, you know, criminals, pickpockets, because it is easy to escape from this 
areas. And so, there is this stigma if you’re [from this] community.  
The purported “slumming” of relocation sites thus has repercussions within and beyond the 
designated resettlement spaces. If government and private sector (and non-governmental) 
trustees shirk their responsibility, there will be negative security and social consequences. Claims 
that crime and social stigma increase near “shantytown”-like resettlement sites were partially 
supported by statements from survivors and the police.  
The trustees involved at some sites, most notably at Xavier Ecoville, took measures to ensure the 
sites would not degrade into a “slum.” The University Board of Trustees and the Jesuits hired a 
well-known developer of high-end housing in Manila to design Ecoville. At the request of the 
developer, the university increased the area of land it donated from 5 to 5.3 ha to comfortably 
accommodate all its intended beneficiaries. The university limited the number of families to avoid 
future overcrowding and overtaxing the carrying capacity of the land, and to leave space for non-
residential facilities. One third of the property has temporary housing, a community garden, 
composting facilities, a row of talipapas (small specialised kiosks), a covered court and a small tree 
nursery (Fig. 6.9). Unlike other resettlement sites where gardens sprang up organically, gardens 
were incorporated into the design of Ecoville. Growing food was seen as a way for residents to 
feed themselves and to recapture the skills they were presumed to have as former farmers forced 
off their land with the expansion of plantations. The rest of the property has 518 concrete row 
houses, a small daycare and schoolhouse, a chapel, a playground, an indoor meeting room, a 
livelihoods centre, and offices. The relocation houses exceed the minimum standards used at the 
other sites, without straying outside the standard LIAC criteria. In some ways, Xavier Ecoville 
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was better planned than other parts of the barangay. Lumbia, for instance, has neither a site 
development plan nor a barangay-wide drainage system. According to the head of the Ecoville 
infrastructure team, in Lumbia, “they just let the water flow wherever it may go. Each resident 
would have to take care of his [or her] own property, so people dig their own canals.” In contrast, 
Xavier Ecoville has a well-researched and approved site development plan made by professionals 
in collaboration with Lumbia barangay officials. 
We had this [site development plan] prepared with all the technical descriptions, like the 
drainage system. The drainage system, water works, electrical, everything. So we had them 
prepared by our engineers here in the university. But actually the teaching engineers, the 
faculty members, they helped in developing the site and the actual designing of the 
houses. And we also worked with the barangay to establish the roads, which roads should 
be opened, which roads should be kept closed. 
The carefully designed elements of Ecoville reflect the optimistic view of the site’s trustees who 
desire a wholesome, self-sufficient community and not a transplanted slum. 
The different attitudes of academic, religious, city, and private sector trustees toward the 
customisation (or slumming) at resettlement sites are indicative of their respective adherences to 
vulnerability discourses and their respective understandings of the overarching objectives of 
resettling urban poor survivors in a relocation site. Chapter 7 analyses the ways in which trustees 
developed resettlement sites akin to what Jane Jacobs (1961) describes as the perpetual state 
project of “unslumming.” 
In this discussion of the physical space of relocation sites, two additional absences must be 
underlined. The first point is that on-site opportunities for acquiring money are rare. There are 
few livelihood opportunities apart from low-return, self-initiated self-employment within or near 
the resettlement sites. As indicated in the quotation opening this section, relocations sites do not 
have lots of “fish, meat and vegetables” because the economic activities, money and customers 
that make the city “abundant [and] busy” simply do not exist in the periphery. Relocated 
residents no longer have access to the high interest informal 5-6 loans they previously depended 
upon for making ends meet. Lenders assumed their former clients cannot find work in the 
resettlement sites and are thus no longer credit-worthy. These problems suggest that although 
trustees claim they want survivors to have secure and viable livelihoods, this objective is 
subordinate to transferring people into the newly built houses.  
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Fig. 6.9. The Xavier Ecoville transitional and permanent resettlement sites on 21 January 2013 
(top) and 14 March 2013 (bottom).  
Fences are the second conspicuous absence at relocation sites. None of the resettlement sites I 
visited in CDO or Opol was enclosed by a fence. Informal settlements and the residences of the 
urban poor typically do not have fences or gates. They are open. In contrast, when a new middle 
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or upper class development is built in CDO, the first physical structure to be built is a fence 
enclosing the area. Only after the community is gated can construction begin on the roads, 
houses and other facilities contained within the gate. Although the individual houses might not 
be fenced in, or might just have a fence serving nothing more than a cosmetic purpose, the 
neighbourhood itself is fenced in.  
The lack of fences at relocation sites can be partially explained by economic constraints and 
design objectives. With a limited budget, trustees may have prioritised building a few additional 
housing units over a superfluous fence. Or, trustees may have perceived fences as tools 
potentially undermining their attempts to integrate the physical space of relocation site into the 
host barangay. Or, trustees may have prioritised building other types of infrastructure that would 
facilitate their work. At Ecoville, for example, one of the first structures to be built was a large 
covered community centre where people could gather to disseminate information, distribute 
relief goods, and socialise. As such, it was more important to create a space in which people 
come together – both insiders (i.e. residents) and outsiders (i.e. donors) – than to fence off the 
area. 
The lack of fences also situates relocation sites as spaces for the urban poor, a group 
characterised as deficient and different from the upper and middle classes. In the Philippines, like 
in many other places around the world, fences are erected as barriers to keep some people out 
and other people in. The wall in the West Bank, for example, serves a dual purpose: (1) to 
prevent Palestinians from “leaking out” into Israel or Occupied Territories, and (2) to protect 
Jews from Arab Palestinians (Weizman 2007, 172). Fences are both literally and metaphorically 
“structural;” they are physical structures (in the engineering sense), and they are visual cues of the 
institutions and structures in society that delimit power and class. Fences should not be overused, 
however, because their presence suggests those within fear the outside; hence, building a fence 
gives power to the adversary (Weizman 2007). Weizman (2007, 133) points out that not building 
fences is also a deliberate strategy because it allows for expansion into new territories. As such, a 
fence is an indicator of wealth, of the power to exclude people from entering, or alternatively, of 
protecting the inhabitants from being exposed to certain undesirable people. It is a constant and 
glaring reminder of difference and exclusion. The absence of a fence in formal developments 
planned by predominantly middle class trustees is equally telling. 
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Rules  
Rules operate both as an external power that sets limits to behaviour and prohibits certain 
actions, and as an internal discipline imbuing and remaking social processes (Mitchell 2006). At 
the majority of relocation sites, the rules are designed primarily for determining eligibility and for 
stipulating what can and cannot be done with the relocation house. Rules about appropriate 
behaviour are largely absent and left to national laws and municipal bylaws, or to rules 
spontaneously generated and enforced by the residents themselves, for example through a 
homeowners’ association. The exception to the hands-off approach is Ecoville. From the outset, 
the importance of rules was unmistakable. During the resident selection interview, candidates 
were informed of Ecoville rules. To proceed to the next step, candidates had to agree to abide by 
a code of conduct. In addition to these initial rules, new rules were added once the residents 
moved into the temporary housing. The ensuing discussion summarises the generic rules 
applicable to all resettled survivors, and delves into the particularities of rules at Xavier Ecoville.  
There were stringent rules delineating who is and who is not eligible for relocation housing. For 
example, relocation house recipients must provide certification from a barangay official that their 
house was washed away or irreparably damaged. They must possess a government-issued family 
access card indicating they are Sendong survivors. Their names must be on one or more of the 
official lists of Sendong survivors made by the city, the DSWD, and the archdiocese. They must 
prove they had a prolonged stay at an evacuation camp, or that they formerly resided in a 
designated no-build zone. They cannot own property in another part of CDO. They must 
demonstrate that they do not have the capacity to rebuild a house, or cannot access other means 
to build or buy another house within one year’s time. This last criterion excluded most middle 
class survivors and just-above-the-poverty-threshold survivors working in the formal sector 
because both groups could apply for a Pag-Ibig or other employer-sponsored loan to repair or 
purchase a house. These rules, developed and enforced by LIAC, were occasionally relaxed. For 
instance, some relocated survivors did own land in other parts of the city, and others had resided 
outside of the Sendong flood affected areas. In general, however, only applicants who met the 
eligibility criteria were placed on a list of survivor households that would eventually receive a free, 
concrete relocation house. For many, the house was the last form of assistance to which they 
were entitled; once survivors moved in, they are typically cut off from disaster relief goods and 
services other than livelihood assistance. 
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There were rules restricting the number of and type of familial relationships among residents who 
can inhabit a single dwelling. A maximum of seven people are permitted to live in each housing 
unit. While this cap is based on the small size of relocation houses, the average size of Filipino 
families, and the aim of avoiding overcrowding, it also indicates a willingness on the part of 
trustees to actively shape the concept of “family” and “household.” Government agencies 
assume an average Filipino family size of five: a mother, a father, and three children. Yet, it is not 
uncommon for urban poor families to have more than five people living under the same roof. 
There were five to seven cases at Ecoville where Sendong survivor households had eight or more 
members, and the families had to be split into two units. The “core family” consisting of a couple 
and their children was kept together; other members such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, 
and other close or distant relations were grouped together into another house. Large families 
were occasionally penalised in other ways; one NGO’s eligibility criteria for its educational grant 
to survivor households included a stipulation that recipient families have four or fewer children. 
Thus, the policies dictating who is part of the family unit, who can live together under a single 
roof, and what size families deserve assistance are based on what certain trustees qualify as family, 
and not what the beneficiaries themselves experience.  
In addition to the eligibility rules, there was a second set of on-site rules. These latter rules 
specified which types of physical changes to the relocation house and lot were permissible, to 
whom the house and lot could be sold or transferred, and which behaviours, activities, and goods 
are allowable, and which are banned.  
Rules about renovating and selling relocation houses are another device used by trustees to 
problematise and render technical (Li 2007a), thereby maintaining their control over people and 
landscape. Recipients of relocation houses sign a contract, written in English, agreeing to a suite 
of conditions. A municipal official in charge of relocation housing elaborated on the content of 
the contract. 
The contract is all about their [the beneficiary’s] responsibility. This is a contract between 
the city and the beneficiary because, according to the policy guidelines under the Local 
Inter-Agency Committee, there [is a] set of policies that governs the awardee because we 
wanted to prevent them from stealing or from having some business [using] the awarded 
house and lot. We do not allow any IDP or any beneficiary awardee to transfer without 
complying this one [the contract]. So, it is being signed by the awardee and also the city 
mayor. So here in this contract it elaborates about the rights and duties, the perpetual 
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rights and duties, the limitations that we [beneficiaries] cannot just own the house and 
then let other people live [in it]. [The contract] also elaborates on who will own this 
awarded house and lot after they [the beneficiaries] grow old or they will die. It is 
stipulated here who will be the next beneficiary. [It delimits] the responsibility [of] the 
community [regarding] climate change – in terms of providing, helping establish a 
community of dignity, a community free from the disaster.  
As stipulated in another part of the contract, homeowners are forbidden from making 
modifications to their house because any changes might affect the structural integrity of the 
building. This particular rule is not enforced and was broken almost from the instant survivors 
began moving in. Such customisation is a way for residents to assert their control over space, to 
defy state rules. From the perspective of trustees, such allowances can be read as a form of 
compromise in which there is a “tacit agreement to look the other way when rules are broken” 
(Li 2007b, 280). Homeowners cannot sell either the land or the house because the land upon 
which the house sits is owned by the local government. Beneficiaries can, however, pass the 
house on to their children. This not-quite full ownership underscores the paternalistic attitude of 
trustees, and their reluctance to relinquish control and truly allow survivors to exercise control 
over their own lives. This situation breeds uncertainty in housing tenure because residents never 
know if or when their lot will be reclaimed by the titled owner. This situation is especially 
troubling for residents who had previous experience with demolition and eviction. Resettlement 
can thus be framed as a land problem, not just in the natural hazard sense, but also in the 
(in)security of land tenure and ownership sense. These conditions, and the other characteristics of 
resettlement sites discussed in this section, point to the gap between the stated objective of 
providing safe housing and its actual achievement at resettlement sites. The gap among stated, 
attained and attainable objectives is even wider when the broad visions of resettlement sites are 
studied.  
Unlike other relocation housing sites established after other disasters in the Philippines, the CDO 
resettlement sites do not have minimum residency requirements for retaining ownership of the 
house. At two resettlement sites in General Nakar and Infanta, Quezon, for example, residents 
are required to spend a minimum of two nights per week in their resettlement house if their farm 
is located in the same municipality, or two nights per month if their farm is further away in 
another municipality. Without such residency restrictions, relocation house recipients frequently 
sleep at various sites in the city that better facilitate their ability to meet their livelihood, health 
 
 
 292   
 
and personal needs and preferences. These recipients demonstrate a hybrid post-Sendong 
sleeping trajectory. 
To help ensure the proper functioning and the long-term success of relocation sites, trustees 
strongly urged residents to form committees or associations, especially homeowners’ associations. 
Most relocation sites, like most planned neighbourhoods in CDO and in other parts of the 
Philippines, have homeowners’ associations. A homeowners’ association plays several roles: it 
brings order and stability, it promotes architectural integrity, it ensures basic maintenance, it may 
support collectively-owned recreational or other facilities available to residents, and it tacitly 
enforces individual conformity to group values. Members must maintain their houses, pay certain 
fees, and comply with use regulations and other association rules. The legal rights and 
responsibilities of a homeowners’ association are laid out in The Magna Carta for Homeowners and 
Homeowners’ Associations (R.A. 9904), enacted into law in 2010 (GoP 2010c). Although trustees 
generally concurred on the necessity of homeowners’ associations, there was intense negotiation 
and debate over when such associations should be created. For example, should the associations 
be formed once survivors start moving into the resettlement sites, to ensure the smooth running 
of the site right from the outset? Or, should the associations be formed only after all the residents 
have moved in, thereby ensuring the rules and policies created by the association would have 
been produced by all residents, and not potentially favour the first-comers at the expense of the 
later-comers? Another timing consideration was a fact that no key informant actually verbalised, 
even though they were undoubtedly aware of it. Officially, external trustees cease to exert 
significant influence over the internal governance of each relocation site once the site’s 
homeowners’ association is officially registered with the national government’s Housing and 
Land Use Regulatory Board. Put another way, the same regulation endorsed by trustees 
effectively shuts them out of the day-to-day running of the relocation site. In CDO, there was no 
single resolution to the timing debate. In the end, homeowners’ associations were established at 
different times during the move-in period at different resettlement sites. 
In addition to a homeowners’ association, Xavier Ecoville has committees. Each adult resident is 
required to join at least one committee. There is a committee for peace and order, for health, for 
education, for agriculture, for family relationships, for infrastructure, for finance, and for 
livelihoods. Committees are responsible for everything from managing the chapel and playground 
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equipment, to helping to organise and fund livelihood trainings, to polling residents on what sort 
of additional infrastructure should be built. Committee work was presumed to help build the 
social elements of a community, to encourage collective problem-solving, to promote self-
governance, and to foster trust among strangers. These attributes were all part of the rationale of 
Ecoville trustees for instituting mandatory participation in one or more committees. 
At most of the relocation sites, the formal, relocation site-specific rules imposed by external 
trustees ended with the rules about eligibility, homeowner contracts and homeowner associations. 
What external trustees did bring to relocation sites were less official rules and more highly 
recommended guidelines. For example, the success of the values training at Ecoville inspired the 
implementation of special seminars, educational classes and orientation events at government and 
church-run relocation sites. To combat youth delinquency, domestic violence, and other 
problems, residents were strongly encouraged to undertake the Gawad Kalinga values formation 
training. Successful completion of the training could not be enforced as a condition for housing 
because residents had already moved into their relocation houses. Still, municipal and regional 
government agencies perceived it as a means to address the peace and order problems prevalent 
at some relocation sites. Consequently, they supported religious and non-governmental 
organisations willing to implement corrective actions that would help ensure the peaceful and 
proper functioning of relocation sites. Frequently, these actions took the form of socially-
enforced informal rules. 
The major exception to the hands-off approach to official rule-setting was, not surprisingly, 
Xavier Ecoville. On-site staff explained that its rules help to build a sustainable community based 
on trust, self-motivated initiatives, and self-reliance. Ecoville residents were introduced to a 
variety of rules when they first moved into the temporary housing portion of the site. For 
instance, households had to pay a portion of the electricity and water bills and tend to a small 
garden, and adults had to join one or more committees, complete a values training formation, 
and fulfill a minimum of six hours of volunteer work on-site. To an extent, the practical 
outcomes of the rules are embraced by the residents. An elderly woman explained that gardening 
is a therapeutic and peaceful experience that allows her to forget the trauma of Sendong. Some 
men explained that their volunteer hours surveying the construction of their new concrete houses 
were important because it ensured quality control, and they could inform Ecoville staff if any of 
 
 
 294   
 
the builders were cutting corners to accelerate the construction process. Ecoville rules are well-
intentioned and anything but nefarious, but they do border on zealous. Moreover, they reflect a 
clear intentionality, a deliberate design in modifying the behaviour of residents.  
The attempt of Ecoville trustees to shape the behaviour is perhaps best illustrated by on-site 
bans. No pets, animals, videoke machines, smoking and drinking are permitted. Residents can 
and still do possess these things and partake in these activities, just not within the Ecoville 
boundaries. The rationale for and the repercussions of each banned activity or item are diverse. 
Smoking and drinking are considered vices. Anyone succumbing to these vices was clearly 
identified in the initial screen process. Their vice did not prevent their family from receiving a 
relocation house, but it did exclude them from receiving additional family or educational support 
grants from one of Ecoville’s NGO partners.  
The prohibition against keeping pets or any animal on-site had both emotional and economic 
consequences for the residents. Some residents had to give up their pets (mostly dogs), and leave 
them in the care of old neighbours or relatives living elsewhere. Residents rarely, if ever, see their 
old pets. One woman sadly recounted that her dog had had puppies, but that her neighbour, to 
whom she had given her dog, ate them. Other residents, especially those who lived in the Isla 
Puntod area of barangay Balulang, had raised farm animals, many of which were swept away in the 
flood. Some livestock and poultry had been replaced through the livelihood initiatives of the 
DSWD and NGOs, but these animals had to be given away to neighbours and relatives who 
would care for them off-site. When Ecoville residents can afford the time and expense to visit 
their animals, they do. Moving to Ecoville forced upon them a difficult choice to forego some of 
their wealth (e.g. animal capital) and future income in exchange for a free house outside of a 
flood-prone area.  
The rationale for the on-site ban on videoke was never explained to me. It is not a particular 
aversion to musical performances, pop music or suggestive dancing; in fact, Ecoville trustees 
proudly support the public appearances of “Xavier Ecoville Got Talent,” an Ecoville youth 
group that enthusiastically partakes in all three. Instead, I suspect the ban is partly based on a 
desire to create a calm and peaceful space, unpolluted by scratchy, loud and rambunctious 
singing. Partly, it is because of the affiliation with activities that frequently occur alongside a night 
of videoke, namely drinking, smoking, mahjong-playing, and raucous partying. Partly, it is because 
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of the association of videoke bars and prostitution; in CDO, many of the videoke bars double as 
brothels, with the matron of the videoke bar, often a former sex worker herself, acting as a 
brothel keeper. Despite the on-site ban, residents continue to belt out a constant stream of 
machine-amplified tunes at one of several videoke bars located just outside the Ecoville 
perimeter, and operated by entrepreneurial Lumbia residents.  
The ban on pets, animals, videoke machines, smoking, and drinking demonstrate a particular 
vision of what is right and wrong, and what should and should not be done or kept in a 
community. The values of cleanliness, discipline and calm that religious trustees envisioned for 
Ecoville are enacted imperfectly within the site’s physical boundaries (e.g. when videoke music 
trespasses into the Ecoville airspace) and are partially (or even entirely) rejected by the residents 
when they engage in prohibited activities off-site. Although residents may consent to the conduct 
of their conduct inside Ecoville, they do not necessarily assimilate the underlying intention or 
values. The spatial compliance with rules can be, in fact, a subversive strategy for obtaining 
otherwise mutually exclusive benefits. 
There is yet another layer of rules at Ecoville. These rules are more fluid, and they are framed and 
understood differently by different residents, on-site staff, and university-based trustees. They 
cover what residents can and cannot do, when tasks must be completed, and other minor things. 
The site’s director explained that these rules were created by the residents themselves. Several 
residents, however, dispute this claim, insisting that it was the university who imposed more and 
onerous rules on them. Irrespective of who creates the rules, at Ecoville, there is a strict policing 
of rules, mostly self-policing among the residents. It is somewhat akin to the Big Brother feeling 
of constantly being under the scrutiny of your neighbours in an Orwellian dystopia (Orwell 
1949), or the design of Jewish settlements in the West Bank that allows for the inward-facing 
gaze (Weizman 2007). A list tracking the rule violations of each resident is posted in a public part 
of the site. As one elderly woman resident explained, “if you have two black marks next to your 
name then you will be kicked out.” As of April 2013, only one survivor was expelled for failing to 
abide by the rules. For minor rule-abiding lapses, residents must do extra chores such as cleaning 
the CRs and tending to the compost. These on-site rules and the way in which they are policed by 
the staff and residents demonstrate the exercise of discipline (cf. Mitchell 2006).  
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In a powers of exclusion framework, the rules at relocation sites operationalise the regulation, 
force, and legitimation powers. The rules shape the physical character and the social dynamics of 
resettlement sites. The rules encourage, even compel, residents to behave in certain ways, without 
ever coercively forcing them to comply. The rules shape relocation sites into spaces of exclusion, 
at times excluding the very trustees who aim to control the space and the people within it. The 
peripheral location of the resettlement sites further cements the exclusionary character of the 
third major type of official post-disaster sleeping space.  
Balik Provincia 
The vast majority of Sendong survivors who followed an institutionalised pathway slept at one or 
more safe spaces run by state and non-state trustees, and eventually moved into a resettlement 
site. There was, however, a very small minority of survivor households who followed an 
alternative institutionally-endorsed pathway.  
The Balik Provincia program encourages survivors to literally “go back to your province.” It is a 
national program of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) implemented 
by regional DSWD offices. The intended beneficiaries of Balik Provincia are “those who are not 
amenable to settling here after what they’ve been through” and “families [who] don’t plan on 
staying in the city.” While participation is entirely voluntary, regional government officials actively 
encouraged evacuees to partake. After their documents are processed, Balik Provincia participants 
receive a one-way fare “to anywhere in the Philippines, wherever you are from” plus an 
additional amount for food allowance and porter service. It was a potentially lucrative option for 
large families because funds were allocated per individual, and not per family or per household.  
Of the tens of thousands of affected families, the number of CDO-based families who took the 
deal was “more or less, maybe a hundred.” Whether or not the program attained its stated goal of 
returning beneficiaries to their former provincial homes is unknown. As of March 2013, the 
regional government agency responsible for follow-up had not contacted municipal officials to 
ascertain whether program participants had actually arrived at their destinations. This lack of 
follow-up and the low participation rate reflect the minor importance of the program, and more 
importantly, the harsh reality of life in the home provinces of CDO migrants. Philippine 
provinces have been gutted of livelihood opportunities and land for people with limited means. 
They do not offer many of the benefits of cities in terms of quality of life, and educational, social, 
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and economic opportunities. Decades of government investment in the development of urban 
areas, largely at the expense of rural areas in the provinces, are paying dividends in attracting and 
retaining the rural-turned-urban poor. Despite the hardships of city life, the vast majority of 
potential Balik Provincia beneficiaries residing in CDO do not want to return to their provinces. 
Government agencies recognised this situation, and allocated their resources accordingly. 
Balik Provincia reflects another discourse reactivated by Southeast Asian governments during the 
2007-08 food crisis and the 2008-09 global economic crisis. Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011, 201) 
describe it as the “discourse of the ability of the Southeast Asian countryside to serve as a ‘safety 
net’ for redundant workers [from urban and industrial sectors], who can return to ‘their’ villages 
to wait out the crisis.” The discourse exaggerates the capacity of rural areas to absorb redundant 
workers and ignores the reasons why they migrated to the city in the first place. During the 1997-
98 Asian economic crisis, for example,  
[i]n Java, many of the people who had left villages for the cities were precisely those who 
had lost their land, decades or sometimes generations previously, and they also had been 
squeezed out of opportunities to work as sharecroppers or labourers in the fiercely 
competitive agrarian scene. […] That the concept of the village as a safety net providing 
‘farm-financed social welfare’ re-emerged and was again promoted by the World Bank 
after another decade of deagrarianization, and at a time when agriculture in the region 
was facing a profound crisis, seems perverse (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 201). 
Helping survivors return home is only one objective of Balik Provincia. A more significant and 
urgent aim of the program was to immediately alleviate pressure on overtaxed official post-
disaster spaces (and perhaps in the medium to long-term, to alleviate pressure on an overcrowded 
city, too). As one regional government official explained, motivating this program was the desire 
to “decongest the evacuation camps.” Recall that the evacuation camps were very undesirable 
places to stay and were consuming copious amounts of state resources. Balik Provincia can thus be 
read as a state attempt to exclude certain people from official post-disaster spaces in CDO. By 
paying survivors to leave the city permanently, the DSWD program used positive incentives to 
promote certain behaviours; in order words, the state regulated people out. 
Hors-système pathways 
Institutionalised pathways monopolised media, public, and trustee attention, shaping what people 
assumed were the spaces frequented by Sendong survivors. Yet, many Sendong-affected people 
simply avoided most or all official disaster aid spaces. Some households never ventured into an 
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evacuation camp, transitional housing site, or permanent relocation site. These people followed 
what I call an “hors-système” sleeping pathway because they remained outside the official disaster 
sleeping spaces run by state, religious and humanitarian trustees. A significantly larger group of 
people, even surpassing the number of people who followed an institutionalised sleeping 
pathway, pursued a “hybrid pathway” in which households slept in both official and non-official 
spaces. This section characterises the sleeping spaces of hors-système devotees, while the next 
section analyses those used by hybrid followers. 
Where do urban poor survivors sleep? 
Urban poor survivors put themselves on an irreversible hors-système trajectory when they decided 
to stay away from the evacuation camps. Sendong survivors were expected to follow a sequential 
path along institutionalised post-disaster spaces – from evacuation camp to transitional site to 
resettlement site. It was extremely rare for survivors to skip a step (or, using a powers of 
exclusion language, to break the inertia of an immovable institutionalised pathway). With the 
benefit of hindsight, the choice of whether or not to go to an evacuation camp was potentially 
life-altering.  
The hors-système urban poor survivors offered diverse reasons for why they did not go to official 
post-disaster spaces. Some people had other options. If they could, they preferred to stay with 
relatives whose homes were still habitable. Other people did not perceive any benefit of going to 
an evacuation camp, and just stayed put. Had they known a long stay at an evacuation camp 
would increase their chances of getting a free relocation house, then they would have gone. 
Evidence from the archdiocese’s database charting which survivors went to evacuation camps for 
Tropical Storm Sendong and Super-typhoon Pablo supports the free housing incentive 
hypothesis. An urban poor federation similarly recounted that many of its members and their 
neighbours who had avoided evacuation camps post-Sendong had willingly and pre-emptively 
evacuated one year later with the hope of getting a free house and lot. Many people deliberately 
avoided evacuation camps because they considered them unpleasant, overcrowded, and even 
dangerous. After observing that people at the camps were falling ill with leptospirosis, dengue, 
and festering open wounds, they opted to stay away, especially if they had a pre-existing health 
condition. Still other people were influenced by their employers who told them that the camps 
were unsafe and unsanitary.  
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The explanation of a Carmen-based sikad driver stands out because it explicitly draws upon his 
place-based sense of belonging. He simply stated, “I don’t go to evacuation because this is my 
place.” After his house and all its contents were completely washed away, he spent several 
months staying with friends and relatives in other parts of the city, which required a 30 minute, 
$0.20 commute to work each way. One year after the storm he remained without a permanent 
home. He slept in his sikad and bathed either in the Cagayan River or at the public bath at 
Carmen market at a cost of $0.22. Unlike most other interviewees, he never sought assistance 
from any trustee or member of his social network (apart from the people who gave him shelter 
during the initial months). For him, it was more important to stay in a familiar place “where I 
belong” than to risk being sent away by a trustee with whom he came in contact. As a single man 
with no dependents, he could prioritise his own well-being and not worry about the needs and 
desires of immediate family members. 
For a young vegetable seller and her family, it was both financially feasible and socially preferable 
to remain outside official post-disaster spaces. The 25 year old lives with her parents and seven 
siblings in barangay Kauswagan, just across the Maharlika Bridge from where she works in 
Consolacion selling vegetables at the market under the bridge. On Sendong night, her family took 
her father’s motorela to the bridge, to higher ground. When the water subsided, they returned to 
their house and lived on the second floor while they cleaned the flooded first floor. Because their 
house was only partially damaged and they had an intact second floor, they did not need to go to 
an evacuation centre. More importantly, they owned the house. Selling it was not an option 
because it is located within the no-build zone; the resale value of the house and lot plummeted to 
zero with Sendong, and it became legally impossible to transfer the deed. Yet, as homeowners of 
a partially damaged house, they were still eligible for government compensation; DSWD gave 
them $21.85. Even though they are eligible for relocation as residents of a no-build zone, the 
vegetable seller’s family does not want to be relocated. Their reasoning echoes the concerns of 
many resettled residents: the relocation sites are too far from the city, especially considering some 
of her siblings are still students and the sites are far from their school.  
Furthermore, it is economically possible for the family to remain in Kauswagan. The contents of 
her house, including all of her livelihood-related products were washed out with the flood waters. 
Like many other urban poor, she had no insurance. She stopped selling for one month while the 
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market was shut down and was cleaned and repaired by the market sellers. A relative living in 
CDO lent her $87.41 to restart her shop, and she has repaid the loan in full. Access to credit was 
critical in enabling her to rebuild her livelihood. Such access reveals that contrary to the 
assumption embedded in the illegal squatter, deficiency and different-from-us vulnerability 
discourses, urban poor families do have local social networks that can provide them with material 
assistance. Moreover, the resources obtained through the personal network of an urban poor 
survivor can exceed the resources obtained from trustees. For example, the amount of the 
relative’s loan was four times greater than the official compensation from DSWD. The long-term 
future of the vegetable seller’s business is uncertain. Pre-Sendong, she earned $17.48 per day, but 
many of her former clients, especially those from nearby Isla de Oro have been relocated. 
Consequently, in 2013 her daily earnings has dropped by nearly 40% to $10.93 per day. It is 
unlikely she can ever make up for these lost clients because the no-build zone prevents people 
from reclaiming and living in these spaces. 
Where do Muslim survivors sleep? 
For a variety of social, cultural, and religious reasons, Muslim survivors avoided post-disaster 
spaces. Post-disaster spaces were supposed to be open to all people regardless of religious 
affiliation. Yet, in practice, very few, if any, Muslims felt welcome in these spaces. If they could 
not stay in their own houses, they stayed with relatives, and occasionally with other Muslims in 
their homes or in one of the city’s mosques. 
Muslim families frequently adopted a temporary split householding strategy in which the husband 
would remain at the family house in CDO and the wife would bring the children to stay with 
relatives in Marawi City, 100km southwest of CDO. The man was expected to continue his work, 
which often involved small-scale entrepreneurial activities at or near the city’s main market. It 
was considered important to maintain a business presence in the aftermath of the disaster and 
not lose existing business connections. It was considered safer, more comfortable and more 
appropriate for the women and children to leave the city and live with extended family members 
while their CDO home was cleaned and repaired. Most Muslim split householding families 
eventually reunited and returned to their CDO homes. Only a few houses of Muslim Sendong 
survivors were permanently deserted by their former inhabitants. The hors-système pathways of 
Muslim Sendong survivors demonstrate a highly gendered migration pattern based on a gendered 
division of labour and entrenched constructs of gender. 
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Where do middle class survivors sleep? 
The interim safe spaces accessed by survivors with financial means were predominantly private 
spaces, including the homes of relatives and friends, hotels, rental apartments, and offices 
temporarily converted to apartments. The middle class avoided sleeping in evacuation camps and 
transitional sites for many of the reasons presented in this chapter. Because they had the capacity 
to repair or rebuild their houses, or to move into an entirely new house, they did not meet the 
eligibility criteria for a free, concrete resettlement house. To my knowledge, there was only one 
case of a middle class survivor (an individual, not a family) who moved into a relocation house. 
In CDO, middle class survivors typically returned to their old houses. They are an immobile 
population in that they chose to stay in hazard-prone locations (cf. GOS 2011). They had the 
financial means to return, clean, and rebuild, either through their personal savings or through the 
generous donations of their social network within and outside of the Philippines. The decision to 
return was a rational one. The neighbourhoods in which the middle class reside usually do not 
experience the regular flooding characteristic of the informal settlement neighbourhoods heavily 
hit by Sendong. These middle class developments are mostly located outside of the government-
declared no-build zone, so they retain the legal right to inhabit these spaces (Reach 2012). 
Regulation worked in their favour, ensuring their inclusion, whereas the same regulation 
prevented many of the urban poor who formerly resided in the no-build zone from returning 
home. Moreover, middle class survivors typically possess a formal deed and title to their house 
and lot, and are thus financially invested in a very specific non-portable, place-based capital. In 
the Philippines, house insurance is included in all mortgages. Thus, households with a mortgage 
had access to some financial compensation though their mortgage provider. Households that had 
paid their mortgage may not have had house insurance, and would have had to find alternate 
resources for repairing or rebuilding their houses. But, because they had finished paying for their 
house and lot, they too had a significant economic incentive to stay. A final factor compelling the 
middle class to return to their old houses is that the quality of the house structure, usually made 
of concrete and other long-lasting, structurally sound materials, would have been more likely to 
withstand raging floodwaters and be able to be repaired (as compared to the makeshift houses of 
the urban poor).  
When middle class survivors returned to their old houses, they frequently built one or more 
additional floors (called “panic rooms”) and/or stairs providing easy access to the roof. Many 
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Cagayaños describe this response as the “build-back-taller” strategy. This strategy was also 
adopted by urban poor survivors who returned to their former homes, and was financed through 
savings, loans, and donations from the survivor’s social network and/or from trustees (Fig. 6.10). 
 
Fig. 6.10. Renovations made to houses affected by Sendong floodwaters. A build-back-taller 
strategy was adopted by both middle class and urban poor survivors who built an upper floor 
with a so-called “panic room” (10 March 2013). 
Some middle class survivors did move. In a few exceptional cases in which they experienced 
extreme trauma (e.g. watching one’s child drown or swimming alongside snakes in the 
floodwaters), entire households did leave CDO and even Mindanao. More often, however, the 
middle class households who moved typically moved into middle class houses of equivalent or 
greater value as compared to their previous houses. Some families received enough money from 
friends and relatives to purchase a larger house in a highly desirable middle class neighbourhood. 
The most popular destinations were geophysically safer parts of the city – mostly in the plateau 
barangays near the Lumbia airport on the western side of the city. In fact, some developers were 
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actively advertising these developments as “flood-proof” or “flood-free.” The peripheral location 
of these new neighbourhoods added time and distance to commutes into the city for work, 
school, leisure, and other activities. But, because the middle class mostly have access to a private 
vehicle or take taxis, the added distance was not an obstacle. Instead, the difficulty in reaching 
these flood-proof neighbourhoods without private transportation (i.e. their exclusivity) was 
occasionally portrayed as a benefit in that the neighbourhoods will not attract illegal squatters or 
deficient or different vulnerable people. Put another way, some middle class survivors could use 
their economic clout as a power of exclusion.  
What distinguishes all hors-système survivors is that they chose to avoid official post-disaster 
sleeping spaces. Their exclusion from these spaces was a self-imposed and not a trustee-imposed 
exclusion. In theory, all survivors, including all urban poor, Muslim and middle class survivors, 
were permitted to stay at evacuation camps and transitional housing sites. Yet by design, these 
spaces were targeted at particular segments of CDO’s vulnerable population. The resulting 
character of these spaces and the people inhabiting them, which were carefully crafted by 
trustees, was frequently the rationale of hors-système survivors for avoiding official post-disaster 
sleeping spaces. In contrast, the hybrid pathway followers, by choice or by force, were not 
excluded from official post-disaster sleeping spaces.  
Hybrid pathways 
As the name suggests, a hybrid sleeping pathway is one in which members of a Sendong-affected 
household sleep in spaces both within and beyond the purview of trustees. Hybrid pathways were 
extremely common amongst the urban poor, with many survivors spending one or several nights 
in an evacuation camp before returning home. The urban poor also adopted a variety of 
strategies that guaranteed their access to the plentiful disaster relief available at post-disaster 
spaces, while simultaneously allowed for continued livelihood opportunities or comfortable living 
conditions for at least some family members. The strategies dispute the characterisation of 
vulnerable survivors as needy, helpless, socially-unnetworked, unambitious freeloaders, as 
portrayed in the IDP, victim, illegal squatter, deficiency, and different-from-us vulnerability 
discourses. Yet the strategies also reinforce elements of these same discourses; they underscore 
that the precarious economic and housing situation typical of CDO’s urban poor has an 
enormous impact on their capacity to cope and recover from a disaster, and consequently affects 
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the decisions they take. The following paragraphs study three of the most common strategies 
used by urban poor survivors to acquire what they perceived, at the time, to be the greatest value.  
A split householding strategy 
Split householding occurs when members of an economically-defined household reside in 
different places but all contribute to the economic and social betterment or welfare of the 
household. It is commonly recognised in the migration literature as a strategy for coping with 
difficult economic situations (Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson 1998, Ball 2004, Parreñas 2006, 
Hunter and Davis 2009, Parreñas 2010). In the Philippines, many families can count at least one 
relative working overseas who contributes to their economic well-being. According to the Bangko 
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), personal remittances from 1.6 million overseas Filipino workers 
continue to be a major contributor to the national economy, accounting for $27 billion or almost 
8.5% of the Philippine gross domestic product in 2014 (BSP 2015, iMoney 2015). Many of those 
who go overseas do so because of the lack of well-paying jobs in the archipelago, rather than a 
desire to travel and work abroad.  
For the present discussion, however, the phenomenon of split householding is confined to the 
scale of the city, and the contributing factor to Typhoon Sendong. Split householding occurred 
when a survivor family deliberately sent members of the household to stay at different locations, 
even though pre-Sendong, the family lived together as a single unit. The rationale for doing this 
was to obtain the perceived maximum benefits while incurring the minimum costs to the family. 
As previously indicated, evacuation camps and temporary housing sites were undesirable places 
to live. They were crowded, unsanitary, noisy, and hot. Families with different practices were 
crammed into tight spaces. But, in order to receive a free cement house in a relocation site, 
survivors had to stay in an evacuation camp for a minimum, albeit unspecified, period of time. 
The account of one Ecoville family helps unpack the rational for and the mechanics of a post-
disaster split householding strategy. 
At 4:30 am, after spending five hours stuck in an acacia tree in lower Balulang on the banks of 
the Cagayan River, Rizalyn, along with her two children, husband and two helpers were rescued 
by the Philippine National Army. The family, but not the hired help, went to her sister-in-law’s 
house in a higher elevation part of barangay Balulang and stayed for three days. Then, she and her 
husband went to stay at the Xavier Heights covered court for two months and nine days while 
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the children remained with their aunt. Rizalyn and her husband visited the children on weekends. 
It was only when the family was transferred to a bunkhouse at Ecoville that the parents and 
children began living together again. Rizalyn explained that the army had told them that the 
people who stayed at evacuation centres would be given a free concrete house and lot. There was 
no guarantee of relocation housing for those who did not stay at an evacuation camp. Because 
she and her husband wanted a free concrete house on their own lot outside of the flood-prone 
areas, they opted to live temporarily in an evacuation site, even though they had the option of 
staying in a more comfortable temporary safe space.  
Rizalyn’s story reinforces the earlier discussion on evacuation camps, and provides additional 
insight into the situation of more vulnerable survivors and the haphazard dissemination of critical 
information. First, her decision points out that evacuation camps are undesirable places, which 
should only be tolerated if there is a prize (e.g. free house and lot) at the end. Because they are 
undesirable places, individuals located at the more vulnerable end of the vulnerability continuum 
(such as their children) should be protected or excluded from them. Details of difficult periods in 
one’s life tend are remembered; Rizalyn, like many other survivors I interviewed, knew exactly 
how much time she spent at each post-disaster space. Second, the idea that the urban poor have 
limited social networks in the city upon which they can rely, perpetuated by the illegal squatter 
and deficiency vulnerability discourses, is not entirely founded. The first place Rizalyn’s family 
turned for help was to her extended family, and not to trustees at the official disaster relief 
spaces. Having her children stay with her extended family was deemed a better option than 
moving them into an evacuation site. This was one way that Rizalyn’s family could create their 
own safe space – in the short-term by keeping the children with a trusted family member outside 
of an undesirable evacuation camp, and in the long-term by obtaining greater housing security 
and quality by obtaining a relocation house. Third, it was serendipitous that Rizalyn learned about 
the eligibility criteria for relocation housing through the exchange with her army rescuers. The 
criteria were not widely advertised. As several urban poor informants who continue to reside in 
their old barangays told me, had they known about the “live in an evacuation camp, get a free 
house and lot” deal, they would have gone to an evacuation camp, or stayed there for a longer 
period of time. Fourth, Rizalyn’s family was only one among several families who adopted a split 
householding strategy in which the children stayed with CDO-based relatives, while the adults 
lived in the evacuation camps. 
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A circular migration strategy 
Circular migration refers to the temporary movement of people, usually for livelihood purposes 
(Caces, Arnold et al. 1985, Parreñas 2010). It includes short- to medium-term migration strategies 
for coping with seasonal variability and employment opportunities, and, if the movement of 
people is significant, the daily commute into a city or a particular neighbourhood (Boyle, 
Halfacree and Robinson 1998). In many cases, it was livelihood-related issues that compelled 
urban poor survivors to deviate from a strict institutionalised pathway onto a hybrid pathway. 
Livelihood-driven migration 
Certain livelihoods are predisposed to circular migration, particularly if the hours are odd, the pay 
unpredictable, and the work site specific. The following two profiles are illustrative. 
Lechonero 
Roasted pig, or lechon, is a favourite dish of Cagayaños. CDO lechon is famous throughout the 
country; it is not uncommon to receive orders from Manila or other Philippine cities. It is 
prepared by men called lechoneros (Fig. 6.11). They sell lechon by the kilo; piglets for $33.75-45.00, 
and full-sized pigs for $90.00-112.50. The butchering, cleaning, seasoning, and cooking is an 
additional $15.75, which is split between two to four lechoneros. Lechoneros can do up to five lechon 
per day, or even up to ten per day during peak season (Christmas). Lechon-making is lucrative 
enough to support an urban poor family. 
Typhoon Sendong strongly affected the city’s lechoneros. As one lechonero explained, “you have to 
know something about Filipino culture to understand why there was no lechon during this 
evacuation period.” Not only were there no pigs (they were washed out with the flood), and 
people left with no money, but Cagayaños had no desire to celebrate. Lechon is expensive and 
usually only consumed during special occasions such as holidays, graduations, birthdays, and 
fiestas. It is associated with festivities and joy, and not with devastation and mourning. 
Even after the post-disaster recovery had begun, pursuing their livelihood was difficult for the 
lechoneros. Because the pig is roasted over an open fire, lechon-making can theoretically be done at 
many different sites throughout the city. However, it is typically done near established pig 
delivery sites in informal settlements where dead carcasses and large open fires are permitted. It is 
not a particularly portable livelihood. Consequently, when the lechoneros were transferred to 
transitional and permanent relocation sites in the city outskirts, they continued to return to their 
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former worksites, which are frequently located in the no-build zones along the Cagayan River 
near their former homes in Isla de Oro and lower Balulang. A group of lechoneros I interviewed in 
Isla de Oro explained that they used to live and work there, but have been relocated to the 
Calaanan relocation site. To fill orders from Manila that are shipped out on the afternoon flight 
from the Lumbia airport, the lechoneros must start preparations at 3 am. There are no jeepneys 
running from Calaanan into the city at a quarter past two in the morning, so the men have no 
choice but to spend the night in Isla de Oro, in the flood-prone no-build zone. Employing a 
circular migration strategy is the only option available to the resettled lechoneros if they want to 
continue their profession.  
 
Fig. 6.11. Lechoneros at work in Isla de Oro (22 March 2013). 
Quarry workers 
Circular migration is imposed on quarry workers, too, albeit by economic forces. River quarrying 
is one of the main income sources for the urban poor living in barangays adjacent to the Cagayan 
River. Men dive into river, collect river sand and gravel, and put in into the base of a boat (Fig. 
6.12). Once the boat is full, it is brought to shore. The sand and gravel are loaded onto the trucks 
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of buyers, who pay the quarry men by the truckload. The account below derives from group-
based survivor interviews with Consolacion-based quarry men and their wives. Similar accounts 
were told by quarry men based in barangays Kauswagan, Macasandig, and Balulang. In the latter 
two barangays quarrying is also done mechanically, where it is directed by private companies 
instead of self-employed individuals. 
 
 
Fig. 6.12. Quarry workers dig for sand in the Cagayan River in barangay Consolacion (21 March 
2013, top and 18 March 2013, bottom). 
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All the interviewees used to live in Isla de Oro, where it was walking distance to the quarry. The 
men receive $3.28 per small truckload, which is divided among the workers and usually amounts 
to $1.09 each after deductions. In one day, the men can earn up to $2.18-4.36 if they are “lucky 
with buyers.” Some days there are no buyers, and thus no income. On average, there are three 
out of seven days each week when there are no buyers. No income, no food. Some days all they 
eat is coconut meat from the coconut trees that grace the riverbanks. 
The no-buyer, no-income days are especially hard now that the quarry workers and their families 
are officially living in resettlement sites. Some were relocated to Camaman-an, a 10-minute 
motorela ride from the quarry. Others were relocated to Calaanan, which requires a considerably 
longer and more expensive commute (e.g. a one-way trip lasts two hours in traffic). The workers, 
their wives and children all stay in Consolacion when they have no money for the fare to return 
to their relocation houses. Seven families, totaling 25 people, cram into a small house about the 
same size as the relocation houses designed for a maximum of seven people. On average, they 
stay at the Consolacion house 12 days per month. As of March 2013, the longest uninterrupted 
stay was one week. Barangay officials have informed them that the concrete house will be 
demolished because it is located in a designated no-build zone, but they did not specify when 
demolition would occur. The interviewees stated matter-a-factly that they will continue to stay 
there even after the house is demolished, they just will not have a house to stay in. Like the 
lechoneros, the quarry workers must accept a circular migration lifestyle or find a new livelihood. 
The post-Sendong livelihood experiences of the lechoneros and the quarry workers indicate various 
ways in which relocation sites, by design, can exclude people from livelihood opportunities. The 
peripheral location of the sites, and the accompanying physical distance between home and work 
imposes challenges. The schedule of public transit is not conducive to a city centre-based 
livelihood with an irregular schedule. The cost of this transportation can be prohibitive, especially 
on days with little or no income. The transportation hurdles therefore increase the likelihood that 
workers will stay overnight, and sometimes multiple nights, at the sites of their old houses near 
their work sites in the no-build zones. Put another way, the men deliberately avoid the official 
“safe” spaces (i.e. relocation housing) in favour of the official “unsafe” spaces (i.e. no-build 
zones). The men and their families are safer in officially unsafe spaces because the possibility of 
income enhances their economic and food security.  
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This type of circular migration in which survivors continue to work and often stay overnight in 
their old unsafe house sites instead of at a safe relocation site is not unique to CDO. It is 
observed in other parts of the Philippines, and was a common theme at relocation sites in 
Southern Leyte and Quezon provinces, and in interviews with Filipino geologists and NGO 
researchers working for a disaster centre. One survivor of the 2004 typhoons that devastated 
parts of Real, Infanta and General Nakar in Quezon province recounted that many residents 
officially living at the relocation site consider these residences their “vacation homes.” They slept 
in the resettlement site only as often as required by the mandatory residency rules. Relocated 
residents spent the majority of their time at the sites of their old homes because of the proximity 
to their source of livelihood and income. 
The lechonerso and quarry worker accounts also underscore that different livelihoods have different 
degrees of portability. River quarrying, for example, cannot be moved to relocation sites as a 
livelihood option. Thus, the quarry men either have to commute or find another livelihood. 
Lechon-making could potentially be established at relocation sites. But, it must be considered in 
the initial design phase so that appropriate spaces are set aside in the site development plan, and 
the rules dictating allowable activities on-site permit such livelihoods. Then, there are the 
additional hurdles of recreating supply and delivery chains and networks. The exclusion of 
residents from the planning process and planning spaces obliterated any such possibility.  
The portability of livelihoods is also gendered. Most livelihoods done by men living in relocation 
sites require commuting to a job site outside the relocation sites, although the hours and pay may 
not require an overnight stay at or near the job site. While some of the livelihoods done by 
women are place-specific and do require commuting (e.g. laundry woman for a family or 
salesclerk at the Guisano Mall), many of the women’s livelihoods, such as sari-sari shop owner or 
dress-maker, are more portable and can more easily be recreated at different locations, including 
relocation sites. Indeed, women survivors continued to work in the evacuation camps and 
transitional housing sites, giving manicures and pedicures, selling mobile phone load, and doing 
laundry. Some were the sole income earners in their household at this time. Because women’s 
livelihoods are typically less lucrative than men’s livelihoods, there were significant economic 
impacts at the household level, when the secondary income became the primary one.  
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There were social impacts, too. The portability of women’s livelihoods meant that post-disaster 
spaces were sites for temporarily remaking or reshaping gender roles. Although many Filipina 
women contribute to their household’s income (e.g. in 2012, employment rates for women and 
men were 46.7%  and 72.9%, respectively; ADB 2013, 13), it continues to be the social 
expectation that male household members cover daily expenses and provide the house. For 
example, the city’s ongoing livelihood training programs for the urban poor teaches women how 
they can supplement husbands’ income (without upsetting mainstream gender norms). As the 
mayor explained, 
We are concentrating more specially on the women, because the husbands, even those 
without jobs, know how to find ways to make money here and there. The wives are left at 
home. So they’re the ones we concentrate on. While at home, they can do the trade that 
they have learned from this skills training actually. Augmentation, so a little augmentation 
of the incomes of their husbands. 
The post-Sendong livelihood programs of trustees that targeted women similarly concentrated on 
small-scale livelihoods that women can do in or near their houses, thereby reinforcing gendered 
social norms about work.  
The responsibility for obtaining a home, however, shifted from the male to the female domain. 
The head of a municipal office that allocated relocation housing, for example, recalled that it was 
always women – often pregnant and with children in tow – who waited in line to ask her for 
relocation housing. She asked them outright if their husbands put them up to this, preying upon 
her pity in order to “jump the cue” and get relocation housing faster than the others. There was 
thus a mismatch between a revised economic and social reality and norms faced by survivors and 
the services offered to them by trustees. 
Other motivations for circular migration 
Reasons other than strictly economic ones spurred circular migration between relocation sites 
and former homes, too. The peripheral location of relocation sites and the lack of on-site services 
and facilities were frequently cited as the reasons why survivors moved between two houses. For 
example, the transfer of survivors into relocation sites began before water and electricity were 
connected. Survivors did not want to live without water and power, so they simply returned to 
their old houses and waited until resettlement site facilities were hooked up, returning periodically 
to maintain their claim on the relocation house.  
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Other survivors justified their circular migration with health-related claims. For example, even for 
women with uncomplicated pregnancies, living at Ecoville can be a challenge. There are no 
nearby clinics offering pre-natal appointments. The bumpy and long roads connecting Ecoville to 
the city are poorly served by public transit. Other women support pregnant residents, for 
example, by contributing gas money or taxi fare, or by lending a vehicle when the women go into 
labour and need to get to a hospital in the city. As such, it is an informal social safety net that 
provides security to these women, and not the official design of the relocation site. For women 
with high risk pregnancies, staying at a remote resettlement site is not an option. In one instance, 
a pregnant woman, her husband and father-in-law lived in a small rental apartment near their old 
house in barangay Macabalan close to the city centre. They were Sendong survivors, had been 
allocated a relocation house at Ecoville, and, according to the site’s guidelines, were supposed to 
be staying in their bunkhouse. But they were not. Instead, they adopted an extended circular 
migration strategy in which they lived in town for the duration of her pregnancy. The woman had 
been instructed by her doctor, employed by and thus a representative of the State, to remain in 
the city centre. She was having a difficult pregnancy and required quick and easy access to 
emergency health facilities. The jarring movements that inevitably occur along the roads to and 
from Ecoville were considered dangerous for her and her baby. Put another way, a state trustee 
had clearly identified that the safe relocation site is unsafe for some pregnant women. As such, 
the inability of a relocation site to meet the specific health needs of survivors can compel circular 
migration. 
A Community Mortgage Program strategy 
Survivors who were not allocated a relocation house under LIAC rules can participate in a special 
express lane of the Community Mortgage Program (CMP). Its intended beneficiaries are survivor 
households who require relocation but did not meet the official eligibility criteria, for example, 
because they did not go to the official post-disaster sleeping spaces, they live outside the no-build 
zone, or their houses were partially, and not completely, damaged. The CMP helps trapped 
households who want to move away from environmentally risky or hazardous areas but lack the 
capital to move or to cope in-situ (cf. GOS 2011). The post-Sendong trajectory of survivors on a 
hybrid CMP pathway spend several months to years living in their partially repaired pre-Sendong 
houses or in other private spaces while they wait for a house and lot acquired through the 
intervention of trustees. After escaping to higher ground, these survivors stayed at interim safe 
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spaces beyond the purview of trustees, and occasionally at the official evacuation sites and 
transitional housing sites, and then eventually moved into a home in a trustee-endorsed 
relocation site. 
Since 1988, the CMP has provided group mortgages to low-income communities in the 
Philippines (Sawyer 2014). It is a microfinance approach to housing in which the national 
government, through the Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC), aims to give informal 
settlers access to affordable financing so that they can secure tenure on the land they occupy, and 
improve their houses and neighbourhoods (Cacnio 2001, SHFC no date). The mortgages have a 
6% interest rate, and a maximum amortisation period of 25 years (Sawyer 2014). 
In response to Sendong, the SFHC created an express lane so that survivors could buy land for 
off-site relocation (Sawyer 2014). The express lane differs from the regular program in that up to 
500 families can join a community association (versus a maximum of 200), a portion of the loan 
is disbursed before all of the obligatory documentation is done (thereby shortening the process 
by up to several years), and community mobilisers52 guarantee that the deferred documents will 
be completed within one year (Sawyer 2014, 4). There are three accredited community mobilisers 
in CDO; the archdiocese’s Social Action Center is taking care of 5,000 families in 25 community 
organisations, and the Growth, Organizational Upliftment of People, Inc. (GROUP) and the 
Technology Outreach and Community Help (TOUCH) Foundation are taking care of the rest. 
The community mobilisers organised 8,000 beneficiary families into 36 community organisations, 
and are helping them navigate the program, negotiate purchase agreements with landowners, 
liaise with other government agencies, and build organisational capacity (Sawyer 2014). 
Demand for relocation housing on safer and higher ground outstrips supply in CDO. The CMP 
helps resolve this problem. By March 2013, approximately 3,000 relocation houses had been built 
for survivors, with another 3,000 in the pipeline. But as the Sendong coordinator at the 
archdiocese explained, “based on our data, the total number of families that need to be relocated 
                                                          
52 A community mobiliser organises informal settlers into a community association that purchases and 
owns the land. A community mobiliser can be “any government entity, non-government organizations 
(NGO) and People’s Organizations (PO) and must possess the needed skills to organize communities, 
document CMP project applications and provide access to other government agencies involved in the 
program” (SHFC no date). 
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to safer ground is about 20,000.” The 14,000 house shortfall is reduced through the CMP; it 
targets 8,000 families. If additional funds can be raised, the remaining 6,000 families may be 
added to the program.  
Like the other official post-disaster spaces, the CMP-facilitated relocation sites are exclusionary 
spaces. CMP sites are situated in the same peripheral areas as the fully-funded relocation sites, 
including in the barangays of Indahag and Lumbia, and the municipality of Opol. Consequently, 
the same transportation, accessibility, livelihood, and services problems associated with a remote 
location also apply. Access to the CMP also presents financial hurdles because the beneficiary 
must pay for the house and lot. The SHFC imposes a ceiling of $1,350 for the house portion of 
the loan, but the actual cost of building fully functional houses exceeded this amount (Sawyer 
2014).  
The hybrid pathways underscore that some Sendong survivors were very savvy in crafting their 
post-disaster trajectory. The three strategies indicate that survivors went out of their way to 
ensure that they would not be excluded from disaster assistance. The importance of trustees 
differs among the strategies; in the split householding and circular migration strategies, trustees 
play a secondary role in directing movement, whereas trustees play essential roles as community 
mobilisers and funders of the CMP-sponsored relocation sites. The existence of these hybrid 
pathways underscores that “improvement schemes [– implemented in official post-disaster spaces 
–] are simultaneously destructive and productive of new forms of local knowledge and practice” 
(Li 2005, 391). The split householding and circular migration strategies, in particular, show that 
survivors are creating new practices that enable them to weave their needs and desires into the 
schemes designed to improve them. 
This concludes a lengthy discussion of the post-disaster sleeping pathways of CDO’s Sendong 
survivors. Whether survivors follow an institutionalised, hors-système or hybrid pathway is strongly 
influenced by individual and household scale factors, such as where a survivor is located along 
the vulnerability continuum, as well as by macro scale factors and institutions linked to the 
powers of exclusion. Sendong survivors, of course, did much more than just sleep in the days, 
weeks, and months after the disaster. The final section of this chapter looks at the other places 
Sendong survivors went in the course of rebuilding their lives and livelihoods. 
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Where else do survivors go post-disaster? 
In addition to sleeping places, CDO’s Sendong survivors accessed a variety of other urban 
spaces. They sought out spaces for obtaining money and relief goods, for accessing medical, 
educational and safety services, for enjoying recreational and spiritual activities, and for engaging 
in advocacy or political activities. These spaces, just like sleeping spaces, should be read as spaces 
of exclusion informed by vulnerability discourses. The following pages briefly introduce the 
major relief spaces, income and livelihood spaces, and recreational, spiritual, and advocacy spaces 
that were deemed significant by the more vulnerable survivors. 
Disaster relief spaces 
For many survivors, obtaining some sort of immediate disaster relief was a priority. Disaster relief 
refers to money, goods, and services made available to the individuals and communities affected 
by Sendong. It does not include the money some survivors obtained by selling their personal 
possessions or seeking loans from private companies to cover post-disaster expenses. Disaster 
relief is usually collected and distributed by government agencies, religious groups, NGOs, 
humanitarian organisations, and private companies. In CDO, academic institutions, notably 
Xavier University, and local residents (including many survivors) were major conduits of disaster 
relief. Filipino politicians, actors, and other celebrities were also highly visible distributors of 
disaster relief.  
Disaster relief was distributed at what I call “disaster relief spaces.” Trustees typically maintained 
a strong presence in them. For example, emergency relief was distributed primarily in state spaces 
such as barangay halls and health centres, covered courts, and schools, or in religious spaces such 
as churches and mosques; compensation for partially and totally damaged houses, and 
indemnities paid to the surviving family members of dead and missing persons were disbursed 
exclusively at government offices; and livelihood assistance cheques and trainings were delivered 
at a variety of government, Christian and private sector offices, academic institutions, and even at 
some transitional and permanent relocation housing sites (Fig. 6.13). To a lesser extent, relief was 
distributed directly to survivors in their affected communities. 
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Fig. 6.13. The sites in CDO accessed by survivors to obtain aid and non-livelihood income sources. Sites include the official distribution 
disaster emergency relief and other forms of disaster assistance sites, and they include commercial enterprises such as pawn shops and 
financial institutions. © Marc Girard, 2015. 
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In order to access relief at a state site, survivors first had to obtain a “family access card.” 
Initially, the cards were issued only at the municipal and regional social welfare and development 
offices (CSWD and DSWD, respectively). The DSWD office is located in barangay Lumbia, far 
away from affected areas and difficult to access. Yet, it was important to obtain cards from both 
CSWD and DSWD because neither agency would accept the other agency’s card. It quickly 
became apparent that two distribution points were insufficient; the inaccessibility excluded 
survivors from obtaining much needed resources. Consequently, family access cards began being 
issued at evacuation centres and at barangay halls, including ones that were not evacuation camps 
– the same locations at which the emergency relief items, services, and small cash grants were 
distributed by state, religious, and non-governmental trustees. 
Other disaster relief distribution sites in the city did not impose restrictions on who could access 
relief. Both Christians and Muslims reported non-discriminatory distribution of relief goods at 
their places of worship. Churches and mosques reportedly gave to anyone who came, regardless 
of religious affiliation, economic status, and even Sendong survivor status. In addition to 
distribution sites for food, water, clothing, and other physical goods, they were also sites where 
medical missions took place. Anyone was welcome to receive a check-up, medical care, drugs, 
and referrals from trained health care professionals. 
Some relief spaces were roving public spaces or informal private spaces in the community. For 
example, NGOs and religious groups walked along the streets in affected communities 
distributing aid to anyone who asked. Celebrity Filipinos and politicians went into selected 
affected communities and handed out bills to people. In listing the various forms of disaster relief 
they obtained, many urban poor survivors recalled getting “₱500 from Erap” ($12), the former 
actor-turned one-time-President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Survivors hailing from barangay 
Consolacion described a surprise, almost cinematic, visit from the heartthrob Filipino actor 
Robin Padilla. Around 10 pm on 24 December 2011, Padilla woke up survivors sleeping in tents 
pitched on the streets and sidewalks in Consolacion. He handed them an envelope containing 
$12. Excited recipients began texting their family and friends. Many people arrived by 11 pm, but 
the so-called James Dean of Philippine cinema had already left. These three examples point to 
the temporal and spatial fluidity or the transience of disaster relief sites. The latter two examples 
highlight the prevalence of celebrity culture in the Philippines, and more importantly, that 
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individual, recognisable faces and names are perceived as larger than the institutions they 
represent.  
This latter point helps to explain why some current politicians were closely associated with 
disaster relief and were often seen at evacuation camps and other disaster relief spaces in CDO. 
The names of these politicians came up repeatedly in survivor and key informant interviews.  For 
politicians with future political ambitions, it is clearly in their interest to advocate on behalf of 
their constituents, and especially to be seen working on their behalf. For a politically-savvy 
politician seeking re-election, time is better spent personally visiting disaster relief spaces and 
personally handing out small envelopes of cash to prospective voters than negotiating in the 
backrooms with colleagues and superiors. Although survivors would likely gain more from the 
latter lobbying efforts, the credit would go to a government agency and not to a particular 
politician. Because the amount of relief money given to any one individual is relatively small, it is 
the physical presence of a politician in a camp that has the most impact. According to a regional 
government officer, this physical presence, favourable name retention link explains the 
involvement of several prominent CDO politicians in a variety of disaster relief and recovery 
events and spaces: “Sometimes people will not appreciate the amount given. Their presence 
going there into the camp to meet them matters to the people. So it is their presence in the area 
that will matter to the people. That is why they are popular.” 
Survivors from all along the vulnerability continuum were selective in choosing which disaster 
relief spaces they accessed. Not surprisingly, many survivors selected disaster relief spaces that 
were in close proximity to their Sendong-affected homes. They also preferred to go to the places 
where they felt welcome; for example, they would seek assistance at their usual places of worship 
where they were already part of a community before they would go to a relief site set up by state 
or humanitarian actors. Many middle class survivors considered the opportunity cost of waiting 
for hours in a hot line-up to receive some noodles, canned sardines, bottled water, and rice 
unfavourable; instead, they typically sought out or received unsolicited assistance through their 
personal social networks. If they even bothered to obtain a Sendong victim card, they used it 
almost exclusively to obtain high value disaster relief such as compensation for partially and 
totally damaged houses, indemnities paid to the surviving family members of dead and missing 
persons, and allowances from air carrier companies to change holiday travel plans without paying 
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a penalty. Moreover, because the family access card included the family’s former and sometimes 
current address, which is indicative of the family’s wealth, middle class survivors were given 
smaller or no aid packages at the distribution sites requiring a family access card. Consequently, 
most of the survivors who regularly frequented disaster relief spaces were the urban poor. 
Survivor household were similarly selective in which family members went to the disaster relief 
spaces. If survivors knew that relief items would be given on a per person basis, then all adult 
family members, and sometimes even the children, would wait in line. If survivors knew that 
relief items would be allocated on a per household basis, then it was primarily the adult women, 
sometimes accompanied by their young children, who went. The women would also be the ones 
who exchanged the “gift cheques” (e.g. gift certificates) for groceries and household items at 
participating stores, and who waited in line to plead for relocation housing. Not surprising, 
women survivors of all ages typically had a greater knowledge of the sources, amounts, and types 
of disaster relief and the sites where it was distributed than did their male counterparts. As such, 
the disaster relief sites were gendered spaces. 
It was rare for survivors to actually venture inside some designated disaster relief distribution 
sites. In Figure 6.13, the dotted circles indicate disaster relief distribution sites that were not 
accessed by any of the survivors I interviewed or by any of their acquaintances. For example, the 
indemnities paid to survivors who lost a family member during Sendong were disbursed at the 
Region-X headquarters of the Office of Civil Defense, but no participant in my study actually 
collected money from the OCD office. This is but one example of the gap between the disaster 
relief sites run by trustees and the use of these same sites by survivors. 
There were reasons other than acquiring goods, services and money for seeking out disaster relief 
spaces. They were information hubs. Survivors could inquire about the next shipment of food 
and blankets, or find out when the next medical mission was taking place. In the first few days 
after the storm, disaster relief spaces were also spaces where survivors could inquire about 
missing family members and friends; some families were indeed reunited in this way. Disaster 
relief spaces, especially those that doubled as evacuation sites, were also spaces where Sendong 
survivors could begin a healing process with the assistance of trustees conducting psychosocial 
counseling and debriefing activities.  
 
 
 320   
 
Although disaster relief spaces and official post-disaster sleeping spaces were intended to meet 
the immediate survival needs of Sendong survivors, they could not meet all of their needs. 
Consequently, many survivors sought out other spaces to fulfil their financial, recreational, and 
spiritual needs. 
Income and livelihood spaces 
To supplement what they received at the disaster relief sites, urban poor survivors frequently 
sought out opportunities to earn income through livelihood activities or through the one-time 
sale of personal items. In exceptional cases, they could access loans from a formal financial 
institution. These livelihood and income spaces were located throughout the city. 
Livelihood earnings were an important source of money for survivors, urban poor and middle 
class alike. Middle class survivors often continued with their usual jobs. Those working for the 
government agencies, private sector companies, and NGOs tasked with disaster relief and 
recovery efforts frequently experienced a temporary increase in their workload without an 
accompanying increase in salary or benefits. The urban poor experienced greater short-term 
interruptions to their livelihoods. Whenever possible, they resumed their usual livelihoods, often 
after a brief delay of several days to several weeks during which the work sites were cleaned up, 
and the capital repaired or replaced. In other cases, survivors restarted their old livelihoods in 
new locations such as the evacuation camps. Certain livelihoods were more penalised by the 
disaster than others. For example, the river quarry workers had to wait for the river to “calm 
down,” and then adjust to its slightly altered currents, channels, and shorelines. Many Cagayaños 
stopped consuming fish for several weeks, even months, after Sendong; they were suspicious of 
freshwater fish that may have come into contact with dead human bodies. The stigma against fish 
was especially hard on the city’s fishermen and fish mongers who experienced a major drop in 
business that lasted for several months. 
Other urban poor capitalised on short-term opportunities opened in the aftermath of the disaster. 
For example, the drivers of small vehicles such as sikads and motorelas that could easily navigate 
narrow city streets strewn with debris were in high demand. For one week after the flood, drivers 
were earning $15.19-17.36 per day – instead of the usual $4.34-6.50 income – shuttling debris 
from middle class and urban poor homes to the city dump in Zayas. Many barangays and 
humanitarian organisations offered a ten day cash-for-work program in which survivors were 
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paid a total of $54.25 to clean up the streets. This program was very popular among the urban 
poor.  
The volume of garbage post-Sendong provoked a mini bonanza for the city’s recycling, scrap and 
junk shop businesses. The benefits accrued not only to survivors but also to non-Sendong 
survivor Cagayaños involved in the business. The canvassers, able-bodied men who collect bits of 
metal and plastics that can be exchanged for cash at junk shops, benefitted greatly. The case of a 
junk shop in Macanhan is illustrative. The way the business normally works is that each canvasser 
is given a $32.55 capital loan each morning, which he uses to buy scrap and recyclables around 
the city. Canvassers typically earn $2.17-10.85 a day once they have repaid the morning’s loan. In 
low season, the junk shop takes in 900 kg of scrap on a daily basis (300 kg each of plastics, 
metals, and cans). The scrap is sorted and processed by the junk shop’s regular employees. The 
scrap is purchased on-site by buyers based in the city. After being flooded and closed for two 
days, there was what the junk shop owner called a “boost in business” from December 2011 until 
February 2012 (Table 6.2). There was a big increase in the collection of plastics and metals post-
Sendong, and a lesser increase in almost everything else. The price the shop paid canvassers for 
items increased temporarily. The price paid by the buyers for scrap items around Sendong was 
also $0.01-0.02/kg higher than usual. Overall, the junk shop did more than three times its usual 
business. 
Table 6.2. Comparison of a Macanhan junk shop’s usual business and its post-Sendong boost. 
 Usual level (e.g. 
March 2013) 
Post-Sendong boost (December 
2011-February 2012) 
Total daily capital loaned to 
canvassers  
$434.04-542.55 $1,953.16 
Price paid to canvassers for 
collected scrap 
Cans $0.11/kg $0.15/kg 
Metals $0.26/kg $0.28/kg 
Plastics $0.30/kg $0.33/kg 
 
A similar boost in business was observed at the vast city landfill site in Zayas, Carmen from 
December 2011 to March 2012. An on-site city official recalled that there was a lot of electronic 
garbage and furniture entering the landfill site. In the boost months, there were more than 600 
“scavengers” (or who the junk shop owner and employees called canvassers) seeking recyclables 
like plastics and metals to sell to junk shops. The landfill scavengers are mainly from Zayas, and 
do scavenging as part-time work. There are also scavengers who come down from Lumbia but 
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only twice a week because the fare to reach the landfill site is quite expensive. During the boost, 
scavengers could earn $21.70-32.55 or more per day, and even more if they found a television or 
fridge, or if they worked the full day. Unlike the junk shop canvassers who are almost exclusively 
male, scavengers at the city landfill are both men and women, mostly between the ages of 40 to 
60 years old.  
Sendong survivors also sought out non-livelihood means for obtaining money. They initiated 
financial transactions with private sector companies (Fig. 6.13). For example, women sold the 
jewelry they were wearing, or other valuables they had managed to save. Bonnie, the woman 
profiled in the institutionalised pathway, pawned her engagement ring for $130.21 at a Carmen 
pawnshop. It was this money that sustained her family after their house and its contents were 
washed out, and before her husband was able to resume his livelihood as a motorela driver and she 
was able to resume her livelihood as a farmer in a neighbouring province.  
In rare cases, urban poor survivors could access new loans or change the conditions of existing 
loans from a formal financial institution. Only four out of the 23 men and 56 women urban poor 
survivors I interviewed had a personal account with a formal banking institution. In contrast, 
many of the urban poor maintained a line of credit with 5-6 lenders. All four were with a CDO-
based financial cooperative called FICCO. One woman vendor had been pre-approved for a loan 
and received the first installment before 16 December 2011. The second half of the loan was 
disbursed after Sendong, and she was able to delay repayment without penalty. Similarly, a 
middle-aged couple running a carinderia in the Consolacion market did not require an additional 
loan post-Sendong. They used the dividends paid from their FICCO account to cover for the 
college fees of their children, and money from other sources to restart their successful carinderia 
business. A woman vegetable seller at the Consolacion market rounds out the FICCO members; 
she joined after Sendong and had a very modest savings account by February 2013. To help her 
manage her household and restart her business post-Sendong, she obtained a loan from a 
neighbour and not from FICCO. That so few urban poor survivors seek out assistance from 
formal banking institutions underlines their exclusion from a critical component of the formal 
market system. 
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Recreation, spirituality and advocacy spaces 
The third suite of non-sleeping post-disaster spaces were those used for recreational, spiritual, 
and advocacy purposes. According to survivors, these spaces were vital for helping them recover 
from Typhoon Sendong. These spaces helped survivors to cope emotionally and psychologically 
with their experiences, and to regain a sense of normalcy in their lives. The existence of this 
category of post-disaster spaces indicates that successful disaster relief and rebuilding efforts 
should not only enable survivors to meet their basic physical needs, but should also promote 
overall well-being. 
Recreational spaces 
Visits to recreational spaces plummeted in the immediate aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. Urban 
poor survivors described their favorite leisure activities in the city: picnicking along the 
riverbanks, spending the day at the Bonbon, Agas, Macasandig, or Bayabas beaches, and malling at 
CDO’s Guisano and Limketkai malls. They stopped going to these spaces in the days and weeks 
after Sendong. For many, it was because they had more urgent matters to attend to – like 
reuniting with missing relatives, surviving, and finding income. For others, it was because they 
“didn’t feel like it.” Other survivors avoided recreational spaces out of necessity and even shame. 
For example, survivors who had previously enjoyed malling avoided the city’s shopping centres 
because they had no money, and moreover, they considered themselves unpresentable. They had 
not had a chance to properly bathe, and they had no appropriate clothing to wear because they 
had lost everything but the clothes on their backs. One woman recalled going to a grocery store 
on the morning of 17 December 2011. The security guards blocked her entry because she was so 
dirty and muddy. There were many other like her trying to get in. All she wanted was to buy 
some clean underwear. This initial post-Sendong exclusion from recreational spaces was thus a 
product of force, the market, formal rules, and especially informal norms about appropriate 
entry, and self-imposed, personal priorities. As the weeks and months passed, survivors began 
returning to their preferred recreational spaces, but less frequently than when they lived in the 
city. For resettled survivors, the added travel time and expense cut into a household budget 
already constrained by the dearth of livelihood opportunities and the increased cost of living in 
the relocation sites.  
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Spiritual spaces 
Spiritual spaces were also important in helping Sendong survivors heal. Rather than offering 
material or physical things, these spaces nurtured the souls of survivors. While in the evacuation 
camps, many people continued attending religious services at their regular places of worship. For 
Christians, it was just before Christmas time, which for many Catholic and Aglipayan Filipinos 
involves a frequently unsuccessful attempt to attend all the Simbang gabi or devotional pre-dawn 
masses from 16 to 24 December. While no interviewee specifically mentioned trying to go to 3am 
masses, they did describe regular attendance at church services. Once survivors began moving 
into the transitional and permanent relocation sites, they sought out nearby churches. 
Occasionally, they return for church services in their former barangays, but only on special 
occasions when they can justify the extra travel time and expense. Attending or even participating 
in one of the mass weddings and mass baptisms at the Xavier University chapel is one example. 
Included in the spiritual spaces category are the spaces used for the events commemorating the 
one year anniversary of Sendong. The events blended cultural and religious traditions with the 
objectives of local government, academic, religious, and other non-government actors. Among 
Filipino Catholics, mourners celebrate multiple times after the death of a loved one, including 9-
day prayers, 45-day prayers and mass offerings, and one-year anniversary celebrations. Non-
Catholic Filipinos partake in similar commemoration activities. To commemorate the death and 
disappearance of hundreds of Cagayaños during Typhoon Sendong, trustees organised one-year 
anniversary events in November and December 2013. Table 6.3 summarises all of the events I 
attended or was aware of. As one regional government official explained, these types of events 
are like “a ritual, a closure,” which are “an essential part of moving on.”  
Commemorative events were located at different sites around the city, and were targeted at 
different segments of the population. For politicians, commemoration events were opportunities 
to showcase the achievements of the city and the regional governments in enabling a speedy 
recovery and rebuilding process. Not surprisingly, there was a push to close all of the evacuation 
camps before the one-year anniversary. As previously explained, the “squatters posing as 
survivors” were swept out of the highly visible Capitolio evacuation camp in late November 2012 
and given relocation housing even though they did not meet the LIAC relocation eligibility 
criteria. For urban poor survivors, the commemoration events were perceived as opportunities to 
remember and mourn the loss of their loved ones, to celebrate their recovery, and to reunite with 
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old neighbours (at the expense of politicians who paid for transportation and food), and to 
demand that government agencies address the injustices and difficulties they continue to face. 
For religious actors, commemorative events were used as a way to re-engage and remember 
alongside Cagayaños in fun, high-energy, and solemn activities alike. Commemorative masses at 
Catholic churches were a platform for priests and nuns to remind parishioners about climate 
change, disaster risk reduction, watershed management, and in some cases, the ineptitude of the 
city administration in protecting its citizens from a disaster. 
Table 6.3. A summary of the events commemorating the one-year anniversary of Sendong. 
Acronyms are: Ateneo de Manila University (AMU), Capitol University (CU), Habitat for 
Humanity Philippines (H4H), Junior Chamber International (JCI), Mindanao University of 
Science and Technology (MUST), Office of Civil Defense (OCD), Xavier University (XU). 
Organisers Event description Venue Attendees Notable 
absentees 
City 
government 
Lively 
commemoration 
event for resettled 
survivors with free 
food, music and 
dancing 
Rotunda 
(by the 
Cagayan 
River) 
Over 6,000 urban poor 
survivors (bussed in from 
relocation sites); street 
vendors; musicians; children 
and youth dance teams from 
the relocation sites 
Politicians 
City 
government 
Unveiling of “Tree of 
Life” that reportedly 
saved more than 50 
Isla de Oro residents 
during Sendong 
Isla de Oro 
mango tree 
Politicians; media  
City 
government; 
JCI 
Unveiling of 
Sendong memorial 
wall, followed by a 
solemn mass, 
speeches and a 
concert 
Gaston 
Park 
Politicians (e.g. mayor, vice 
mayor); JCI; Catholic priests; 
media 
 
CU Book launch of Sa 
kagabhion sa Sendong – 
Narratives of children-
survivors by Lilian C. 
de la Peña and Amor 
Q. de Torres (eds.) 
CU campus CU staff and students; OCD; 
XU; Children’s book club; 
children-survivor authors and 
their families; media 
Politicians 
CU Typhoon Sendong 
installation  
CU’s 
Museum of 
Three 
Cultures 
  
Kadamay 
(urban poor 
federation) 
Protests at 
government offices, 
followed by prayers 
DSWD 
office, city 
hall, 
Rotunda 
Urban poor; urban poor 
federations 
Politicians; 
government 
agency officials 
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to remember the  
victims 
(by the 
Cagayan 
River) 
OCD Launch of OCD’s 
official report Bul-og 
–Streams of learning 
from Sendong 
SM Mall 
(venue 
changed 
from 
Centrio 
Mall a few 
days prior) 
OCD; organisations 
contributing to the report; 
mall-goers; media 
Urban poor 
survivors 
OCD, XU Dagan Kagay-an 
Sendong 
commemoration fun 
run 
Rotunda; 
route along 
Cagayan 
River in 
flooded 
barangays 
OCD; XU; police; Philippine 
National Army; university 
students (mostly middle 
class); vice mayor; children 
and youth from Xavier 
Ecoville Got Talent club; 
media 
Mayor; urban 
poor survivors 
OCD, XU Photo exhibit and 
creative writing 
workshop 
XU campus OCD; XU students; media Urban poor 
survivors (i.e. 
the subjects of 
the photo 
exhibit) 
OCD, XU, 
CU 
“Mobile Read” – 
Readings of Sa 
kagabhion sa Sendong – 
Narratives of children-
survivors by Lilian C. 
de la Peña and Amor 
Q. de Torres (eds.) 
Ecoville, 
Indahag 
and 
Calaanan 
relocation 
sites 
OCD; XU; CU; urban poor 
survivors at relocation sites 
 
Various 
Christian 
churches 
Special church 
services and 
commemorative 
masses 
Various 
churches in 
CDO 
Parishioners  
XU  Symbolic housing 
turnover and house 
blessing event 
Ecoville 
relocation 
site 
City politicians (e.g. vice 
mayor, councilors) and 
administrators; barangay 
captains; private sector 
donors (e.g. San Miguel 
foundation, Union Bank, TP 
Wood); religious donors (e.g. 
Chinese ladies of Sacred 
Heart Parish, Cebu); H4H; 
XU (including the Board of 
trustee, the university 
president, staff and students); 
AMU; Children and youth 
from Xavier Ecoville Got 
Talent club; Catholic priests; 
media 
Residents from 
Ecoville’s 
transitional 
sites (i.e. the 
future home 
owners); mayor  
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XU Mass wedding and 
mass baptism 
Ecoville 
relocation 
site 
Ecoville couples, their 
children and families and 
friends; Ecoville staff; 
photographers; XU staff; 
Catholic priests 
Politicians; 
media 
XU, H4H Interfaith event 
(building relocation 
houses and 
ceremony) 
Ecoville 
relocation 
site 
XU and MUST engineering 
students (including some 
Muslim women); H4H private 
sector partners from the 
construction industry;  
various Christian churches; 
various Christian student 
associations; XU officials; 
H4H officials; media 
Residents from 
Ecoville’s 
transitional 
sites (i.e. the 
future home 
owners); local 
and regional 
politicians 
 
Advocacy spaces 
The final type of post-disaster space that CDO’s urban poor survivors frequented were spaces 
used for advocacy and protesting purposes. These spaces included centrally-located sites like 
Divisoria, city hall and Capitolio, and out-of-the-way sites like the DSWD regional office in 
Lumbia. At these sites, the urban poor, particularly those organised into the survivor collectives 
of an urban poor federation and the newly minted activists in a women’s organisation, did 
numerous “dialogues” and “picket rallies.” According to the organisers and participants, the 
events aimed to protest a haphazard and unjust selection of the beneficiaries of government aid 
and narrow definitions that excluded many flood-affected people from accessing aid, and to 
demand that more, better quality, and fairly distributed services and cash assistance be given to all 
needy Sendong survivors. The number of protesters was limited by availability of free 
transportation, especially for events outside the city centre. 
A year of protests began in January 2012. The foci of the ensuing protests closely mirrored the 
changes in the disaster relief, recovery, and rebuilding efforts of state trustees, and called 
attention to unfulfilled promises. Many of the participants were survivors who had returned to 
their old communities. The first picket rally on the highway outside the DSWD Lumbia office 
called out the unfair interview process for assessing Sendong damage to houses. Protesters 
claimed that their houses had been wrongly classified, or that the damage was grossly 
underestimated by officials who did not actually survey the affected areas but instead relied upon 
accounts from their personal contacts. In February and March 2012, they returned to the DSWD 
Lumbia office, these times protesting the unfair, random, and insufficient distribution of kitchen 
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utensil kits, and the unfulfilled promises of educational assistance to survivors, respectively. In 
July 2012, 300 members of the S.O.S. collectives staged a dialogue outside the DSWD office 
calling for a review of the data and the implementation of projects. The DSWD had promised 
kitchen utensils, cash assistance for partially damaged houses, and livelihood assistance. At the 
time, however, only the utensils had been distributed. The collectives reiterated these complaints 
to DSWD in November 2012; many people were dissatisfied with the execution of the program. 
More than 500 protestors claimed that without a close friend in the bureaucracy or very vocal 
protests to the appropriate authority, it was impossible to receive any aid. As one survivor 
explained, not only did DSWD “randomly select the people who get benefits,” it also grossly 
underestimated the actual need. For example, DSWD allocated benefits to only 200 families per 
affected barangay, whereas thousands of families required assistance. In September 2012, Sendong 
survivors went to the city hall to ask for reclassification from the City Social Welfare and 
Development office. They claimed that because their houses were not properly surveyed, they 
were incorrectly classified as “flooded” instead of “partially damaged” or “fully damaged.” The 
erroneous classification meant they were denied financial compensation. In January 2013, there 
was another protest, this time in front of Capitolio. DSWD had promised to accommodate all the 
“Sendong victims” by January 2013 but many victims had not yet been assigned a relocation 
house. Protestors were objecting to the delay and the resulting prolonging of precarious and 
uncertain living conditions in no-build zones and transitional housing sites.  
From the perspective of the government agencies targeted by the picket rallies and dialogues, 
many of the complaints were unjustified and demonstrated a lack of knowledge about procedural 
and jurisdiction constraints. Government workers pointed to the immense pressure they were 
under to perform assessments in very short periods of time; these data formed the basis of all 
subsequent official state-sponsored disaster relief and recovery activities. Government workers 
admitted that their data were not always sound, especially because their assessment of whether or 
not a person is a victim relied upon a belief that people would tell the truth and inform 
authorities about unjustified claims. As one official explained,  
We conducted a validation, and we encouraged the people to tell us the truth. And we 
assured them that the information [is] confidential. We even told them that ‘you can text 
us [about unjustified claims] and then you don’t have to tell us [what] your name is. That 
information will be strictly confidential.’ That will be our basis to conduct validation. 
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Later, government agencies did revisit these initial assessment and tried to correct erroneous 
information. They also bent the rules to accommodate people who would have otherwise been 
excluded from benefits. A regional government officer explains the limitations imposed on her 
agency’s work, and how it tried to be more inclusive and fair.  
If you are categorised as totally damaged in our list, then you will receive [₱]10,000 based 
on assessment of the worker. But we don’t really have to give the [₱]10,000 – it depends 
on the assessment of the social worker. If partially damaged, you can receive the [₱]5,000. 
But again, it depends on the assessment. For those families who are categorised as 
flooded under our guidelines, we are not supposed to give them. But they cannot 
understand that. Because they say ‘we are also victims.’ [Our workers reply,] ‘But you are 
categorised as flooded so we cannot just bend the law [that] has been there for as early as 
1970s.’ So, they were complaining that some of them were not given [compensation].  
We will only accommodate those on our master list. But we do understand that [there 
might be some mistakes on the list] because, you know, [the] United Nations came and 
we have to make that report in 72 hours. We have to make that assessment fast. If you 
are not included in our list, there is no money for you. But you cannot just tell the people 
like that, so what we did was try to bend that guideline. We tell the people that ‘even if 
you are not in our list, but you are a holder of [a] family access card [we will consider 
giving you benefits].’ Then last year, we did the revalidation. Second, there are those who 
are categorised as flooded but [are really] partially or totally [damaged], or the other way 
around. So we have conducted that revalidation to ensure that what we give to this family 
[what] is really due to them.  
I end this section with an excerpt from my blog. It describes the International Women’s Day rally 
in Divisoria, another popular location for protests. It is a public square outside the gates of the 
city’s premier university and part of the main commercial district near the city centre. Most banks 
have their regional headquarters, or at least a branch, here. It is the site of the famous Night Café, 
where street vendors, shoppers and foodies take over in Friday and Saturday nights, turning the 
area into a bustling night bazaar. Municipal, provincial and regional government offices are all 
within walking distance. The following excerpt provides a feel of what actually transpires during a 
dialogue or picket rally in an advocacy space. Unlike the aforementioned events, the focus of this 
particular one did not centre around justice for Sendong victims or survivors. The focus was 
instead on the rights of Filipina women and the difficulties they continue to face. Here is what I 
wrote. 
INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S DAY 
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The Northern Mindanao chapter of Gabriela hosted a rally in Divisoria, the city centre. According to its 
website, Gabriela Philippines is “a nationwide alliance of more than 200 women’s organizations that cut across 
sectors and regions.” Since 1984, Gabriela has led the struggle of Filipinas for freedom and democracy. The 
Gabriela organisers I have met over the past few months have helped me better understand the political and 
domestic situation of women in this country. 
Today’s event builds on the 1 Billion Rising campaign that was launched on Valentine’s Day. The campaign calls 
attention to violence against women and girls, and refuses to accept this violence as a given, demanding a change. 
On February 14th, the campaign aimed to have one billion men and women from all around the world rise up and 
dance. And they did. 
Gabriela’s unity statement for the 2013 International Women’s Day calls attention to the “oppressive conditions 
that have been plaguing the Filipina women – poverty, hunger, structural violence, discrimination and the general 
lack of opportunities for women.” On page two there are a few lines about the situation of women and children 
survivors of Typhoon Sendong: “in our region, ‘Sendong’ survivors especially mothers and children suffer still in 
relocation sites and danger zone communities. Access to livelihood, water, electricity, school and other social services 
remains a persistent problem.” From what I’ve been told in interviews, and observed in site visits, this statement 
rings true. 
When Ada and I arrived at in Divisoria, there were one hundred plus women, men and children sitting in the 
park, listening attentively to the speeches. Many participants wore pink or black t-shirts stamped with the 
campaign logo. Throughout the afternoon, Gabriela leaders and sympathetic partylist political candidates read unity 
statements. Their calls for action were received with enthusiastic cheering. A spirited version of the 1 Billion Rising 
choreography interspersed the speeches. Most of the crowd had mastered the choreography, suggesting they had 
participated in last month’s campaign launch. 
Not surprisingly, the crowd was filled with individuals apparently very sympathetic to the women’s cause. It was, 
however, not who was present that is especially telling, but rather who was absent. There were no politicians - 
municipal, regional or national. There were no hoards of university students (easily identifiable by their school 
uniforms), even though the main gates of Xavier University stand less than 200 metres from the microphone. There 
were no individuals wearing religious garb. There were no Muslim women (although Muslim Filipinas do 
participate actively in other Gabriela campaigns in the Philippines). There were no army, police or fire units. There 
was one photographer, and no film crew.  
Tomorrow morning, the Region-X Police is hosting a fun run to raise money and awareness for abused women. If I 
can wake up early enough to run, I expect to see a very different crowd and experience a very different vibe at the 
state-sponsored event (Gibb 2013, 8 March). 
Conclusion 
After Typhoon Sendong, many sites within the city were used in disaster rescue, relief, recovery, 
and reconstruction efforts, but these sites were used very differently by survivors variously 
positioned along the vulnerability continuum and by trustees tasked with assisting them. Such a 
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differential suggests each group has a limited spatial sphere where they exercise power and agency 
over rebuilding processes. For example, to acquire cash to meet their immediate needs, survivors 
brought salvageable goods to pawn shops and junk shops, or returned to work at their old job 
sites. Religious, state, and humanitarian trustees were largely absent from these places, opting 
instead to design interventions in their offices, and then implement programs in evacuation 
centres, transitional sites, and resettlement housing sites. Their post-disaster management plans 
necessarily interacted with the powers of exclusion to deny certain people access to a broader 
suite of resources after Typhoon Sendong. 
This chapter has drawn attention to issues about mobility and the compression of time-space in 
post-disaster spaces. It posited that post-disaster spaces are not merely exclusionary, but 
exclusionary by design. The next chapter contends that the careful crafting of resettlement sites 
demonstrates the attempt of certain trustees, notably state and Catholic actors, to reconstruct 
specific elements of CDO society. The impacts of such governmental interventions are unevenly 
distributed among Cagayaños and disproportionately penalise relocated survivors in terms of 
their mobility and their experiences of time-space compression.  
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Chapter 7. Resettling Sendong survivors: an unslumming 
project of trustees 
Introduction 
The two preceding chapters laid out what happened to whom and in which spaces in the 
aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. Chapter 5 introduced the five main vulnerability discourses that 
place Sendong survivors along a vulnerability continuum, inform and influence the post-disaster 
efforts of trustees, and limit the access of survivors to resources required for rebuilding their lives 
and livelihoods. Chapter 6 contended the official post-disaster spaces, such as evacuation camps 
and resettlement sites, were deliberately designed as spaces of exclusion. Chapters 5 and 6 were 
very CDO-focused. Here in Chapter 7, the discussion broadens. It argues that the environmental 
migration of certain people affected by a disaster was co-opted by trustees aiming to govern or 
conduct the conduct of others.  
This chapter posits post-disaster spaces are spaces for reconstruction. By definition, reconstructing 
assumes that something is broken and requires fixing. This assumption is reflected in the groups 
of people targeted as the beneficiaries of reconstruction (Chapter 5), in the post-disaster 
reconstruction activities carried out by diverse trustees (Chapter 6), and in the spaces they 
designed and created (Chapter 6). The intended long-term products of the reconstruction 
processes are the permanent resettlement sites and the people; these spaces and the people who 
live there reflect what each actor envisions as an improved society. 
The discussion in Chapter 7 is informed by a conventional content analysis of key informant 
interviews with trustees and the Sendong-related reports they produced. The official claims made 
by these sources were then contrasted with the experiences of survivors accessing post-disaster 
spaces, as expressed in survivor interviews, focus group discussions, participatory videos, and 
non-participant observation. Discrepancies between the various accounts are noted throughout 
the chapter. The discussion on time-space compression, especially the parts about fast and slow 
mobility and the speed of recovery, is based on survivor and trustee interviews, GPS activities, 
and my personal experiences traversing the city using all the different modes of transportation 
available to trustees and survivors. 
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Chapter 7 is organised into two parts. Part I briefly recaps literature on state aims and how 
trustees and experts attempt to achieve them. It then applies James Scott’s (1998) thesis of 
“seeing like a state” – tempered by Tania Murray Li’s (2005) critical engagement with his 
arguments – to the three main official post-disaster sleeping spaces – evacuation sites, temporary 
housing sites, and permanent resettlement housing. It extends Scott’s thesis to investigate how 
official post-disaster spaces also demonstrate “seeing like a church.”53 This discussion establishes 
post-disaster resettlement as what Jane Jacobs (1961) has termed an “unslumming project” and 
what Tania Murray Li (2007a) describes as a demonstration of “the will to improve.” At 
relocation sites, there are attempts to change and control people and landscapes. This is done 
through various means, in particular through direct intervention in the culture of the intended 
beneficiaries, where culture is understood as “a general process of intellectual, spiritual 
development [and] […] as a ‘way of life’ characteristic of particular groups” (Williams 1981, 90 in 
Gregory, Johnston et al. 2009, 135). The discussion in part I underscores that post-disaster 
interventions were an exercise in governmentality. The discussion focuses on the intentions of 
trustees – “what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined 
how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques” – the starting point 
of any study of government according to Rose (1999, 20 in Li 2007b, 278). To a lesser extent, the 
discussion here also addresses the “ ‘witches’ brew’ of processes and practices” resulting from 
governmental interventions, a critical yet underappreciated corollary of empirical analyses of 
governmental intentions (Li 2007b, 279). (The “witches’ brew” of outcomes was developed at 
length in Chapters 5 and 6.) 
Part II analyses the uneven repercussions of relocating certain segments of the city’s population 
into resettlement sites. It focuses on the reduction in the mobility of resettled residents. The 
discussion is framed in terms of Doreen Massey’s (1994) ideas about time-space compression, 
and how one person’s or one institution’s power can actively enhance or constrain the mobility 
of another. It underlines that the differential experience of time-space compression necessarily 
impacts the possibilities for truly rebuilding lives and livelihoods post-disaster.  
                                                          
53 I am indebted to Dr. Patricia Ehrkamp who first suggested that I had a case of “seeing like a church.” 
She was the discussant for the Religion and biopolitics panel where I presented preliminary research results at 
the annual meeting of the American Association of Geographers in 2014. 
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Seeing like a state / Seeing like a church in Cagayan de Oro 
James Scott (1998) contends that states ascribing to high modernism aim to remake society and 
ecology to conform to a rational plan. This plan enables the state and its representatives to 
intervene or to “manipulate” in order to achieve certain objectives, be it implementing mass 
vaccination campaigns, collecting taxes, setting up proper sanitation facilities, enforcing 
conscription for military service, etc. To see like a state, Scott (1998) argues your three primary 
aims are to simplify, to render legible and to manipulate. You carry out your rational plan in a 
blank space that exists outside of locality and history. High modernists see the world as a blank 
canvas devoid of ecological, historical, geographical, social, political, and cultural particularities. 
This blank canvas can be moulded into a specific vision. Such a plan requires copious amounts of 
data be collected, standardised and held by a central authority. You rely upon experts who decide 
what is best for your beneficiaries. The implementation of your plan requires a state powerful 
enough to force its scheme on the beneficiaries.  
Both state and religious trustees, to a degree, attempted a high modernist revamping in CDO’s 
relocation sites. This section explores how post-disaster spaces reflect “seeing like a state” and 
“seeing like a church.” CDO’s state actors closely followed Scott’s (1998) articulation of seeing 
like a state. CDO’s religious trustees, especially Catholic actors, followed a similar pattern; they 
collected, organised, and standardised data that not only made people and the places they inhabit 
more accessible to outsiders, but also made it easier for them to further intervene in people’s lives 
and impart on them specific values. Seeing like a church thus entails exercising both old and new 
types of pastoral power (cf. Foucault 2003a), or ministering to the entire person because, 
according to one archdiocese staff member “a person is both body and soul.” 
Since the Spanish colonial period, religion and state governance have been closely intertwined in 
the Philippines (Tan 2009, Francia 2010). The response to Sendong was no exception. There was 
a close interplay, a tacit complicity perhaps, between state and religious trustees in the relocation 
sites, and indeed in all of the post-disaster spaces. From the outset, the Catholic Church had a 
leadership role in directing post-disaster management and bringing together civil society, religious 
groups, and state agencies, with whom the archdiocese has strategic partnerships and receives 
funding. To help with disaster relief and recovery, Catholic actors intervened at evacuation 
camps, temporary housing sites and in Sendong-affected communities. Catholic NGOs provided 
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physical materials to build and repair houses, archdiocese staff created a database of Sendong 
victims and survivors, nuns helped with psycho-social debriefing of traumatised survivors, 
archdiocese-recommended camp managers intervened where there were incidences of domestic 
violence at the evacuation camps, and so on. In other words, Catholic actors did all of the things 
that state actors should have been doing. Gupta and Sharma (2006, 277) critique this type of 
“government-at-a-distance” element of neoliberalism in which “social institutions such as 
nongovernmental organizations, schools, communities, and even individuals that are not part of 
any centralized state apparatus […] are made responsible for activities formerly carried out by 
state agencies.”  
This situation elicits the question of whether the Catholic Church is a competitor of the state (e.g. 
by delivering parallel services) or an instrument of the state (e.g. by delivering services that the 
government chooses to fund)? It is not an either/or situation. It is both. The post-disaster 
situation unfolding in post-disaster spaces reinscribes the power play between a weak Philippine 
state (and other levels of the state), and a strong, secular church (Hedman 2006). Yet, even 
though CDO’s religious institutions were in a position to usurp the primary position of the state 
in reconstructing society post-Sendong, they frequently allied themselves with state trustees 
instead of opposing them. 
The rational plans of trustees revealed a motivation to reconstruct broken elements of some of 
the CDO citizenry. The rational plans did have laudable objectives. They aimed to fix the poorly 
constructed housing of the urban poor (by giving beneficiaries concrete houses) and to relocate 
them to safe parts of the city that would not be prone to flooding. The plans were designed to 
remedy the dire economic situation of the urban poor by offering livelihood training and loans, 
too. These were the explicitly stated objectives. But there were other equally important objectives 
motivating the disaster relief, recovery, and rebuilding interventions in post-disaster spaces. 
The role of experts  
The role of experts is essential to high modernist plans to control people and landscapes (Scott 
1998). Experts are akin to the trustees who strive to problematise and render technical an issue or 
an element of social life so that they are uniquely positioned to address it (Li 2007a). There was 
no lack of experts or trustees involved in CDO’s post-disaster efforts. Official post-disaster 
spaces are conceived, supported, and run by myriad actors, including: local government offices, 
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regional or provincial government agencies, humanitarian organisations, the United Nations, the 
private sector, local NGOs or people’s organisations, schools and universities, churches and 
other religious organisations, and private affluent individuals. Conspicuously absent from this list 
of so-called experts are the very beneficiaries of disaster assistance and the people who actually 
reside in official post-disaster spaces.  
The purported expertise of the experts is questionable. As Li (2007a, 7, emphasis added) points out, 
“the claim of experts to expertise depends on their capacity to diagnose problems in ways that 
match the kinds of solutions that fall within their repertoire.” The people in charge of creating and 
running post-disaster programs were indeed in positions of power and authority, but they were 
not always highly knowledgeable about the disaster-related issues for which they were 
responsible. Sendong was “seen by many as a test of leadership and good governance” at the 
regional and national state levels (NEDA 2012, 78). It was the first calamity after the passing of 
the Philippine Disaster Act (R.A. 10121) (GoP 2010b). The Act mandated that Philippine 
agencies lead disaster rescue, recovery and rehabilitation processes, whereas these processes were 
previously under the purview of external international agencies such as the United Nations. 
Because the law had come into force, regional offices were under immense pressure from the 
national government to quickly “learn on the fly” so they could carry out the duties for which 
they had “not yet [been] capacitated.” According to R.A. 10121, the disbursement of disaster 
relief funds from the national government is contingent upon the publication of an action plan. 
Regional government staff, however, had not yet been trained on the preparation of key 
documents such as the Strategic action plan (SAP) and the Post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA). The 
SAP reports on the four major sectors (infrastructure, economic, social and governance) affected 
by Sendong for which post-disaster programs and policies are required, and it delineates the 
obligations of all relevant government agencies. The PDNA identifies priority needs for post-
disaster reconstruction and initiates short and long term recovery processes. The lack of training 
in preparing these critical documents limited the scope and quality of the data collection, analysis, 
and validation. It contributed to inconsistencies between the SAP, which was released in 
February 2012, and the PDNA, which was published nine months later. It may have even 
provided misleading information to post-disaster programs and policies. 
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Non-expert non-state trustees were similarly called upon to manage post-disaster efforts because 
they were widely perceived as possessing the capacity to do so. The people representing powerful 
institutions were treated as experts because of their authoritative and respected positions in 
Philippine society, and specifically in CDO, and not because they possessed any particular proven 
expertise in disaster management. For example, the archdiocese and Xavier University assumed 
leadership roles in collecting and distributing emergency relief, chairing coordination meetings 
among local, national, and international actors, and even designing and running temporary and 
permanent sites. Underpinning these efforts were very well-intentioned individuals, many of 
whom spent countless hours volunteering in post-disaster sleeping spaces or coordinating relief 
activities. Still, much of their expertise was unrelated to disasters and resettlement. Many, 
including members of the Xavier Board of Trustees and Xavier professors involved in Ecoville, 
admitted to knowing very little about setting up and running a resettlement site; their expertise lay 
in their specific academic subjects in agriculture, engineering, social work, etc., and not in housing 
developments and planning. As one professor explained, the university was committed to 
supporting Ecoville to the best of its abilities, but it acknowledged its limitations and had no 
intention of long-term engagement. “We are not a resettlement agency, we are a university. When 
we want to donate the land, we don’t want to engage the people there [forever], we also don’t 
want to stay there forever. So they have to have their own community.” Similarly, the 
archdiocese, while in the business of tending to the spiritual needs of its congregation, and 
supporting diverse community development initiatives through its Social Action Center, had no 
formal experience relocating and rebuilding communities.  
Both Catholic trustees, recognising their limitations, sought out external expertise. Xavier 
University, for instance, welcomed students and staff from its sister school Ateneo de Manila 
University who had worked on psychosocial debriefing in other disasters to help train locals on 
delivering appropriate programs to Sendong survivors. It also hired a professional developer to 
prepare the site development plan for its Ecoville resettlement site. As such, it gained expertise 
during, and not before, the design and implementation of its post-disaster activities.  
There were, of course, many trustees assisting in CDO’s post-Sendong relief, recovery and 
rebuilding who could rightfully be considered experts in disaster relief, recovery and rebuilding in 
the Philippines. But these trustees did not direct the efforts, they merely supported them.  
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The lack of experience of state and religious trustees thrust into leadership positions meant there 
was a very steep learning curve. As key informants from several regional government agencies, 
NGOs, activist groups, universities, and religious groups stressed, the initial absence of a 
centralised incident command system was problematic. Organisations each performed their own 
needs assessments and rarely shared their results and action plans with others. Not surprisingly, 
this lack of communication contributed to the somewhat chaotic delivery of emergency relief, the 
duplication of efforts, the oversupply of some items and the undersupply of other items, and an 
overall inefficient and ineffective distribution of aid immediately after the disaster. 
The inexperience of state and especially religious experts likely also influenced what they 
constructed as a rational plan to help Sendong survivors rebuild their houses, lives and 
livelihoods after the disaster. They, like the state planners Jane Jacobs (1961) critiqued a half 
century before, succumbed to the fallacy of salvation by bricks. That is, the resettlement plans 
carried out by state and Catholic trustees unmask resettlement sites as an unslumming project 
underpinned by the assumption that good housing begets good neighbourhoods and good 
conduct. 
A rational plan to reconstruct society  
The rational plans devised for CDO’s relocation sites echo a broader historical pattern in which 
states attempt to expand state spaces and neutralise non-state spaces (De Koninck 1996, Scott 
1998). In CDO, the relocation sites demonstrate an attempt to reduce the perceived threat posed 
by the impenetrable and illegible neighbourhoods of the urban poor and to transfer the residents 
into productive and settled state spaces. The newly visible residents are ushered into the national 
economy, national politics and national legal system; for example, they become titled 
homeowners, and are eligible for government loans. The rational plans also attempt to enact a 
doctrine of salvation by concrete. The resettlement plans of CDO’s state and religious trustees 
stipulate not only the type of physical space that beneficiaries should inhabit, but the social, 
economic, and political spaces, too. Put another way, the rational plans of CDO trustees aimed to 
reconstruct a certain segment of the city’s residents through what can be described as an 
“unslumming project.”  
By definition, reconstructing assumes that something is broken and requires fixing. In the case of 
Typhoon Sendong reconstruction, two things were stated explicitly as broken: (1) poorly 
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constructed housing, and (2) the location of the housing settlements on hazard-prone land. What 
was usually left unsaid was that there are other broken elements requiring fixing, namely (3) the 
dire economic situation of the urban poor survivors, and (4) their purported questionable moral 
character and values. To enact their rational reconstruction plans, trustees first had to identify 
and select beneficiaries. A second prerequisite was to simplify and render legible the beneficiaries. 
Once they were sufficiently knowable to external actors, trustees could begin their governmental 
interventions. Processes of simplification, rendering legible and manipulation (i.e. intervention) 
mostly occurred in official post-disaster spaces.  
The design and implementation of the rational plans in official post-disaster spaces is telling. The 
selection of beneficiaries shows which groups are perceived as somehow deficient. The 
identification of four explicit and implicit problems, and the ways each is addressed hints at what 
each trustee values in reconstructing society. The reconstruction principles guide trustees in 
transforming former outsiders into insiders while enabling state and Catholic institutions to retain 
their power and hegemonic positions in Philippine society. The fact that diverse state, religious, 
academic, and non-governmental actors are even engaged in reconstruction activities reveals an 
intention to govern. They sought to govern not in a strictly governmental sense, but instead in a 
Foucauldian sense, where governance is “the conduct of conduct” (Foucault 2003a, 2003b). 
State, academic, and church actors alike actively sought to shape the behaviour of beneficiaries, 
which, in turn, reinforces the existing positions enjoyed by these trustees. As such, building 
Cagayaños’ trust in and respect for government authority was an imperative part of their rational 
plans.  
Enacting unslumming plans post-Sendong also allowed trustees to advance their particular 
agendas. Throughout the reconstruction process, trustees capitalised on opportunities only 
tangentially related to Typhoon Sendong. For example, many trustees privately, and occasionally 
publically, critiqued the ineptitude of the city administration in its management of the disaster. 
Trustees also reframed certain societal problems as Sendong-related issues, thereby deliberately 
creating alternative discourses that mask unresolved problems prevalent in Philippine society. 
The rational plans of experts thus had broad political, economic, and social effects reaching far 
beyond the physical boundaries of resettlement sites. 
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Targeting beneficiaries  
Seeing like a state or a church entails selecting beneficiaries of a rational plan. The vulnerability 
discourses discussed in Chapter 5 featured prominently in the selection of beneficiaries for post-
disaster interventions, and especially for relocation housing. As argued in Chapters 5 and 6, 
trustees targeted people they categorised as “victims,” “illegal squatters,” or “informal settlers,” 
and people they declared as somehow “deficient” or “different-from-us.”  
In CDO, the selection process was iterative; trustees first attempted to identify all flood-affected 
persons, and then chose a subset of these people as the primary recipients of their reconstruction 
programs. During the initial stage of identifying potential beneficiaries, however, political 
meddling, unreasonable expectations, inexperience, and institutionalised prejudices against 
Muslims created a situation in which there was systematic exclusion of affected people and 
inclusion of non-affected people. Thus, from the outset, both Type I and Type II errors plagued 
the identification of persons legitimately affected by Typhoon Sendong.54 
Of all the Sendong survivors, only the urban poor survivors were specifically targeted for 
reconstruction. “Vulnerable people” were the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian, state, and 
religious post-disaster assistance. The city’s urban poor living in precarious housing in informal 
settlements fit the trustees’ definitions of “vulnerable people.” The archbishop, for example, 
recounted which factors were most important in choosing beneficiaries of CDO’s official 
resettlement program. 
Some of the priorities would be those whose houses were totally washed out, also those 
who have rented houses that were also washed out. In other words, they are not the 
owners but they are renters. In general those were the informal settlers, or we call them 
squatter families, that did not have any land at all so they were living dangerously by the 
margins of the river. So in that sense, Typhoon Sendong, the overflooding, also affected 
the most marginalised groups that were already without, you might say, stable housing or 
no lands to own. [Other factors are that they typically exhibit are] no employment, and 
also, a number of them would come from the provinces. 
The archbishop’s comments, echoed by many other key informant trustees, indicate that 
beneficiaries are chosen based on a singling out of particular vulnerable demographic groups 
approach and on an indicators of vulnerability approach. The quotation singles out informal 
                                                          
54 A Type I error is the rejection of a true null hypothesis (i.e. a false positive). A Type II error is the 
failure to reject a false null hypothesis (i.e. a false negative). 
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settlers, the unemployed, and people living in disaster- or flood-prone areas (Table 5.1 on 
vulnerable groups). It points to geophysical susceptibility, migrant status, no land, title or stable 
housing, and unemployment as key criteria or indicators (Table 5.2 on indicators of vulnerability). 
Both approaches classified the urban poor as vulnerable. 
Selective targeting is evident through the plethora of programs and resettlement sites aimed at the 
urban poor, and the dearth of programs and housing aimed at the middle class, Muslim, and rural 
poor survivors. The urban poor were the ones targeted at the evacuation sites. They were ones 
allocated space at the temporary and permanent housing sites – spaces that permit people and 
landscapes to be controlled. For example, only one out of more than 15 built and planned 
housing resettlement sites was allocated specifically to Sendong survivors working in the formal 
sector and earning more than the poverty threshold (NEDA 2012). The targeting was justified by 
the disproportionate number of urban poor affected by the disaster. For example, although 
Sendong survivors included city residents from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, roughly 
85% were urban poor living in informal housing (OCD 2012, 14). In five of the hardest hit 
barangays, affected informal sector workers outnumbered affected formal sector workers nearly 29 
to one (NEDA 2012, 39).  
The clearest example of the selective targeting of beneficiaries comes, not surprisingly, from 
Xavier University’s relocation site. As explained in Chapter 6, Ecoville trustees were highly 
selective in choosing who was permitted to live at the site. In addition to meeting the minimum 
criteria for all relocation site applicants, Ecoville residents had to pass other screening processes. 
For example, residents must be listed on two, and preferably all three, Sendong survivor lists; 
residents were interviewed, and then informed about and consented to the community guidelines 
at Ecoville; and Ecoville staff conducted background investigations to verify the veracity of 
claims. After meeting these prerequisites and moving into the temporary housing at Ecoville, 
residents were required to fulfil additional criteria before moving into the permanent housing. 
Failure to comply with these rules was grounds for getting kicked out of the Ecoville transitional 
housing and booted off the list for a free concrete house in the permanent resettlement site. The 
additional conditions for living in Ecoville permanent housing reflect who the site’s trustees 
consider worthy of joining their community. Furthermore, the application of stringent eligibility 
rules display concerted attempts to govern in the Foucauldian sense.  
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Reconstruction principles 
In designing their rational plan to unslum a portion of CDO residents and their homes, state and 
religious experts adopted guiding principles, which were mostly implied and left unsaid. These 
principles are both process- and outcome-oriented. That is, some guide the ways in which 
trustees set about creating resettlement sites, while others focus more on what trustees set out to 
achieve. Some principles, such as the simplify-and-render-legible principle and the build-back-
better-and-safer principle, fit into both categories. The reconstruction principles highlight the 
extent to which post-disaster spaces were instruments of governmentality.  
Simplify-and-render-legible  
James Scott (1998) contends that simplification and legibility are prerequisites for manipulation. 
Simplification entails stripping away all particularities of people, land, social and economic 
relations, market production, farming systems, religions, languages and other institutions within 
state boundaries. Legibility yields visible units (e.g. citizens and villages) that are easily “identified, 
observed, recorded, counted, aggregated and monitored” by external agents (Scott 1998, 183). At 
the scale of state mega-projects, previously inaccessible populations are rendered legible through 
sedentarisation, concentration, and radical simplification of both settlement and cultivation. The 
state and its agents can manipulate or intervene in simplified, legible spaces. 
On a smaller scale, simplification and legibility were salient features of the disaster relief, 
recovery, and reconstruction processes in Cagayan de Oro. In any disaster management situation, 
legibility is key to grasping the magnitude of the problem and designing an appropriate response. 
For instance, knowing which people in which particular geographical areas were hardest hit by 
Sendong was a prerequisite for targeted distribution of emergency goods. As one informant from 
an NGO working with Indigenous Peoples underlined, Sendong-affected groups who remained 
illegible to authorities (such as the upland communities surrounding CDO) did not receive aid. 
Measures to simplify and render people legible to outsiders were thus introduced in the initial 
stages of the disaster response, and became the basis for subsequent interventions.  
Some trustees had already established initiatives to promote legibility prior to Sendong. The 
Philippine Red Cross, for example, had introduced a nation-wide “Red Cross 143” volunteer 
program in 2006 as part of its disaster preparedness and capacity building programs. Each 
participating barangay has one leader and 43 trained first responders; of the 43, 25 are designated 
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as emergency blood donors, nine are specialised in disaster response and another nine in health. 
The capacity building component of Red Cross 143 ensures that barangay residents know how to 
help each other during emergencies or disasters, and not rely exclusively upon the assistance of 
the municipality, barangay council, or Red Cross (or other organisation). According to the officer-
in-charge of the CDO branch disaster preparedness is an urgent and salient concern for all 
Filipinos because they live “in the ring of fire, where all of the disasters are [happening], especially 
with the climate change and with all the changes.” The legibility component of the program is 
equally valuable to the NGO. The officer succinctly articulated the importance of having “this 
Red Cross 143 [as] our eyes [and] ears [on] the ground.” She explained that “if there is nobody 
who is reporting [an emergency, fire, flood, etc.], of course, there is nobody [from the outside] 
who can help.” As such, the interventions of trustees from outside the barangay is sped up by 
ensuring people and places are legible prior to a disaster. 
CDO’s legibility-oriented coping mechanisms, however, were overwhelmed by the enormous 
demands brought on by Typhoon Sendong. On 17 December 2011, it was clear the disaster 
response required new ways to rapidly simplify survivors and their immediate needs, and to 
quantify, organise, and map the distribution of relief aid. The selected methods were the cluster 
approach, family access cards, and victim and survivor lists. 
The cluster approach 
In the context of the IDP vulnerability discourse, Chapter 5 introduced the cluster approach to 
coordinating disaster relief. Once set in place, the cluster approach helped improve coordination 
among myriad organisations and clearly delineated responsibilities. Gathering, managing, and 
sharing data on food, shelter, water, medical, sanitation, and other needs were made easier, and 
the distribution of aid streamlined. Many different trustees participated, including municipal and 
regional government agencies, United Nations organisations, local, national and international 
NGOs, universities, religious groups, and private companies. They profiled affected households 
and barangays, organised their data into needs assessments which they shared, and used each 
other’s data in their subsequent disaster relief and recovery interventions. 
Family access cards 
The regional DSWD and the municipal CSWD government offices each issued “survivor cards” 
or “family access cards.” The cards were the agencies’ main tool for identifying Sendong 
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survivors, and for collecting, organising, and tracking data on survivors’ post-Sendong 
movements, needs, and activities. The family access cards simplified survivors into a list of 
names, ages, monthly income, occupation and region(s) of origin of all family members, an 
address and the name of the head of the family at the time of Sendong. The workers assigned by 
DSWD or CSWD to issue cards were “as much as possible encouraged not to leave [any portion 
of the card] blank,” however, due to the immense demand, many workers did not complete the 
interview, leaving blanks on the cards and holes in government records.  
The family access cards were a sort of passbook, recording all the disaster relief-related 
transactions of the cardholder (Fig. 7.1). Survivors were required to produce their family access 
card every time they sought relief goods, cash, or other items at evacuation camps or other aid 
distribution sites. Survivors had their cards stamped each time they participated in a cash-for-
work or food-for-work program. Because only households whose incomes fell below a certain 
threshold were eligible for most of disaster relief packages, there was little incentive for middle 
class survivors to obtain and repeatedly use a family access card. Consequently, the cards were 
disproportionately used by the urban poor, thereby disproportionately increasing the legibility of 
the urban poor – a previously illegible segment of the city’s population – to authorities. 
 
Fig. 7.1. A family access card, or “yellow card” of a totally damaged urban poor Sendong survivor 
household (18 March 2013). One side records personal information, and the other records the 
types of assistance received (e.g. a kitchen set from DSWD and a food package). All legible 
names have been removed. 
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The family access cards were fraught with problems: obtaining a survivor card required standing 
in a hot line for long hours, claims were not properly validated with community visits, cards 
issued by the city were not accepted by the regional offices and vice versa, and the card data were 
incomplete. Put another way, the state efforts to render legible did not allow for smooth, 
effective intervention in the lives of the survivors, especially for those remaining in the 
community, outside of the evacuation camps. 
The family access cards permitted the CSWD and DSWD to minimise resource expenditure. For 
example, the DSWD began issuing family access cards on 19 December 2011 on small sheets of 
paper. The agency quickly switched to official family access cards that came in various hues; most 
were yellow, but there were green, blue and pink cards, too. The cards came from various DSWD 
regional offices; they all recorded the same information, just the colour was different. The 
different colours provided a serendipitous solution to the problem (from the DSWD perspective) 
of “double-dipping.” One officer explained.  
[Colour coding is] our innovation to ensure that people are not getting more than what is 
intended for them. Because there are so many people in the evacuation camps. One camp 
is near to another camp. One thing that people do not know is about our colour coding. 
If you are in the Citizen’s Route [evacuation camp] you are pink. And Citizen’s Route to 
Macasandig [evacuation camp] is just a bridge away. So, since there are 3,000 families in 
the Citizen’s Route if I am number 20 [in the relief good line], right after I got my share 
in Citizen’s Route, I will go to Macasandig. So little do the people know that we have that 
colour coding. So they went there again and fall in line, but we know that they are lying. 
[Even though] we sign it at the back [as] our way of knowing whether they’re done 
getting their family food pack, sometimes they ask their wife to get another card. Or their 
son, another card. [Colour coding] is our way of ensuring that when we give our quality 
foodstuff, they’re not going to have it the second way around.  
The benefits of legibility are thus accrued to the outsider trustees (e.g. DSWD). Legibility enables 
them to restrict the quantity of relief goods and cash disbursement. It is easier to control and 
deny resource access to legible survivors than illegible ones. 
Victim and survivor lists 
Immediately after the flood, religious and state actors alike prioritised the identification of 
affected persons. The city, the region and the archdiocese each compiled their own list of dead, 
missing, and affected persons. A fourth list, made by the National Commission on Muslim 
Filipinos, comprised the names of Muslim families whose homes were partially or fully damaged. 
 
 
 346   
 
(No Muslims died or went missing in CDO.) As of April 2013, the NCMF-X list had not been 
used to disburse aid or prioritise housing beneficiaries. Lists were made at evacuation camps and 
barangay halls. The archdiocese list was also based on reports from parish priests. Being on one or 
more of these lists was imperative for receiving aid and other benefits.  
The archdiocese’s list was widely lauded as the most thorough and valid. It included data on 
Muslim survivors, people who remained in the communities, as well as those who went to the 
evacuation centres. The city even used the archdiocese’s list of dead and missing persons – 
instead of its own list – when it commissioned a memorial plaque for the city park across from 
city hall (Fig. 7.2). There were substantiated rumours that some lists were politically motivated 
with the inclusion of many non-affected households, especially the city list. 
The simplification and legibility efforts of the Catholic Church and other Catholic actors went 
beyond compiling a simple list of names. In the immediate disaster relief and recovery efforts, the 
archdiocese enlisted the staff in its various ministries and volunteers at the parishes in CDO to 
conduct interviews with survivors, and then track and validate the data. They recorded 
demographic information, including specific details on people’s origins, and disaster-related info 
such as the extent of the damage to people’s houses. The archdiocese commissioned a computer 
software expert to design a database system so that the data could be easily catalogued and used. 
Thanks to the intervention of certain congressmen and their wives (who answered the 
archdiocese’s calls even at midnight!), the archdiocese’s team was granted permission to encode 
these initial data at the computer labs at four of CDO’s post-secondary institutions. The 
archdiocese is staunchly committed to record-keeping; when I visited in February 2013 (more 
than one year after data gathering began), there was a team of five youth volunteers adding to the 
database and conducting analyses in a small computer lab in the archbishopric. 
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Fig. 7.2. A memorial plaque in Gaston Park across from both the City Hall and the Archdiocese 
commemorates the dead and missing victims of Tropical Storm Sendong (21 February 2013, 
top). The plaque was unveiled by local politicians, civic organisations and Catholic priests at a 
special anniversary celebration (17 December 2012, bottom).  
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The archdiocese’s Responsible Parenthood and All Natural Family Planning ministry (RP-ANFP) 
went even further in their sleuthing on a group of survivors. The ministry acquired their 
baptismal records from other dioceses all across the Philippines; these records were needed for 
the mass weddings they arranged for survivors. The head of the RP-ANFP recalled that 
procuring baptismal certificates was a near-Herculean task. 
They are from different provinces. [The] IDPs or the victims in the evacuation camps, I 
realised [by] asking them [that] they’re from Luzon, all over Luzon, anywhere in Visayas. 
During that time I really tried to send [for copies of the original baptismal certificate]. 
Some can say that ‘I was baptised in Talibon, Bohol,’ [or] ‘I was baptised in Hagna [in 
Southern Leyte]’. We really sent letter of request for the baptismal certificate all over 
Visayas and all over Mindanao. 
When the documents could not be found she sought ecclesiastically acceptable substitutes. 
If you ask ‘where were you baptised?’ [they respond,] ‘in Manila.’ [Then you ask,] ‘where 
in Manila?’ [and they answer,] ‘I do not know, I only know that it’s in Manila’. [Similarly, 
you would ask,] ‘Ma’am are you baptised?’ [and she would answer,] ‘Yes, in Cebu’. [You 
would follow up with,] ‘Where in Cebu?’ [and she would respond,] ‘No, I do not know’. 
So, it’s hard to get …, we cannot get the baptismal certificate. So, I asked our Chancellor, 
because he is also a canon lawyer, what to do. And you just ask the bishop to give them 
conditional baptism. To fast-track also the activity [of the mass weddings] because if we 
will wait for them to look for somebody to remember where they were baptised [we 
would never finish]. 
The detective work of the RP-ANFP provided further evidence that many of the urban poor 
survivors were born and baptised in other parts of the country and later moved to CDO.  
The Ecoville trustees similarly added to the basic baseline data on the survivors who would be 
living at the Xavier Ecoville relocation site. The staff conducted a preliminary survey on the 
various skills and livelihoods of adult residents, and their vices. The data were added to the site’s 
records, which also include information about whether or not households pay their portion of 
the electricity and water bills. These data were then used for targeted interventions.  
Applications for the legibility data 
Once survivors were rendered legible to trustees, the latter could reconstruct them according to 
their rational plan to fix one or more of the four purportedly broken elements of their lives. At 
Ecoville, for instance, the staff used the residents’ data in subsequent disaster assistance programs 
such as livelihood trainings and special family support grants. The grants program is an 
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illustrative example of how legible people facilitated the very specific targeting of beneficiaries 
according the very specific missions of trustees. One of Ecoville’s NGO partners offered special 
health, educational, and livelihood benefits to families that met certain criteria. To be were 
eligible for the grants, the household head had to be younger than 45 years old, family members 
had to have no vices (e.g. drinking or smoking), and families could have no more than four 
children. Only five of 518 Ecoville households met all the criteria.  
The archdiocese used its data to focus on remedying the supposed moral failings of the urban 
poor. The survey data collected by the archdiocese complemented the observations of religious 
and lay workers volunteering in the evacuation camps and transitional housing sites, allowing the 
workers to design and carry out a sequence of appropriate interventions. For example, after 
observing “the problem of the conjugal act” the RP-NFP ministry inspired a series of “couples 
sessions,” which subsequently inspired natural-family planning and marital counseling 
workshops, mass weddings and baptisms, and all the associated prerequisite activities. The head 
of the RP-NFP explained the iterative learning and intervention processes spurred by the 
presence of the archdiocese workers and volunteers at CDO evacuation camps.  
[In the] middle of the night, everyone will wake up because somebody might shout. Then 
when interviewed, it was found out that the cause of the problem is the conjugal act. [The 
RP-ANFP], we make a two-hour couples session. It’s about ‘what is conjugal act?’ to 
enhance the relationship, that’s our goal. So since they’re working during daytime, we give 
that orientation [at] 7 to 9, or 7 to 10 o’clock in the evening. We give that almost two 
times or three times every night [at the evacuation camps]. One of the things that we 
found out, they are not married, or even civilly- or church-married. They are not. They 
are just live-in partners. And they expressed the need to legalise their bonds. So, after 
that, we offer NFP counseling or marital counseling. Then, they want to marry each other 
with the legal documents. So that’s why we [organised] the first batch [of weddings].  
Organising and financing three mass weddings for more than 300 couples, and conducting all the 
ecclesiastical preparations was a massive undertaking. The head of the RP-ANFP described the 
some of the steps and costs involved. 
It’s very expensive. For each couple, each individual we need to pay [₱]125 for the 
CENOMAR [Certificate of No Marriage], and [₱]240 for the application for the marriage 
license here in the city hall. So what I did is, I talked to the director of the NSO [National 
Statistics Office] if they can give us [the CENOMAR] for free. I asked bishop Tony to 
write the director with his signature. Then I just [ask] if they can give us a paper because 
we are only helping the people in the evacuation camps. I also did that with our mayor. 
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Bishop Tony also wrote a letter if they can give the [marriage] application for free. And so 
far, they agreed. So that’s the legal documents needed, the [CENOMAR from the] NSO 
and the marriage application.  
But in the church we need their baptismal certificate, we need their confirmation 
certificate. And they need to undergo that preparation for marriage – the seminars. And 
only [then do we] find out they claim they are Catholics but they are not baptised here. 
Yeah. They have 3, 4, 5, 6 kids. They are not baptised, they are not confirmed. So again, 
another pre-baptism seminar, then baptism. [Pre-reconciliation seminar, then the 
Sacrament of Reconciliation. Pre-Eucharist seminar, then the Sacrament of the 
Eucharist.] Confirmation seminar, then confirmation. After they comply, then we ask 
them to undergo the seminar for the preparation for the marriage. Before they say the 
Sacrament of Matrimony, we ask them to have Confession. That’s a requirement. The 
wedding celebration, that’s the day also [of] the Confirmation. And for the first batch [of 
53 couples married in the first mass wedding] one of their first problems is their kids, 
their children are not also baptised. So during the wedding celebration, after that big 
celebration, there’s a mass baptism for their children.  
We solicit help for their wedding ring, for their bouquet. We are very ambitious to have 
cake [at] each table, and wine [at] each table. For that, we ask [the] politicians, but for the 
catering, each couple they have 10 visitors that’s paid by bishop Tony from the Sendong 
funds. For that first two batches [of couples married at two mass weddings] we are 
working with the camp managers, camp managers of DSWD. For now [for the third 
batch], we are working [with] a congregation of priests, the Barnaby fathers, who stayed 
in Calaanan camps. In the field the Barnaby fathers manage all the [ecclesiastical] 
activities, but for the legal papers, I’m the director. 
That out-of-CDO parents were happy to see their children finally legalise their relationships in 
the eyes of God is another example of how Sendong was seen as an opportunity arising out of 
catastrophe.  
They [the young people in question] came in Cagayan de Oro for work. And they meet 
someone. Without the blessing of their parents, they are together. I met some parents 
[who came from the provinces for the wedding]. They’re very happy. They thanked us 
[the RP-ANFP team] because they are really against the decision of their son or daughter 
to live together without the blessing. [The parents’ excuse was,] ‘we have no money, we 
have no time’. But after Sendong, we have time [and money from many donors]. Many of 
them who visit the Sacrament of Matrimony [were] cross because of Sendong but for 
now they told us, ‘now we are happy because of Sendong’. There is blessings after 
Sendong. Many of them. 
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A legible landscape 
Official post-disaster landscapes were similarly intended to be simplified and rendered legible. 
According to Scott (1998), a legible landscape can be easily navigated by outsiders aided only by a 
map or other official document; it does not require an intimate knowledge of the particularities of 
a place. In practice, legible landscapes are transformed through the removal or the overlooking of 
geographical particularities. Hills are razed, meandering creeks straightened, locally unique 
microcosms of biodiversity homogenised. Atop this blank canvas, high modernist experts can 
recreate the built landscape so that it follows a purportedly universal or intuitive logic. For 
example, city streets that follow north-south east-west axes. Not only is the design immediately 
understood by outsiders, but it is also conducive to below-ground drainage and sewage systems, 
quicker response times by the police, and more organised mail delivery – interventions or 
manipulations intended to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants.  
Creating legible landscapes was a priority for the trustees contributing to Sendong relief, 
recovery, and reconstruction efforts. Such landscapes and the built structures on them would fix 
the two main problem requiring reconstruction, namely the substandard housing and the siting of 
these homes on natural hazard-prone sites. 
At the transitional housing sites, tents and amakan houses were arranged in neat rows, facilitating 
the task of relief workers to monitor evacuees. The grid design made it easier to locate and track 
people. Like many building projects, preparing the land for resettlement houses frequently 
involved removing or significantly altering existing components of the landscape. Small 
mountains and hills were bulldozed into level planes, many trees were felled, ditches and small 
creeks were filled in. Onto this tidy blank workspace orderly permanent relocation sites were 
built, mapped out in a grid. Every house was designed not only to match its neighbour, but to 
replicate its appearance exactly. Each house was assigned to one family only, who can have a 
maximum of seven members. As such, the permanent relocation sites are much more legible to 
outsiders than the maze-like informal settlements where the urban poor survivors formerly 
resided, often in homes filled with seven or more household members.  
The architectural design of CDO’s relocation sites necessarily reflects practical planning 
constraints such as a limited budget, a short time-frame, and a large number of families to be 
accommodated. But it also tells another story. As Israeli architect Eyal Weizman forcefully 
 
 
 352   
 
argues, architecture is a way of exercising separation and maintaining control (de Sousa 2014). 
Drawing from his research on the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Weizman describes 
architecture as a kind of low violence in which the crime is committed on the drawing board. The 
built landscape is a battlefield where weapons are simple elements like trees, terraces, houses, and 
cladding. These tactical tools need to be decoded; they tell the story the government wants them 
to tell. The architect’s job is to translate that story into something the people can easily decipher. 
Weizman (2007) purports that the physical exclusion of Israeli settlements mirrors the increased 
political exclusion of and control over Palestinians in the West Bank. Israeli settlements are 
located on hilltops, the ideal sites for self-protection, dominating the surroundings, and surveying 
the Palestinians in the valleys. In their design, architects created two kinds of constructed gazes, 
both of which serve Israeli state interests. The outward-facing gaze looks out and down towards 
the landscape, and the inward-facing gaze overlooks the common public spaces and other 
people’s homes in the settlement.  
Each of the constructed gazes, inwards and outwards, embodies complexities and 
contradictions of different kinds. The inward-looking gaze aims to reinforce a sense of 
community, facilitating the intimate management of the inhabitants’ lives, and with it, 
regulating ‘acceptable’ public behavior. The disciplinary power of this urban layout 
conforms the subject under a common gaze which is diffused amongst all other 
community members. The fact that the circular layout is closely oriented inwards towards 
the common public areas promotes an ‘unconscious policing’ with controls on acceptable 
public behavior. With the social and physical cohesion of its cul-de-sac environment, the 
‘community settlement’ promotes a communal coherence in a shared formal identity. […]  
The outward-facing arrangement of homes orients the view of the inhabitants towards 
the surrounding landscape. […] [This design] attests to the perceived role of visual 
control in the state project of pacification: ‘terrorist elements operate more easily in 
territory occupied exclusively by a population that is indifferent or sympathetic to the 
enemy than in territory in which there are also persons liable to monitor them and inform 
the authorities of an suspicious movement’. […] Implicit in this statement is the Israeli 
government’s enlisting of its civilian population to act as its agents alongside the agencies 
of state power, and the fact that the settlers’ presence is being used to serve the state’s 
security aims (Weizman 2007, 132, emphasis in original). 
Clearly, the political and security situation in CDO is drastically different from that in the West 
Bank. The trustees involved in designing the city’s resettlement sites did not intend for relocated 
survivors to spy on their new neighbours or keep authorities informed on happenings in their 
new barangays. Still, the built landscape of the resettlement sites do lend themselves to 
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“unconscious policing” and the formation of “a communal coherence in a shared formal 
identity.” Specific discourses pursued by trustees are communicated through the architecture of 
resettlement sites, which are themselves an expansion of state spaces. This expansion of state 
space followed other principles, notably a faster-is-better rule. 
Faster-is-better  
Rapid recovery from Typhoon Sendong was a priority for state, religious, humanitarian and 
academic trustees, especially the mayor. These trustees applied a “faster-is-better” principle to 
diverse aspects of disaster management and reconstruction. Chapter 6 examined how CDO’s 
resettlement sites were built so quickly, and what problems ensued from the accelerated building 
process. Here, I explain why a faster-is-better strategy was considered so crucial.   
The faster-is-better principle first applied to the distribution of emergency relief. The collection, 
packaging, and distribution of aid began immediately. On 17 December 2011, for example, the 
Xavier University campus was converted into a conduit of relief goods, and the university’s 
website was updated to accept donations. The local chapters of humanitarian organisations such 
as the Red Cross began coordinating their staff and volunteers in response to reports emerging 
from affected barangays. The archdiocese’s Social Action Center staff packaged emergency relief 
kits at the regional DSWD office. 
Applied to housing, the faster-is-better principle meant that it was important to rapidly move 
people out of evacuation camps into more private, more comfortable temporary housing. 
Quickly moving them into permanent relocation housing was perceived as a superior option. 
One trustee described how fast the focus on shelter shifted from meeting emergency housing 
needs to proposing long-term housing solutions. 
It was very fast. First two days: relief. The next five days was already [focused on] 
rehabilitation. And then, the next two days after the rehabilitation [there was] already the 
call for resettlement. And then we were meeting with Habitat, IOM, Red Cross and they 
were thinking of putting up temporary shelters because they are saying that the situation 
could escalate, and tents could only be an emergency form of shelter, and it may take a 
while for other organisations to come in and really build permanent houses.  
The trustees feared that “the situation could escalate” such that there would be greater numbers 
of displaced people who “do not have the capacity to resettle themselves on their own.” Hence, 
expediency was a strategy for containing the disaster. 
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Another motivation for a faster-is-better approach to disaster management was political. As the 
mayor pointed out, projects that are completed quickly tend to be marred with less corruption – 
not an insignificant consideration in the Philippines (cf. Transparency International 2014). A 
more pressing consideration for politicians was the political repercussions of swift versus tardy 
action. Resettlement sites took longer to build in Iligan City than in CDO, even though both 
cities were similarly affected by Sendong. The mayor of Iligan was not seeking re-election, and he 
could afford to focus on projects other than disaster recovery and rebuilding. In contrast, local 
politicians in CDO demanded expediency in rebuilding, in part, because of the then-upcoming 
2013 elections in which the congressmen, mayor, and barangay officials were seeking re-election. 
Demonstrating an ability to lead a speedy recovery was considered an excellent strategy to 
winning political allies and votes. In an interview, for example, CDO’s mayor was not shy about 
boasting about the city’s post-disaster achievements under his leadership. 
We are [much-admired] in Geneva because of what we have done [in terms of building 
resettlement sites and moving people into them]. It’s a recognised fact, and they said that, 
‘what has happened here [in CDO] is a miracle because very normally it takes at least two 
years before anything can be started.’ [But] we [already] have rehabilitations and 
relocations. We were able to do it four months after the flood, after the typhoon. 
Economic pressures also influenced the speed of recovery. When survivors stayed at evacuation 
camps and transitional housing sites, various levels of government incurred costs. The city, for 
example, was responsible for providing water, electricity, and light. The regional DSWD office 
paid the salaries and expenses of full-time camp managers for one year after Sendong. Once 
survivors were transferred into the resettlement sites, these government expenditures 
disappeared.  
Instituting capitalist values  
The rational plan of experts prioritised remedying the precarious economic situation of urban 
poor survivors, which was correctly identified as a critical element of vulnerability. The 
integration of capitalist values into post-disaster assistance and the concerted attempts to bring 
vulnerable survivors into the formal economy thus became critical reconstruction principles. 
Such efforts began in the evacuation camps, and continued through to the transitional and 
permanent relocation housing sites. The tendrils of capitalism were apparent in the gentle 
reminders of DSWD camp managers to their charges to repay their credit and livelihood loans, 
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the corporatisation of post-disaster spaces, the terms of the livelihood loans programs of church 
and state trustees, and the emphasis on private property in the design of relocation sites. 
Corporate money influenced post-disaster spaces. Many Philippine companies donated millions 
of pesos worth of branded products and cash to Sendong survivors, which were distributed in 
evacuation camps. A large portion of the funding for relocation housing was provided by the 
private sector. For instance, San Miguel Corporation, one of the largest conglomerations in the 
Philippines with ventures in everything from logging concessions to bottled beverages, gave more 
than $10.8 million. Following San Miguel’s lead, other large Philippine companies, including 
major banks, telecommunications companies, and water, power and utilities companied donated 
cash or in-kind products and services. Corporate representatives attended public ceremonies such 
as the housing raffles at the city hall and the symbolic housing turnover event at Xavier Ecoville, 
where their philanthropic generosity was applauded by state and religious trustees, and in 
subsequent media coverage. This public recognition was beneficial to the individual businesses. 
Indirectly, the positive recognition also commended the policy directives of Philippine national 
governments since the 1980s that brought in structural reforms and the ideologies of 
globalisation and liberalisation (Bello, Docena et al. 2004, Francia 2010). Politicians could justify 
their push for privatisation and measures for strengthening the private sector (without equivalent 
efforts on improving the public sector) because Philippine companies were good corporate 
citizens and would help Filipinos in a time of need. 
Livelihood loan programs 
The livelihood assistance programs of various state and Catholic actors provide another example 
of weaving capitalist values into rational reconstruction plans. The DSWD and the archdiocese’s 
Social Action Center (SAC) were the main disbursers of livelihood assistance loans in CDO; for 
example, as of March 2013, the SAC had loaned out more than $49,000. The official procedures, 
loan conditions, and recipient selection all demonstrate attempts to bring people previously 
outside of the formal capitalist economic system into it, and to render them legible to trustees. 
Yet, the types of livelihoods supported and the loan provisions are heavily informed by the 
deficiency and different-from-us vulnerability discourses, which reinforce the status quo. 
The process of obtaining a livelihood loan from either the DSWD or the SAC renders Sendong 
survivors legible to trustees, and offers a starting point for a capitalist education. The livelihood 
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loans programs of both the DSWD and the SAC are akin to a Grameen Bank kind of scheme. 
Trustees conducted a skills inventory of potential beneficiaries and helped organise them into 
groups. Group members submitted proposals, received loans, tracked business transactions and 
loan repayment in special passbooks, and applied peer pressure to ensure loan repayment. The 
repaid money was reinvested as new loans to new recipients and larger loans to existing 
recipients. Loan beneficiaries were required to attend business classes. While these classes may be 
useful to some recipients, for many of the urban poor, the skills to run a small business at the 
scale enabled by the size of the livelihood loan are often ones recipients already possessed 
through their previous livelihood activities.  
The procedure for obtaining a livelihood loan is similar to that for obtaining a business loan from 
a private financial institution. For the SAC loan, prospective recipients first attended an 
orientation program. Interested individuals then underwent a livelihood skills, experience, and 
preferences assessment. They were placed into loan groups of five to ten recipients; members 
were expected “to take care of each and monitor their membership [so] that everybody is 
contributing to the venture.” Individual members each prepared a project proposal. They 
received seed capital of up to $107.82. Repayment was amortised over a period of ten months; 
the weekly payment were “very, very affordable for them,” usually only $2.16. Although there 
was no interest on the loan, there was a one percent service fee. Once the loan was repaid, 
recipients could apply for a second (or third) loan; as of February 2013, about 30% had taken out 
multiple loans. SAC staff also provided instruction on simple bookkeeping and record-keeping, 
assisted in market studies, and monitored livelihood activities in the communities. In addition to 
the equity requirement of many business loans, SAC loan recipients were required to provide 
savings equivalent to 10% of the loan amount. As an SAC officer explained,  
We require them to put up an equity equivalent to 10% because we want them to own 
their livelihood project. In other words, we emphasise to them that ‘this is not a dole out, 
you have to pay this back, and you have to have your counterpart.’ So we require them a 
10% equity and also we require them to put up savings, it’s also equivalent to 10% 
savings. The idea here is once the loan is fully paid, we will return to them the amount of 
equity and savings they have accumulated so that they can start on their own. In other 
words, they will not be dependent on anybody else. The idea is once they have fully 
repaid their loan, and their livelihood program is doing fine, and then they can continue 
with their own money, and [they are] not dependent anymore with us. 
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The SAC livelihood loan program very much mirrors a capitalist system of acquiring capital, 
repaying it, and getting entrenched in the market economy. Thus, the Catholic Church is not 
competing with the state through its post-disaster activities. Rather, it is complicit in 
implementing the state’s neoliberal agenda. The assistance program is designed using capitalist 
language and ideas: loans, equity, savings, seed capital, etc. The narrative invites people previously 
outside of the formal system into its folds. It reduces them to a series of skills and financial 
transactions, and renders them legible to anyone reading the detailed profile assessments and 
passbooks. Typhoon Sendong was thus a catalyst for bringing people to the market economy. 
And because it was facilitated by a trusted purportedly non-state actor, it is perceived as less 
state-interventionist. 
In its livelihood program, the DWSD sought to minimise risks to the agency. For example, by 
providing loans to a group of 15 to 30 families, it downloaded risks to loan recipients. DSWD 
feared that recipients thought they were getting a “dole-out from the government” and would 
default on their loans. The government’s fear is largely unfounded; according to one government 
officer, “the repayment rate is good. [It is] more than 90%.” Still, DSWD officers reminded 
potential loan recipients of the importance of carefully selecting group members, discussing 
business matters with other group members on a monthly basis, and remaining aware of their 
whereabouts, especially as group members moved through a variety of post-disaster spaces.  
During that time when they were in the evacuation centre, we warned them that if they 
will go away and will not pay, it’s the members who stayed behind who will pay on behalf 
of that one rogue. So it is very important that the selection of members is really [done by] 
them and they have to know each other, that they check each other so that they will know 
who are the members because they will shoulder the payments if ever one will go away. 
To further ensure loan recipients ran profitable businesses, a DSWD project evaluation officer 
was assigned to support each group. The officer helped the group to research the market 
potential of various livelihoods, and to prepare their project proposal, and even wrote or 
improved it. The officer evaluated proposals, trying to minimise competition within and among 
groups, and later monitored loan repayment. Finally, the DSWD livelihood loans program aimed 
to minimise risk by capping the amount of each loan at $107.82 for a first-time recipient, so that 
the agency could “establish their track record” before it lent out larger sums. 
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The disbursement of livelihoods loans was used as a way to educate the urban poor about the 
value of saving money and opening bank accounts at financial institutions. As one DSWD officer 
explained, not only did loan recipients obtain seed capital, they also learned money management 
and marketing skills, and were “encouraged to have life savings” at one of the city’s banks. None 
of the bank employees with whom I spoke was aware of urban poor Sendong survivors opening 
up bank accounts after the disaster; only one urban poor survivor with whom I spoke had 
opened a savings account during this period. In contrast, saving was a mandatory component of 
the SAC livelihood loan. Recipients were obliged to save 10% as part of their loan conditions, but 
were encouraged to set aside even more if they could afford it. Although the SAC livelihood loan 
program promoted saving, it did not promote opening up a savings account with a financial 
institution. Instead, the SAC acted as a financial institution by collecting, holding, and later 
returning money to program participants. Like the DSWD, the SAC encouraged the value of 
saving to promote capitalist accumulation. Unlike the DSWD, the SAC did not overtly support 
the financial institutions that epitomise capitalism. 
Reproducing class differences 
Certain characteristics of the livelihood assistance programs of trustees belie the claim that 
livelihood loans and training will render beneficiaries independent and lift them out of poverty. 
The design of the programs, for example, reproduces existing class differences. First, both the 
DSWD and SAC loan programs work with groups and not individuals. This decision makes 
logistical sense from the trustee perspective; it is easier to manage a program for hundreds, even 
thousands, of micro-loan recipients organised into self-policing groups with a single 
representative. Second, both the DSWD and SAC loan programs impose a weekly loan 
repayment schedule. This decision is similarly sound from the trustee perspective; loan recipients 
can better manage small, frequent payments than large, less frequent payments, which, in turn, 
augments repayment rates. In contrast, the loans made by private banks to middle class 
entrepreneurs are typically made to individuals who are given greater flexibility in the repayment 
frequency. Even the loans disbursed by financial cooperatives to the urban poor, in amounts 
similar to those given by the DSWD and the SAC, are made to individuals and may have more 
flexible terms. The restrictions placed on the urban poor receiving livelihood loans are thus 
designed to overcome their presumed deficiencies (i.e. a presumed inability to manage money), 
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which the middle class are presumed not to have.  The discourse and (mis)assumptions about 
vulnerability thus informs the programs designed to assist urban poor survivors. 
Third, the SAC perceives a livelihood disbursed to an individual as a loan “given to the entire 
family.” Children, for example, are presumed to partake in their family’s economic enterprises. 
In the slipper-making or candy-making [livelihood], it’s the entire family. The kids help in 
the cutting of the cloth. In the candy-making, the kids help in the wrapping of the candy. 
It’s a household activity. Except for vending, that is the job of the husband and the wife. 
Yet, in middle and upper class Filipino families, children would not be expected to be involved in 
the family business. Instead, they are expected to attend school, do their homework, and play. 
Thus, the expectations of how the livelihood loans will be used reproduces class distinctions.  
Fourth, the livelihoods supported by trustee initiatives are mostly the precarious, small-scale, self-
employed, high competition ones characteristic of the urban poor. For example, the SAC’s 
livelihood program supports 42 different options “from rug-making to vending, fish-vending, to 
candy-making, junk, scrap buying and selling, bag-making, slipper-making, small eatery, rice 
vending.” A similar targeting of low-yield livelihoods is evident in the livelihood trainings offered 
by Xavier Ecoville: carpentry, mansonry, food processing, beauty care service, massage, 
housekeeping, food and beverages, nursery and sewing. Most of these livelihood options do not 
promote upward economic and class mobility, especially at the scale practiced by urban poor 
Sendong survivors. Instead, they make daily survival just a bit easier. The few livelihood options 
that have the potential for lucrative employment, such as carpenter, mason and food and 
beverage worker, require entry into the formal economy and working as a wage labourer. 
Bringing in the women 
More than 70% of DSWD’s livelihood loans were disbursed to women. In a statement that 
echoed comments made by the city mayor on the rational for women-focused livelihoods training 
programs, a regional government officer justified her agency’s targeting of women recipients. 
[We focus] mostly [on] women because their husbands are having a job after all. So we 
encourage women not just to stay at home, but if ever it is a home-based then at least you 
have to augment the minimal income of your husband. That is why mostly it is women. 
Usually men have their existing work so they can no longer engage in another livelihood 
so we encourage women, too, as part of women’s development.  
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This statement echoes a neoliberal development rhetoric that sees women as economic actors 
that should be brought into the market economy. Joining the formal economy is expected to 
advance their well-being. Teaching women the value of saving, accumulating capital, managing a 
business, tracking financial transactions, and following a budget is expected to promote their 
welfare and that of their household. As such, the livelihood loans made to women survivors 
further the neoliberal agenda of the Philippine state, and bring a previously excluded group into 
the fold of capitalism. And, by supporting these activities, the Catholic Church is complicit.  
Curiously, the trustees who develop and implement the livelihood loan programs wrongly 
presume that their intended beneficiaries lack entrepreneurial and management skills. As one 
women’s rights activist aptly pointed out, CDO’s urban poor women face difficult financial 
decisions every day. 
The role of the wife in the house is how to create their economic situation easier – that’s 
the biggest challenge to the women. Your husband just give you [₱]2,000 and said, ‘you 
will fit this one. You will see to it that this 2,000 will be enough for 15 days.’ And then 
you have- you have 6 kids. Like that. Is this 2,000 enough for two weeks? There are some 
times a housewife from the urban poor, her husband only give 200 pesos and said, ‘see to 
it that this 200 pesos would be enough for one week.’ So that’s the challenge on the 
women’s side. How could she fit their budget – the 200 pesos budget – for one week? 
Since they have three or four kids. And they were six all alone with her husband. 
Not only can these women manage a budget, but many also have extensive experience with credit 
through their regular use of the services of the high-interest, daily repayment terms of the 5-6 
lenders, or through their tab at the informal economy businesses, such as sari-sari stores, that are 
part of their daily lives. Many of these women also ran buy-and-sell operations, they gave 
manicures and pedicures, or they did laundry in their homes. Yet, the business skills they acquire 
from operating these micro-businesses do not count; recognising these skills as legitimate 
threatens the validity of the deficiency and different-from-us vulnerability discourses. It suggests 
the need for alternative explanations for vulnerability, which, in turn, demand a questioning of 
powerful structures and institutions in Philippine society. 
Three final points close this discussion of the implementation of capitalist values in post-disaster 
spaces. One, resettlement sites celebrate private property. Beneficiaries are called “homeowners” 
and are recorded as the legal holders of a deeded house. Two, another aspect of capitalism has 
ironically invaded post-disaster spaces. Capitalism yields unequal benefits and costs among 
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members of society, creating enormous wealth or access to resources for some people, while 
impoverishing others and limiting their access to resources. In spite of the genuine efforts of 
various state and religious trustees to integrate survivors into the formal market economy, most 
relocated survivors do not have viable livelihoods. Three, there is room for alternative economic 
systems in relocation sites. At Xavier Ecoville, for example, the livelihoods program is actively 
facilitating the formation of a cooperative, which owns and runs many of the on-site businesses. 
Endorsing a system in which the means of production are collectively owned by survivor 
members, and are specifically employed to yield useful (as opposed to profitable) goods and 
services, was a calculated decision taken by Ecoville trustees. The cooperative model, as 
explained later, is a good match with the vision of Ecoville trustees of ensuring fairness and 
creating an ideal community.  
Fairness and objectivity 
Throughout the reconstruction process, great pains were taken to ensure fair and equal access of 
legitimate Sendong victims to resettlement housing. Or, at least, to maintain the appearance of 
objectivity. The processes of creating eligibility rules, designing of relocation houses, and 
allocating housing units, and the outcomes of these processes, were all intended to ensure 
fairness. Diverse trustees contributed to the Local Inter-Agency Committee (LIAC) in setting up 
a series of minimum eligibility criteria against which potential housing beneficiaries at all CDO’s 
resettlement sites were evaluated. The square footage and basic design of all relocation housing at 
all sites is roughly the same; it was done this way so that there would be no basis of comparison. 
As illustrated in Figure 6.7, even the façades of adjacent relocation houses are nearly identical (at 
least before the residents begin personalising their homes). Even the assigning of relocation 
houses was done through a lottery system at a “housing raffle.” The randomness of the lottery 
assignment reinforced the message that no household receives preferential treatment. 
The spectacle of the relocation housing raffle 
Relocation housing is turned over to beneficiaries at a “housing raffle” or a “lottery;” municipal 
and regional government offices describe the “raffling of resettlement houses.” The process 
unfolds in the following way. All eligible households are placed on a list at the Estate 
Management Division (EMD), the municipal office responsible for housing. Once a certain 
number of resettlement houses are ready, a corresponding number of eligible households are 
randomly picked to attend a housing raffle at the city hall. Occasionally, raffles are held at 
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transitional housing sites. Lists of selected households are posted at evacuation and transitional 
housing sites; one household member is required to attend the event. Households generally know 
which relocation site they had been assigned, but not which house. Free transportation is 
provided on the day of the raffle. At the event, each household is informed which house they 
“won.” There is much fanfare at the event, with speeches from politicians, bureaucrats, NGO 
workers, and funders. The event is covered by local, and sometimes national, media outlets.  
The choice to call the housing turnover event a “raffle” or “lottery” is curious. The Cambridge 
Dictionaries Online define raffle in two ways: as a noun, a raffle is “an activity in which people 
buy tickets with different numbers, some of which are later chosen to win prizes, that is 
organised in order to make money for a good social purpose,” and as a verb it means “to offer 
something as a prize in a raffle” (Cambridge Dictionaries Online 2015). In the CDO context, 
these definitions can be further elucidated as “an activity in which legitimate Sendong survivors 
may be selected to obtain a free concrete relocation house, that is organised in order to assist in 
the disaster recovery process,” and “to offer a relocation house as a prize in a raffle.” Raffle 
suggests an element of chance, that every eligible person has an equal chance of winning. Lottery 
is associated with gambling, in which the state determines the rules and ultimately ends up as the 
winner. While both raffles and lotteries pay out a certain amount in prizes, they are designed such 
that most of the benefits are accrued to the state (or other organiser).  
The raffle event and the publicity it generates offer more than the “good social purpose” of 
providing houses to the urban poor survivors. The optics of the spectacle are as important as the 
actual transfer of the housing. It is a political and public relations bonanza. It provides an 
excellent platform for selling oneself, one’s party and one’s organisation (i.e. securing future votes 
and political or financial support). The mayor, for example, articulated the importance of 
personally raffling off the houses in the presence of the beneficiaries (i.e. his people.) 
It would not be fair if the mayor would just choose who would be relocated. Definitely, if 
it would be me [and my decision alone], then priorities as to who [would receive houses 
first would be] people who are my political allies, definitely. [I.e.,] they [are] my political 
allies so they get the priorities. But if you raffle it, in their presence, then everybody gets a 
fair chance to own a house. And that has been the rule. That has been the policy since I 
started constructing houses for my people. 
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The fact that the mayor personally draws the names, congratulates all housing recipients at all 
housing raffles at the city hall (yet is absent at many other Sendong-related events), and stands 
next to a representative of the builder, the major funder, and the DSWD is indicative of their 
political salience.  
The word raffle is also suggestive insofar as it implies that providing secure housing is a 
charitable act, instead of an act in which a responsible state accepts its duty to protect the well-
being of its citizens. By positioning the giving of houses as a charitable act, state actors and 
partner trustees advance a narrative of the benevolent-state-that-looks-out-for-its-citizens-in-
their-time-of-need. The narrative tries to mask the fact that these same actors neglected citizens 
by allowing, and sometimes even encouraging, them to build in high risk locations. Using 
language that connotes chance and charity slyly shifts the discourse away from a state that 
deserves blame and condemnation to a state that deserves congratulations and further support. 
Unfair and subjective evidence 
Refuting claims of fairness and objectivity is contradictory evidence. Government compensation 
packages for Sendong victims are underlain with highly subjective value judgements. Chapter 6 
discussed the issues at the centre of Sendong-provoked picket rallies. Protesters pointed to the 
unfair way municipal and regional government representatives assessed the damages to totally 
and partially damaged houses, and subsequently allocated compensation. Protesters alleged that 
there was political favouritism in the process; for example, politically-connected households 
would receive compensation even if they were not genuinely affected by the flood. Protestors 
objected to the value-laden criteria, too. Recall the embedded assumptions about the worth of the 
physical structure of the house (which is eligible for government compensation) versus the value 
of the contents in sustaining other aspects of people’s livelihoods that may have been washed out 
or destroyed (which is ineligible). This value judgment is anything but neutral, and demonstrates a 
classist bias that privileges households that can afford to separate their living spaces from their 
productive assets. 
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence contesting claims of fairness and objectivity abounds. There 
were rumours about inconsistencies on the official lists of survivors and victims of Sendong. The 
last evacuees at the Capitolio evacuation camp were given free relocation housing even if they did 
not fulfil the official eligibility criteria. Neighbours living together in a barangay pre-Sendong had 
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“successfully advocated and lobbied” to remain together in the relocation sites. Clearly, the 
allocation of relocation housing was not entirely random. Consequently, the authenticity of 
trustees’ attempts to embed fairness and objectivity in the reconstruction processes is unresolved. 
Build-back-better-and-safer 
Safety and access to safe spaces were priorities in all post-disaster processes. Trustees clearly 
stated that improving safety was an overarching objective for post-Sendong reconstruction. Yet, 
what exactly was meant by “safety” was ambiguous. The confusion around the term, and 
especially its temporal and spatial fluidity, contributed to the creation of safe-yet-still-unsafe 
resettlement sites in spite of strong commitments of trustees to a build-back-better-and-safer 
reconstruction principle. (The “-er” suffix on safer connoted a comparison of resettlement sites 
and informal settlements.) 
Regional state actors unanimously described their approach to reconstruction as ‘build-back-
better-and-safer,’ but different agencies understood the principle differently. Take, for example, 
the approaches of the two lead agencies that each prepared one of the two main government 
documents directing the disaster relief, recovery and reconstruction policies and programs. In the 
Strategic action plan, the Region-X director of the National Economic and Development Authority 
(NEDA) explains that  
[t]he rehabilitation and recovery focus is more of rebuilding the affected communities, 
restoring livelihoods effectively, preventing the recurrence of disasters and harnessing 
conditions for future development. Thus, managing recovery efforts will require building 
local capacities, restoring coping mechanisms, empowering communities and determining 
root causes and vulnerabilities which make the communities disaster-prone. […] The 
aftermath of TS Sendong is not a mess, it is an opportunity for all of us to become 
resilient and rebuild safer and productive communities (NEDA 2012, i).  
This definition reflects a structuralist approach to disasters (cf. Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004 and 
Chapter 5). It is consistent with the international approach of building national and community-
level resilience to disasters articulated in the Hyogo Framework of Action, to which the 
Philippines is a signatory (PreventionWeb no date, UNISDR no date). In contrast, the Office of 
Civil Defense (OCD) adopts a narrower definition reflecting a “geophysicalist and technocratic 
reductionism” (Hewitt 1983, 7). In the Post-disaster needs assessment, it defines building-back-better 
as the  
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construction, rehabilitation and community building that is safer and smarter. This 
involves identifying hazard-free areas for resettlement projects, using disaster-resilient 
housing design and construction (e.g. concrete foundation), and community-based 
disaster risk reduction (e.g. early warning system) (OCD 2012, 15).  
The OCD’s definition thus concentrates on technical fixes to mitigate the impacts of natural 
hazards instead of addressing the root causes of vulnerability. In contrast, the NEDA definition 
acknowledges the need to address them. This discrepancy is reflective of other reconstruction-
related discrepancies between organisations that purport to ascribe to a common principle or 
objective, but, upon closer inspection, are actually at odds with each other. 
Different trustees had diverging, even conflicting definitions of safety, as did different survivors. 
Their definitions and methods to achieve safety changed over time and space. For example, on 
17 December 2011, trustees began opening safe spaces, where safety was initially defined in terms 
of spaces free from contaminated water, damaged buildings, and dead bodies. Many survivors, 
however, did not perceive these official evacuation sites as safe and instead opted to create their 
own safe spaces and used them exclusively. Safety was redefined in the resettlement phase, where 
it referred primarily to the absence of geophysical hazards and the presence of sturdy concrete 
houses. Even this safety consideration was not achieved at several sites, notably the relocation 
houses built between a steep landslide-prone hill denuded of vegetation and a live creek that 
floods nearby areas during the rainy season (Fig. 6.6). Safety secondarily meant the absence of 
physical violence and crime, and the presence of livelihood opportunities. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, trustees introduced a values formation training at transitional and permanent housing 
sites, which was expected to increase trust among strangers and thereby reduce crime rates. They 
also encouraged the intervention of camp managers at the evacuation and transition housing 
stages in addressing domestic violence, even going as far as threatening to withdraw relocation 
houses from repeat offenders. To address the safety concerns stemming from a lack of economic 
and livelihood opportunities, city and regional government agencies coordinated with technical 
and trade schools, local universities, NGOs, and religious groups to design and deliver skills 
training. They distributed livelihood starter kits to ensure beneficiaries had the basic tools 
required for their specific livelihood; for example, beauty care workers received scissors, combs 
and manicure sets. Trustees also disbursed zero-interest livelihood loans. The success of these 
various efforts was mixed. 
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Other aspects of safety, particularly those prioritised by the survivors living at the resettlement 
sites, were less considered by trustees. As argued in Chapter 6, the distance and inaccessibility to 
the city centre from the resettlement sites had repercussions on the economic and food security 
of resettlement site residents. For example, people who used to count on easy access to credit 
through 5-6 loans to feed their family in their old barangays no longer have access to this credit. 
The lenders assume that the resettlement site residents live too far from the city to earn enough 
money to repay their loans. Relocated residents similarly noted an erosion of their personal and 
community security. They explained that the mix of residents coming from many different 
barangays across the city exacerbated distrust and stereotype-based prejudices that manifest in 
material ways, especially as disputes among young men. Both residents and police confirmed an 
increase in theft and violence at most relocation sites as compared to their old barangays. 
Although the values formation training aimed to remedy this problem, it was not enough to 
counter the underlying economic precarity and geographic isolation. 
In theory, the principle of build-back-better-and-safer is a laudable one for guiding reconstruction 
efforts. Not understanding what safety means to different trustees, and especially to different 
survivors, renders it an unattainable objective. That the concept is characterised by spatial and 
temporal fluidity and requires addressing the root causes of vulnerability further complicates 
matters. The failure to enact relocation sites as safe spaces – from the perspectives of the actual 
inhabitants – results in the adoption of hybrid migration pathways. The divergence on the 
definition of safety is similarly found in the concept of an “ideal” relocation community. 
An ideal community 
Each relocation site was designed according to its major sponsor’s vision of an ideal community. 
Not surprisingly, the visions of state trustees diverged from those of Catholic trustees, and 
especially those of Ecoville’s trustees.  
According to state trustees 
According to the mayor, CDO’s resettlement sites are flourishing. When asked what characterises 
a successful resettlement site he responded,  
I would not answer that. If you would have a chance, it would be good that you go there 
and look at them and watch them and have a look-see of the area. Because I would be 
praising myself and telling you ‘it’s the good one, it’s the best that anyone can find.’ Oh 
certainly. We’ll leave that to your judgment even when you have a chance to go to these 
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areas and look how people have been relocated and accommodated, actually. If you 
would as me, [the relocation sites are working well now] – tremendously yes. The foreign 
donors whose money was donated here are now in Compostela and Davao Oriental [in 
response to Super-typhoon Pablo] and [in] the speeches there they will always tell them, 
all the time, ‘follow the example of the city of Cagayan de Oro, do not lose hope.’ They 
keep on telling them that. 
The mayor’s ideal community evolves organically though the initiatives of residents or interested 
external groups after the site’s minimum infrastructure is built and the people move in. Put 
another way, for him, reconstructing society is restricted to fixing the broken elements of housing 
locations and poorly-built structures. 
The rational plan of other state actors is similarly focused on physical geography and engineering 
fixes. The Strategic action plan clearly writes the primary goal of state actors in building resettlement 
sites is to establish disaster-resilient communities (NEDA 2012, 42). All other aims are secondary. 
The ideal relocation sites of state actors are “safe and sustainable communities” in which 
survivors enjoy “a sense of normalcy” and can “rebuild their lives and progress” (NEDA 2012, 
41). Relocation housing should be “safe, accessible, and sustainable [long-lasting] and […] 
provide security of tenure for the inhabitants” (OCD 2012, iii). Some state actors conceded that 
the ideal reconstructed community must be more than merely disaster-resilient. For example, the 
head of one municipal government office involved in the relocation sites argued that they should 
be peaceful, orderly, and address health, educational, livelihoods, religious, and moral needs. 
How do these ideals match up with the actual state-funded resettlement sites? Not well. The 
siting of certain relocation houses in hazard-prone areas belies the primary aim to secure a 
minimal risk of natural hazards. The state-sponsored programs offered to survivors reflect a half-
hearted attempt to meet the perceived needs of residents, and fail to reach all residents, much less 
to meet all of their needs. The rush to transfer residents into permanent housing before services, 
livelihood options, and even water and electricity were available suggests that state actors 
prioritise deadlines over truly livable communities. Lastly, while state trustees recognise the 
salience of long term tenure security, they, along with religious actors, fail to achieve this 
objective or even call for Sendong survivors to become both homeowners and landowners. 
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According to religious trustees 
In contrast to state actors’ priority on safety from hazards and their laissez-faire approach to post-
transfer interventions, religious actors envision a resettlement site as a community-oriented space 
where they maintain a highly visible, long-term, on-site influence. Recall, for instance, the 
livelihood trainings and loans programs of the archdiocese’s Social Action Center, and the pre-
marital and all-natural family planning courses led by the archdiocese’s Responsible Parenthood 
and All Natural Family Planning (RP-ANFP) ministry. The archbishop penned articles for the 
local press in which he describes the ideal relocation site as “a community of hope” characterised 
by “orderliness” and “community awareness” (Ledesma 2012). Community awareness is 
demonstrated through the formation of associations such as homeowners’ associations, and the 
active participation of residents in those associations. He distinguishes communities of hope 
from the “slums [where] these internally displaced persons were already marginalised – [living] on 
the fringes, literally, of society and the riverbanks, [and had no] regular employment or self-
employment.” This ideal community, in the eyes of the Catholic Church, demonstrates a concern 
for morality, ethics and fairness, and of course, Catholic values. This position presupposes the 
former communities of the beneficiaries were not worth keeping. 
According to Xavier Ecoville trustees 
Like the archdiocese and other Catholic trustees, the Xavier Ecoville relocation site is conceived 
as a community-oriented space. In fact, its motto, proudly displayed at the site’s entrance (Fig. 
7.3), is “We are not just building houses. We are building a community.”  The ideal community 
Ecoville trustees envision is self-reliant, self-governing, resilient,55 inclusive, and egalitarian. The 
ideal Ecoville residents are interdependent, actively engaged in neighbourhood and barangay life 
and demonstrate the treasured Filipino trait of bayanihan. Ecoville trustees went further than any 
other trustee involved in Sendong reconstruction efforts in designing an “ideal community” and 
then taking concrete steps to implement it. Their vision and subsequent actions echo the 
tradition of religious institutions and Catholic missionaries who sought to develop the whole 
                                                          
55 At the housing turnover event at Xavier Ecoville, one of the guest speakers defined resilience as 
“growing stronger under pressure.” It is one of the most cherished of Filipino traits and frequently came 
up in interviews with key informants and survivors. 
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person providing not only spiritual guidance but also by supporting self-sufficiency, livelihood, 
educational, and governance initiatives (Foucault 2003a, 2003b, Calderisi 2013). 
 
Fig. 7.3. A sign welcomes residents and visitors at the entrance of the Xavier Ecoville relocation 
site, reminding them of the site’s overall mission (17 March 2013). 
Not surprisingly, the Jesuit university-run relocation site strives to enact the ideals of a Jesuit 
education. What, precisely, are the skills, attitudes and knowledge that distinguish Jesuit-trained 
graduates? Calderisi (2013, 88) writes that  
the phrase ‘trained by the Jesuits’ [means not so much] to be consumed by a passionate 
faith, so much as to be able to stand on one’s own feet, be critical of inherited truth, 
discern and exploit important distinctions in meaning, debate confidently, and admire 
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knowledge and culture. Jesuits were also indulgent confessors. From the very start, they 
were urged to be ‘sweet, approachable, and sensitive,’ to show ‘compassion and kindness,’ 
and avoid self-righteousness. Their moral judgments could also appear rather convenient, 
which is why the word ‘Jesuitical’ has never been a compliment in the English language. 
Inspired by the humanist ideals of the Renaissance, they wanted to produce good citizens, 
not just good souls.  
Although the first Jesuits arrived in the archipelago in 1581 (Demetrio 1981), they did not begin 
concentrating their efforts on education in the mid-19th century (Hedman 2006). Since then, 
however, they have established prestigious educational institutions – including Xavier University 
– throughout the archipelago that count among their alma mater Filipino national heroes, 
presidents, Chief Justices of the Supreme Court, politicians, media moguls, scientists, 
businesspeople, engineers, academics, cardinals, diplomats, artists, musicians and writers. 
Ecoville’s trustees are affiliated with Xavier University – as members of the Board of Directors, 
as professors and professional staff, as student members of clubs or other special initiatives, or as 
staff hired specifically to work for the relocation site. The decisions and programs implemented 
at Ecoville reflect the ideals of these university trustees. According to a dean who is also 
Ecoville’s director, the site mirrors “student idealism” and the desire of students for “an ideal 
community where they’re able to love each other.” High school and university students and 
recent graduates are encouraged to volunteer at Ecoville; they help build houses, they tutor and 
read stories to children, they host story-writing contests, they organise singing sessions and 
artistic glee clubs like Xavier Ecoville Got Talent. Their active participation in community life 
models the active participation trustees desire of Ecoville residents. 
The work of a Catholic university would naturally be influenced by religious teachings and 
traditions. As the site’s director explained, Xavier Ecoville was no exception. “It’s part of our 
being a Jesuit University in that generosity of saving stray ships. We’re kind of infected by all of 
this.” These “stray ships” are saved by getting to know, trust and have empathy for each other 
and by becoming integrated into “a community that can be self-reliant, can govern themselves, 
and be part of the bigger local community [i.e. the barangay of Lumbia].” The mandatory 
participation of adult Ecoville residents in a values formation program facilitated this process. 
The program aims to instill values deemed essential to a properly-functioning community. 
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Despite their clear identification as Christian values, Ecoville trustees and their Gawad Kalinga 
partners contend the values are shared by people from all faiths. 
We start with [becoming aware of your] feelings [and] valuing your neighbours, your 
community. And then values like service. [Then] you would have to address the needs of 
the poor, the excluded, and the lonely. Things like those. Those are very Christian values 
but of course, Muslim families are very much welcome. But these are [the] general kind of 
values that we think are important in building a community. 
The importance of the values was reinforced in diverse aspects of life in Ecoville. Chapter 6, for 
example, described a long list of rules such as obligatory volunteer hours on committees and 
participation in community gardens. Collaborative creative projects such as the ongoing youth 
music and dance clubs or the seasonal decorating initiatives are designed to “let all [of] these 
artistic abilities surface and be valued by themselves.”  
Ecoville trustees were equally concerned with assuring the long-term financial and livelihood 
security of residents. The site’s director was adamant that livelihoods are a critical component of 
community-building. A livelihoods focus is particularly salient at Ecoville because  
many of these families have their businesses or sources of income somewhere here in the 
city proper. So when they went there [to the Ecoville site in Lumbia], some of them, 
actually, have to give up some of these employment opportunities. So, we put importance 
in providing livelihood opportunities. 
Ecoville trustees were highly supportive of the site’s livelihoods program. Ecoville had a full-time 
paid livelihoods coordinator, it offered training courses, it subsidised professional licensing fees 
(e.g. for carpenters and masons), it built a permanent livelihoods centre, it established 
partnerships with private firms who agreed to purchase goods from Ecoville businesses, etc. 
Trustees also encouraged the formation of a cooperative for Ecoville residents. The cooperative 
handled the on-site tree nursery, catering services, talipapa kiosks, and a manpower agency. It did 
bulk purchase orders for on-site businesses, passing the savings on to cooperative member 
entrepreneurs. As of January 2013, the livelihoods coordinator had begun the official registration 
process with the Cooperative Development Authority and scheduled the required 14 training 
courses. 
Not only was the cooperative expected to support viable livelihoods for Ecoville residents, but 
the business model itself embodied the broader Ecoville vision of an ideal community. The 
livelihoods coordinator explained why the cooperative model was selected: 
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We want the IDPs to be united through cooperatives. We already see the values of co-
operatism. It’s not all about business, it’s not all about livelihood. It is more about 
bayanihan – helping each other. So we want them also to inculcate the deepest, the deepest 
value of the sense of bayanihan. The sense of helping each other, the sense of the 
neighbourhood. Because values is the most important rather than their livelihoods. 
Because if you change the person’s [values], you change the IDP. That’s the main reason 
why we want to put up a cooperative.  
The initial capital outlay required to join a cooperative was much more affordable for the urban 
poor, as compared to the steep registration fees and associated costs of setting up a corporation. 
Ecoville co-op members began receiving the benefits of membership even before they had fully 
paid their dues. Ecoville trustees deemed the cooperative model more egalitarian than 
alternatives. Egalitarianism ensures that benefits are shared, and not accrued exclusively to those 
already in control of substantial resources. This was particularly important for Sendong survivors 
“because of the little resource that they have, the benefits should be shared.” The governance 
structure of the cooperative also facilitates the exit of the external livelihoods staff by putting 
cooperative members in charge of Ecoville businesses. Finally, the Ecoville cooperative was also 
intended to generate a small profit, which would help reduce the financial burden on Xavier 
University and other private funders, and enable the livelihood program to cover its costs.  
Individuals from several different organisations who were involved in the Ecoville relocation site 
expressed a shared long-term goal of self-governance in which Ecoville residents ensure an 
appropriate conduct of conduct on-site. Attaining this objective requires that residents assimilate 
certain values (i.e. those promoted through the values formation training) and engage in self-
policing to maintain what has been achieved through the efforts of Ecoville trustees and their 
partners. The goal is more of a “self-governance, but…” ideal. That is, Ecoville residents should 
organise and represent themselves, yet remain under the oversight of one expert group or 
another. In January 2013, a member of Ecoville’s project management team explained why self-
governance was a priority for trustees. 
In the next six months our objective really is to strengthen the community as an 
organisation so that they may be able to govern themselves. And of course, turn over the 
entire Xavier Ecoville to their management, and get them to partner with the local 
government unit, the barangay, and the city. [In] June we will have to pull out because they 
will have the resilience in themselves, they will have to be effective in taking the lead and 
so we must be able to strengthen the programs, like livelihood. 
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The informant immediately followed up with the “but,” or how there will be continued trustee 
oversight of the way Ecoville is managed by the residents. 
But Xavier will not end its engagement there. There is a plan. Child Fund Japan [is] an 
NGO sponsoring children in their education and not only sponsoring them [in terms of] 
books and school supplies, tuition, allowance, et cetera, but they take into account the 
whole family. What they do is they sponsor one child in your household and then they get 
everyone involved in the education of that single child. They train the mothers. They 
have programs for the fathers. They offer livelihood programs. [The NGO] already has 
sponsored children in Lumbia and they will be extending to Xavier Ecoville once this 
team, the project management team, pulls out by June. There will be a transition, so they 
will now be the ones who will take care of the community. And then, of course, there will 
also be medical missions by the German Doctors [an NGO providing medical care to the 
poor] and the School of Medicine [at Xavier University]. There will be interventions. It’s 
just that we will pull out from being full-time community workers, but there will be 
engagements with the community. We will just have to pull out so that they may be 
strong in themselves so that they will not develop this dependency. 
As such, in the ideal community of Ecoville planners there is limited self-governance with a 
continued and flexible role for trustee oversight.  
Ecoville, and to a lesser extent other resettlement sites where religious groups have intervened, 
have narrowed the gap between the ideal resettlement site and the reality. Ecoville has targeted 
(and achieved with varying levels of success) all four perceived problems – damaged housing 
units, hazard-prone settlements, poverty, and questionable moral character – in reconstructing its 
own society of urban poor survivors. Its long-term success or failure, however, remains 
uncertain. 
The other intended consequences of carrying out a rational plan 
Efforts to simplify, render legible, and intervene for the purposes of reconstructing a certain 
segment of CDO’s population were not the sole objectives of post-Sendong activities. The 
rational plans of trustees were carefully crafted to attain additional goals. These aims were less 
focused on actual disaster-related issues, and more focused on larger narratives relevant at the 
scale of the city, and even the country.  
Public and private critiques of the city administration  
According to Philippine Disaster Act (R.A. 10121), the local government should have 
immediately taken the lead in disaster relief (GoP 2010b). In CDO, however, the city 
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administration was conspicuous for its absence, especially in the first month following the 
disaster. Many trustees framed their dissatisfaction with the city’s response within a broader 
critique of it; for them, the city’s inaction confirmed what they already believed about the merits 
of the administration. Most trustees, however, hid their criticism from the public. Instead, they 
publically praised the local government’s involvement in the post-Sendong efforts. These white 
lies were designed to achieve a larger objective of instilling confidence in the authorities. As such, 
reconstruction activities revealed a mostly private critique of the city administration’s inadequate 
response alongside a mostly public recognition of its efforts. 
In the hours and days after the flooding began, it was the archdiocese and Xavier University who 
immediately filled the leadership void; it was to these Catholic institutions and the charismatic 
archbishop that the majority of the city residents turned for help. On the state side, when it 
became clear the city had neither the capacity, nor the experience to deal with the situation, it was 
national and regional government agencies who assumed the responsibilities normally under the 
purview of the city. For example, the DSWD oversaw the management of the disaster and the 
National Housing Association (NHA) oversaw resettlement housing for several months before 
the city took over its mandated responsibilities. The absence of the city and the takeover first by 
Catholic actors, and then by national and regional agencies, disrupted the normal governance 
hierarchy in the city. In the context of relocation housing, for instance, instead of going through 
the barangay captain to solicit potential residents for the resettlement sites as would normally be 
done, the trustees sponsoring relocations sites bypassed municipal and barangay officials to work 
directly with the DSWD.  
Trustees frequently remarked upon the ineptitude of the city administration, and occasionally 
regional government agencies, in managing the disaster. Even the mayor himself acknowledged 
such critiques of his administration’s handling of Sendong. When asked about the different 
outcomes of Tropical Storm Sendong in December 2011 and Super-typhoon Pablo in December 
2012 in CDO, he stated, 
Let’s put it this way. We were prepared for typhoon Sendong. Unfortunately we never 
expected it was going to be that huge. And no amount of preparation would have been 
able to stop it from destroying houses and the lives that were lost because it came so 
suddenly. We were there. They say I was not around. My political opponents spread the 
news that I was playing mahjong – that I was there, I was here, that I was all over. I was 
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here [at the city hall] together with my secretaries until five o’clock in the morning but 
there was nothing we could do against the flood that hit us, who struck so suddenly. And 
therefore we lost a lot of lives, a lot of houses were swept away. When Pablo wanted to 
come, we were at the time very, very prepared. We were ready for that based on the last 
one we got from Sendong, and very precisely we were able to get people away from 
harm’s way and no deaths did happen at that time. But while the international community 
lauded, even talked about it, our own [national] government could not talk about it 
because, again, it would be good for my politics, very precisely. But that’s ok. I’m not 
here for the honour of all these because I would not want you to praise me to the higher 
heavens, no. I’m just here, Miss Gibb, because this is a crusade, this is a cause. And, I just 
would like to serve my people. 
In the majority of key informant interviews, however, trustees – apart from those representing 
the city administration or a municipal government office – offered substantially less sympathetic 
opinions. The following citations are a small sample of their comments. From a local research 
institute worker,  
In terms of the responding agencies, even the city LGU [local government unit] was not 
prepared for it, the Office of Civil Defense was not prepared for it. 
From an academic researcher,  
[The] government just couldn’t function. The local government didn’t function so the 
church just essentially took over.  
From an activist in an urban poor federation, 
Our current mayor has been the mayor for, like, decades and decades already. And he has 
great political influence, but it’s kind of wavering now because of what happened during 
the typhoon just to show at how inefficient he is. A lot of, even the local groups there, 
there’s political strife. There will be anti-mayor movements already because of this 
inefficiency that has happened before, during and after the disaster. 
From the archdiocese,  
Sometimes the local government’s own data was with political overtones. They would 
want to include the people that they favoured politically. Or sometimes the people that 
were not actually affected but since the barangay captains wanted their names inserted, 
they were included. There are reports about that [i.e. people were commonly added or 
removed from survivor and victim lists based on politics] but it’s hard to verify. But, 
that’s why eventually the city government had its own listing, the DSWD Region X had 
its own listing, and we had our own listing. And to verify people who would apply for the 
permanent housing, they had to sort of match those three lists or to find out [through 
house validation visits]. 
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From a trustee in the academe,  
Probably it’s confidence in the city’s ability to manage the situation. When Sendong hit 
the city, everyone was like ‘where is the city?’ I mean, ‘where is the city government in all 
of this mess?’ For like a month or so we could not get assistance from the city 
government, so that is why national agencies took over. That is why DSWD took over.  
That is why NHA took over during the rehabilitation to resettlement period. And during 
the relief period, it was DSWD who was leading. It took that long before they had 
confidence in the government, in the local government, to actually lead in the response 
for Sendong. 
From a regional government officer, 
In the early days, it was like they [the city] are an island. We understand that feeling 
because it’s supposed to be their responsibility but although we have that order from the 
president, the term was ‘take over.’ Supposedly it [is] the local government unit who will 
man the evacuation centres but they also acknowledge that they don’t have the [capacity]. 
This is sad to say but they don’t have the capacity to run as far as manpower and 
experience. So we, by order of the president, the regional office take[s] over the 
management of all the camps.  
These sorts of comments were frequently followed by fault-finding opinions on the reasons for 
the city administration’s inadequate response. Some trustees pointed to the private economic 
interests of municipal politicians in two of the resource extraction activities singled out as causal, 
or at least aggravating, factors of the disaster: logging and mining. One local activist recounted 
that in “the local government a lot of the local officials were engaged in logging and mining. 
That’s scandal, really. Some of them were investing in the equipment.” Such investments are 
deemed “scandalous” because of a national moratorium on logging was declared in February 
2011, just months before Sendong, and the general restrictions placed on all mining activities 
except for small-scale exploration (GoP 2011b).56 A researcher at a CDO-based research institute 
noted the complications added to disaster relief efforts due to the intertwining of local mining 
interests and patronage politics. 
The small-scale mining activities in Cagayan de Oro have really multiplied. Because of the 
natural landscape of Cagayan de Oro City, and [the] mining [that] is taking place up there 
[in the highlands and the plateaus that comprise the city’s watershed] where they are using 
                                                          
56 On 1 February 2011, President Aquino III signed Executive Order No. 23, which declares a nation-
wide moratorium on the cutting and harvesting of timber in natural and residual forests, and created the 
Anti-Illegal Logging Task Force (GoP 2011b). 
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hydraulic mining, they’re literally melting the hills and the mountains to expose the soil 
with the gold, and excavating for whatever. Then Cagayan de Oro City downtown is 
really bound to the disaster track. Given the political situation now… Because it’s small-
scale mining, the LGU [and not the Department of Environment and Natural Resources] 
is able to provide the [mining operations] permit. But they [the miners] are actually 
operating with big equipment. This is already illegal mining operation because they’re 
bringing big barges that continually dredge the river and overturn the whole riverbed, 
changing the whole landscape.  
Environmentally and politically, mining in Cagayan de Oro is a very, very big issue. 
Because of our present mayor, it’s really difficult. And then when you go to the hinterland 
barangay local government units, they are also very much entrenched in the patronage 
politics. So if you are a political member of the mayor’s [party], you have to heed his 
whims, you have to protect his business interests. So, actually when we were facilitating 
the whole relief, we were facilitating the shelter assistance, we really had difficulty in 
coordinating with the LGU because in these barangays, political rivalry is very strong. 
With the assurance of confidentiality, key informants did not conceal their disappointment with 
the city’s disaster response. Yet, despite this private lack of confidence, at all public Sendong 
relief and reconstruction-related events, churches, non-governmental organisations, academic 
groups, and regional government agencies always gave credit to the city. Such public praise was 
part of a deliberate strategy to reinstate in Sendong survivors a trust in their local government, 
which was deemed necessary to avoid chaos. One trustee involved in the planning of CDO’s 
resettlement sites justified these little white lies. 
The thing is, we in the private sector and the civil society organisations, inasmuch as we 
could hate the government, the local government, but we could not take away the little 
trust, the hope that the communities have in the government. Or else it would be chaos. 
So we always say ‘this is in partnership with the city.’ Because if not, then the people will 
lose trust and hope in the government, and we would foresee chaos in the end. So we did 
not want that to happen. So yes, as much as possible, I, for one, am not very comfortable 
with the local government, [but] we always make it a point to say that ‘this is in 
partnership with the city’ and we always make it a point to invite them [the city 
administration] in all of our activities. 
Yes, it has to be [that politicians are thanked at public events even if they are not 
physically present] to maintain order. Because if you say ‘ahhh, the government’ [in a 
condescending or cynical tone] then, you’d really foresee like what happened in Comp 
Val [Compostela Valley] when Pablo hit them. The government [there] really is helpless 
and now [the people there] have not yet given back the trust the local government. I’m 
saying this because we see the local government as an institution, not as a personality. 
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The public must trust the local government – whoever would be in [a] position of power. 
Now in Comp Val, the local government is very helpless, and now there was a case of 
lawlessness. And at the time of Sendong we did not want to happen here. Well at least 
they [the city] were providing police assistance. They helped in some way.  
In any place in the Philippines, that’s our ideology: we must make the local government 
work. That is why the national agencies took over so they could strategise on how to put 
back the trust of the people to its local government because it will not be the national 
government governing the local communities, no. So, that was actually a strategy – to put 
back the trust. 
Regional government offices backed up their public praise with private overtures to the 
municipal administration, and later built successful partnerships upon which productive planning 
and construction of resettlement site transpired. A regional government officer explained the 
process. 
What I did is to introduce myself, ‘I’m from the Regional Office’ and I told them that I 
am here to help. Later on, they understood that there is a need for us to work together 
but the early stage is really difficult. [Eventually, we were able to work effectively with the 
city] because our Secretary, almost every day, she was here in the city and talked with the 
mayor trying to [work out a compromise]. Because you know the political situation: the 
mayor is not in the same boat with the president politically. Our secretary is here almost 
every day to talk with the mayor, and explain our role, and give support regardless of the 
political affiliation. I think that’s the reason why now mayor Emano is really telling how 
good the relationship is [between] the city [and] our office. 
The archdiocese remained one of the few public critics of the city, with the archbishop strongly 
condemning the city’s unpreparedness and its ineffectual response, and calling for the resignation 
of elected officials (Tubeza 2011, Ledesma 2012). The stance of the archdiocese is especially 
interesting given the general complicity of the Catholic Church in advancing other state interests 
in their disaster response. The archdiocese, like most of the other trustees critical of the city’s 
response to Sendong, criticised many facets of city administration. Typhoon Sendong just 
provided an additional opportunity to publically and privately pass judgement on the 
administration. As such, the rational plans of these trustees incorporated elements of their wider 
interests and discourses. 
Creating alternative discourses 
With their rational plans, the post-Sendong experts also sought to advance or redirect particular 
narratives. The example that best illustrates this phenomenon is the treatment of gender-based 
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violence in official post-disaster spaces. According to the national leader of a prominent women’s 
rights advocacy group, violence against women is a pervasive and unresolved societal problem in 
spite of myriad laws, “we have many, many laws for violence against women, laws in the 
Philippines but it doesn’t mean the implementation is good.” Furthermore, gender-based 
violence is linked to other highly politicised and polarising issues in the Philippines, notably 
human rights violations and the culture of impunity in which representatives of the state have a 
carte blanche to act howsoever they please. These two latter problems draw national and 
international attention and can have significant political (and occasionally economic) 
repercussions for politicians and other state actors. Consequently, it is in their interest to deploy 
the discursive potential of disaster to reframe social problems as “Sendong issues.”  
Even before Typhoon Sendong, many representatives of the state, including the police and 
municipal and regional social welfare and development offices, were tasked with addressing 
gender-based violence. These actors and others, such as the Catholic trustees, continued dealing 
with this violence in the evacuation camps, transitional housing sites and permanent relocation 
sites. They joined forces with other local and international organisations and government 
agencies working in the protection cluster, creating a special Gender-Based Violence team. The 
team delivered lectures on violence and the conjugal law, on the rights of women and children, 
and on the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children (VAWC) Act (R.A. 9262) (GoP 2004). 
The team also “answered all those problems relating to family matters, like the abuses, [and] 
answered all the situations right away there in the evacuation centre,” and maintained a presence 
in the camps to deter violent outbursts. According to one team member, such interventions were 
necessary because the typhoon and the ensuing losses provoked the violent and aggressive 
behaviour of men directed against their partners. She recalled that, the violence “happens anytime 
because of their depression, because they cannot control these emotions, frustrations because 
they have no houses.” Other trustees similarly attributed the violent behaviour of some Sendong 
survivors to their traumatic Sendong experiences, even though they acknowledged the violence 
had occurred before 17 December 2011, too. 
The regional leader of a women’s advocacy organisation deplored this approach of reclassifying 
gender-based violence as “Sendong trauma” because it marginalises a pressing, unresolved and 
harmful issue in Philippine society. As an example, she recounted how the death of one woman 
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at one of the city’s evacuation centres was attributed to depression by state authorities, even 
though the woman’s fellow evacuees maintained she was the victim of domestic violence. Note 
also that the different explanations indicate that the evacuation centre was perceived as a very 
different place by some of the evacuees who lived there, and by the state officials who provided 
the official explanation for the woman’s death. 
So there was a case wherein there was a couple – they weren’t married. The woman was 
killed in the evacuation centre. But the findings were that [it] was due to domestic 
violence. They didn’t impose it as like a murder or something. They just say that it was 
Sendong-related, like she was depressed or something. But we, the people in the 
evacuation centres, firmly believe that she was [a] victim of domestic violence. 
As explained in Chapter 6, Filipinos generally do not interfere in marital affairs. It is thus 
unsurprising that domestic violence continues to be neglected in post-disaster spaces. Trustees 
could have used the violence they observed to raise awareness about gender-based violence and 
to tackle the institutions and structures in society that permit its persistence. Instead, they chose 
to scale down the problem from a societal to an individual or household level, and to deploy the 
discursive suggestion of Sendong trauma to conceal gender-based violence.  
Reclassifying gender-based violence as an unfortunate by-product of a natural hazard event is 
highly problematic. It masks the failure of the state to live up to its duties to protect its citizens 
against violence. As David Petrasek (2015) points out, in the 1980s feminists in Canada (and 
elsewhere) argued that domestic violence was not a private matter (as previously understood and 
acted upon by state representatives such as law enforcement), but rather a failure of the duty of 
the state to protect its citizens and to ensure their physical, psychological, and emotional safety. 
This ground-breaking perspective has been integral in international treaties and agreements 
protecting the rights of women, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Woman (OHCHR 2015). In the Philippines, this perspective is embedded 
in the aforementioned R.A. 9262. The Sendong trauma narrative is yet another instance of the 
state’s shirking of its duty to implement the “many, many laws for violence against women.” The 
trauma discourse mutates gender-based violence from a socially-constructed unnatural problem 
in which the state is complicit through its failure to act into a problem with natural origins largely 
beyond the purview of the state.  
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The chapter has thus far contended that disasters create opportunities. Through their rational 
plans, trustees can attempt to expand state spaces and neutralise non-state spaces, to reinscribe 
power, hierarchy and the status quo, to advocate for change, and to shape a segment of society 
that is deemed deficient, or in need of reconstruction or rebuilding. Trustees may also endeavour 
to advance interests and discourses only indirectly linked to the disaster. But do these efforts 
succeed? 
Why do the rational plans of high modernist inevitably fail? 
In his book, James Scott (1998) shows that centrally managed social plans to control people and 
landscapes inevitably go awry. Several reasons explain this failure. Rational plans are devised by 
trustees whose privileged positions in society depend upon uneven power relations, and thus will 
never eradicate the structural sources of inequality that render their intended beneficiaries 
vulnerable (Li 2007a). These trustees “claimed an omniscience they did not have” (Li 2005, 387); 
not surprisingly, the improvement schemes they designed reflected their ignorance. These experts 
disregard métis, or what Scott (1998, 313) defines as “a wide array of practical skills and acquired 
intelligence in responding to a constantly changing natural human environment” that is analogous 
to contextualised, place-based knowledge and practice. Experts expect interventions aimed at 
solving one problem will solve other unrelated problems. They confuse aesthetics with efficiency. 
Their rational plans disrupt complex social and ecological interdependencies. The following pages 
explore some of the literature explaining the inevitable failure of centrally managed social plans. 
It is still too soon to observe all of these processes unfolding at CDO’s relocation sites. 
Nonetheless, there are already both literal and figurative fissures in the concrete, foreshadowing, 
perhaps, the future of these official post-disaster spaces. 
History lessons 
State planned settlement to effect massive social engineering has a long history. For instance, 
compulsory villagisation in Tanzania in the mid-1970s aimed to “reorganize human communities 
in order to make them better objects of political control and to facilitate the new forms of 
communal farming by state policy” (Scott 1998, 224). State appointed experts envisaged 
standardised citizens inhabiting legible, controlled state spaces called “ujamaa villages.” A program 
that first encouraged and later coerced five million dispersed rural-dwelling Tanzanians to move 
into larger villages planned by the central administration, Operation Planned Villages was supposed 
to result in better bureaucratic management, improved development services such as education 
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and health, and visual order and efficiency. Initially, Catholic leaders in Tanzania were supportive, 
even complying with President Julius Nyerere’s request to send Catholic sisters to the ujamaa 
villages (Calderisi 2013). Catholic leaders later withdrew their support; this was significant 
because the Catholic Church was the only national institution that could rival the influence of the 
national party after the abolition of traditional chieftaincies. Villagisation, however, was a dismal 
failure. The designers dismissed métis, denied the intended beneficiaries the possibility of agency, 
and forgot  
the most important fact about social engineering: its efficiency depends on the response 
and cooperation of real human subjects. If people find the new arrangements, however 
efficient in principle, to be hostile to their dignity, their plans, and their tastes, they can 
make it an inefficient arrangement (Scott 1998, 225, emphasis in original).  
While Tanzanians resisted moving to planned villages there continued to be voluntary pioneer 
settlement that was “disorderly, illegible, but more productive” and more importantly outside 
government purview, although it “was castigated as squatting and severely reproved, although 
without much practical effect” (Scott 1998, 228). The hubris of state officials is not, however, 
exclusive to East Africa. 
In a similar critique, Jane Jacobs (1961) bemoans the perennial state objective of “unslumming” 
especially through state-led “salvaging projects.” Under the euphemism of “urban renewal,” 
paternalistic planners and politicians aim to replace slums and their populations with projects and 
people that yield higher tax revenues and draw upon fewer public resources. Such policies are 
doomed to fail. They destroy vibrant neighbourhoods already in the slow process of unslumming, 
and they often just create new slums, with uprooted residents shouldering the hardship of 
moving and starting again in a new location. Conventional planning ignores the real requirements 
for unslumming, namely the retention of slum residents through choice, the advancement of this 
population, the presence of safe streets and animated and continuously used public spaces, the 
diversification of commercial and cultural establishments, and the continual inflow of 
constructive gradual money that helps to build complex diversification and brings about gentle 
changes over the long term. Instead, “orthodox planners” employ “impossibly superficial means” 
to “make impossibly profound changes” (Jacobs 1961, 271). For example, in designing a housing 
project, these planners may also attempt to shape the private, business, and recreational lives of 
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the intended project beneficiaries. But, as Jacobs (1961) points out, good housing does not beget 
good neighbourhoods or good conduct. She explains: 
Other things may be more important than housing, however, and it means also that there 
is no direct simple relationship between good housing and good behavior, a fact which 
the whole of the Western world’s history, the whole collection of our literature, and the 
whole fund of observation open to any of us should long since have made evident. Good 
shelter is a useful good in itself as shelter. When we try to justify good shelter instead on 
the pretentious grounds that it will work social or family miracles we fool ourselves. 
Reinhold Niebuhr has called this particular deception, ‘The doctrine of salvation by 
bricks’ (Jacobs 1961, 113). 
When such a moralistic lens is focused on city design, the results are detrimental. 
Orthodox planning is much imbued with puritanical and Utopian conceptions of how 
people should spend their free time, and in planning, these moralisms on people’s private 
lives are deeply confused with concepts about the workings of cities. […] The preference 
of Utopians, and other compulsive managers of other people’s leisure, for one kind of 
legal enterprise over others is worse than irrelevant for cities. It is harmful. The greater 
and more plentiful the range of all legitimate interests (in the strictly legal sense) that city 
streets and their enterprises can satisfy, the better for the streets and for the safety and 
civilization of the city (Jacobs 1961, 41).  
In this way, Jacobs underlines the fact that not only does the doctrine of salvation by bricks fail 
to produce obedient, morally righteous citizens, it is also ruinous to the development of a city. 
In the above examples, Jacobs and Scott illustrate the inevitable social failure of top-down 
imposition of planned settlements. The mere idea of a salvaging project is absurd; conceiving of 
projects as projects “abstracts [them] out of the normal city and sets [them] apart” (Jacobs 1961, 
392). Planners wrongly presumed they were smarter and more farseeing than they actually were, 
and that the intended project beneficiaries were more stupid and incompetent than they actually 
were (Scott 1998). In the process of dumbing down and denying agency to beneficiaries, planners 
would actually create the unthinking, indistinguishable robot citizens they had assumed in their 
plans. Scott points out another source of failure. Massive state-led social engineering attempts 
will inevitably be thin as compared to their thick city and village counterparts that grew out of a 
long history built by many people from all walks of life. The thinness derives from the complexity 
of social processes and relations that can never be re-created through planned order. The planned 
model of social organisation and production is insufficient to create a thriving, functional social 
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order. The model forgets, perhaps deliberately, that formal order “is always and to some 
considerable degree parasitic on informal processes” (Scott 1998, 310). It is the disorderly, 
improvised, illegal structures, social relations and spaces paralleling the planned ones that permit 
the official city to function. 
Confusing aesthetics with efficiency 
Yet, as Jacobs (1961) emphasises repeatedly, modern state-led planning has consistently favoured 
visual order over functional or experienced order. There is not a necessary correspondence 
between the tidy look of geometric order and systems that effectively meet daily needs. States 
prefer grid designs because they are simple, legible, and easy to manipulate. Without local 
knowledge, outsiders can easily move goods, deliver services, and treat land as a standardised 
commodity (Scott 1998, 58). A neat structure, however, does not answer Jacob’s perennial 
question, “what function does this structure serve and how well does it serve it?” Planners have 
limited knowledge and cannot possibly re-create the diversity, cross-use and complexity that 
increase social order, and the rich, informal public life that undergird successfully functioning 
formal public institutions of order (Jacobs 1961, Scott 1998). Jacobs strongly rebukes the primacy 
of the visual order approach because it wrongly confuses life with art. A city is “life at its most 
complex and intense” and cannot be reconstructed and refined into an immutable piece of art 
(Jacobs 1961, 372). The artist necessarily makes selections and organises these selections into 
works under their control, hence art entails selectivity, organisation and control. Cities planned as 
art instead of as life result in “neither life nor art. They are taxidermy. […] However, it goes too 
far when the specimens put on display are exhibitions of dead, stuffed cities” (Jacobs 1961, 373). 
Scott further points out that a focus on the visual aesthetic of social engineering and settlement 
projects results in a stasis, disconnected from the realities or human life. He explains that the 
planned villages in Tanzania have a 
curiously static quality to [them]. It is rather like a completed picture that cannot be 
improved upon. Its design is the result of scientific and technical laws, and the implicit 
assumption is that, once built, the task then becomes one of maintaining its form. The 
planners aim to have each new village look like the last. […] Every field and every house 
would also, in principle, be nearly identical and located according to an overall scheme. 
To the degree that this vision had been realized in practice, it would have made absolutely 
no connections to the particularities of place and time. It would be a view from nowhere. 
Instead of the unrepeatable variety of settlements closely adjusted to local ecology and 
subsistence routines and instead of the constantly changing local response in shifts in 
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demography, climate, and markets, the state would have created thin, generic villages that 
were uniform in everything from political structure and social stratification to cropping 
techniques. The number of variables at play would be minimized. In their perfect 
legibility and sameness, these villages would be ideal, substitutable bricks in an edifice of 
state planning. Whether they would function was another matter (Scott 1998, 255, emphasis 
in original). 
Scott’s observation about the absence of the particularities of place and time in planned 
settlements recall the analyses of post-disaster spaces and places in Chapter 6. Massey’s (1994) 
emphasis on conceiving of place, space and time as processes of social relations experienced 
differently by different individuals and groups is especially relevant. If we accept the dynamic, 
relational character of space and time, then settlements lacking the capacity to change will 
ultimately fail.  
Instead of focusing on visual order and isolation, Jacobs (1961) advocates a focus on functional order 
and integration. There is no single linchpin that supports a city’s complex systems of functional 
order. Instead, it is the mixture of elements and the interactions among these elements. Thus “a 
city’s very structure consists of mixtures of uses, and we get closest to its structural secrets when 
we deal with the conditions that generate diversity” (Jacobs 1961, 377, emphasis in original). Jacobs 
calls for the erasure of the soulless single-use borders that creep up around projects and for the 
stitching together of edges into a strong, cohesive seam. She clarifies that “the aim should be to 
get that project, that patch upon the city, rewoven back into the fabric – and in the process of 
doing so, strengthening the surrounding fabric too” so that the project “take[s] on the qualities of 
healthy city fabric” (Jacobs 1961, 392, 394). These results can be achieved by recognising people’s 
agency and their capacity for perceiving and behaving in accordance with their own self-interests. 
Achieving functional order and integration of planned settlements into the wider city (or region), 
however, are rarely state objectives.  
Finally, attaining the desired aesthetic without encroaching upon the elite or other powerful 
interests often requires displacing the urban poor toward the periphery. State planners typically 
prefer  
a freshly cleared site and a ‘shocked’ population moved abruptly to the new setting in 
which the planners’ influence is maximized. The alternative is to reform in-situ an existing, 
functioning community that has more social resources for resisting and refashioning the 
transformation planned for it (Scott 1998, 256).   
 
 
 386   
 
As such, settlement sites are located away from the city centre, on land that is not owned by 
powerful landowners. This so-called frontier “terrain [is] where land can be found without taking 
on powerful actors, and thus as a ‘safety valve’ for people living in crowded core areas who are 
mobilizing, or might be able to mobilize, against the government” (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 34). 
A shocked population in an isolated frontier does not guarantee that collective protest will abate. 
For example, in Sulawesi, Indonesia, the highlanders resettled under state schemes did not 
become “quiescent and abject” (Li 2005, 391). Rather, the unmet promises about improved lives 
and livelihoods spurred the highlanders “to challenge experts and officials, and organize 
themselves to claim their due;” resettlement had “radicalized them in ways no one would have 
predicted” (Li 2005, 391). 
The fallacy of salvation by concrete relocation houses  
Typhoon Sendong precipitated the preferred prerequisites for enacting a centrally managed social 
plan to control people and landscapes: a “shocked population” willing to move into “a freshly 
cleared site” where “the planners’ influence is maximized” (Scott 1998, 256). In its design and its 
implementation, the rational plan to reconstruct a particular segment of CDO’s population shares 
many of the aforementioned characteristics of state-led settlements.  
The experts involved in Sendong reconstruction activities were akin to the state planners 
described by Jacobs and Scott. Trustees carried out activities to simplify, render legible, and 
manipulate people and landscapes. They ascribed to the doctrine of “salvation by concrete 
relocation houses outside flood-prone areas.” That is, providing good shelter will miraculously 
cure the other social and economic problems faced by the urban poor, especially their poverty 
and purported questionable moral character and values. The experts did not recognise or 
understand the complex social and ecological organisation that underpinned the functional order 
and integration of the city’s informal settlements. Given this disregard, it is not surprising that the 
members of the Local Inter-Agency Committee who planned the resettlement sites failed to 
solicit input based on the métis of the future residents.  
The exclusion of the specific needs, desires, and métis of intended beneficiaries in the planning 
phase has material consequences on the city’s resettlement sites both as spaces and as uniquely 
experienced places. Many sites demonstrate a confounding of aesthetics with efficiency. There is 
a spatial separation of activities and infrastructure types, with identical housing units neatly laid 
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out in grids. Sites are located in the city outskirts on land censured of its geographical 
particularities. Newly-built sites are necessarily thin compared to the thick decades-old riverside 
slums. Relocated survivors, for example, noted that the sites lack the relatively easy access to 
services, credit, livelihoods, and recreation, and the general sense of community and security they 
enjoyed in their old neighbourhoods. The sites do not replicate the complexity and diversity 
characteristic of a thriving neighbourhood that develops organically over time.  
There are other indications that Sendong trustees overestimated their ability to control relocation 
sites, and more importantly, to govern the desires and behaviour of residents. There were flagrant 
violations of the rules prohibiting renovations to relocation houses. Attempts to improve the 
moral character of residents were similarly dismissed. Residents continued to smoke and drink 
and sing videoke – off-site. Prostitution continued – on-site. To a degree, it was the housing 
beneficiaries who control their residency movements. They delayed moving until they were 
satisfied with the on-site infrastructure. Many residents rejected full-time residency at the 
resettlement sites. Instead, they adopted a circular migration strategy or a split householding 
strategy to compensate for the shortage of nearby livelihood opportunities or healthcare facilities.  
These acts of defiance, or demonstrations of human agency, will undoubtedly hamper or at least 
slow down the achievement of rational plans. There is, however, a greater obstacle preventing 
Sendong trustees from reconstructing a certain segment of CDO’s population. The uneven 
impacts of mobility and time-space compression were not considered in the design and the 
implementation of the resettlement sites. Mobility and time-space compression, themselves 
shaped by societal structures, affect how, when and why different people use different spaces. 
Understanding how these concepts shapes the lives of Sendong survivors helps to explain where 
and how they choose to live. 
The uneven repercussions of “unslumming” on mobility 
Mobility is typically conceived as the ability to move or the act of moving between physical or 
social locations. Physically moving from one location to another is important for accessing 
services (e.g. going to school, going to a doctor’s appointment), for conducting livelihood 
activities (e.g. going to work, selling goods in a market, visiting clients), as well as for exerting 
influence on decision-makers and the decisions they enact (e.g. going to vote, attending public 
meetings). Mobility is important for deriving social, cultural, and psychological benefits through 
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visiting friends and relatives, and nurturing social networks that help people, especially in times of 
need (e.g. in the aftermath of a disaster). As such, mobility is important for many aspects of 
people’s lives because it enables a person to actively shape and derive benefits from social 
relations with other people in a particular space. 
Mobility, as argued by feminist scholars, is also an embodied experience situated within societal 
structures and spatialities of power (Pessar and Mahler 2003, Silvey 2005, Piper 2006, Hunter and 
Davis 2009). It is a function of socioeconomic status, childcare responsibilities, geographic 
location, violence, age, race, gender, sexuality, religion, class, caste, and institutional and state 
migration practices and policies (Lawson 1998, Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000, Silvey 2004, 
Crosby 2006). Consequently, both access to mobility and speed of movement are unevenly 
distributed in any society. 
Typhoon Sendong accentuated the variance in mobility and speed of movement that different 
groups of Cagayaños enjoy. The disaster laid bare that some citizens benefit from a compression 
of time-space, others struggle with its elongation, and all employ strategies to benefit from time-
space compression. The response of trustees to the disaster, notably the attempt to unslum parts 
of the city by creating resettlement sites, catalysed changes in the urban poor survivors’ access to 
mobility and their speed of movement. Resettlement sites effectively reduced the mobility and 
the speed of movement for resettled survivors, thereby intensifying the existing gap between 
them and their more privileged counterparts. The slowness and reduced mobility characteristic of 
resettlement sites made them governable spaces. For, as Eyal Weizman explains in the 
documentary film, The architecture of violence (de Sousa 2014), “to control a space you need to create 
differentiation in speed of movement.”  
Time-space compression 
Time-space compression is defined as “movement and communications across spaces, […] the 
geographical stretching-out of social relations, and […] our experience of all of this” (Massey 
1994, 147). Due to actions related to capital, race, and gender, people have unequal access to and 
control over mobility and movement. Some people initiate and control flows. These hypermobile 
elites can compress time-space such that they diminish the temporal and spatial distance between 
them and desired resources. They also wield the power to reduce the mobility of significantly less 
powerful people, thereby stretching out the latter’s experience of time-space, and increasing the 
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temporal and spatial distance between them and desired resources. Thus, the least powerful 
people can be imprisoned by flows. In the middle are people who merely follow flows, neither 
directing nor being trapped by them. The salience of time-space compression to people’s lives is 
evident in the speed of recovery of various groups post-Sendong, as well as in CDO’s relocation 
sites where those in power (e.g. trustees) actively constrain the mobility of the less powerful (e.g. 
relocated survivors). 
Differentiation in the speed of post-Sendong recovery 
Sendong survivors located at various positions along the vulnerability spectrum took different 
amounts to time to recover after the disaster. The less vulnerable middle class survivors typically 
remained outside the institutionalised post-disaster spaces. They stayed with friends and relatives, 
or perhaps at their office instead of at evacuation sites. They amassed sufficient resources 
through their personal savings and donations or loans from people in their social networks to 
either return to their previous homes or to move into another concrete house in a planned 
development. The duration for which they stayed outside of their home was relatively short, a 
matter of days or weeks, up to three months. The time they took off work was usually limited to 
a few days, which they used to clean and repair their homes. As such, the period of displacement 
and the time to rebuild lives and livelihoods was relatively short; it was compressed time-space.57  
                                                          
57 While not a Sendong- or CDO-specific example, the following account illustrates how the middle class 
benefit from time-space compression in the aftermath of a disaster because of their social networks and 
their rapid access to livelihood assistance.  
In December 2012, Super-typhoon Pablo flattened parts of Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental on the 
eastern side of Mindanao. My middle class host family in CDO has relatives in Davao Oriental, coconut 
farmers whose ancestral home and livelihood were uprooted and destroyed. Other CDO-based relatives 
housed and provided affected relatives in the weeks after Pablo, in addition to sending money, water, 
blankets, clothes and food to the relatives who opted to stay in-situ. As such, social networks were critical 
in the immediate relief period and in accelerating recovery. Social networks determine access to, and 
especially the speed of access to, resources including people, spaces, events, and material goods and money.  
To help their family members, my host family focused on rebuilding their livelihoods. They sent a 
chainsaw, which was used to cut the felled coconut trees, which was then sold as timber. The family 
researched fast maturing coconut varieties that would yield fruit earlier than the usual variety that only 
reaches maturity at 10 years. They invested in other agricultural products to diversify revenue sources and 
to generate livelihoods and income in the short and medium terms. Finally, they sent several family 
members to physically assist with rebuilding. Clearly, rebuilding livelihoods is a priority, particularly on 
titled land. The middle class – in part thanks to its extensive and well-resourced social network – can 
expedite their livelihood recovery and rebuilding processes.  
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In contrast, the recovery period was much longer for survivors clustered at the more vulnerable 
end of the vulnerability continuum. As a group, the urban poor typically experienced a stretching 
out of time-space. Many had protracted stays at official post-disaster sleeping spaces. The 
precarious situation was exacerbated for survivors who were transferred through multiple 
evacuation camps or multiple transitional sites, and who waited more than 15 months to finally 
settle into a relocation house. While living in temporary housing, it was incredibly difficult to 
rebuild lives, especially ones with a semblance of normalcy. At these sites, the focus was on 
surviving, on obtaining financial and material resources to support short-term needs, and not on 
long-term planning. The uncertainty made it difficult for the urban poor to restart certain of their 
livelihood activities on a large scale. It was difficult and potentially expensive to move business 
assets (e.g. portable capital such as sari-sari store goods), and it was unwise to invest in hard-to-
move assets (e.g. non-portable, place-based capital such as the physical structure of sari-sari 
stores). Furthermore, residential uncertainty also discouraged mothers from sending their 
children to schools until they could provide school officials with a permanent address and 
guarantee that the children would not have to be transferred to another school in a few weeks or 
months.  
The survivors who did not qualify for relocation housing demonstrate an extreme example of 
stretched out time-space. For these survivors, it is a waiting game that they will almost certainly 
lose. Many of them lived in what are now designated as no-build zones. At any time with little or 
no notice they may be forcefully evicted, and their houses destroyed. Although these survivors 
have recovered insofar as they have repaired or rebuilt their Sendong-affected houses and 
restarted their old livelihoods, they cannot be considered to have fully recovered. They continue 
to live precariously in a state of uncertainty about their future. 
Differentiation in the speed of movement at relocation sites 
Time-space compression is also experienced differently by the well-intentioned experts designing, 
building, and servicing relocation sites and by the people actually living there. Pre-Sendong, each 
group had its own, mostly non-overlapping, ways of understanding and coping with time-space 
compression. These differences were not effectively incorporated into the design of the 
resettlement sites. The neglect of urban poor métis in the planning process resulted in very 
different experiences of the post-disaster livelihood assistance, the geographical siting of the 
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relocation sites in the periphery of the city, and the material impacts such locations have on the 
lives of trustees and housing beneficiaries. 
Site selection was partially based on the future growth potential of barangays Lumbia and Indahag. 
These locations are well-suited to middle class or affluent Cagayaños; their wealth affords them 
the privilege of waiting until these barangays transform into residential and commercial hubs. They 
can cope with the possibly of losing money. They can afford to wait months or even years for a 
return on their investment. Consequently, they have greater choices, including the option to do 
work with greater profit margins but that requires a certain waiting period. Put another way, their 
access to resources allows the affluent to cope with the difficulties associated with the prolonging 
of time-space. 
In contrast, the urban poor cannot afford to wait for economic opportunities to materialise. Most 
urban poor households require a daily income to survive. The daily requirement for cash affects 
many aspects of their lives – from the choice of livelihood, to the preferred housing location, to 
the decision to take on a high-interest 5-6 loan. For the urban poor, the prolonging of time-space 
exacerbates their precarious economic situation. 
This mismatch thwarted the success of livelihood assistance programs aimed at the urban poor 
but designed according to a middle class understanding of the world. A frustrated business 
graduate volunteering at Ecoville explained to me that the residents had a “myopic perspective” 
on livelihood activities. They repeatedly forewent opportunities for seasonal work that offered 
large profit margins and greater overall income opportunities in favour of highly competitive 
ones with miniscule profit margins. For example, residents rejected lucrative bag- and pillow-
making opportunities, which offered a monthly or quarterly paycheque, and instead requested 
help in running a sari-sari or taliapa shop on site. But, as the Ecoville director pointed out, there 
were 40 talipapas that “compete with each other because they’re selling the same things.” It is not 
that residents do not want to partake in relatively high value enterprises, but that they do not 
want to forgo a daily income, no matter how tiny the profit. Predictability trumped opportunity 
cost. Waiting – as required in investing – is the luxury of those possessing a certain reserve of 
resources. Obtaining a daily income is one of the few options available to the urban poor in 
which they exert some control over time-space compression, and ensure a predictable, albeit 
financially costly, temporal and spatial distance between them and required resources. 
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A second major problem is linked to the different means of transportation used by the relocated 
survivors and the trustees. The former group commutes using what American geographer Joseph 
Nevins (2015) describes as modes of “slow mobility,” while the latter group uses modes of “fast 
mobility.” Nevins argues that the slowness of Third World travelers is indicative of their 
vulnerability, where the speed at which people move is proportional to their power. The fastest 
mode of transportation (e.g. airplane) is the safest; it is also the most expensive, most regulated, 
most energetically costly, and most ecologically destructive. In air travel, the benefits are 
individualised, and the costs are dispersed throughout society. In contrast, the slowest forms of 
transportation, walking and cycling for example, are the least safe options because people share 
the road with motorised vehicles (and not because slow transportation is dangerous, per se). 
Even slow motorised vehicles, such as freight trains, are more dangerous than fast ones because 
it is easier to jump on and off of them. Fast travel or fast mobility thus enables the enrichment of 
“speed capitalists” and their control over less powerful people forced to use modes of slow 
mobility. 
Nevins’ arguments can be scaled down to the municipal level in CDO. Faster modes of 
transportation include private vehicles and taxis, and slower modes of transportation include 
walking and public transit (e.g. motorela, sikad, jeepney, multicab). The trustees mostly took private 
vehicles to reach the relocation sites situated in the city outskirts. For them, the distance from the 
city centre is “not so far” and the commuting time is “not so long.” Plus, the comfort of 
commuting in a private air-conditioned vehicle along dry, dusty, hot roads is “not so bad.” Theirs 
is a fast mobility; they have the capacity to compress time-space. The commute between the same 
sites is drastically different on public transit. During my fieldwork, I never met a trustee who 
commuted to resettlement sites aboard public transit. When the Xavier University jeepney went in 
for repairs for a few days, the staff cancelled all on-site activities and worked instead out of the 
Ecoville office on the university campus in the city. The alternative – walking to the jeepney 
station, taking two jeepneys to the Ecoville resettlement site, and organising the day’s schedule 
around the only jeepney returning to the city in late afternoon – was not considered a viable 
option. Public transit still offers mobility, but it is a slow mobility. The routes are circuitous, often 
weaving in and out of tiny, potholed roads to pick up or drop off commuters in out-of-the-way 
locations, doubling or tripling the distance covered. The added distance and the additional stops 
to pick up and drop off passengers add significantly to the commuting time. The infrequent trips 
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mean that many people (and their large packages) are crammed into vehicles, which is not 
especially comfortable. Additionally, the fare is relatively expensive, for example ranging from 
$0.54-1.08 for a one-way trip into the city centre from the Lumbia, Indahag and Calaanan sites. 
The public transport that is available at the resettlement sites is perceived as costly in terms of 
time and money by the people who use it.  
The difficulty in leaving resettlement sites has material repercussions on the lives of residents. 
The few urban poor survivors who have access to motorised vehicles prefer not to use them 
solely for commuting purposes. The added gasoline costs and mileage are considered unnecessary 
and unwanted costs. To compensate for the increased commuting expense (in terms of both time 
and money), many residents reduced the number of trips into the city as compared to when they 
lived in their pre-Sendong homes. The total cost is prohibitive, and effectively deters or reduces 
physical mobility, thereby isolating resettlement site residents in the periphery. For them, time-
space is elongated. So, like the lechoneros and quarry men, many urban poor survivors devise 
strategies to enhance their physical mobility, and potentially their social mobility through 
increased economic wealth. Put another way, they use circular migration to compress time-space 
to ensure they can access their livelihoods. Because they rely upon slow mobility modes of 
transportation, other urban poor survivors adopt strategies to minimise their travel. Some, like 
the Ecoville woman with a high risk pregnancy, adopt a split householding strategy in which 
household members who require access to critical resources actually move closer to these 
resources. Living in the city reduces their dependency on slow transportation by decreasing the 
temporal and spatial separation between them and key resources.  
Living in relocation sites also accentuates gender differences in access to mobility and speed of 
movement. The limited vehicles available to the urban poor survivors in resettlement sites are 
controlled by men. The male drivers of jeepneys, motorelas, sikads and multicabs are responsible for 
their vehicles, and thus act as gatekeepers connecting people seeking transportation with the 
means of transportation. Without easy access to public transportation or direct access to private 
vehicles, women are disproportionately affected by a reduced mobility. Not all women are 
trapped in relocation sites (e.g. through implied constraint because they cannot afford 
transportation). Indeed, the women at Ecoville pool their limited financial resources to ensure 
that pregnant women can travel into the city for medical appointments. Yet, because men control 
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the means of transportation, women face an additional hurdle in accessing mobility as compared 
to their male counterparts. 
The design of and the conditions at CDO’s relocation sites set up a situation in which 
hypermobile trustees actively reduced the mobility of the already weak. By increasing the 
differentiation in the speed of movement, trustees could control space (de Sousa 2014). Trustees 
facilitated the resettlement of people with limited access to fast transportation into peripheral 
locations. By moving the beneficiaries out of city homes and increasing their dependence on slow 
transportation, trustees exacerbated the pre-existing differential in the speed of movement, and 
guaranteed that people with greater mobility will control relocation sites.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has situated post-disaster spaces as spaces for reconstruction where purportedly 
“broken” urban poor survivors could be “fixed.” For the state-funded sites, reconstructing 
society concentrated on physical improvements in house structure. It reflected a mostly laissez-
faire attitude. It was suited to the organic development of a resettlement site into a lived space 
with renovated houses and neighborhoods sculpted by residents. It allowed diverse non-
governmental, religious, and government groups to enter and run activities, livelihood trainings, 
political, and social events, in which participation was mostly optional. State actors were not 
preoccupied with improving the moral character of residents.  
In contrast, the governmental interventions at religious group funded sites focused on improving 
morality, ethics, fairness and sustainability. Religious groups made a point of holding trainings 
and maintaining a strong religious presence. At the religious sites, reconstruction entailed 
ensuring what religious actors perceived as opportunities to better one’s life and that of the 
family, which necessarily involved improving the economic situation (e.g. via livelihood trainings 
and loans) and the moral character (e.g. via values formation training) of residents.  
Before closing I want to clarify that I have no evidence that neither Catholic nor state trustees 
had a nefarious master plan to remake society and landscapes according to a particular ideology, 
or to elongate time-space for beneficiaries. I do not believe such a plan ever existed. Indeed, as Li 
(2007b, 276) points out, the grandiose, visionary, high modern plans that Scott describes are very 
rare; instead, it is more common that “programs of intervention are pulled together from an 
existing repertoire, a matter of habit, accretion and bricolage.” What transpired in CDO was a 
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situation in which there was a highly visible and urgent need for assistance after a disaster, state 
actors were conspicuously absent, and the Catholic Church already possessed the means, the 
capacity and the public’s trust for directing disaster relief and recovery. As Catholics and as 
Filipinos, Catholic trustees saw it as their civic, religious, and moral imperative to help, which 
they did. But, the work they carried out, and the vision they applied to the post-disaster spaces 
where they intervened, demonstrate that Catholic actors assumed state-like roles. In other words, 
the disaster created an unforeseen opportunity for the Catholic Church to target a particular 
segment of CDO residents, and to remake and govern them according to Catholic values. And 
Catholic actors seized this opportunity to enact their own vision of development. This vision of 
development was largely uninformed by the previous experiences, values, interests – the métis – of 
the beneficiaries. 
Taken a step further, in post-disaster situations where you have a weak or absent government, 
there are opportunities for so-called non-state actors, such as churches, corporations, rebel 
groups, or NGOs, to re-imagine, re-create, and govern portions of society and landscapes 
according to their visions.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
This research project set out to answer the question: where do the survivors of a disaster rebuild 
their lives and livelihoods? Rather than generate a list of locations, this dissertation analysed post-
disaster spaces, defined as the spaces designed for a particular subset of survivors with the aim of 
helping them to survive, to cope with, and to recover from the disaster. Many survivors accessed 
and benefitted from official post-disaster spaces designed and run by trustees. The uses of and 
experiences inside these spaces, however, were very different for individuals differentiated by 
gender, class, race, and religion. Many survivors also sought to rebuild their lives and livelihoods 
outside of the official post-disaster spaces; they turned to their personal social networks, their 
usual work spaces or places of worship, as well as to newly created spaces for advocacy and 
healing. This latter category of survivors was largely excluded from official aid conduits because 
these survivors were either invisible to, or not officially deemed vulnerable by, trustees. 
This dissertation offered a critical topography in which the processes and practices of producing 
post-disaster spaces were exposed, which, in turn, “invite[d] the vivid revelation of social and 
political difference and inequality” (Katz 2001, 1228). Because space is necessarily malleable, 
fluid, and relational due to the ever-changing activities, conflict, and experiences unfolding in the 
landscape (Staeheli and Martin 2000), any analysis of space must be formulated in terms of the 
social relations occurring within and beyond its porous boundaries (Massey 1994). Accordingly, 
this study explored how the social relations among survivors and trustees were linked to 
exclusion, governmentality, mobility, and space- and place-making. Specifically, it examined these 
processes and practices in the environmental migration precipitated by Typhoon Sendong in 
Cagayan de Oro, Philippines. 
The first research objective aimed to characterise vulnerable survivors. Understanding 
vulnerability is important because a natural hazard only progresses into a disaster if normal 
conditions are disrupted, people are affected, and the capacity of the local community to cope is 
exceeded. Put another way, without vulnerable people there are no disasters. In CDO, 
government agencies, humanitarian organisations, religious groups, and NGOs alike claimed that 
their disaster risk reduction, relief, and recovery activities targeted “the people who need help the 
most.” Yet, these same trustees shared neither a coherent definition of vulnerability nor a 
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consensus on delimiting one or more target populations. Instead, different trustees invoke 
diverse interpretations of vulnerability in guiding their post-disaster efforts. 
The trustees designing and implementing disaster relief and recovery programs claimed their 
initiatives helped vulnerable Sendong survivors. Despite the absence of a clear shared 
understanding of vulnerability, the trustees primarily ascribed to a singling out of vulnerable 
demographic groups approach or to an indicators of vulnerability approach, and to a lesser 
extent, a physicalist approach. What these approaches have in common is that they attribute 
vulnerability to biologically-based attributes, technological failures or inadequacies, unfortunate 
geography, individual or household level poverty, and poor decisions made by individuals and 
households. They do not associate vulnerability with the deeply rooted unjust processes, 
structures, and inequalities in society.  
As a result, the solutions enacted by trustees fail to resolve the very elements that enable the 
perpetuation of vulnerability in CDO and the ongoing disasters that result from natural hazard 
events all over the archipelago. Philippine disaster relief, recovery, and rebuilding efforts rarely 
tackle, let alone remedy underlying complex and intertwined economic, political, technological, 
biological, geographic, cultural, legal, and social issues. Understandably, immediate search and 
rescue and disaster relief cannot and should not address these issues when urgent responses are 
required to save people from imminent death. Yet, without acknowledging and then addressing 
the underlying issues, trustees effectively absolve the state, the Catholic Church, and other 
powerful entities in Philippine society from addressing root problems. In variously framing 
vulnerability in terms of property, of individuals exhibiting particular biological characteristics, 
and of terrain-based geophysical risks, vulnerability is framed as an individual problem instead of 
a collectively-produced one. Framed in the latter sense, the onus to resolve underlying issues is 
the responsibility of powerful trustees. Whereas, framed in the former sense, anything a trustee 
does to help vulnerable people is a charitable act but not its ultimate responsibility. 
Given the inability of the trustees’ approaches to vulnerability to account for the range of 
Sendong survivors and their experiences, I proposed that a more useful way of framing 
vulnerability and understanding vulnerable people is to visualise survivors along a vulnerability 
continuum. A continuum unmasks the variation that exists within communities, households, and 
even individuals depending on their situation in relation to other people at a given time. It 
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acknowledges that “less vulnerable” survivors were legitimately affected by Typhoon Sendong. It 
highlights the “more vulnerable” people who lack the resources and capabilities to quickly 
recover from a disaster. It also gives a place to “invisible” survivors who span the continuum, so-
called invisible because of their neglect by the official conduits of disaster relief. Their exclusion, 
in some cases, rendered them even more vulnerable than those officially deemed vulnerable. 
The final, and most significant, element of charactering vulnerability in CDO is what I call the 
five major vulnerability discourses. By shaping how people conceptualise vulnerability and 
vulnerable people, these discourses informed the official post-disaster programs. These narratives 
played an influential role in the targeting of beneficiaries, the design and delivery of disaster 
assistance and resettlement programs, the mobility of more vulnerable and invisible survivors, 
and the exclusionary nature of post-disaster spaces. These discourses were apparent in the 
language used to describe these people, the attitudes of trustees towards these people, the types 
of disaster assistance, and the formal and informal rules about accessing assistance.  
The five narratives overlap, and occasionally contradict each other. Each one advances or hinders 
a specific agenda; not surprisingly, different intervening trustees adopted one or more discourses 
that reinforce their particular attitudes and priorities. For example, an internally displaced persons 
(IDP) narrative emphasises the unbiased work of trustees; a victim narrative focuses on 
legitimate, helpless people; and a survivor narrative is used for advocacy and healing purposes. 
Illegal squatter and informal settler narratives lend themselves to strategies aimed at solving the 
precarious housing situation of vulnerable Cagayaños. A deficiency narrative identifies 
beneficiaries as people with actual and presumed shortages. A different-from-us narrative 
accentuates differences between trustees and beneficiaries, and among survivors. To varying 
degrees, each discourse was also adopted and reworked by vulnerable people affected by 
Typhoon Sendong. Unlike the trustees who typically framed discourses in terms of individual, 
household, and even class-based failures, the more vulnerable survivors and their advocates also 
point out that the challenges they face are embedded in larger economic, political, and legal 
historical processes. Put another way, the former interpretation suggests micro and meso level 
issues produce vulnerability, which can be addressed with micro and meso level interventions, 
while the latter contends macro scale issues produce vulnerability, which is then manifested at the 
micro and meso scales.  
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The second research objective sought to map the post-disaster trajectories of survivors, and 
especially those situated at the “more vulnerable” end of the continuum, in the short and medium 
terms. Chapter 6 presented a critical topography of the various post-disaster spaces along these 
routes. Sendong survivors accessed various urban spaces for critical rebuilding activities, namely 
sleeping in a safe space, obtaining money and relief goods, accessing medical, educational and 
safety services, enjoying recreational and spiritual activities, and engaging in advocacy or political 
activities.  
The analyses focused on “sleeping pathways,” the specific places where a survivor is based over a 
given period of time. Sleeping pathways reveal the options available to survivors lying along the 
vulnerability continuum, and their preferences. These options and preferences are necessarily 
linked to the different constraints and resources of different individuals and households, which, 
in turn, are underpinned by larger processes, structures and institutions in CDO and in Philippine 
society. There were three broad categories of sleeping pathways: institutionalised, hors-système, and 
hybrid pathways. In the institutionalised pathway, survivors sleep exclusively at the official post-
disaster spaces created by state, religious and humanitarian trustees; for example, they typically 
went from their flooded house to “higher ground” to an evacuation camp to a transitional 
housing site to a permanent relocation site. Institutionalised pathways monopolised media, 
public, and trustee attention, shaping what people assumed were the spaces frequented by 
Sendong survivors. Yet, many Sendong-affected people avoided most or all official post-disaster 
aid spaces. Some households never ventured inside an evacuation camp, transitional housing site, 
or permanent relocation site. They followed what I call an “hors-système” sleeping pathway because 
they remained outside official disaster sleeping spaces run by state, religious, and humanitarian 
trustees. A significantly larger group of people, even surpassing the number of people who 
followed an institutionalised sleeping pathway, pursued a “hybrid pathway” in which households 
slept in both official and non-official spaces.  
Access to all types of post-disaster spaces was uneven, and the experiences of different 
individuals and groups within these spaces were similarly disparate. Such unevenness is a product 
of exclusion. The analyses engage extensively with what Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011) call the 
“powers of exclusion” that deny certain people access to land. The authors identify eight powers 
of exclusion; they contend that the most important ones in rural Southeast Asia are regulation, 
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force, the market, and legitimation, but that “environmental change, growth in and control over 
knowledge and technologies that influence both the incentives for new forms of exclusion and 
capacities for monitoring and enforcement, political relationships and alliances, and inertia” can 
also exclude (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 197). To varying degrees, all eight powers operated in an 
urban post-disaster context in Southeast Asia. Not only did they shape access to land (e.g. where 
survivors slept), but they also shaped access to other critical resources such as relief goods and 
compensation for damaged houses. 
The official post disaster sleeping spaces – evacuation camps, temporary housing sites and 
permanent resettlement sites – are distinguished by where they are located, when people stay 
there, what type of housing they reside in, and the types of assistance given there. They all share 
inclusive mandate to assist the vulnerable survivors of the disaster. Yet, the design and character 
of these spaces deterred many survivors from accessing them. The official post-disaster sleeping 
spaces are highly exclusionary spaces, in part because they are more informed more by the 
vulnerability discourses to which trustees adhere than by the needs, desires, and métis of the 
intended residents. 
The survivors themselves were mostly excluded from spaces of power, in which decisions about 
them and their fate were taken. When they did enter such spaces, such as the city hall, the 
archbishopric or Xavier University campus, it was primarily for positive publicity for the city 
administration (e.g. relocation house raffles) and for social activities (e.g. psychosocial debriefing 
activities and mass weddings), in which survivors did not assume a decision-making role. This 
non-overlapping use of a shared space recalls Doreen Massey’s (1994) articulation of a fluid time-
space that is necessarily differentially experienced by different people through their varied social 
relations with others. For the purposes of expediency, decisions can and probably should be 
taken by a relatively small group of people during the disaster rescue and relief period. However, 
in designing relocation sites, and temporary housing where people live for more than one year, it 
only seems fair to include purported beneficiaries in the discussion.  
The third and final research objective endeavoured to evaluate the roles of trustees and 
vulnerable survivors in shaping post-disaster spaces. These roles were articulated throughout the 
thesis, in Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7, and were critically analysed in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 went beyond 
evaluating roles. It used Michael Burawoy’s (1998, 5) strategy of using preexisting theory to 
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“extend out” from the microworld of a very specific, bounded case study to “extract the general 
from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro,’ and to connect the present to the past 
in anticipation of the future.” I extended out from the very particular case of environmental 
migration in CDO catalysed by Tropical Storm Sendong to analyse processes of exclusion and 
governmentality in trustee-led disaster relief and resettlement.  
Such an analysis underscores an obvious and unacknowledged point: reconstructing is much 
more than building houses. It is about rebuilding lives and livelihoods. It also poses many 
questions about fairness and power. It entails choosing which people should and can be 
reconstructed, and creating or reinforcing barriers that exclude certain groups of people. It allows 
the erasure of people and their presumed immoral or undesirable acts from previously occupied 
territory, cleansing the space and freeing it for other purposes. It cements or unravels 
relationships and strengthens faith in religious and state institutions, and in the individuals 
fronting them. It offers opportunities to shape people and impart on them the values deemed 
important, sometimes quite explicitly. It has uneven repercussions on different individuals and 
groups, especially with regards to their mobility and experience of time-space compression. 
The process of resettling survivors and the relocation sites themselves can thus be read as an 
“unslumming” or an “improvement” project that abstracts the residents and the locale out of the 
normal city. It is a process that takes unreadable, underground, informal people from an illegible, 
non-state space and transforms them into standardised citizens living in a legible state space 
conducive to governmental intervention. It is not only a conflictual and incoherent, concrete yet 
abstract state who endeavours to carry out this social engineering project, but also other trustees 
acting like quasi state actors (e.g. the Catholic Church), however benevolent their intentions.  
Main contributions of this dissertation 
Among the contributions of this research project, I underline four here. First, this inquiry 
intersects studies of environmental migration, feminist research, governmentality, and political 
ecology. The integration of these diverse research arenas in this study offers salient insights to 
each one. In particular, I have demonstrated the importance of extending beyond the practical 
and policy-oriented focus of much of the environmental migration literature. Using empirical, 
theoretical, and methodological contributions from feminist geography and feminist approaches 
to migration situates environmental migration as a process of space- and place-making with vastly 
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uneven consequences for different individuals and groups. Analysing environmental migration 
through a governmentality framework indicates that this type of mobility yields yet another 
opportunity for trustees to control people and landscapes. 
Second, this dissertation, and Chapter 6 in particular, provides a strong case in support of Hall, 
Hirsch and Li’s (2011) thesis on the importance of regulation, force, the market and legitimation 
as powers of exclusion that shape access to land in Southeast Asia. It demonstrates that these 
powers can determine access to a broader suite of resources, in addition to land. It develops 
examples of how the four other powers of exclusion operate in the context of disaster relief, 
recovery, and rebuilding efforts. It proposes that social norms and prejudices also have the power 
to exclude. 
Third, on a practical level, the main findings of the research can usefully inform disaster 
management efforts in the Philippines and elsewhere. Like many aspiring international 
development scholars, a part of me had hoped that my research would somehow benefit people 
on-the-ground. (This was countered by another, more cynical side of me attuned to the 
disconnect between academic research and actual policy and programs.) At the end of my field 
season in CDO, however, my aspirational side received a reason to be hopeful. When I presented 
preliminary research results to a variety of people who had participated in the project in some 
capacity, I was told by top officials at two regional government agencies that they wanted a copy 
of my dissertation (or at least a succinct summary of the main findings). They were surprised by 
the salience of religion in post-disaster spaces, and the many ways in which what they perceived 
as inclusive spaces were actually highly exclusive. Furthermore, because the critique would come 
from a foreign researcher – another so-called “expert” – it would carry more weight when 
presented to their superiors at the national offices. They also pointed out that I had more 
freedom to be critical; the same critiques postulated by government employees could hinder their 
career opportunities. As such, I am hopeful that there are committed government trustees who 
have the authority, the desire, and the resources to actually create better post-disaster spaces.  
Fourth, this dissertation demonstrates the potential for accompanied research projects. The 
writing, and especially the fieldwork, components of this study required that I explore ways to 
make academic life and family life work together. The richness of the data and the analyses in this 
dissertation indicate that accompanied research projects can and do work, and moreover, that 
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there is value in writing reflexively about the accompanied and embodied aspects. For graduate 
studies brave enough to read this tome (or at least parts of Chapter 4), I hope that my reflections 
can help them to navigate their own experiences with accompanied fieldwork and academic life 
more generally. 
Limitations of this research project 
As presented in Chapter 4, this research project has methodological limitations. Here, I want to 
briefly discuss two other limitations related to its theoretical component. The first is the limited 
analysis of class and race in producing and contesting CDO’s post-disaster spaces. As Kofman 
(2004) insists, migration is a process in which gender, class, and race are intertwined. The 
interaction of these and other constructs of inequality yield a complex stratification that 
contributes to very different migration experiences of people occupying a common space. For 
the most part, my analyses grouped survivors into broad economic classes – the middle class and 
the urban poor – without rigorously troubling these categories, situating them historically, and 
investigating the within-group variation, and what such variation means. My analyses did not 
critically examine class for trustees who, while mostly situated as middle class, were not uniform. 
My analyses similarly sidelined the salience of race in post-disaster trajectories and individual 
experiences of post-disaster spaces. In exploring the exclusionary nature of official post-disaster 
spaces, Chapter 6 did delve into several race-related issues. For example, survivors who were 
visibly identifiable as Indigenous Peoples or as Muslim Filipinos were ostracised in post-disaster 
spaces and were either denied relief goods or given goods of substandard quality. Further 
unpacking of class and race, and their relationship to gender would likely yield a more nuanced 
and complex understanding of environmental migration and post-disaster spaces. 
A second point concerns scale. As explained in Chapter 4, the decision to undertake fieldwork 
with my husband and then-infant daughter had important practical implications. The focus on a 
single case in a single city was one such implication. Yet migration is inevitably connected to 
different temporal, spatial, and analytical scales, such as the body, household, region, nation-state, 
supranational organisation, among others. In contemporary feminist theory, the body is not a 
mere corporeal biological entity that exists at a single location of scale; instead it is an analytical 
concept that evades dichotomies, welcomes many material and symbolic sites, and exists as lived 
sites of power (Moss 1993, Silvey 2005). This concept lends itself to studying how migrant bodies 
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(re)produce space and place, who wins by claiming certain bodies are illegal or undocumented, 
how and where power dynamics operate between states and migrants, and what are the corporeal 
migration experiences of specific social groups (Silvey 2005, Parreñas 2010, Mountz 2011). I did 
analyse temporal, spatial, and analytical scales at the body, household and municipal levels, albeit 
within a restricted time-frame. I did not, however, investigate other more meso or macro level 
analytical scales such as the region, nation-state, and transnational sphere. A scalar approach to 
studying the production and governmentality of post-disaster spaces that includes these larger 
scales would likely reveal relational linkages I could not detect with my limited scale study. There 
is a vast global Filipino diaspora that maintains significant material ties to the Philippines, for 
example by sending remittances (cf. De Koninck and Caouette 2012). As evidenced in the 
outpouring of international support after Typhoon Sendong, this diaspora also cares about 
Cagayaños. It is thus probable that the CDO case would illustrate the ability of scales to interact 
dynamically and even jump scales through the increasing transnationalisation of people, goods, 
ideas, and institutions (Bailey 2010, Wright 2014). 
Starting points for future research  
An intriguing direction for future research would be to produce a counter-topography that 
connects the case of Typhoon Sendong in CDO to “vastly different places made artifactually 
discrete by virtue of history and geography but which also reproduce themselves differently 
amidst the common political-economic and socio-cultural processes they experience” (Katz 2001, 
1229). The accelerated pace of global environmental change, and especially climate change, is 
amplifying the impacts of larger economic, political, and social processes that increase the 
vulnerability of millions of people around the world. These processes increase the possibility that 
natural hazards precipitate disasters that can provoke environmental migration and the real and 
perceived need to create safe post-disaster spaces for the survivors. In the past decade alone, 
examples can be found in diverse locations including New Orleans, U.S.A. (Hurricane Katrina in 
2005), Haiti (earthquake in 2010), Eastern Visayas, Philippines (Super-typhoon Haiyan in 2013) 
and Nepal (earthquakes in 2015). A counter-topography would investigate specific issues – for 
example the character of post-disaster spaces and the roles of diverse trustees involved, and their 
attempts at governmentality – in and across sites, generating contour lines that illustrate particular 
relations to a process of governmental intervention. Such a counter-topography would draw 
attention to “precise analytical relationships” without homogenising different sites (Katz 2001, 
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1229), and could be used to connect people and ideas, to navigate political space, and to bridge 
theoretical and empirical work on marginalised populations (Mountz 2011). 
A second research project could analyse CDO’s relocation sites as spaces of everyday resistance. 
According to Benedict Kerkvliet (2002, 114),  
Resistance refers to what people do that shows disgust, anger, indignation, or opposition 
to what they regard as unjust or unfair claims on them by people of superordinate class 
and status or institutions. Stated positively, people struggle through resistance to affirm 
their claims to what they believe they are justly entitled to based on values and rights 
recognized by a significant proportion of others in similar class and status positions.  
Everyday resistance usually occurs on a small scale, for example an individual or a small group 
with no formal leadership. It requires some sort of justification or implicit values. It brings 
immediate benefits to the resister, but if too many people resist, then there may be serious 
repercussions. Finally, the target is often unaware of the opposition and the identity of the 
resisters. 
As a starting point, a research project could investigate the architecture of resettlement sites. 
Architecture, as Weizman (2007, 26) explains, has a communicative function. 
Architecture – the organization, form and style by which these neighborhoods were built, 
the way they were mediated, communicated and understood – formed a visual language 
that was used to blur the facts of occupation and sustain territorial claims of expansion. 
This project was thus an attempt to sustain national narratives of belonging while short-
circuiting and even blocking other narratives. 
Yet, Weizman argues that architecture itself can resist the violence of architecture. In CDO, does 
this mean that the modifications made by resettled Sendong survivors to their identical cookie-
cutter houses are forms of resistance contesting the narratives put forth by trustees? Were these 
customisation efforts akin to the “subdued, subtle, and surreptitious type” of everyday resistance 
deployed by the subordinate residents of a village in Central Luzon studied by Kerkvliet (2002, 
16)? Apart from architectural expressions of everyday resistance, other political, cultural, and 
social forms of resistance practiced by CDO’s resettled survivors are worthy of further study.  
A third fascinating research project would be to reimagine or reconfigure mobility so that the 
benefits of time-space compression are more equitably dispersed and available to people living in 
the periphery. The project should aim to resolve, or at least advance, the following puzzle. 
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There were clearly very real practical constraints in resettling tens of thousands of Sendong 
survivors, especially because of the pressure to build relocation sites in the city’s periphery. Given 
this limitation, how can the differential in the speed of movement between resettled residents and 
their city-centre counterparts (both trustees and urban poor) be diminished? Can a person 
actively shape and derive benefits from social relations with other people in a particular space 
through a virtual, and not a physical, presence? Instead of defining mobility as the ability to move 
or the act of moving between physical or social locations, what if mobility was recast as the 
potential to engage with others in another space and to influence that space? Would it then be 
possible for an individual with restricted physical mobility to obtain the benefits accrued from 
physical mobility? If so, then it might be possible for the urban poor survivors resettled in the 
periphery of the city to counter the repercussions of limited physical mobility and the resulting 
elongation of time-space.  
The advent of modern information and communication technologies (ICTs) promises such an 
outcome. Of all the technological tools and resources currently available to create, disseminate, 
store and bring value to information, mobile phones and especially smartphones are most 
relevant to enhancing mobility to CDO relocation site residents. Indeed, like many women in the 
developing world who “are not ‘waiting’ for access to ICTs, but rather using ICTs when they are 
available to get around the constraints they face in politics, society and economy” (Hambly 
Odame 2005, 20), many urban poor Cagayaños, both women and men, are already using mobile 
phones. Sharing information through text messages and phone calls can provide the urban poor 
with greater “influence” mobility, despite their restricted “physical” mobility.  
Yet, there are limits to influence mobility. At some point, obtaining the full benefits of mobility 
requires physical mobility; receiving a text message about the time and location of the distribution 
of relief goods, or other resource, alleviates the need of being physically present for the 
announcement. Picking up the goods requires physical travel to the distribution site at the 
appropriate time, which can be difficult from some of the resettlement sites. Moreover, influence 
mobility implies dependence – or at least a degree of reliance – upon new technologies, and the 
infrastructure, capital and powers underpinning them. While mobile technologies have reduced 
gender inequalities and democratised communications for many previously disconnected or 
isolated populations around the world (Hambly Odame 2005), the technologies are not a 
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panacea. They remain largely controlled by corporate and state interests, and require significant 
investment in, for example, setting up cellular towers. In a hilly region such as Cagayan de Oro, 
setting up enough infrastructure to ensure people living in the periphery are well connected 
would be difficult, especially if the potential clients are construed as too poor to pay as per the 
deficiency vulnerability discourse. Furthermore, despite the relatively inexpensive costs to 
purchase a cell phone and to send and receive calls and text messages, the cost is a significant 
addition to a household with a limited budget. It is not uncommon for the urban poor to own a 
cell phone, but never have the load required to make calls or send text messages. As such, this 
alternative influence mobility is still within the purview of the powerful, the affluent, the experts. 
* * * * * 
The built environment of relocation sites and the programs offered there reflect an amalgamation 
of the objectives of trustees. The changes imagined and created by trustees to the resettlement 
landscape and the lives of the people whose lives were targeted for reconstruction are thus the 
legacy of Typhoon Sendong. Thus, it was a reconstruction primarily designed and implemented 
by state and religious trustees for urban poor, with almost no overlap between the former 
reconstructors and the latter reconstructees. In re-making society, there was no intent to change 
religious or state institutions, the inner workings of local politics and religious practices, or the 
people in positions of power. There is no attempt to heed Pelling’s (1999, 2001) call to reduce 
vulnerability by addressing the underlying political, social and economic processes that render 
people vulnerable. In CDO for example, a patriarchal relationship is maintained through the 
house ownership – land tenure arrangement at resettlement sites, indicating that reconstructing 
society does not mean a restructuring of hierarchical patron-client relationships that have 
characterised the Philippines and other parts of Southeast Asia (cf. Scott 1972, 1976, McCoy 
1994). Neither church nor state was willing to relinquish the power that comes with land 
ownership in the Philippines. Such a focus replicates the problem of “correcting the deficiencies 
of villagers while leaving the deficiencies of [trustees] […] unexamined and unimproved” 
identified by Li (2005, 384). Perhaps this re-making is the real reconstruction challenge post-
Sendong. 
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Annex 1. Oral and written consent forms 
 
CONSENTEMENT VERBAL 
Bonjour,  
Mon nom est Christine Gibb, je suis étudiante à l’Université de Montréal, au Canada. J’effectue 
une thèse de doctorat dans laquelle je m’intéresse aux expériences locales de la migration 
environnementale suite aux catastrophes naturelles aux Philippines. Les renseignements collectés 
auprès de vous seront repris dans le cadre de mon travail de recherche doctoral. La recherche 
comporte trois différentes étapes; chacune implique un traitement différent de confidentialité. 
1. La première étape comprend principalement des entrevues. Les informations collectées seront 
anonymes. Votre identité ne sera pas divulguée dans les communications écrites ou orales. Je vais 
peut-être utiliser une citation de notre conversation, mais votre identité sera protégée.  
2. La deuxième étape implique la création d'une vidéo. Vous avez le choix de rester anonyme ou 
pas dans votre vidéo. Vous avez le choix de permettre la diffusion de votre vidéo à: l'équipe de 
recherche, et/ou aux participants de l'atelier (voir ci-dessous), et/ou aux organisations aux 
Philippines, et/ou aux organisations ailleurs. Il y aura des outils de postproduction pour modifier 
votre vidéo pour s'assurer de votre anonymat. Votre identité ne sera pas divulguée dans les 
communications écrites ou orales. Je vais peut-être utiliser une citation de votre vidéo, mais votre 
identité sera protégée.  
3. La troisième étape implique un atelier de groupe pour visionner et discuter les vidéos, et pour 
discuter les résultats de recherche. Pendant l'atelier, je ne peux pas vous offrir la confidentialité ou 
l'anonymat parce que c'est une activité de groupe avec des autres membres de votre communauté. 
Cependant, je vais demander aux participants de l'atelier de respecter la confidentialité des 
participants après l'atelier. Suite à l'atelier, votre identité ne sera pas diffusée dans les 
communications écrites ou orales. Je vais peut-être utiliser des citations de l'atelier, mais les 
identités des participants seront protégées.  
Votre participation est entièrement volontaire. Je vous invite de participer dans l'étape (les étapes) 
X (1, et/or 2, et/ou 3). Vous êtes libre de refuser sans préjudice et sans devoir justifier votre 
décision, la participation à cette recherche à tout moment.  
SVP, confirmez oralement si vous accepter de participer, oui ou non :  
 Oui, j’accepte de participer ; 
 Non, je n’accepte pas de participer.  
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CONSENTEMENT ÉCRIT 
Titre de la recherche : Reconstruire la dignité : Une exploration des vies post-catastrophes des 
migrants environnementaux aux Philippines  
 
Chercheuse :   Christine Gibb, étudiante, Doctorat en géographie, Université de Montréal  
 
Co-directeurs de recherche :  Patricia Martin, professeure agrégée, Département de géographie, 
Université de Montréal ; Rodolphe De Koninck, professeur titulaire, Département de géographie, 
Université de Montréal 
 
A) RENSEIGNEMENTS AUX PARTICIPANTS 
 
1. Objectifs de la recherche. 
Ce projet de recherche vise à mieux comprendre où des groupes vulnérables de « migrants 
environnementaux » aux Philippines reconstruisent leurs vies et gagne-pains après une 
catastrophe. Les objectifs spécifiques du projet sont : (1) de caractériser les groupes vulnérables 
aux Philippines, (2) de cartographier où les migrants environnementaux se retrouvent dans les 
court et moyen termes, et (3) d'évaluer les rôles des acteurs religieux et de l’état lors des trajets 
migratoires. 
 
2. Participation à la recherche 
Votre participation à cette recherche consiste à 
- partager vos expériences migratoires lors d'une et après une catastrophe dans une entrevue 
d'environ une heure; et/ou 
- partager vos expériences migratoires d'une et après une catastrophe dans la création d'un 
vidéo; et/ou 
- évaluer les conclusions préliminaires dans un atelier final. 
 
3. Confidentialité 
Les renseignements que vous nous donnerez demeureront confidentiels. Chaque participant à la 
recherche se verra attribuer un numéro et seuls la chercheuse principale et/ou la personne 
mandatée à cet effet auront la liste des participants et des numéros qui leur auront été attribués. 
De plus, les renseignements seront conservés dans un classeur sous clé situé dans un bureau 
fermé. Aucune information permettant de vous identifier d’une façon ou d’une autre ne sera 
publiée. Ces renseignements personnels seront détruits 7 ans après la fin du projet. Seules les 
données ne permettant pas de vous identifier seront conservées après cette date. 
 
4. Avantages et inconvénients 
En participant à cette recherche, vous pourrez contribuer à l’avancement des connaissances sur 
expériences locales de la migration environnementale suite aux catastrophes aux Philippines. 
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Votre participation à la recherche pourra également vous donner l’occasion de mieux vous 
connaître. Par contre, il est possible que le fait de raconter votre expérience suscite des réflexions 
ou des souvenirs émouvants ou désagréables. Si cela se produit, n’hésitez pas à en parler avec 
l’agent de recherche. S’il y a lieu, l’agent de recherche pourra vous référer à une personne-
ressource. 
 
5. Droit de retrait 
Votre participation est entièrement volontaire. Vous êtes libre de vous retirer en tout temps par 
avis verbal, sans préjudice et sans devoir justifier votre décision. Si vous décidez de vous retirer 
de la recherche, vous pouvez communiquer avec la chercheuse, au numéro de téléphone indiqué 
à la dernière page de ce document. Si vous vous retirez de la recherche, les renseignements qui 
auront été recueillis au moment de votre retrait seront détruits. 
 
B) CONSENTEMENT 
 
Je déclare avoir pris connaissance des informations ci-dessus, avoir obtenu les réponses à mes 
questions sur ma participation à la recherche et comprendre le but, la nature, les avantages, les 
risques et les inconvénients de cette recherche. 
 
Après réflexion, je consens librement à prendre part à cette recherche. Je sais que je peux me 
retirer en tout temps sans préjudice et sans devoir justifier ma décision. 
Signature : ___________________________       Date : ________________________ 
Nom : _______________________________      Prénom : ______________________ 
 
Je déclare avoir expliqué le but, la nature, les avantages, les risques et les inconvénients de l'étude 
et avoir répondu au meilleur de ma connaissance aux questions posées.   
Signature de la chercheuse___________________ Date : ___________________________  
Nom : ________________________________ Prénom : _________________________ 
 
Pour toute question relative à la recherche, ou pour vous retirer de la recherche, vous pouvez 
communiquer avec Christine Gibb, chercheuse principale, à l’adresse courriel suivante :  
 
Toute plainte relative à votre participation à cette recherche peut être adressée à l’ombudsman de 
l’Université de Montréal, au numéro de téléphone (514) 343-2100 ou à l’adresse courriel 
ombudsman@umontreal.ca. (L’ombudsman accepte les appels à frais virés). 
 
Un exemplaire du formulaire de consentement signé doit être remis au participant. 
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Annex 2. Interview guides 
Example of a key informant interview question guide 
 
History of organisation and the role of the informant  
 Will you tell me about your organisation (mandate, main activities, issues, intended 
beneficiaries, funders)? 
 What is your position? What does it entail? How long have you been involved?  
Typhoon Sendong: organisational involvement 
 What did your organisation do in the hours, days, weeks and months after Sendong? 
Why?  
 Did you offer any livelihoods-related activities or programs? Explain. 
 Where did you work (list barangays)? Why? 
 Who were the beneficiaries of your work? 
 How long have they lived at their pre-Sendong houses? 
 Pre-Sendong, where did these people typically live? Work? Go? Post-Sendong? Describe 
their trajectories. 
 Which other organisations or groups did your organisation work with?  
 When did your Sendong work start and end? 
 Were any of your staff personally affected by Sendong? 
 How did you fund your Sendong work? 
Typhoon Sendong: personal experience and knowledge  
 Apart from the people your organisation targeted, who else was affected by Sendong? 
 Which other areas (locations) were affected by Typhoon Sendong? 
 Who lives / works / goes to these areas? What do people do there? 
 Who doesn’t go to these places? Why (not)? (prompt with gender and religion question, if 
necessary) 
 Where else did people go post-Sendong?  
 Were any links made between climate change and Sendong? 
 Are you aware of any new livelihood opportunities that were created post-Sendong? If so, 
who participated? (prompt with gender and religion question, if necessary) 
 What else should I know about Sendong and people’s experiences? (prompt with gender 
and religion question, if necessary) 
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 Where can I obtain data/statistics, reports and maps on: evacuation centres, population 
movements, relief and aid programs, donors, etc.? 
Contextual information about CDO, migration and settlement 
 When did the migration pressures arise in CDO? Why? Where were the migrants coming 
from? 
 Who settles where? What do they build?  
 Where did the poor used to settle? Where do they settle now? 
 How have stakeholders X, Y and Z affected where people live and work? 
 
Vulnerability 
 Who are the most vulnerable groups of people? What makes them vulnerable? (prompts, 
if necessary)  
 Are these vulnerable people also the ones most affected by Sendong? If not, who are the 
most vulnerable groups of people affected by Sendong? 
 How can I reach these people? 
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Example of a survivor interview question guide 
I’m a PhD researcher from the University of Montreal in Canada. I’m interested in the migration experiences of 
people affected by Typhoon Sendong in and around Cagayan De Oro. In particular, I am interested in the changes 
in people’s livelihoods since December 2011. 
I’d like to ask you some general information questions and also about your experiences post-Sendong. If you want 
to end the interview at any time, just say so. All information you share will be kept confidential. 
Demographic information for interviewee and other members of their household 
 Name, pseudonym, age, sex, gender, gender, ethnicity, family status, faith, education 
 Address on 16 December 2011 
 
Pre-Sending migration experiences 
 Original home(s), other destination(s), reasons for migration, timing 
 
Livelihood history of interviewee and household members (including OFW)  
 Livelihood, job history, +/- of livelihood, why start/stop this livelihood 
 Employment status, work hours, days per week  
 Income, type of remuneration, pay income taxes, receive employee benefits  
 Training (where, when, sponsored) 
 Livelihood location, distance and time between job-home, commute mode and cost 
  
Vulnerabilities and assets at household level – Pre-Sendong, post-Sendong (evacuation period, 
transitional housing and current) 
 Monthly/annual income and expenses 
 Debts and liabilities 
 Access to credit (e.g. 5/6 loans) 
 Physical household assets (e.g. house, electricity, running water, furniture, car, phone, 
electronics, jewellery, etc.) 
 Physical livelihood assets (equipment, land, etc.) – access and/or control over 
 Support to or from OFW 
 Support to or from other family members, friends, others 
 Savings or investments 
 Insurance (health, house, etc.) 
 Pre-arranged, pre-paid funeral arrangements 
 Security of living situation (human risks and natural hazards) 
 # meals per day 
 Experience with violence (verbal, sexual, physical, etc. – domestic, work, state, etc.) 
 Health status 
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Please tell me about the places you’d go on a daily, weekly, monthly and annual basis pre-
Sendong – for living/sleeping, for work/livelihoods, for religious, recreational and activism 
activities. Why these places?  
Please tell me about the places you went when Sendong occurred.  
Please tell me about the places you went in the first few days after Sendong.  
Please tell me about the places you went in the first few weeks after Sendong occurred a daily, 
weekly and monthly basis.  
Please tell me about the places you went in the first few months after Sendong occurred a daily, 
weekly and monthly basis. Why these places?  
Please tell me about the places you go now on a daily, weekly and monthly basis.  
Please elaborate on your experiences during and after Sendong – for living/sleeping, for 
work/livelihoods, for religious, recreational and activism activities, and for Sendong relief and 
recovery. (E.g. who went to these places with you? Who didn’t go with you? Why (not)? Why did 
you go to these particular places? What were the other options? How long did you stay at these 
places? Who cared for the other members of your household during this time? What happened to 
your belongings?) 
You listed …………as (one of) your livelihood(s) post Sendong. Please elaborate. (E.g. how did 
you support yourself/ your household? What happened to your livelihood? How did you obtain 
food, shelter, money, etc.? Aware of livelihood trainings or cash for work programs available? 
Participate? Why (not)? Other post-Sending livelihood options? 
Are you interested in participating in the focus group discussion and/or the video component of 
the research project? 
Who would you recommend I speak with? How can I reach them? 
Do you have any questions for the research team? 
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Annex 3. Focus group discussion guidelines 
Introductory Workshop 
This workshop with Sendong survivors aims to (1) introduce the research and research team, (2) identify livelihoods 
and generally characterise changes pre and post Sendong, (3) identify and characterise the places people went post 
Sendong, (4) find out how workshop participants define vulnerability. 
Workshop schedule and activities: 
1. Opening activities (30 min) 
a. Opening prayer (most of the meetings I’ve attended here open and close with a prayer) 
and thank participants for coming – (2 min) 
b. Logistics (timetable, CR location, etc.) - (5 min) 
c. Introduce research, research team, today’s activities. (5 min) 
Christine Gibb a PhD researcher from the University of Montreal in Canada. I’m interested in the migration 
experiences of people affected by Typhoon Sendong in and around Cagayan De Oro. In particular, I am interested 
in the changes in people’s livelihoods since December 2011. Kuki Musngni is part of the research team; she’s 
helping with translation during today’s workshop and interviews later on. 
Today, we’ll be asking you about (1) your livelihoods, and the changes in your livelihoods since Sendong, (2) the 
places you went after Sendong – for living, for work/livelihoods, for disaster relief, for recreational/religious 
activities, and for activism purposes, and (3) which groups are the most vulnerable after Sendong. The results of the 
workshop and the other research activities (e.g. interviews and participatory video) will be used for Chris’ PhD 
dissertation.  Copies of the research reports will be given to groups in CDO and Manila. There is no project or 
funding that is associated with this research project. 
d. Note on confidentiality, participation and withdrawal from research  (2 min) 
Your participation in this research consists of sharing your migratory experiences during and after 
Sendong. The information you share will be kept confidential. The information will be coded so 
that only the primary researcher can identify individual participants. Your participation is entirely 
voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the research at any point and to ask that any information 
you share not be included in the research. 
 
e. Go around the room and everyone introduce themselves and say (1) one thing they do 
for their livelihood, and (2) the barangay in which they lived pre-Sendong. (15-20 min) 
 
2. Livelihoods theme (60 min) 
a. As a large group, do a brainstorm (list) of all the types of livelihoods of people living in 
the community. Write the list on flipchart paper. (5 min)  
b. Break into livelihood-based groups. Each group discusses the following questions: (20 
min) 
i. Describe the typical persons doing this livelihood (age, male/female, marital status, 
level of education, religion, economic status)? 
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ii. What is the daily/weekly/monthly/annual wage of someone with this livelihood? 
iii. Is this livelihood secure? Why or why not? 
iv. Where is the location of this livelihood? How much time does it take to get from 
home to work? How much does it cost? What mode of transportation is used to get 
there? 
v. Describe what happened to this livelihood during and after Sendong. For example, 
did the livelihood offer more or less employment to people? Did people have to 
take time off? Were new jobs created? Did the pay increase, decrease or stay the 
same?  
c. Each group reports back to the larger group (20 min) 
d. Individuals comment on other groups (10 min) 
 
3. Merienda (snack) break 
 
4. Places theme (90 min) 
a. As a large group, do a brainstorm (list) of all the places people went during and after 
Sendong. Write each place on flipchart paper. (10 min)  
b. Break into 4 small groups. Each group discusses 1 of the following questions: (30 min) 
i. Where did people go for “living” and “sleeping” immediately after Sendong and in 
the days, weeks and months after Sendong?  
1. Draw it out like a timeline  
2. Why did you go to each of these places? 
3. Describe the profile of the people who went to these places (age, sex, marital 
status, level of education, religion, economic status).  
4. Who did not go to these places? 
ii. Where did people go for “relief” and “recovery” needs immediately after Sendong 
and in the days, weeks and months after Sendong? (same 4 points as “living” and 
“sleeping” question) 
iii. Where did people go for “work” and “livelihoods” immediately after Sendong and 
in the days, weeks and months after Sendong? (same 4 points as “living” and 
“sleeping” question) 
iv. Where did people go for “recreational” and “religious” and “activism” activities 
immediately after Sendong and in the days, weeks and months after Sendong? 
(same 4 points as “living” and “sleeping” question) 
c. Each group reports back to the larger group (20 min) 
d. Individuals comment on other groups (10 min) 
 
5. Lunch (reimburse participants for travel costs) 
 
6. Vulnerability theme (60 min) 
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a. As a large group, do a brainstorm (list) of all the types of people who are most affected 
by disasters. Write the list on flipchart paper. (5 min)  
b. Break into 3 small groups. Each group discusses 1 of the following questions: (20 min) 
i. For each group (type of person), describe the reasons why they are “vulnerable”? 
ii. For each group (type of person), describe their assets (e.g. skills, abilities, 
knowledge, physical possessions, social networks, land, etc.)? 
iii. You’ve listed vulnerable groups that you – the survivors of Sendong – know to be 
vulnerable. Compare your list to the groups of people the government, religious 
groups, relief agencies and NGOs define as vulnerable. If there are any differences 
between lists, why are there differences? 
c. Each group reports back to the larger group (20 min) 
d. Individuals comment on other groups (10 min) 
 
7. Closing (5 min) 
a. Invite participants to volunteer for a longer individual or household semi-structured 
interview about their personal experiences, and indicate if they want to participate in the 
video-making component (take down names afterwards) (3 min) 
b. Thank participants for their participation and closing prayer (2 min) 
